Recurring concern

Unreliable formal safety-incident management processes

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First reported 29 May 2013•Latest report 10 Mar 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of a formal organisational safety-incident or serious-incident management framework, including incident identification, grading, coordination, investigation, monitoring and control.

Not included

  • Excludes failures limited to implementing corrective actions after incident learning has already been established.
  • Excludes generic organisational learning, governance or incident-reporting deficiencies where no serious-incident management process is identified.
  • Excludes the underlying clinical or operational hazard and failures in ordinary care that are not part of serious-incident management.
  • Excludes investigations concerning deaths, complaints, crime or regulatory matters where the reported concern is not the management of a serious or untoward incident.
  • Excludes operational emergency-response, rescue and event-planning protocols that are not part of a formal organisational safety-incident management framework.
Reports
103

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
129

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
182

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care16
Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust10
NHS England10
Care Quality Commission9
Barts Health NHS Trust5
Tees, Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust5
East London NHS Foundation Trust3
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust3
Midlands Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust3
Tameside and Glossop Integrated Care NHS Foundation Trust3
General Medical Council2
Great Western Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust2
Leicestershire Partnership NHS Trust2
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence2
Norfolk and Suffolk NHS Foundation Trust2

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Lancashire and Blackburn with Darwen

    AI-generated summary

    Ida Jean Lock · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Ida Jean Lock died on 16 November 2019 after suffering a lack of oxygen during delivery on 9 November 2019, resulting in severe hypoxic-ischaemic brain damage. The report describes missed opportunities for enhanced care and obstetric input, delays in responding to fetal distress, and initially ineffective neonatal resuscitation. The principal concerns include the Trust’s alleged lack of candour and transparency, deficient clinical and maternity governance, inadequate investigations, gaps in mandatory and remedial training, and inappropriate grading of the harm suffered.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to grade fatal severe harm correctly

    Wider context from the report

    “14. The Trust graded Ida’s level of harm as “moderate”, even after her death. This grading should have been adjusted to "severe" by the Trust before Ida was transferred to Royal Preston Hospital as the consultant paediatrician identified that she had sustained a severe hypoxic ischaemic encephalopathy due to fetal bradycardia. ”

    Source location

    Ida Jean Lock · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to notify external and internal patient-safety bodies of serious incidents

    Wider context from the report

    “4. The Trust did not disclose that they had failed to notify the external bodies namely the CQC and the then CCG [ICB] via STEIS and the Trust's internal Serious Incidents Reporting Investigation panel, none of which was noted by the Trust's Patient Safety Summits .The matter was reported to the Coroner a year after Ida's death by the family after the Trust took no action to do so, despite being on notice of failures in treatment from the HSIB report Ida’s harm was at no point categorised by the Trust as a harm event that caused “death”. ”

    Source location

    Ida Jean Lock · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to categorise a death-causing harm event correctly

    Wider context from the report

    “4. The Trust did not disclose that they had failed to notify the external bodies namely the CQC and the then CCG [ICB] via STEIS and the Trust's internal Serious Incidents Reporting Investigation panel, none of which was noted by the Trust's Patient Safety Summits .The matter was reported to the Coroner a year after Ida's death by the family after the Trust took no action to do so, despite being on notice of failures in treatment from the HSIB report Ida’s harm was at no point categorised by the Trust as a harm event that caused “death”. ”

    Source location

    Ida Jean Lock · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 5 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Evaluate the operating effectiveness and consistency of serious-incident controls following PSIRF adoption.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Board has asked the internal auditors to:”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 8 · response
    Published 26 March 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Participate actively in developing regional maternity guidance and principles for consistent identification and reporting of incidents.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The North-West Regional Chief Midwife is developing Maternity Guidance and Principles with the aim to ensure there is a consistent approach in the identification and reporting of incidents. The ICB are supportive of this work and are actively engaged with the regional work to reduce this known risk.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS Lancashire and South Cumbria Integrated Care Board
    Page 7 · response
    Published 26 March 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Publish and update national guidance on recording patient safety events and levels of harm.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To support the new system and framework, NHS England has published guidance on recording patient safety events and levels of harm (updated in October 2024) - NHS England » Policy guidance on recording patient safety events and levels of harm. For example, severe physical harm is defined as when at least one of the following apply:”

