Recurring concern

Unreliable formal safety-incident management processes

Pin Get email alerts Request correction

First reported 29 May 2013•Latest report 10 Mar 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of a formal organisational safety-incident or serious-incident management framework, including incident identification, grading, coordination, investigation, monitoring and control.

Not included

  • Excludes failures limited to implementing corrective actions after incident learning has already been established.
  • Excludes generic organisational learning, governance or incident-reporting deficiencies where no serious-incident management process is identified.
  • Excludes the underlying clinical or operational hazard and failures in ordinary care that are not part of serious-incident management.
  • Excludes investigations concerning deaths, complaints, crime or regulatory matters where the reported concern is not the management of a serious or untoward incident.
  • Excludes operational emergency-response, rescue and event-planning protocols that are not part of a formal organisational safety-incident management framework.
Reports
103

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
129

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
182

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care16
Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust10
NHS England10
Care Quality Commission9
Barts Health NHS Trust5
Tees, Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust5
East London NHS Foundation Trust3
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust3
Midlands Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust3
Tameside and Glossop Integrated Care NHS Foundation Trust3
General Medical Council2
Great Western Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust2
Leicestershire Partnership NHS Trust2
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence2
Norfolk and Suffolk NHS Foundation Trust2

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. East London

    AI-generated summary

    John Ioannou · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    John Ioannou, a 61-year-old non-verbal man receiving 24-hour residential care, died after a cardiac arrest on 24 June 2025 following treatment for a problem with his PEG apparatus. An autopsy identified an infection at the PEG site that spread to his small intestine and caused peritonitis. The principal concerns were that the death was not investigated under NHS England’s Patient Safety Framework, and that the cause and timing of the infection and possible communication failures were not fully explored.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to investigate the case under the Patient Safety Framework

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The Barts Health Trust chose not to investigate this case as part of NHS England’s Patient Safety Framework. Mr Ioannou’s death ought to have been subject to such an investigation. Firstly, despite an autopsy, the aetiology and precise timing of Mr Ioannou’s fatal infection was not fully understood. In a functioning clinical governance setting, both the possibility of the trust having missed a pre-existing infection at the time of the treatment on 23rd June 2025 or the prospect that the treatment itself caused the infection should have been explored. Secondly, in the context of the treatment of a patient with a profound learning disability where communication failures may have contributed to poor care, a valuable learning opportunity was missed. ”

    Source location

    John Ioannou · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  2. East London

    AI-generated summary

    Sheila Creagan · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Sheila Creagan, an 81-year-old woman with heart failure, underwent emergency abdominal surgery in February 2025 and was later admitted with breathing difficulties, anaemia and a suspected gastrointestinal bleed. She died in hospital on 17 March 2025; the inquest determined that untreated and undiagnosed infective endocarditis caused her death. Concerns included the failure to investigate the source of her worsening infection, the missed diagnosis of infective endocarditis, inadequate monitoring of her heart failure, and the decision not to conduct a Patient Safety Framework investigation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to investigate deaths under the Patient Safety Framework

    Wider context from the report

    “1. BHRUT chose not to investigate this case as part of NHS England’s Patient Safety Framework. Mrs Creagan’s death ought to have been subject to such an investigation. Decisions were reached at two clinical governance meetings that meaningful learning could not flow from a governance investigation into the circumstances of Mrs Creagan’s care. Such decisions appear to be incongruous with; a. The inaccurate cause of death initially offered by the Trust, b. The failure to investigate the seat of Mrs Creagan’s burgeoning infection after her pneumonia resolved. c. The missed diagnosis of infective endocarditis, d. The failure to monitor the development of Mrs Creagan’s heart failure during her inpatient treatment. ”

    Source location

    Sheila Creagan · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Operate the Coroner’s Case Review Meeting as a formal governance mechanism for multidisciplinary oversight of inquest and coronial cases.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To have good governance process to support these decisions, HM Coroner will be aware that the Trust has now established a Coroner’s Case Review Meeting (CCRM) as part of its formal coronial governance arrangements.”

