Recurring concern

Unreliable formal safety-incident management processes

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First reported 29 May 2013•Latest report 10 Mar 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of a formal organisational safety-incident or serious-incident management framework, including incident identification, grading, coordination, investigation, monitoring and control.

Not included

  • Excludes failures limited to implementing corrective actions after incident learning has already been established.
  • Excludes generic organisational learning, governance or incident-reporting deficiencies where no serious-incident management process is identified.
  • Excludes the underlying clinical or operational hazard and failures in ordinary care that are not part of serious-incident management.
  • Excludes investigations concerning deaths, complaints, crime or regulatory matters where the reported concern is not the management of a serious or untoward incident.
  • Excludes operational emergency-response, rescue and event-planning protocols that are not part of a formal organisational safety-incident management framework.
Reports
103

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
129

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
182

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care16
Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust10
NHS England10
Care Quality Commission9
Barts Health NHS Trust5
Tees, Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust5
East London NHS Foundation Trust3
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust3
Midlands Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust3
Tameside and Glossop Integrated Care NHS Foundation Trust3
General Medical Council2
Great Western Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust2
Leicestershire Partnership NHS Trust2
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence2
Norfolk and Suffolk NHS Foundation Trust2

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. County Durham and Darlington

    AI-generated summary

    Ian Darwin · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Ian Darwin died from multiple injuries after being found below ████████, Durham, on 6 March 2023. The report raises concern that Tees Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust routinely delays serious incident investigations, potentially allowing lethal hazards to persist and compromising investigations intended to prevent avoidable deaths. The inquest had not been heard and the investigation had not concluded at the time of the report.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to complete serious incident investigations within required timescales

    Wider context from the report

    “Tees Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust (“TEWV”) routinely fails, to employ, in a timely way, nationally recognised process and procedure designed to prevent avoidable death. In permitting delay of “serious incident” investigations, TEWV may: (i) permit lethal hazard to persist for longer than necessary; and (ii) compromise the quality of such investigations and hence their value in preventing avoidable deaths. The above-mentioned inquest has not been heard; there has been no finding that the present death was attributable to acts or omissions in care. Although arising in the present investigation, the matter of concern is general and has arisen in the context of other investigations. Despite past assurances that the material circumstances have been addressed, the facts of the present case demonstrate that they continue to exist. I am aware that on 19th July 2023, Assistant Coroner Janine Richards notified you of the same concern arising from matters revealed by another investigation. TEWV identified Ian Darwin’s death as a “serious incident” (“SI”) for the purposes of The Serious Incident Framework¹ (the Framework”). The SI investigation (“SI”) process-defined in the Framework- was the means employed by TEWV to investigate this SI. The Framework defines SIs as “events where the potential for learning is so great, or the consequences to patients… so significant that they warrant particular attention to ensure these incidents… are investigated thoroughly… and trigger actions that will prevent them from happening again”. SIs “include acts or omissions in care that result in… avoidable death…”. Further, the “occurrence of a serious incident demonstrates weaknesses in a system or process that need to be addressed to prevent future incidents leading to avoidable death or serious harm”. SI investigations are the means “to ensure that weaknesses in a system are identified, to understand what went wrong … and what can be done to prevent similar incidents happening again”. Discussing one of the seven key principles of the SI investigation- that they be Timely and Responsive- the Framework requires that SIs “must be reported without delay and no longer than 2 working days after the incident is identified”. One of “two key operational changes” introduced in the 2015 update was a single timeframe of 60 working days (from date of initial report) for completion of investigation reports. At an “early meeting” the investigator must “set out a realistic and achievable timescales and outcomes”. The present case: • Death occurred on 06.03.23; • I am informed that an investigator was initially appointed in around mid-June 2023; • By late June, TEWV were “unable to say” when the investigation would be complete; • The investigation is now expected to be complete in the week commencing 21.08.23 and its report to be finalised 18.09.23 The general situation: • TEWV SI death investigations, at all levels of seriousness, are routinely (if not invariably) significantly delayed and I understand there is no expectation of immediate, or any timetable for eventual rectification; • In some other cases delay is significantly longer than in the present; • Such delays affect cases of all levels of seriousness. ”

    Source location

    Ian Darwin · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Maintain direct oversight of serious incident review performance and brief the Quality Assurance Committee and Board.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I am responding in the same format and with similar information to that in the response letter sent last month, I hope this consistency will be helpful in enabling you and your team to see the clear evidence of the progress we are making towards providing timely serious incident reviews. I have continued to have direct oversight of how we are performing as I am concerned that we improve our position as soon as possible. Our CEO and our Board share this concern and therefore I am keeping our Quality Assurance Committee and our Board fully briefed.”

