Recurring concern

Unreliable communication and understanding of emergency policies and procedures

Pin Get email alerts Request correction

First reported 8 Jan 2016•Latest report 18 Mar 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of the dedicated process for communicating, acknowledging, maintaining understanding of and applying emergency policies and procedures, including local variation, staff receipt and comprehension, acknowledgement controls and assurance that personnel know which emergency procedures apply.

Not included

  • Excludes generic staff training, communication or documentation deficiencies unless they directly concern emergency policies and procedures.
  • Excludes failures in the substantive design or clinical adequacy of an emergency procedure where communication, understanding or application is not the shared unsafe condition.
  • Excludes non-emergency policies and procedures unless the report explicitly links them to the same emergency-policy communication and understanding process.
  • Excludes operational failures occurring after personnel have reliably received, understood and applied the applicable emergency policies and procedures.
Reports
11

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
11

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2016–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
15

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

HM Prison and Probation Service2
Alton Towers Resort1
Care Quality Commission1
Care UK1
College of Policing1
Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly Safeguarding Adults Board1
Drayton Manor Resort1
Dyfed-Powys Police1
Leeds City Council1
LEGOLAND Windsor Resort1
Lightwater Valley Family Adventure Park1
London Ambulance Service NHS Trust1
Merlin Entertainments Limited1
Metropolitan Police Service1
Musgrove Park Hospital1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    Julie Anne Pytches · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Julie Anne Pytches died on 14 October 2023 during elective spinal surgery after suffering a covert probable arterial bleed, major haemorrhage and cardiac arrest while prone in the operating theatre. The report identifies concerns about emergency protocols, staff understanding and training, communication of clinicians’ practice limitations, and uncertainty about ambulance attendance and possible transfer to a tertiary centre.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure consultants understand locally varying emergency policies and procedures

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) Mrs Pytches suffered a major haemorrhage whilst undergoing spinal surgery and there was confusion about the protocol and procedures at the hospital. Consultants with practising privileges in this private healthcare organisation were not all aware of policies and emergency procedures required and these are subject to local variation within the Group organisation across the country. Doctors may have practising privileges in more than one hospital that may cause confusion as to what is required in individual hospitals within the Group. There is assurance that Consultants are required to acknowledge they have read policies, however this does not mean this local variation is clear particularly for a less frequently occurring emergency life-threatening event. ”

    Source location

    Julie Anne Pytches · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Operate MyStaff as a centralised platform for accessible Group and local policies, update alerts and critical-policy readership analytics.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Nuffield has implemented MyStaff, a centralised policy management system providing real-time access to Group-level and local policies via desktop and secure mobile application. We are the first independent provider to have done this. This ensures policies are more accessible at the point of care and that users are alerted when documents are updated. Phase 1 (launched November 2025) migrated all Group policies and associated documents to the platform. Phase 2 (launched April 2026) introduced analytics to monitor readership of critical policies, strengthening assurance and enabling targeted follow-up. All staff and Consultants have 24/7 access to policies via the MyStaff app (on and off site).”

    Source location

    Response from Nuffield Health
    Page 5 · response
    Published 26 March 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use policy-access and readership analytics to assure Consultant and staff engagement with critical emergency documentation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Further actions across Nuffield Health:”

    Source location

    Response from Nuffield Health
    Page 6 · response
    Published 26 March 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Maintain recurring major-haemorrhage and emergency scenario training, including escalation, blood-supply, role-clarity, documentation and transfer exercises.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Emergency reference guides are consistently available across all departments and include guidance for cardiac arrest and major haemorrhage in line with Nuffield Health Policy CL71 Medical Emergencies and Resuscitation Council guidelines. The availability, accessibility and use of these guides are routinely reviewed and reinforced through regular emergency scenario training and simulations to ensure staff familiarity and effective application in practice. Laminated emergency algorithms, including adult major haemorrhage pathways, are located on resuscitation trolleys and in key clinical areas.”

    Source location

    Response from Nuffield Health
    Page 5 · response
    Published 26 March 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update induction and practising-privileges renewal checklists to cover MyStaff access and locating local emergency policies.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Further actions across Nuffield Health:”

    Source location

    Response from Nuffield Health
    Page 6 · response
    Published 26 March 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Monitor emergency training compliance, emergency-document availability, MyStaff policy access and scenario outcomes through audit and governance processes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Ongoing monitoring will be undertaken through existing audit and assurance processes, including Interim Quality Assurance Report requirements, scenario dashboards, and governance reviews.”