    Source location

    Response from Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 18 March 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require multidisciplinary clinical review of relevant coronial cases, including cases involving concerns about diagnosis, deterioration, monitoring, treatment or missed opportunities.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust has reflected carefully on the concern expressed in the Report that meaningful learning should have flowed from the circumstances of Mrs Creegan’s care. We accept the need to demonstrate clearly, in coronial cases, that learning is being actively pursued and is not dependent on PSIRF alone. Our revised approach is that coronial cases of this nature will be considered through the CCRM and, where relevant, alongside other existing review methodologies so that there is explicit multidisciplinary scrutiny, clear senior clinical oversight, and a documented record of the Trust’s appraisal of the care and the resulting actions.”

    Source location

    Response from Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 18 March 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use multiple review routes, including MDT, mortality, complaints, clinician reflection and CCRM reviews, rather than relying solely on PSIRF.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust agrees that learning should not be constrained by whether a case meets a particular PSIRF learning response threshold. In these cases, a number of review methods have been, and continue to be, used to examine the care provided and identify learning. These include:”

    Source location

    Response from Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 18 March 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Clarify in governance arrangements that PSIRF is one learning mechanism and not the Trust’s sole route for reviewing deaths or responding to coronial concerns.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Clarification within governance arrangements that PSIRF is one mechanism for learning, but not the sole route by which the Trust reviews deaths, identifies learning, or responds to coronial concerns.”

    Source location

    Response from Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 18 March 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    BHRUT is responsible for responding to the broader concerns raised about Mrs Creegan’s care and the application of PSIRF.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In preparing this response, my officials have made enquiries with NHS England and the Care Quality Commission (CQC) to ensure we adequately address your concerns on PSIRF. I note you have also copied your report to Barking, Havering, and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust (BHRUT) who will respond to the broader concerns you have raised.”

    Source location

    Response from Department of Health and Social Care
    Page 1 · response
    Published 18 March 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing clinical reviews, mortality review, governance meetings and reflection had identified sufficient learning, so a PSII would not add further learning.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The group was asked to reflect specifically on whether declaring a Patient Safety Incident Investigation (PSII) would have generated additional learning beyond what had already been obtained. A full clinical timeline had already been completed; a Trust Mortality review and the case had been discussed at Trust wide meetings with senior medical representation. Reflective learning was also presented by the Quality and Safety Team to seek clinical colleagues’ views on whether the incident had been managed appropriately by the Quality and Safety Advisor with a focus on ensuring optimal care and outcomes for patients going forward.”

    Source location

    Response from Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust
    Page 5 · response
    Published 18 March 2026

    Open published response
  3. Devon, Plymouth and Torbay

    AI-generated summary

    Linda Brooks · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Linda Brooks, a 78-year-old care-home resident with respiratory and other comorbidities, was admitted after a fall and later died at Torbay Hospital on 17 May 2022. The inquest identified concerns about oxygen being switched off for an unknown period before her death, and about failures to report, investigate, escalate, and record the incident and related Datix referrals.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of understanding of when Serious Incident Reports should be made or actioned retrospectively

    Wider context from the report

    “3. There appears to be a lack of understanding as to when a Serious Incident Report should be made or actioned retrospectively ”

    Source location

    Linda Brooks · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review structured judgement review scores through care-group governance and executive meetings to determine further patient-safety investigation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “These are then reviewed by governance leads in the care group and scored on the DCIQ SJR system, with any scoring 1 or 2 triggering being considered for further investigation. These structured judgment reviews will be considered at the weekly executive review meeting for consideration of a more detailed patient safety review or patient safety incident investigation in line with local and National PSIRF priorities. Effectiveness is monitored by the ME service and care group governance leads via completion of ME reviews and the number/timeliness of DCIQ submissions and SJRs, reviewed weekly at the Executive Incident Review Meeting (EIRM).”

    Source location

    2026-0085 - Response from Torbay and South Devon NHS Trust
    Page 5 · response
    Published 13 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Adopt PSIRF and operate weekly Executive Incident Review Meetings to determine proportionate investigation responses, including retrospective incidents.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To clarify when incidents require investigation (including retrospectively), the Trust has adopted PSIRF and uses a weekly Executive Incident Review Meeting (EIRM) to determine and govern the appropriate response.”