    Source location

    Response from Tees,Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 6 September 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Contract additional expert capacity to address delayed serious incident reviews.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1) We have contracted in additional expert capacity in incident reviews to actively address the reviews that are delayed, this is a group of incidents that happened before February 2023. Some of these reviews are now being concluded and are going through the internal quality assurance checks before we share them with the families, submit to the ICS and to your office. The attached document gives the detail of this.”

    Source location

    Response from Tees,Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 6 September 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Increase internal capacity by engaging leaders to complete incident reviews and prevent further delays.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2) We have increased our internal capacity to review incidents by engaging our leaders in completing incident reviews in order that we can review incoming incidents and avoid further delays developing. We intend to continue to use some of this capacity and expertise in the future which is part of our plan to avoid delays in the future.”

    Source location

    Response from Tees,Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 6 September 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Adopt daily patient-safety-huddle processes to identify the required type of incident review earlier.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “5) We have adopted processes to facilitate much earlier identification of the type of review required (concise or full) – this now takes place at the daily patient safety huddle, and we follow the national, soon to be PSIRF, guidance for this. It is anticipated that we will increase the number of concise reviews, where appropriate, in line with this national guidance.”

    Source location

    Response from Tees,Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 September 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Operate weekly review-progress meetings and monitor performance against the improvement trajectory.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “7) We have in place weekly sitrep / report out meetings to ensure we are sighted on the progress of each review and can provide any additional support to reviewers that may be needed. We will be monitoring our performance against the trajectory we have developed, and this is being reported to executive directors on a weekly and monthly basis.”

    Source location

    Response from Tees,Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 September 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Modify documentation, review report templates and use standard operating procedures to support efficient review workflows.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “9) We have modified our documentation, reviewed our report templates and are utilising standard operating procedures to support efficient working and flow.”

    Source location

    Response from Tees,Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 September 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Expand subject-matter-expert categories to lead specific review types.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “11) We will continue to expand our range of subject matter expert categories to lead specific types of reviews and we are currently contracting with an external provider who are a professional incident review company. Again, this is an opportunity to avoid delays in the future.”

    Source location

    Response from Tees,Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 September 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Contract an external professional incident-review provider.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “11) We will continue to expand our range of subject matter expert categories to lead specific types of reviews and we are currently contracting with an external provider who are a professional incident review company. Again, this is an opportunity to avoid delays in the future.”

    Source location

    Response from Tees,Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 September 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Exact completion dates for some serious incident reports cannot be predicted because final reports may not be available for review on time.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I have taken the opportunity to share a list of the serious incident reviews that we believe will be required by you and I have indicated the dates that we expect the internal quality assurance process to be taking place. You can reasonably expect to receive most finalised serious incident reports within 2 weeks of the internal review however some will take longer than two weeks depending on, and this is difficult to predict, when the final report is available for review.”

    Source location

    Response from Tees,Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 September 2023

    Open published response
  2. Leicester City and South Leicestershire

    AI-generated summary

    Marie ZARINS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Marie Zarins, aged 42, was reported missing by her family and found suspended in Leicestershire; her death was confirmed at the scene on 24 November 2021. The report raised concerns about flawed multidisciplinary team discussions, inaccurate understanding and documentation of her medication status, failures to prescribe antidepressants and sleeping tablets, and inadequacies in the subsequent serious incident investigation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of Serious Incident investigations to provide robust critical analysis and identify learning for patient safety

    Wider context from the report

    “3) I remain gravely concerned about the inadequacies in the Serious Incident Investigation and Reporting processes at Leicestershire Partnership NHS Trust. The Serious Incident Investigation failed to identify the errors in the care provided to Miss Zarins making the use of the process somewhat otiose in this case. The failure to properly investigate led to the wholly untenable situation where errors in care were uncovered for the first time at inquest, which took place some 20 months after the date of death (due to witness availability). I am concerned that the lack of robust critical analysis and investigation of the care provided to Miss Zarins before her death has caused a delay to, and led to missed opportunities (for some staff) to learn lessons that are vital to patient safety. My concerns relating to the inadequacy of the Trust Serious Incident Investigations and the risks related to that go far beyond just the care provided by the CRISIS Team. The risks have the ability to prevent learning, therefore negatively impact upon patient safety, across the entire Trust. ”

    Source location

    Marie ZARINS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review the original Serious Incident report with input from the previously unavailable Locum Consultant.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As agreed during the inquest, contact details were shared with the Trust and the Locum Consultant is now engaging in our review of the original SI report.”