    Source location

    Response from Nuffield Health
    Page 8 · response
    Published 26 March 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Regulation 28 concerns did not contribute to the patient’s death.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “HM Coroner specifically noted that the Regulation 28 concerns did not contribute to this patient death.”

    Source location

    Response from Nuffield Health
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 March 2026

    Open published response
  2. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Sean Perry WILLIAMS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Sean Williams died in the back of a Serco van outside Thames Magistrates’ Court after suffering a fit during transport and then a cardiac arrest. Concerns included gaps in his custody healthcare assessment and treatment, inadequate Serco first-aid training and competence assessment, failure to provide timely first aid, unclear emergency procedures, and insufficient emphasis on preserving life.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to operate and provide clear guidance on emergency button procedures

    Wider context from the report

    “For the MPS The MPS had already recognised before inquest that, following Mr Williams’ detention, he was not seen by a custody nurse for 23 hours. However, there was another sub optimal element of his care that did not appear to have been identified. The custody nurse who reviewed Mr Williams on two separate occasions in the twelve hours immediately before he attended court, did not on the second occasion take any observations of Mr Williams’ vital signs before (or after) prescribing dihydrocodeine, and did not record any part of Mr Williams’ clinical picture. Despite having prescribed dihydrocodeine for drug withdrawal, when giving evidence in court the nurse was unable to describe the signs and symptoms of withdrawal. For Serco By 18.11 hours, the Serco van that was transporting Mr Williams had returned to the court car park entrance and the driver had got out of the cab and into the back of the van. At that point, neither the escort nor the driver opened the door to Mr Williams’ cell to administer first aid - at the very least to relieve his slumped, squashed position to try to deal with any potential airway obstruction. At 18.15 hours when he stopped showing any signs of life, they still did not open his door. They only opened his door at 18.23 hours, removing him from the cell at 18.24 hours, and administering chest compressions at 18.25 hours. The driver did not press the emergency button in the cab to alert the operations control centre of the situation. The Serco crew did call the London Ambulance Service from the van, but were unable to give the postcode of their location. I put it to the Serco driver that the focus of the two Serco crew members seemed to be on talking to the three other prisoners in their cells, on phone calls, in fact on anything except getting Mr Williams out of his cell to see if the crew could help him. The driver agreed. The Serco driver eventually administered chest compressions but could not face giving rescue breaths. He seemed to have forgotten that he had a face guard hanging from his belt. Despite evidence from Serco that they were satisfied with the first aid training that was given to the two officers, the jury found that: - the Serco first aid training was inadequate; - it did not include a video of a seizure; - it did not sufficiently emphasise the urgency of potentially life saving measures such as use of the recovery position; - the Serco assessment of the first aid knowledge and competence of its staff was inadequate; - Serco failed to provide clear guidance on the emergency button procedures; - Serco’s policy appeared to conflict with its training slides about whether staff should or are even permitted to drive a casualty direct to hospital; - Serco gave insufficient emphasis on urgency and the paramount importance of preserving life. ”

    Source location

    Sean Perry WILLIAMS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop and display an OCC emergency flowchart with structured prompt questions at controller desks to standardise alarm-activation responses.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Serco has also developed a corresponding flowchart for the OCC to reflect that provided to PCOs, together with structured prompt questions to assist OCC controllers in identifying the nature of an emergency and providing appropriate support and direction to PCOs when an incident occurs. A copy of the OCC flowchart has also been provided.”

    Source location

    Response from Serco
    Page 4 · response
    Published 24 February 2026

    Open published response
  3. Devon, Plymouth and Torbay

    AI-generated summary

    Daisy May McCoy · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Daisy May McCoy was born by Caesarean section on 9 February 2022 after reduced and unusual foetal movement was reported, and died in a children’s hospice on 22 February 2022 following a brain injury and peri-natal asphyxia. The report identified concerns about recognising foetal compromise, communication and escalation between staff, staffing and consultant attendance, professional challenge, and the adequacy and implementation of relevant policies and training.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of understanding and implementation of policies for additional staffing during high acuity or emergency situations

    Wider context from the report

    “5. A lack of understanding and implementation of the polices that additional staffing in times of high acuity or other emergency situations which if left unaddressed may leave patient safety compromised. ”

    Source location

    Daisy May McCoy · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Launch and implement the OPEL Framework and Escalating Clinical Concerns Charter.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As part of the maternity and neonatal improvement work following the CQC Maternity inspections, SFT Maternity have launched and implemented a Maternity Operational Pressures Escalation Levels (OPEL) Framework including the embedding of a new Escalating Clinical Concerns Charter. This charter supports all members of staff with a framework of escalation in the event of any clinical concern. The charter provides clear communication and escalation routes based on the “Each Baby Counts” Learn and Support escalation toolkit (RCOG, RCM) and aims to:”