    Source location

    2026-0085 - Response from Torbay and South Devon NHS Trust
    Page 5 · response
    Published 13 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update and publish the Trust PSIRF policy and plan to reflect new patient-safety insight data.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust PSIRF policy and plan is available to access on the internet and was updated in January 2026 following new safety insight data. Effectiveness is monitored by the EIRM through review of all moderate-or-above incidents and confirmation of agreed investigation route and completion, reviewed weekly with actions tracked through care group governance.”

    Source location

    2026-0085 - Response from Torbay and South Devon NHS Trust
    Page 5 · response
    Published 13 February 2026

    Open published response
  4. Shropshire, Telford and Wrekin

    AI-generated summary

    Lynn SILCOCK · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Lynn Silcock was admitted to hospital in September 2022 with symptoms including breathlessness and fatigue, and was diagnosed with aortic stenosis among other conditions. She was discharged without a cardiology referral, appointment or plan, and a gastroscopy report was not followed by a cardiology referral. She died at home on 10 July 2025; the postmortem identified aortic stenosis on a background of bicuspid aortic valve, with myocardial fibrosis. The report raised concerns about communication and document exchange between teams, the absence of an appropriate referral, and the lack of an investigation into what went wrong.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to investigate what went wrong and why between treating and administration teams

    Wider context from the report

    “(4) No investigation by Shrewsbury and Telford NHS Trust as to what went wrong and why between the treating teams and their respective administration teams. ”

    Source location

    Lynn SILCOCK · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct a Patient Safety Incident Investigation into inpatient-to-outpatient referral risks and identify the safest referral system.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The case of Mrs Silcock has been raised as a Patient Safety Investigation (PSII) under the Patient Safety Incident Response framework and some of the initial work of that investigation has been used to inform the response outlined in this letter.”

    Source location

    Response from Shrewsbury and Telford Hospital
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Responsibility for making the cardiology referral lay with the medical inpatient team, not gastroenterology, at discharge.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The possibility of bleeding or malignancy led to the endoscopy investigations being prioritised with cardiology advising these should be completed first then cardiology would continue the process to investigate the aortic stenosis. On review it is clear there was no expectation that the gastroenterology team would be responsible for following up the referral to cardiology once Ms Silcock’s endoscopy investigations were completed.”

    Source location

    Response from Shrewsbury and Telford Hospital
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The concerns fall outside NHS England’s role and remit as a commissioner of certain healthcare services.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The concerns raised in your Report will be dealt with by SATH, to whom your Report has also been addressed, and there is no action for NHS England to take in regard to this matter as the issues fall outside of NHS England’s role and remit as a commissioner of certain healthcare services. However, the following information may be useful to the Coroner as background.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Shrewsbury and Telford Hospital NHS Trust is responsible for addressing the concerns raised in the report.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The concerns raised in your Report will be dealt with by SATH, to whom your Report has also been addressed, and there is no action for NHS England to take in regard to this matter as the issues fall outside of NHS England’s role and remit as a commissioner of certain healthcare services. However, the following information may be useful to the Coroner as background.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response
  5. East London

    AI-generated summary

    Mohan Singh Hothi · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mohan Singh Hothi was admitted to hospital after a fall at home and was found to have a catastrophic subdural haematoma; he died later that day. Concerns included the Trust not investigating two serious injuries from previous unwitnessed falls through its Patient Safety Framework, and vague and incomplete evidence about reflection and remediation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to assess serious unwitnessed falls for investigation through the Patient Safety Framework

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Mohan Singh Hothi died in hospital on 28th March 2025 due to injuries sustained in a fall at home in the early hours of the morning. During a previous hospital admission beginning in February 2025 and concluding on 20th March 2025 Mr Hothi sustained injuries in two separate unwitnessed falls, these injuries were serious (one requiring surgery) but could not be said to have contributed to his death. The two separate incidents were not assessed by the Trust as worthy of investigation through the Patient Safety Framework. This omission gives rise to a concern that future deaths may follow due to an inability on the part of the trust to identify, reflect upon, and remediate sub-optimal practice. 2. Evidence provided by the Trust at inquest to identify that reflection and remediation had been undertaken was vague and incomplete ”

    Source location

    Mohan Singh Hothi · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Discuss every reported fall at weekly Geriatrics Care Group incident reviews, share learning, and assess whether escalation for a wider learning response is required.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. Every reported fall incident is discussed at the weekly Geriatrics Care Group incident review meeting, chaired by the Quality and Safety Advisor, to determine preventability, assess any harm sustained and share learning across the Care Group.”