    Source location

    Joint response from DHSC and NHSE
    Page 3 · response
    Published 26 March 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Enhance engagement with level 3 centres to improve handover of maternity events and concerns relevant to external reporting.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We acknowledged that poor handover of maternity events and concerns to level 3 centres would impact on their decisions around reporting to the CQC and the Coroner and so have enhanced our engagement with these centres.”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 5 · response
    Published 26 March 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Maintain contractual oversight and scrutiny of the Trust’s patient-safety-event reporting, challenging unexpected variation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In line with contractual and regulatory requirements LSC ICB expects all providers to report all patient safety events onto the Learning From Patient Safety Events (LFPSE) platform (this has replaced the National Reporting Learning System – NRLS). Where appropriate and in line with Trust local and national priorities, patient safety events must also be reported onto StEIS where the ICB is then notified. The ICB is very concerned to note from you findings that the Trust failed to fulfil these contractual and regulatory requirements. Since the inception of the ICB there has been a detailed oversight in the reporting of patient safety events from the Trust against expected reporting, with challenge where there has been unexpected variation. The ICB will continue to seek assurance from the Trust through the contractual route and by the ongoing scrutiny of patient safety events.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS Lancashire and South Cumbria Integrated Care Board
    Page 3 · response
    Published 26 March 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Operate a regional procedure for escalating serious maternity patient-safety incidents to regional and national NHS England teams.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NHS England North West (NW), has developed a Management of Patient Safety Incidents Standard Operating Procedure (April 2024), which ensures escalation of the maternity incidents of serious concern to the NW Regional Maternity Team. The ICB are responsible for escalating concerns, which are shared directly with the regional maternity team. The regional maternity team receive, monitor, and share escalation through the regional governance architecture. By extreme exception(s), the significant concerns are escalated to the National Chief Midwifery Officer and the National Obstetric Lead within NHS England.”

    Source location

    Joint response from DHSC and NHSE
    Page 6 · response
    Published 26 March 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    University Hospitals Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust and Lancashire and South Cumbria ICB will address specific changes arising from the report.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “My response therefore focuses on concern D and E. I note that you have also addressed this report to University Hospitals Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust (UHMBT) and NHS Lancashire and South Cumbria Integrated Care Board (LSC ICB). These organisations will address specifics as to the changes being implemented as a result of the Report. NHS England’s response to you is also made on behalf of the Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC), and I understand that they will not therefore be issuing a separate response to the Coroner. With DHSC input, I have also addressed in this response some of your concerns regarding A and B.”

    Source location

    Joint response from DHSC and NHSE
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 March 2025

    Open published response
  2. Oxfordshire

    AI-generated summary

    David Vincent Tighe · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    David Vincent Tighe, a 59-year-old man receiving chemotherapy for cancer, was admitted to hospital with chemotherapy-induced enterocolitis. During his treatment, bile aspiration occurred after insufficient monitoring and displacement of a Ryles tube, contributing to bronchopneumonia and sepsis, from which he died. The principal concerns were the absence of a specific Ryles tube policy and the use of a narrowly focused structured review that could miss care or procedural problems.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use of narrowly scoped and time-pressured structured reviews of incidents

    Wider context from the report

    “Absence of a Ryles tube policy: 1. At the time of David’s death there was no separate policy for Ryles tubes, and clinicians were required to apply the modest Royal Marsden Manual guidance, and/or note that the practice consideration and care requirements for Ryles tubes were not dissimilar to that for nasogastric tubes used for enteral administration, as per the Trust’s “Insertion, Use and Care of Nasogastric Feeding Tubes in Adults: Policy and Procedure”, October 2018 (“NG feeding tube policy”), which provided limited advice. Evidence was given that a Ryles tube policy was required and that there was motivation at the Trust to provide one, albeit none has been forthcoming in the 20 months since David’s death. Evidence was also given that an NG tube “Position Record” for recording “Repeat Position Checks” was in use for Ryles tubes (similar to the “Nasogastric Feeding Tubes Position Record - Repeat Position Checks” document at Appendix 11 / page 53 of 55 of the Trust’s NG feeding tube policy), but no several staff were unaware of such a document existing for Ryles tubes, and no such Ryles tubes records were ever disclosed. Expert evidence was given that it was suboptimal care not to have a specific policy for the management of Ryles tubes given the risks associated with such an invasive procedure that required ongoing monitoring. At the time of the inquest, the Trust’s expressed intention was to provide a Ryles tube policy, and assistance was said to have been requested from the Shelford Group (an external body), although conversations about such a policy were said to have started within the Trust itself, as early as April or May of 2023. It is therefore unclear whether a Ryles tube policy would ever be produced notwithstanding one appears to be accepted as being required. The absence of policy where a need has been identified creates an obvious risk of death to future patients, due to the absence of guidance and procedure to assist clinicians undertaking such an invasive procedure. Use of a narrowly focussed structured review by a treating clinician: 2. On 18.03.2023 the Trust undertook a Structured Review to consider learning from David’s death. Evidence was given that the Structured Review was intended to be narrow in focus, as opposed to a more comprehensive serious incident report. As a result, it did not involve taking information from staff, but was a 2-hour review of medical records across five different areas, undertaken in a highly pressured environment. The Structured Review consequently overlooked considering several issues including: (i) missing bile drainage entries. (ii) missing clinical observations contrary to Trust policy (“Recognising the Acutely Ill and Deteriorating Adult Patient (RAID) Policy, April 2021). (iii) the absence of Repeat Position Checks for the Ryles tube. (iv) the absence of any written record of family concerns that were raised with a ward sister. Evidence was given by an author of the Structured Review that he considered its scope was in fact too limited, and in future, he would advise suspending such a narrow review. That author was also a clinician involved with David’s care in spite of the potential for conflict being correctly raised with the Trust in advance. Any inability to adequately investigate such incidents, without undue restriction in scope, without time pressure, and without any appearance of conflict or bias, creates a risk of death to future patients, as oversights or omissions in care, policy or procedure that may be missed by a narrow review, may remain unidentified and unremedied. ”