    Source location

    Response from Somerset NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 August 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement the South West Labour Ward Framework.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The service has also implemented the South West Labour Ward framework which is a regional strategy for improving services across the South West. The framework provides a structured approach for the safe and high-quality management of a labour ward, focusing on workforce development for roles like labour ward coordinators, leadership, and maternity support workers, many of which we already have in place as part of our service development. The framework outlines key goals and domains, such as education and training, clinical practice, and leadership, to ensure consistent and compassionate care for women and babies, improve outcomes, and support the ongoing professional growth of staff within the maternity setting.”

    Source location

    Response from Somerset NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 6 August 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce a seven-day Flow Midwife service and Senior Midwife On Call support for acuity-related staffing risk and escalation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As well as the implementations described above, the trust has introduced a “Flow” Midwife 7 days per week. The Flow midwife’s role is to provide a helicopter view of services both within the acute unit and in the community to ensure effective use of staff and to support mitigation of any risk in the event of high acuity or activity. Out of hours, the service is supported by a Senior Midwife On Call rota to provide senior advice, support and escalation to the wider trust where necessary.”

    Source location

    Response from Somerset NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 6 August 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Increase and refresh the midwifery and maternity support worker establishment to improve rota cover and workforce deployment.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Following a full maternity staffing review (November 2024) the midwifery and maternity support worker staffing establishment has been increased to support effective workforce rota cover for all maternity areas. Since the temporary closure of YDH services, this staffing template has been reviewed and refreshed to support effective deployment of staff across all areas to mitigate the impact of the additional activity on the MPH acute site.”

    Source location

    Response from Somerset NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 6 August 2025

    Open published response
  4. East Sussex

    AI-generated summary

    Stephen COSTER · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Stephen Coster died from meningoencephalitis owing to Streptococcus pneumoniae after becoming seriously unwell while detained at HMP Lewes. The inquest found delays in providing treatment and transferring him to hospital, with concerns including inadequate observations and assessment, poor record keeping, failures to escalate, and breakdowns in communication and leadership between prison and healthcare staff.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequate understanding among prison staff of the local policy for emergency hospital transfer with retrospective risk assessment

    Wider context from the report

    “f. An inadequate understanding amongst prison staff about the local policy to transfer emergency cases to hospital with a retrospective risk assessment. ”

    Source location

    Stephen COSTER · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Actively review the emergency-escort policy.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Custodial Managers have the authority to dispatch an emergency escort without the relevant risk assessment where the life of a prisoner is in danger. The Local Operating Procedure for Hospital Escorts and Bedwatches refers to escorts being dispatched without the relevant risk assessment where there is an ‘emergency.’ The policy on emergency escorts as a whole is being actively reviewed.”

    Source location

    Response from HM Prison and Probation Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 20 March 2024

    Open published response
  5. Sefton, St Helens and Knowsley

    AI-generated summary

    Wayne MILNE · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Wayne Milne attended hospital with chest pain on 28 February 2022 but was discharged without required chest-pain assessments and senior review. On 2 March 2022, after reporting further symptoms to his GP practice, he was advised to attend the emergency department, but the nurse did not call 999, escalate to a doctor, or check whether he had obtained urgent care; Wayne was later found deceased at home from haemopericardium due to a dissecting aortic aneurysm. The report identifies concerns about inconsistent procedures for summoning emergency assistance, escalation and follow-up, and awareness of dissecting aortic aneurysm within the practice.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to apply the emergency-calling procedure consistently across practice staff

    Wider context from the report

    “2. The nurse at the practice told the Inquest, the procedure for practice staff calling 999 (not leaving it to the patient) in the event of a patient with chest pain and other life threatening conditions applied only to reception staff and not to nursing staff. This led to inconsistency and in this case an avoidable delay in summoning urgent medical assistance and needs reviewing/all staff working in/working on behalf of the practice need to be aware of the procedure to be followed, consideration must be given as to whether it is appropriate to have different standards for qualified nursing and administrative/non qualified nursing staff. The awareness of Dissecting Aortic Aneurysm and the rapidity at which the condition can become catastrophic/fatal also needs raising within the practice. The nurse within the practice who spoke with Wayne on the date of his death on behalf of the practice , did not escalate to a doctor, did not call 999, she did not inform the NOK of her concerns, she did not call back to see if Wayne had called for an ambulance/attended hospital and she did not alert the hospital of her suspicions i.e. differential diagnoses including; PE, cardiac related problem or aortic aneurysm. The GP to whom this regulation 28 (Prevention of Future death) report is addressed informed the court (in a witness statement) no action had been taken within the practice since these events. ”