    Source location

    Response from Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 20 October 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Report all Geriatrics Care Group inpatient falls, including serious-harm incidents, to the Quality Governance and Steering Group and record escalation decisions for Trust Board reporting.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “4. All inpatient falls within the Geriatrics Care Group are reported to the Trust’s Quality Governance and Steering Group (QGSG), with any falls resulting in serious harm detailed. Decisions regarding escalation for a learning response are formally recorded and reported to the Trust Board.”

    Source location

    Response from Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust
    Page 5 · response
    Published 20 October 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The inpatient falls were considered unpreventable, disputing that further investigation would identify preventable sub-optimal practice.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The investigations conducted under incident reference numbers ████████ concluded that both falls were unpreventable. Mr Hothi was assessed as having full mental capacity, displayed no signs of confusion, and was able to understand and follow instructions. Under these circumstances, patients are not provided with constant supervision, as they are deemed capable of communicating their care needs to the nursing staff. Moreover, continuous supervision would require the implementation of a Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards (DoLS) authorisation, for which Mr Hothi did not meet the criteria.”

    Source location

    Response from Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 20 October 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Because the contributing factors were known and understood, no further investigation or learning response was considered necessary.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In accordance with the Patient Safety Incident Review Framework (PSIRF) and the Trust PSIRF plan, incidents are referred for a learning response when the contributing factors are not well understood or when there is potential for significant local or organisational learning. Following the review of incidents ████████, it was determined that the underlying factors were clearly understood – specifically that Mr Hothi chose to mobilise independently without awaiting assistance from nursing staff.”

    Source location

    Response from Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 20 October 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing actions to manage the understood fall risk factors were considered sufficient, so no further investigation was required.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• The factors contributing to Mr Hothi’s falls were known and understood; therefore, no further investigation was required. Ongoing actions to manage these factors were already in place.”

    Source location

    Response from Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 20 October 2025

    Open published response
  6. East London

    AI-generated summary

    Mohammad Ali Asghar · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mohammad Ali Asghar was admitted to hospital with worsening shortness of breath and fluid overload, and later suffered a cardiac arrest after catheter removal following haematuria and clots. The principal concerns were failures in Trust governance and incident-reporting processes, including the failure to identify and investigate the case through the Patient Safety Framework despite concerns about an iatrogenic injury and a court direction for review.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of patient safety governance to identify incidents requiring investigation

    Wider context from the report

    “1. A failure in governance at the Trust meant that this case was not identified as an incident worthy of investigation through the Patient Safety Framework. This omission gives rise to a concern that future deaths may follow due to an inability on the part of the trust to identify, reflect upon, and remediate sub-optimal practice. In this case the trust’s Datix incident reporting system, morbidity and mortality meeting process and PSIRF procedure were inadequate. ”

    Source location

    Mohammad Ali Asghar · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Commission an independent review of governance and PSIRM decision-making for PSIRF learning responses, including PSII criteria and thresholds.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To support this, Barts Health is in the process of commissioning an Independent Review of our governance processes with comprehensive terms of reference which will include review of our decision-making at Patient Safety Incident Review Meeting (PSIRM) relating to the learning responses under PSIRF. This review will examine the criteria and thresholds used to determine when a PSII or alternative learning response is required, ensuring these are clearly defined, consistently applied, and responsive to emerging information or stakeholder concerns.”