    Source location

    David Vincent Tighe · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use of incident reviewers with potential conflicts of interest

    Wider context from the report

    “Absence of a Ryles tube policy: 1. At the time of David’s death there was no separate policy for Ryles tubes, and clinicians were required to apply the modest Royal Marsden Manual guidance, and/or note that the practice consideration and care requirements for Ryles tubes were not dissimilar to that for nasogastric tubes used for enteral administration, as per the Trust’s “Insertion, Use and Care of Nasogastric Feeding Tubes in Adults: Policy and Procedure”, October 2018 (“NG feeding tube policy”), which provided limited advice. Evidence was given that a Ryles tube policy was required and that there was motivation at the Trust to provide one, albeit none has been forthcoming in the 20 months since David’s death. Evidence was also given that an NG tube “Position Record” for recording “Repeat Position Checks” was in use for Ryles tubes (similar to the “Nasogastric Feeding Tubes Position Record - Repeat Position Checks” document at Appendix 11 / page 53 of 55 of the Trust’s NG feeding tube policy), but no several staff were unaware of such a document existing for Ryles tubes, and no such Ryles tubes records were ever disclosed. Expert evidence was given that it was suboptimal care not to have a specific policy for the management of Ryles tubes given the risks associated with such an invasive procedure that required ongoing monitoring. At the time of the inquest, the Trust’s expressed intention was to provide a Ryles tube policy, and assistance was said to have been requested from the Shelford Group (an external body), although conversations about such a policy were said to have started within the Trust itself, as early as April or May of 2023. It is therefore unclear whether a Ryles tube policy would ever be produced notwithstanding one appears to be accepted as being required. The absence of policy where a need has been identified creates an obvious risk of death to future patients, due to the absence of guidance and procedure to assist clinicians undertaking such an invasive procedure. Use of a narrowly focussed structured review by a treating clinician: 2. On 18.03.2023 the Trust undertook a Structured Review to consider learning from David’s death. Evidence was given that the Structured Review was intended to be narrow in focus, as opposed to a more comprehensive serious incident report. As a result, it did not involve taking information from staff, but was a 2-hour review of medical records across five different areas, undertaken in a highly pressured environment. The Structured Review consequently overlooked considering several issues including: (i) missing bile drainage entries. (ii) missing clinical observations contrary to Trust policy (“Recognising the Acutely Ill and Deteriorating Adult Patient (RAID) Policy, April 2021). (iii) the absence of Repeat Position Checks for the Ryles tube. (iv) the absence of any written record of family concerns that were raised with a ward sister. Evidence was given by an author of the Structured Review that he considered its scope was in fact too limited, and in future, he would advise suspending such a narrow review. That author was also a clinician involved with David’s care in spite of the potential for conflict being correctly raised with the Trust in advance. Any inability to adequately investigate such incidents, without undue restriction in scope, without time pressure, and without any appearance of conflict or bias, creates a risk of death to future patients, as oversights or omissions in care, policy or procedure that may be missed by a narrow review, may remain unidentified and unremedied. ”

    Source location

    David Vincent Tighe · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Modify the Structured Judgement Review template to prompt reviewers to identify concerns about the review’s scope or focus.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Secondly, we have modified the SJR template to ask the author if they have any concerns about the scope or focus of the review, giving them an explicit opportunity to raise any concerns which can then be addressed proactively by the Trust through providing additional support. Prior to completing the review, the reviewer will also be asked to confirm whether they have any conflict of interest such as having been involved in the care of the patient. This will provide stronger assurance that all reviews investigate deaths without restriction in scope, time pressure or appearance of conflict or bias.”