    Source location

    Wayne MILNE · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  6. Staffordshire South

    AI-generated summary

    Evha Jannath · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Evha Jannath, aged 11, fell into deep water during a water rapids ride at Drayton Manor Theme Park after being projected from a boat and later falling from a wet conveyor belt. She was located and recovered after 18 minutes. The principal concerns included inadequate CCTV monitoring, lack of safety warnings, worn or incomplete signage, insufficient water-rescue training and equipment, and unclear emergency procedures.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of ride operators to understand water-entry emergency procedures

    Wider context from the report

    “(5) Ride operators had no clear understanding of the emergency procedure to be followed if a guest fell into the water. ”

    Source location

    Evha Jannath · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  7. West Yorkshire Eastern

    AI-generated summary

    Joshua Lee Edwards · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Joshua Lee Edwards, aged 19, became unwell in Leeds after taking ecstasy and cocaine and died in hospital on 15 May 2017 despite treatment. The ambulance was delayed by road closures for the Leeds 10K run, and concerns were raised that repeated calls from police did not lead to escalation and that ambulance crews were unclear about crossing road-closure signs in an emergency.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure ambulance crews understand emergency authority to cross road closure signs

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) Evidence taken at the Inquest indicated that ambulance crews were unclear as to whether they were entitled to cross ‘road closure’ signs in an emergency. Clarification of the Ambulance Service authority to do so in an emergency has been given, but has not yet been circulated to all ambulance crews. This needs to be done on the morning of such events. Ambulance crews should be reminded of this power by way of a refresher briefing. Similar considerations arise in relation to the Fire and Rescue Service. ”

    Source location

    Joshua Lee Edwards · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Ambulance crews do not need event-morning briefings because Emergency Operations Centre directions provide the most appropriate response information at the time.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “These actions taken by the Ambulance Service provide a more secure outcome than simply briefing the Ambulance crews on the morning of the event. Ambulance crews may become available to respond to emergencies during shift changes or brought to the location from outside of the area at short notice. Individual response direction from the Emergency Operations Centre will ensure that crews are informed of the most appropriate response at the time in a more holistic way.”

    Source location

    2018-0335-Response-by-Leeds-City-Council
    Page 2 · response
    Published 2 March 2019

    Open published response
  8. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Kamal Yahyia AL-HIRSI · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Kamal Yahyia AL-HIRSI, a cleaner at a London health club, suffered a cardiac arrhythmia and slipped beneath the water while cleaning the swimming pool on 10 October 2017. Resuscitation attempts were too late to change the outcome. Concerns included dangerous pool-cleaning practices, inadequate water-safety and defibrillator training, ineffective emergency alarms and communication, limited CCTV coverage, and procedures that remained substantially unchanged ten months after his death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure the duty manager reads the standard operating procedures and emergency action plan

    Wider context from the report

    “10. The written procedures did not detail the action that should be taken on noting a bather in difficulty; they talked about RLSS (Royal Life Saving Society) techniques being used but these were never taught; and the duty manager at the time gave evidence that he did not ever remember reading the standard operating procedures or emergency action plan. Of particular concern to me is that, ten months following Mr Al-Hirsi’s death, many of these practices remain entirely unchanged. For example, evidence was heard that no thought has been given to obtaining another camera; no thought to moving the CCTV monitor; and no thought to giving the staff water safety awareness training. Some refresher training is being given, but this was only started two weeks before the inquest began on Monday, and still no consideration has been given to including the freelance personal trainer (whose response to Mr Al-Hirsi was immediate and effective) in training regarding health and safety procedures within the club. ”

    Source location

    Kamal Yahyia AL-HIRSI · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review emergency action procedures and conduct regular documented drills covering multiple emergencies.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As noted above, the Company requires all of its new and existing employees to undertake a documented Workplace Induction Checklist, where they will be given a guided tour of their site to ensure that they are aware of the location and use of the building’s emergency and life saving apparatus. The Company will also review its Emergency Action Procedures (“EAP”) and ensure that its employees participate in regular documented drills. The Company’s new Health & Safety Compliance Manager will audit these centrally on a quarterly basis from 1 October 2018.”