    Source location

    Response from Barts Health NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 3 October 2025

    Open published response
  7. East London

    AI-generated summary

    Tony Buengo Jackson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Tony Buengo-Jackson, who had progressive multiple sclerosis and lived in a nursing home, died after a PEG tube inserted on 19 November 2024 passed through his transverse colon, causing bowel perforation, peritonitis and sepsis. The report raises concerns that the injury was not detected until 3 December despite an earlier admission, CT scan and surgical consultation, and that poor records and inadequate Trust governance impeded investigation and learning.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to identify incidents requiring investigation through the Patient Safety Framework

    Wider context from the report

    “4. A failure in governance at the Trust meant that this case was not identified as an incident worthy of investigation through the Patient Safety Framework. This omission gives rise to a concern that future deaths may follow due to an inability on the part of the trust to identify, reflect upon, and remediate sub-optimal practice in this case the trust’s Datix incident reporting system, morbidity and mortality meeting process and PSIRF procedure were inadequate. ”

    Source location

    Tony Buengo Jackson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Issue Trust-wide communication requiring significant or unexpected complications to be recorded on Datix for PSIRF consideration.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• A Trust-wide communication was issued in October 2025 reminding staff that all significant or unexpected complications, including recognised but serious procedural injuries, must be recorded on Datix for PSIRF consideration.”

    Source location

    Response from Barts Health NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 25 September 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review all deaths proceeding to Coroner’s inquest at PSERM to ensure Datix capture, multidisciplinary review and an assigned learning response.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• All deaths that proceed to Coroner’s inquest are now reviewed at the Patient Safety Event Response Meeting (PSERM) to ensure: o The event is captured on Datix,”

    Source location

    Response from Barts Health NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 25 September 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Embed governance representation within Surgical and Gastroenterology Morbidity and Mortality meetings.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Governance presence is now embedded within Surgical and Gastroenterology M&M meetings to ensure improved linkage between M&M learning, Datix reporting, and PSIRF oversight.”

    Source location

    Response from Barts Health NHS Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 25 September 2025

    Open published response
  8. Black Country

    AI-generated summary

    Margaret Ann MCNAUGHTON · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Margaret Ann MCNAUGHTON was admitted to hospital with breathing difficulties and a respiratory infection, with a known penicillin allergy recorded in available clinical records. She was prescribed and given intravenous co-amoxiclav before being seen by a clinician, suffered cardiac arrest from penicillin anaphylaxis, and died in hospital on 13 December 2024 after deteriorating with respiratory failure. The principal concerns were failures to check and document her allergy status before prescribing, and the absence of sufficiently clear and embedded Trust processes and policies for carrying out and recording such checks, with further medication allergy incidents reported.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to demonstrate compliance with the medication-error management policy

    Wider context from the report

    “13. After reviewing the Policies provided to me, I also noted in The Trusts Management of Medication Errors Policy it defines level 1 and level 2 errors. I do not know what Level the incident concerning Mrs McNaughton was graded as but a level 2 error includes ‘Errors resulting in actual patient harm i.e. any physical effect to a patient that is directly a result of a medication error’. The incident report that I have been provided with only refers to an ‘amber’ incident. I understand the prescriber concerned in this case was a locum doctor and the policy states; In the event of a locum doctor making an error the WMI will forward the report to both HR and the clinical lead for the doctor’s specialty’. The Policy also states ‘The doctor will be counselled by their educational supervisor or clinical lead at the time of the incident who will require them to reflect on their practice. Suspension of a doctor from prescribing or administration of medicines will only occur if the doctor, their educational supervisor or clinical lead assesses that patients will be put at risk if the individual continues to prescribe. If necessary any further training will be arranged through the relevant clinical supervisor or clinical lead’. 14. I was not provided with a statement from the prescribing clinician involved in the incident referred to here although I was informed that the locum Doctor concerned had left the Trust. I have not been reassured by the Trust that they followed their own policy in terms of how this medication error was dealt with at the time and therefore I am concerned that this presents a risk to patient safety at this time. ”

    Source location

    Margaret Ann MCNAUGHTON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update the medication-error policy to align with the Patient Safety Incident Response Framework.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• The Trust has an established process for managing medication errors that includes feedback to the relevant clinician and their line manager/educational supervisor to facilitate reflection and learning. The policy is being updated to align with PSIRF framework and the Trust is committed to system-based learning incorporating the principles of just culture to approach safety and accountability in the organisation.”