    Source location

    Response from Oxfordshire University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 27 March 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require reviewers to confirm before completing a Structured Judgement Review whether they have a conflict of interest.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Secondly, we have modified the SJR template to ask the author if they have any concerns about the scope or focus of the review, giving them an explicit opportunity to raise any concerns which can then be addressed proactively by the Trust through providing additional support. Prior to completing the review, the reviewer will also be asked to confirm whether they have any conflict of interest such as having been involved in the care of the patient. This will provide stronger assurance that all reviews investigate deaths without restriction in scope, time pressure or appearance of conflict or bias.”

    Source location

    Response from Oxfordshire University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 27 March 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The existing Structured Judgement Review process requires whole-record review, allows sufficient time, and enables concerns about care quality to be escalated.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust has a robust process for training clinicians in performing Structured Judgement Reviews (SJRs). The training highlights the need to review the whole case record including the nursing records. It directs the reviewer to contact any individual or team if there are concerns about the quality of care provided. There is no limit put on the length of time to undertake an SJR. Over 230 clinicians within OUH have been trained to date.”

    Source location

    Response from Oxfordshire University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 27 March 2025

    Open published response
  3. East London

    AI-generated summary

    Chloe Every · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Chloe Every died in hospital on 14 May 2019 after complications from a hypoxic cardiac arrest sustained during her admission. The report identified concerns including morphine use without recorded justification, an enema undertaken without informed consent while she was unconscious, inadequate clinical observations, missing records, and failures in incident reporting and governance.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of Serious Incident investigations to identify healthcare failings

    Wider context from the report

    “7. A Serious Incident report completed by the trust in the second half of 2019 failed to identify a series of healthcare failings in Chloe’s treatment. Management failings at the Trust meant that Chloe’s death was not reported to a Coroner until August 2023, by which time Chloe’s body had been cremated denying the court an opportunity to gather relevant evidence through autopsy. ”

    Source location

    Chloe Every · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Operate the Learning Review Group to oversee learning responses, PSIRF adherence and development of improvement actions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In July 2024, the Learning Review Group was established. The Learning Review Group undertakes an oversight function to assess the quality of learning responses and adherence with PSIRF methodology. This multi-professional group ensures an appropriate systems-based approach has been used to extract learning from learning responses and develop robust improvement actions, as well as ensuring that compassionate engagement with patients, families and staff has been central to the learning response.”

    Source location

    Response from Barking, Havering and Redbridge NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 6 · response
    Published 31 October 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Monitor safety actions and improvement plans through the Improvement Oversight Panel, including scheduled three-month progression reviews.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust is monitoring implementation of the safety actions arising from learning responses via the Improvement Oversight Panel (IOP) which was implemented in July 2024. This panel oversees the effectiveness of safety actions and wider safety improvement plans to ensure they are delivering the required improvement. The panel will consider whether sufficient evidence is available of sustainable improvement, prior to closure of the relevant patient safety incidents, or where it is absent, consider what further improvement actions are needed.”

    Source location

    Response from Barking, Havering and Redbridge NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 7 · response
    Published 31 October 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    BHRUT is responsible for responding fully to the concerns, so the Department will not duplicate its response.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NHSE have informed us that BHRUT is preparing a response to address your concerns in full. This is entirely appropriate due to the nature of the concerns raised and as a direct recipient of this report. I look forward to their response with interest and do not wish to duplicate it. However, I will highlight some points from the information shared with us, of the actions taken to improve matters in relation to the care of patients with learning disabilities since Chloe’s death in 2019:”

    Source location

    Response from DHSC
    Page 1 · response
    Published 31 October 2024

    Open published response
  4. North Yorkshire and York

    AI-generated summary

    Stephen Frederick DULLING · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Stephen Frederick Dulling, who had Parkinson’s disease, symptoms of dementia and swallowing problems, was admitted to York District Hospital and choked while eating toast, subsequently dying from aspiration pneumonia. Concerns included the response to reported risks before admission and multiple nursing-care lapses during his hospital admission, including the appropriateness of his diet, nutritional monitoring, response to choking and incident investigation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to debrief choking-incident staff within 72 hours

    Wider context from the report

    “4. I heard evidence of a number of omissions and lapses in the care afforded Mr Dulling by registered nurses during his admission to York District Hospital. My concerns relate to the following findings – a) No evidence of any direct inquiry being made of Mr Dulling’s primary carer in respect of his nutritional needs, despite Mr Dulling being deemed to lack capacity; b) It being recorded and acted upon that a regular diet was appropriate for Mr Dulling, despite a) above; c) No food chart being implemented and maintained despite the outcome of Mr Dulling’s malnutrition risk assessment; d) No assessment or escalation of Mr Dulling’s refusal of intravenous fluids; e) Evidence of a delayed response by a staff nurse to the information that Mr Dulling was choking; f) The absence of a de-brief of staff involved in the choking incident by a nurse of the requisite level within the period of 72 hours after the event. This, together with the subsequent delay in undertaking and completing the patient safety investigation review, resulted in important gaps in the evidence supplied both to the review and the inquest. 5. My concern is that the above reflects a series of lapses in basic nursing care identified in respect of a single patient, a repetition of any of which could present a risk of future deaths to others. ”