    Source location

    Response from Leicestershire Partnership NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 September 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Obtain accreditation for the Trust’s Serious Incident investigation and review processes through the Royal College of Psychiatrists’ accreditation network.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Earlier this year, the Royal College of Psychiatrists’ Serious Incident Review Accreditation Network (SIRAN) awarded accreditation to the Trust for our Serious Incident (SI) processes. This is a national quality improvement and accreditation network for Mental Health Trusts. This accreditation concentrates on the quality of investigations and reviews and ensures processes are in place to work meaningfully with patients, their families and staff equally to identify learning. We were awarded this accreditation in recognition of the high standard of SI reporting undertaken by the Trust in 2023. We believe that this demonstrates the pace and extent of improvement undertaken since the time of the SI report in relation to Miss Zarin’s death. We continue to build on this as we transition towards the Patient Safety Incident Response Framework.”

    Source location

    Response from Leicestershire Partnership NHS Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 6 September 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Current serious incident reporting processes meet a high standard, as demonstrated by national accreditation and subsequent improvement since the case investigation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Earlier this year, the Royal College of Psychiatrists’ Serious Incident Review Accreditation Network (SIRAN) awarded accreditation to the Trust for our Serious Incident (SI) processes. This is a national quality improvement and accreditation network for Mental Health Trusts. This accreditation concentrates on the quality of investigations and reviews and ensures processes are in place to work meaningfully with patients, their families and staff equally to identify learning. We were awarded this accreditation in recognition of the high standard of SI reporting undertaken by the Trust in 2023. We believe that this demonstrates the pace and extent of improvement undertaken since the time of the SI report in relation to Miss Zarin’s death. We continue to build on this as we transition towards the Patient Safety Incident Response Framework.”

    Source location

    Response from Leicestershire Partnership NHS Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 6 September 2023

    Open published response
  3. County Durham and Darlington

    AI-generated summary

    Kenneth Rippon · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Kenneth Rippon had deteriorating mental health, including self-harm, suicidal ideation and command auditory hallucinations, and died on 5 May 2022 after jumping or falling from a viaduct at Durham Train Station. The report identified concerns about inadequate mental health assessments and risk information, insufficient family involvement in safety and discharge planning, and delays and weaknesses in the investigation of the serious incident.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to promptly obtain, secure and preserve relevant serious-incident evidence

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The serious objective investigation report in this case was not available in this case until the 24.03.2023, over 10 months since the death and around 8 months outside the NHS framework guidance of 60 days for the completion of such, despite repeated requests and a schedule 5 notice being issued to attempt to obtain a copy of the draft report to inform this investigation, which was not complied with. (2) The NHS framework sets out clearly a timescale of 60 working days for the completion of investigation reports and highlights the importance of working in an open, honest and transparent way. One of the key underpinning principles in the management of all serious incidents is that they should be timely and responsive. The purpose of the investigation is to ensure that weaknesses in a system or process are identified to understand what went wrong, how it went wrong and what can be done to prevent similar incidents occurring again. (3) The delay in the investigation in this case is particularly concerning in a number of respects, not least in that it revealed problems in clinical record keeping, risk assessments and the consideration of hospital admission, lack of family/carer involvement, lack of comprehensive mental state examination/assessment including capacity, safeguarding and social needs and medication review and access to services. (4) As a result of the delay in the serious incident Investigation and formulation of an action plan, many of the identified actions required to remedy these difficulties were still being actioned /completed relatively recently. (5) Further one of the actions upon identification of a serious incident is to obtain, secure and preserve all relevant evidence. In this case the memory capture forms identified as being required in the immediate aftermath of the incident were not taken promptly and were seemingly only taken after I requested sight of them, several months after the incident and therefore when memories had already begun to fade. This was concerning given the identified problem of clinical record keeping at the time of these events. (6) I am concerned that the extensive and continuing delays in investigating serious incidents may lead to further deaths, as lessons cannot be learnt and improvements made in a timely manner. I am also concerned that the quality of such investigations is compromised by the failure to complete memory capture forms and the passage of time before important evidence is secured. ”

    Source location

    Kenneth Rippon · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Extensive and continuing delays in investigating serious incidents