    Source location

    2018-0265-Response-by-Bannatyne-Fitness-Limited
    Page 2 · response
    Published 11 October 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Centrally audit emergency procedures and documented drills quarterly.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As noted above, the Company requires all of its new and existing employees to undertake a documented Workplace Induction Checklist, where they will be given a guided tour of their site to ensure that they are aware of the location and use of the building’s emergency and life saving apparatus. The Company will also review its Emergency Action Procedures (“EAP”) and ensure that its employees participate in regular documented drills. The Company’s new Health & Safety Compliance Manager will audit these centrally on a quarterly basis from 1 October 2018.”

    Source location

    2018-0265-Response-by-Bannatyne-Fitness-Limited
    Page 2 · response
    Published 11 October 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Changes to policies and procedures were deferred pending the inquest and investigations by the Metropolitan Police and London Borough of Camden.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Pending the outcome of the inquest, and investigations by the Metropolitan Police and the London Borough of Camden, the Company was advised not make any changes to its policies and procedures. Changes will now be implemented at both Maida Vale and across the Company where necessary, in the light of the concerns that have been raised.”

    Source location

    2018-0265-Response-by-Bannatyne-Fitness-Limited
    Page 5 · response
    Published 11 October 2018

    Open published response
  9. Wiltshire and Swindon

    AI-generated summary

    Eugeniusz Niedziolko · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Eugeniusz Niedziolko, who was heavily intoxicated and vulnerable, was left alone in an unheated public lavatory after police and ambulance staff decided he did not require hospital care. He was found unresponsive several hours later and died from acute alcohol toxicity and hypothermia. The report identifies concerns about failures to follow protocols, assess and communicate critical information, provide appropriate training, and consider available options for keeping him safe and monitored.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to verify receipt and understanding of critical policies and procedures

    Wider context from the report

    “d) COMMUNICATION OF POLICY AND PROCEDURE I am aware that following this incident the 2009 Agreement between the Hospitals, Ambulance Trust and Wiltshire Police as regards the assessment of people who appear to be drunk and need of medical assessment was circulated. A newer agreement was also subsequently entered into in June 2017. I am surprised and concerned that even now front-line officers, who gave evidence, were unaware of either of these 2 agreements. It would appear that important communications are being sent out but that there is no effective system in place to check that the important information is received and more importantly is understood. This also applies to e-learning which is capable of abuse if the same questions are asked at the end of modules. Interestingly, I heard from Consultant Paramedic, ████████ that in relation to their e-learning systems random questions are asked at the end of e-learning modules in an attempt to overcome the risk of abuse. I fully appreciate that front line officers are under huge amounts of pressure with increasing workloads and less resources but my fear is that there will be a repeat of this incident and other issues arising that may lead to a death occurring through the lack of effective communication of policies and procedures which, at the end of the day, are designed to guide front line personnel and ultimately protect them. With busy workloads, an expectation that these documents will be read is unrealistic and arguably idealistic. ”

    Source location

    Eugeniusz Niedziolko · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
  10. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Samuel Rodney Darren BLAIR · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Rodney Blair, who had a history of paranoid schizophrenia, alcohol dependency, multiple drug use and depression, was remanded in custody at HM Prison Pentonville and was found hanging in his cell on 2 August 2015. The inquest concluded that his death was suicide, with several contributing factors. Concerns included gaps in assessment and management of his mental health and antidepressant treatment, and delays and procedural issues in the prison emergency response.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inconsistent understanding of prison healthcare emergency procedures

    Wider context from the report

    “9. That nurse gave a description of the code blue and code red system of describing an emergency, that was markedly different from the understanding given by the prison governor and the London Ambulance Service. I heard that the codes blue and red are even described on posters within the prison. It therefore appears that a nurse within the prison healthcare team has the wrong understanding of basic prison healthcare emergency procedures. ”

    Source location

    Samuel Rodney Darren BLAIR · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue working with the healthcare provider to ensure staff understand the steps required when responding to emergency calls.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “This report also brings to the attention of the Governor the inadequate response of a nurse to the emergency call from the control room. As you point out in your report, the local protocol on action to be taken in response to emergency response codes is well publicised throughout the prison. The prison will continue to work with the healthcare provider to ensure that all staff are aware of the steps that they are required to take when responding to an emergency call.”

    Source location

    2016-0196-Response-by-NOMS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 May 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement the emergency-procedure actions outlined in the action table for all healthcare staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Response & Actions:”

    Source location

    2016-0196-Response-by-Care-Uk
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 May 2016

    Open published response
Back to top

Data last updated 7 September 2026