    Source location

    Stephen Frederick DULLING · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement and use a policy requiring a hot debrief or other incident response after relevant events.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is to be noted that at the time of the incident the Trust followed its previous policy on incident management. The Trust moved to the new Patient Safety Incident Response Framework (PSIRF) in December 2023. Since that time revised systems and processes have been put in place to record, monitor, review and learn from incidents across the Trust. It is acknowledged the investigation undertaken following this incident was not timely nor optimal. This has been reviewed with the Medicine Care Group and the new policy requiring either hot”

    Source location

    Response from York and Scarborough Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 October 2024

    Open published response
  5. East London

    AI-generated summary

    Gordon Long · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Gordon Long was admitted to hospital on 1 July 2023 with suspected dry gangrene of the left foot, was assessed by a vascular specialist on 6 July, underwent amputation on 7 July, and died on 8 July 2023. The concerns were the unexplained delay in referral to the vascular team, shortcomings in the patient safety investigation, and the lack of clear evidence that an action plan had resulted in changed practice.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequate patient safety incident investigations

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Despite undertaking a patient safety incident investigation (“PSII”) the Trust was unable to explain why Mr Long was not referred to the vascular team after he was admitted from ED into the medical receiving unit (“MRU”) on the morning of 2nd July 2023. The Trust struggled to identify the consultant in charge of Mr Long’s treatment when on the MRU and could not demonstrate that the consultant was spoken to as part of the PSII investigation. The inadequate standard of the investigation makes the court doubt the effectiveness of the Trust to identify and reflect upon future risks to patients. ”

    Source location

    Gordon Long · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  6. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Alan Stanley FALLOWS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Alan Stanley Fallows was admitted to hospital after a fall at home and later sustained further unwitnessed falls while an inpatient, including a fracture to his right neck of femur. He subsequently developed severe bilateral aspiration pneumonia and died on 28 March 2024. The principal concerns were delayed completion of a Datix report, unclear automated approval processes, and the use of templates that could result in incorrect or incomplete incident information and missed patient-safety learning.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Automated Datix review and approval failing to ensure human identification of patient-safety incidents

    Wider context from the report

    “2. Secondly, I was concerned to read that the Datix relating to the fall of 12 February (code U454194) appears to have undergone some kind of automated approval and sign off process in June 2024, and regrettably staff were unable to shed any light during the inquest on what happened/happens during this process. This is in contrast to the Datix relating to the second fall (code U441480) which appears to have gone through a “manual” approval and sign off process and the matter closed on 06/06/2024 (with the name of the approver being redacted on the form). I am concerned that if the Trust has any kind of automation process for the review and approval of Datix reports, there may be missed opportunities for humans to correctly identify any incident that compromises patient safety and which give rise to a risk of death; ”

    Source location

    Alan Stanley FALLOWS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Incidents are not automatically approved: every incident receives individual review before closure, although low-harm records are automatically stamped after managerial review.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “All reported incidents are reviewed by an individual before the approval and sign off/closure process. We do not have an automated approval and sign off process for incidents and all incidents are closed following review by an individual. For low level incidents, such as the incident relating to the first fall where the level of harm is low, these incidents are closed following review by a local manager. Following this review an automatic closure process is run which ‘stamps’ the record with the final approver as ‘automated’.”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals Birmingham
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 August 2024

    Open published response
  7. Central and South East Kent

    AI-generated summary

    Megan Ceris Williams · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Megan Ceris Williams developed abdominal pain and repeated vomiting between 1 and 5 May 2022, attended hospital twice, and died at home on 5 May 2022 after becoming breathless and losing consciousness. The inquest identified an undiagnosed small bowel obstruction apparently caused by adhesions from previous abdominal surgery. Concerns included possible missed opportunities for investigation, limited staff knowledge and clarity of the Acute Abdominal Pain Pathway, the lack of a signed self-discharge record, and the hospital investigation process not including information from family members.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the hospital SI process to include information from family and other interested persons