    Source location

    Response from Royal Wolverhampton NHS Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 4 August 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Trust cannot obtain Responsible Officer feedback or appraisal reflection because the clinician left the organisation and no longer works in the NHS.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• The clinician involved in the incident was a temporary staff member (locum). Following the incident, the Clinical Director for the Emergency Department provided feedback to the clinician involved. If the clinician had stayed in the Trust they would have been required to reflect on the incident during their medical appraisal. However, the clinician left the organisation soon after the incident and is no longer working in the NHS; hence they are not connected to a Responsible Officer to provide feedback.”

    Source location

    Response from Royal Wolverhampton NHS Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 4 August 2025

    Open published response
  9. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Valerie Hampson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Valerie Hampson died at Willow Wood Hospice on 29 December 2024 as a consequence of Non-Hodgkin’s Lymphoma. The report raises concerns about the progression of a left knee wound while she was under District Nurse care, the absence of a serious incident investigation, and apparent failure to provide recommended fracture-clinic follow-up.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to undertake serious incident investigations for learning

    Wider context from the report

    “I am concerned that the Trust has not undertaken any serious incident investigation with a view to identifying if any learning could usefully be identified in the light of the progression of Mrs Hampson’s left leg wound whilst under the care of the District Nurses. ”

    Source location

    Valerie Hampson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    A formal investigation was not considered necessary because the circumstances did not meet the Trust’s investigation criteria.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Since the inquest we have revisit the care and treatment provided to Mrs Hampson. At the point the wound was noted to be deteriorating, Mrs Hampson was referred promptly back to the Emergency Department. The circumstances surrounding how the wound occurred and how it came to deteriorate did not fit the criteria for investigation in that:”

    Source location

    Response from Tameside and Glossop Integrated Care NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 3 July 2025

    Open published response
  10. Devon, Plymouth and Torbay

    AI-generated summary

    Mary Margaret Pomeroy · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mary Margaret Pomeroy, an 89-year-old hospital inpatient, died after being pushed to the floor by a fellow patient on 3 March 2022, suffering bilateral humeral fractures and deteriorating before her death on 15 March 2022. The inquest found that inadequate assessment and management of the fellow patient’s psychiatric, behavioural and cognitive needs materially contributed to the incident and death. It also identified inadequate analysis of the incident in the hospital’s internal investigation, including failure to identify relevant prior incidents and consider appropriate learning and recommendations.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to learn from serious incidents and consider recommendations for future care

    Wider context from the report

    “At the inquest, the author of UHP NHS’s investigation report (who was the Matron of the relevant ward) accepted, in evidence, that the patient who pushed Mary Pomeroy should, on 3 March 2022, have been subject to enhanced observations of care – this was on the basis that previous assessments in November 2021 and January 2022 had shown that this was required for him owing to his psychiatric and behavioural presentation (which had become more concerning by the end of February/beginning of March 2022) and also because of very recent and specific concerns regarding his behaviour which should have been obvious to ward staff following the incident on 1 March 2022. The Matron accepted, in evidence, that had enhanced observation and care been in place for the patient (which could have taken a number of forms following assessment, depending on what would have been most clinically and therapeutically appropriate at the time) then he should have been prevented from being in a position where he was able to push Mary Pomeroy to the ground on 3 March 2022. The Matron accepted, in evidence, that UHP NHS’s RCA report had been incorrect to conclude that the type of incident that occurred on 3 March 2022 could not have been foreseen. The Deputy Chief Nurse of UHP NHS accepted, in evidence, that the SI Panel Meeting should have interrogated the relevant facts and chronology more thoroughly. The inquest determined that the incident on the ward on 3 March 2022 was foreseeable, based on the concerns about the patient’s behaviour, the likely triggers for him becoming distressed and aggressive and the almost identical incident that had occurred on 1 March 2022. The inquest also determined that the lack of assessment and management of this patient’s behaviour and needs materially contributed to the incident which led to Mary Pomeroy suffering injuries and led to her death. It is unfortunately clear, when comparing the evidence heard at the inquest with the findings of UHP NHS’s RCA report, that there was inadequate analysis of this serious incident by UHP NHS, with concerning circumstances surrounding the care provided not being identified – therefore appropriate recommendations to inform future care provision were not given consideration as part of the RCA investigation/report. If UHP NHS do not identify concerning matters when carrying out internal investigations and do not take steps to try and learn from serious incidents when they occur, then there is an obvious, significant and continuing risk of future deaths occurring arising out of healthcare provision provided. ”

    Source location

    Mary Margaret Pomeroy · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequate analysis of serious incidents

    Wider context from the report

    “At the inquest, the author of UHP NHS’s investigation report (who was the Matron of the relevant ward) accepted, in evidence, that the patient who pushed Mary Pomeroy should, on 3 March 2022, have been subject to enhanced observations of care – this was on the basis that previous assessments in November 2021 and January 2022 had shown that this was required for him owing to his psychiatric and behavioural presentation (which had become more concerning by the end of February/beginning of March 2022) and also because of very recent and specific concerns regarding his behaviour which should have been obvious to ward staff following the incident on 1 March 2022. The Matron accepted, in evidence, that had enhanced observation and care been in place for the patient (which could have taken a number of forms following assessment, depending on what would have been most clinically and therapeutically appropriate at the time) then he should have been prevented from being in a position where he was able to push Mary Pomeroy to the ground on 3 March 2022. The Matron accepted, in evidence, that UHP NHS’s RCA report had been incorrect to conclude that the type of incident that occurred on 3 March 2022 could not have been foreseen. The Deputy Chief Nurse of UHP NHS accepted, in evidence, that the SI Panel Meeting should have interrogated the relevant facts and chronology more thoroughly. The inquest determined that the incident on the ward on 3 March 2022 was foreseeable, based on the concerns about the patient’s behaviour, the likely triggers for him becoming distressed and aggressive and the almost identical incident that had occurred on 1 March 2022. The inquest also determined that the lack of assessment and management of this patient’s behaviour and needs materially contributed to the incident which led to Mary Pomeroy suffering injuries and led to her death. It is unfortunately clear, when comparing the evidence heard at the inquest with the findings of UHP NHS’s RCA report, that there was inadequate analysis of this serious incident by UHP NHS, with concerning circumstances surrounding the care provided not being identified – therefore appropriate recommendations to inform future care provision were not given consideration as part of the RCA investigation/report. If UHP NHS do not identify concerning matters when carrying out internal investigations and do not take steps to try and learn from serious incidents when they occur, then there is an obvious, significant and continuing risk of future deaths occurring arising out of healthcare provision provided. ”

    Source location

    Mary Margaret Pomeroy · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Recruit two Learning Response Leads and provide them with mandatory training to conduct and support safety reviews.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “4. Recruitment to x2 Learning Response Lead posts.”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals Plymouth NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 2 April 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Recruit two Patient Safety Partners to participate in governance and scrutinise safety investigations and final reports.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “5. Recruitment of two Patient Safety Partners. The remit of the Patient Safety Partner role is set out in the National Patient Safety Strategy through the Framework for Involving Patients in Patient Safety. Patient Safety Partners are lay people, who have extensive experience of receiving care and on occasion, may have been involved in safety incidents. As such, they provide a different perspective on patient safety, removing the potential of influence by organisational bias or historical systems.”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals Plymouth NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 2 April 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop and implement a new safety-incident investigation policy incorporating new investigation methods.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “6. Developed a new policy for the investigation of safety incidents, which includes new investigation methods”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals Plymouth NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 2 April 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Redesign quality-concern governance to support transparent multidisciplinary review and assurance of resulting improvement actions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “7. Redesigned our governance processes to further promote transparency and proactive multidisciplinary review of quality concerns and undertaking assurance work on any actions implemented as a result of those concerns. We have done this by ensuring:”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals Plymouth NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 2 April 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement the Patient Safety Incident Response Framework process for recording, escalating, commissioning and overseeing system-based safety reviews with patient and family involvement.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In June 2024, in line with other NHS Organisations across England, University Hospitals Plymouth NHS Trust (UHP) transitioned to the use of the Patient Safety Incident Response Framework (PSIRF) and ceased the use of the Serious Incident Framework (SIF).”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals Plymouth NHS Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 2 April 2025

    Open published response
Back to top

Data last updated 7 September 2026