    Wider context from the report

    “Independent expert evidence was heard that indicated that the deceased likely had band adhesions - a known complication of her past abdominal surgery. It was the expert’s opinion that a small loop of bowel had become trapped in the adhesions causing pain and obstruction. The expert stated that this loop of bowel may have slid in and out explaining why the deceased’s symptoms were transient across the period of time that was examined (between 1st and 5th May 2022) and why clinicians suspected gastritis rather than a bowel obstruction. The inquest examined whether or not it would have been appropriate for a CT scan to have been done on the first hospital admission on 2nd May 2022. The lack of any record of a bout of vomiting by the deceased shortly before she left hospital on that date was relevant inasmuch as, had it been noted by hospital staff, may have lead to the deceased remaining in hospital with the potential for further investigations have been carried out which may have provided opportunities to intervene. The inquest also examined East Kent Hospital’s Acute Abdominal Pain Pathway (AAPP) including knowledge of this pathway among clinicians and the clarity of the pathway as it was documented included about a patient being referred directly back to any specialist department (such as surgeons) if returning to hospital within 48 hours of having been discharged. The lack of any signed record of the deceased self-discharging from hospital on 5th May was concerning. The inquest also examined the EKHT SI process and heard from an emergency department consultant who spoke as to the process. It was suggested that the SI process had not taken account of information which had been provided by the deceased’s family. (a) That there was a lack of knowledge, among clinical staff, of the Acute Abdominal Pain Pathway (AAPP). (b) Given what was said about how clear the AAPP was, that EKHT should provide evidence of what further work has been done make it clearer and accessible to clinicians. (c) That the hospital SI process did not include information from family and other interested persons or parties as part its fact-finding exercise. (d) There was not a clearly documented and recorded process for patients who self-discharge from hospital. ”

    Source location

    Megan Ceris Williams · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Transition incident management to the Patient Safety Incident Response Framework, including patient and family involvement.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Since the conclusion of the inquest, the Trust has changed the SI process to the new Patient Safety Incident Response Framework. The Trust Patient Safety Incident Response Policy (Document 2) and Plan (Document 3) have been agreed and are attached for information.”

    Source location

    Response from East Kent Hospitals
    Page 2 · response
    Published 30 September 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Adopt NHS guidance on engaging and involving patients, families and staff after patient safety incidents.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition to the Policy and Plan, the Trust is adopting the NHS Engaging and involving patients, families and staff following a patient safety incident. The Trust’s Incident Management Policy has been updated (pending ratification) to ensure that patient and family involvement is strengthened. Similarly, the Trust’s Duty of Candour Policy (Document 5) will be reviewed and updated. For”

    Source location

    Response from East Kent Hospitals
    Page 2 · response
    Published 30 September 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update the Incident Management Policy to strengthen patient and family involvement, subject to ratification.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition to the Policy and Plan, the Trust is adopting the NHS Engaging and involving patients, families and staff following a patient safety incident. The Trust’s Incident Management Policy has been updated (pending ratification) to ensure that patient and family involvement is strengthened. Similarly, the Trust’s Duty of Candour Policy (Document 5) will be reviewed and updated. For”

    Source location

    Response from East Kent Hospitals
    Page 2 · response
    Published 30 September 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use the national Patient Safety Incident Investigation report template and include patient and family involvement in learning response reports.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Patient Safety Incident Response Framework and our Trust plan requires the use of a Patient Safety Incident Investigation (PSII) methodology for certain incident types. The Trust has adopted the national template for PSII reports (Document 6). This includes recording of the patient and family involvement in the investigation process. The other learning response reports that the Trust will be using e.g. After Action Review, Swarm, also prompt the inclusion of the patient and family perspective.”

    Source location

    Response from East Kent Hospitals
    Page 3 · response
    Published 30 September 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement a Learning Response Review and Improvement Tool for peer review of reports.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust is implementing the Learning response review and improvement tool to enable peer review of reports. This includes the descriptor, “People affected by incidents are meaningfully engaged and involved”. This tool will be used by learning response leads and the Peer Review Panel described within the Trust Policy (section 12).”

    Source location

    Response from East Kent Hospitals
    Page 3 · response
    Published 30 September 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Establish a Peer Review Panel to review learning response reports.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust is implementing the Learning response review and improvement tool to enable peer review of reports. This includes the descriptor, “People affected by incidents are meaningfully engaged and involved”. This tool will be used by learning response leads and the Peer Review Panel described within the Trust Policy (section 12).”

    Source location

    Response from East Kent Hospitals
    Page 3 · response
    Published 30 September 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    No actions by NICE are considered necessary to address the issues raised in the report.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “On this occasion, we do not consider that there are any actions from NICE that would address the issues raised.”

    Source location

    Response from NICE
    Page 1 · response
    Published 30 September 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The concerns are local Trust issues outside NHS England’s remit.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I note that you have also addressed your Report to East Kent Hospitals University NHS Foundation Trust (EKHT), and it is appropriate that they respond to each of the concerns raised by the Coroner, as these concerns do not fall under NHS England’s remit and are all local issues for the Trust to address.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 30 September 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    East Kent Hospitals University NHS Foundation Trust should respond to and address the concerns.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I note that you have also addressed your Report to East Kent Hospitals University NHS Foundation Trust (EKHT), and it is appropriate that they respond to each of the concerns raised by the Coroner, as these concerns do not fall under NHS England’s remit and are all local issues for the Trust to address.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 30 September 2024

    Open published response
  8. East London

    AI-generated summary

    David John Morris · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    David John Morris, aged 78, developed oesophageal cancer after delays in diagnosis and treatment, later undergoing gastrostomy surgery. He developed a gastrostomy leak, peritonitis and septic shock, and died in hospital on 16 May 2022 after further surgery. The concerns included delayed recognition and treatment of the leak and sepsis, poor clinical records, deficiencies in the investigation, and ineffective controlled-drug management systems.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of serious incident investigations to identify relevant reviewing clinicians

    Wider context from the report

    “4. The initial serious investigation report into Mr Morris’s death was unfit for purpose. The report to investigate or even identify the Registrar who reviewed Mr Morris on the evening of 3rd May 2022. Since then, no effective review has been undertaken by the Trust upon how this deficient report gained executive approval. ”

    Source location

    David John Morris · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unfit serious incident investigation reports

    Wider context from the report

    “4. The initial serious investigation report into Mr Morris’s death was unfit for purpose. The report to investigate or even identify the Registrar who reviewed Mr Morris on the evening of 3rd May 2022. Since then, no effective review has been undertaken by the Trust upon how this deficient report gained executive approval. ”

    Source location

    David John Morris · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use the Patient Safety Investigation Response Framework with multidisciplinary investigations and centrally allocated investigating officers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Since October 2023 there has been a change in the process of investigating significant patient safety incidents at BHRUT. This has now been changed to the Patient Safety Investigation Response Framework (PSIRF) which uses multidisciplinary investigations and reviews with multiple responsible authors. In line with NHS England guidance, the Investigating Officer is centrally allocated by the Quality and Safety team and, whenever possible, these are allocated outside of the Clinical Group where the incident occurred.”

    Source location

    2024-0360 - Response from Barking Havering and Redbridge NHS Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 4 July 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Operate a weekly Incident Oversight Learning Group to review concerning incidents and commission further learning responses where needed.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “There is a weekly Incident Oversight Learning Group (IOLG) whereby all incidents that are considered of concern are discussed with specific terms of reference. This includes background information and a review of the entire pathway which a patient has encountered when systems issues are identified; thereby including any omissions that may have occurred with the previous Serious Incident Framework. The Incident Oversight Learning Group meetings are chaired by either the Medical Director for Patient Safety and Patient Experience or the Director of Nursing for Quality and Safety, and this group decides when to commission a further PSIRF learning response.”

    Source location

    2024-0360 - Response from Barking Havering and Redbridge NHS Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 4 July 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require Learning Review Group sign-off with Board Executive attendance for quoracy when approving patient safety investigations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “On completion of Patient Safety Incident Investigations (PSIIs) there is a Learning Review Group (LRG) which reviews the contents of the reports to ensure adequate exploration of key issues has occurred and that the family has had an opportunity to input into the investigation; and ensures the improvement action plan both aligns with learning identified and is sufficiently robust to counteract the existing safety issues identified. The Terms of Reference for this meeting have been updated and now include a Board Executive (or nominated deputy) who must be in attendance for quoracy when signing off investigations.”

    Source location

    2024-0360 - Response from Barking Havering and Redbridge NHS Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 4 July 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Trust will respond separately to the concerns about care and processes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I understand that the Barking, Havering & Redbridge University Trust will also be responding separately to your concerns and that the London region of NHS England is”

    Source location

    2024-0360 - Response from DHSC
    Page 1 · response
    Published 4 July 2024

    Open published response
  9. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    John Howe · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    John Howe, an 81-year-old man with diabetes and peripheral vascular disease, underwent an amputation for diabetic foot sepsis and later died in hospital on 28 May 2023 from hospital-acquired pneumonia against a background of necessary surgery and wound haemorrhage. Concerns included his late discharge home, which resulted in him being left outside while access was addressed, continuing late discharges despite a policy change, ambulance service awareness of discharge timings, and delays and factual inaccuracies in the Serious Incident Review.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure factual accuracy in Serious Incident Review reports

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) Completion of the Serious Incident Review was delayed, and the report contained factual inaccuracies, giving rise to a concern relating to the approach taken by Manchester City Council to Serious Incident Reviews. ”

    Source location

    John Howe · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in completing Serious Incident Reviews

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) Completion of the Serious Incident Review was delayed, and the report contained factual inaccuracies, giving rise to a concern relating to the approach taken by Manchester City Council to Serious Incident Reviews. ”

    Source location

    John Howe · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Correct inaccuracies in the Serious Incident Review and reshare the amended report with relevant safeguarding teams.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I am extremely saddened by the events of the Mr John Howe’s death and, following your report, we have amended the inaccuracies in the report and reshared the Serious Incident Review (SIR) with Derbyshire Safeguarding Adults Board. I have also rehashed the amended SIR with Manchester Foundation Trust Safeguarding Team.”

    Source location

    Response from MCC
    Page 1 · response
    Published 27 June 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Share consultation agencies’ information for review and accuracy checking before finalising Serious Incident Reviews.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We are also reviewing our processes where a person is discharged from a Manchester hospital into an ‘out of area’ locality and if a safeguarding concern takes place on discharge. This will include ensuring engaging with partners in carrying out the SIR and sharing with them the outcomes and recommendations to those organisations. We will also ensure that, in future, we will share with agencies who have been consulted so the information provided can be reviewed and checked for accuracy, before finalising the report.”

    Source location

    Response from MCC
    Page 1 · response
    Published 27 June 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Establish a service-wide system to ensure investigations are completed in a timely manner.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I recognise the delay in completing the initial SIR due to myself not being in work, and as such we have set up a system, as a service, to ensure all investigations are completed in a timely manner going forward. In reviewing the systems it is essential we are not dependent on a single person within the service and, as such, we have put in place processes to ensure that this does not happen again.”

    Source location

    Response from MCC
    Page 1 · response
    Published 27 June 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement processes preventing investigations from depending on a single person.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I recognise the delay in completing the initial SIR due to myself not being in work, and as such we have set up a system, as a service, to ensure all investigations are completed in a timely manner going forward. In reviewing the systems it is essential we are not dependent on a single person within the service and, as such, we have put in place processes to ensure that this does not happen again.”

    Source location

    Response from MCC
    Page 1 · response
    Published 27 June 2024

    Open published response
  10. Rutland and North Leicestershire

    AI-generated summary

    Christopher Henrik LARSEN · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Christopher Henrik Larsen, a 52-year-old man, was found hanging at his home in Leicestershire on 6 January 2023 and died before a planned mental health triage call. Concerns included inadequate documentation and decision-making in multidisciplinary team meetings, inaccurate interpretation of risk information, insufficient risk assessment and discharge planning, and weaknesses in the serious incident investigation and learning process.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of serious incident investigations to robustly and critically examine all relevant care issues

    Wider context from the report

    “4. The Serious Investigation and Reporting Process at LPT I remain concerned about inadequacies in the Serious Incident Investigation and Reporting processes at Leicestershire Partnership NHS Trust. The Serious Incident Investigation into Mr Larsen’s death did uncover and accepted some failings in relation to the care provided to Mr Larsen. However, it failed to uncover all the matters arising at inquest and, some of the matters that it did uncover do not have correlating items of work listed in the action plan. There was no exploration of the MDT meeting’s functionality or documentation as part of the SI investigation. Further, I have concerns about the implementation and embedding of the lessons learned which are identified by the SI Report. In this case the live witnesses who gave evidence during the course of the inquest did not demonstrate that learning had filtered down to the front-line staff. I am therefore concerned that the SI process at LPT does not support a robust and critical analysis and investigation of the care provided to patients, further, I have concerns about the ability of the Trust to embed changes and learning. This failure to properly explore matters and learn where possible inevitably leads to a delay, or failure altogether, to learn lessons which are vital to patient safety across the whole Trust. ”

    Source location

    Christopher Henrik LARSEN · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Run a rapid improvement programme using quality-improvement methodology to identify improvements to the serious-incident investigation and reporting process.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We take learning form serious incidents very seriously and have taken on board feedback provided relating to the processes within the Trust. All serious incident reports are reviewed by the Medical Director and Chief Nurse to ensure that they provide a critical analysis and investigation of the care provided to patients. We also recognise that the transition to the new National Patient Safety Incident Response Framework (PSIRF) has taken time to embed. Feedback from the new PSIRF process has been positive from families and clinicians. In order to make the process more robust a rapid improvement programme is underway to utilise quality improvement methodology to identify any improvements which can be made to the process.”

    Source location

    Response from Leicestershire Partnership NHS (2)
    Page 5 · response
    Published 14 June 2024

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026