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The serious objective investigation report in this case was not available in this case until the 24.03.2023, over 10 months since the death and around 8 months outside the NHS framework guidance of 60 days for the completion of such, despite repeated requests and a schedule 5 notice being issued to attempt to obtain a copy of the draft report to inform this investigation, which was not complied with. (2) The NHS framework sets out clearly a timescale of 60 working days for the completion of investigation reports and highlights the importance of working in an open, honest and transparent way. One of the key underpinning principles in the management of all serious incidents is that they should be timely and responsive. The purpose of the investigation is to ensure that weaknesses in a system or process are identified to understand what went wrong, how it went wrong and what can be done to prevent similar incidents occurring again. (3) The delay in the investigation in this case is particularly concerning in a number of respects, not least in that it revealed problems in clinical record keeping, risk assessments and the consideration of hospital admission, lack of family/carer involvement, lack of comprehensive mental state examination/assessment including capacity, safeguarding and social needs and medication review and access to services. (4) As a result of the delay in the serious incident Investigation and formulation of an action plan, many of the identified actions required to remedy these difficulties were still being actioned /completed relatively recently. (5) Further one of the actions upon identification of a serious incident is to obtain, secure and preserve all relevant evidence. In this case the memory capture forms identified as being required in the immediate aftermath of the incident were not taken promptly and were seemingly only taken after I requested sight of them, several months after the incident and therefore when memories had already begun to fade. This was concerning given the identified problem of clinical record keeping at the time of these events. (6) I am concerned that the extensive and continuing delays in investigating serious incidents may lead to further deaths, as lessons cannot be learnt and improvements made in a timely manner. I am also concerned that the quality of such investigations is compromised by the failure to complete memory capture forms and the passage of time before important evidence is secured. ”

    Source location

    Kenneth Rippon · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Contract and allocate additional expert reviewers to address delayed incident reviews.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1) We have contracted in additional expert capacity in incident reviews to actively address the reviews that are delayed. Since, my previous update we have contracted / employed further reviewers and to date we have allocated 41 of these reviews which is an increase of 16 since my previous letter to you.”

    Source location

    Response from Tees, Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 28 July 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Increase internal clinical and leadership capacity to complete incident reviews and prevent further delays.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2) We have continued to increase our internal capacity to review incidents, our clinical and leaders are engaged across services in completing incident reviews in order that we can review incoming incidents and avoid further delays developing.”

    Source location

    Response from Tees, Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 28 July 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use an external specialist company to review historical incident data and identify risks from delayed reviews.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “4) An external company specialising in incident management has reviewed our historical incident data so that we can address the potential risks of missing issues and learning due to a delay with some reviews.”

    Source location

    Response from Tees, Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 July 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Adapt processes to identify the required incident review type earlier through daily patient safety huddles.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “5) We have adapted processes to facilitate much earlier identification of the type of review required (concise or full) – this now takes place at the daily patient safety huddle, and we follow the national, soon to be Patient Safety Incident Response Framework (PSIRF), guidance for this. It is anticipated that we will increase the number of concise reviews, where appropriate, in line with this national guidance.”

    Source location

    Response from Tees, Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 July 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Hold weekly review-progress meetings, provide reviewer support and monitor performance against the review trajectory.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “7) We have in place weekly sitrep / report out meetings to ensure we are sighted on the progress of each review and can provide any additional support to reviewers that may be needed. We will be monitoring our performance against the trajectory we have developed, and this is being reported to executive directors on a weekly and monthly basis.”

    Source location

    Response from Tees, Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 July 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Modify documentation, review report templates and use standard operating procedures to improve efficient review workflow.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “9) We have modified our documentation, reviewed our report templates and are utilising standard operating procedures to support efficient working and flow.”

    Source location

    Response from Tees, Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 July 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Increase Serious Incident Review Panel capacity to prevent internal quality assurance delaying review release.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “10) We have increased our internal Serious Incident Review Panel capacity to ensure we can be efficient in our internal quality assurance in order that this does not delay the release of reviews to families once completed.”

    Source location

    Response from Tees, Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 July 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue expanding subject matter expert categories to lead specific types of incident reviews.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “12) We will continue to expand our range of subject matter expert categories to lead specific types of reviews.”

    Source location

    Response from Tees, Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 July 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Establish Associate Director of Patient Safety and Deputy Chief Nurse roles to oversee review quality and support reviewer supervision.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “13) The Associate Director of Patient Safety commenced in post as planned from 19 July 23 and is being supported by the Deputy Chief Nurse who commenced at TEWV 3 July 2023. Together they are ensuring that reviews are of the right standard and that reviewers have the right support and supervision to complete high quality reviews.”

    Source location

    Response from Tees, Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 July 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Contract and deploy additional expert capacity to address delayed incident reviews.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1) We have contracted in additional expert capacity in incident reviews to actively address the reviews that are delayed. Since, my previous update we have contracted / employed further reviewers and to date we have allocated 41 of these reviews which is an increase of 16 since my previous letter to you.”

    Source location

    Response from Tees, Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 28 July 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Increase internal clinical and leadership capacity to complete incident reviews and prevent further delays.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2) We have continued to increase our internal capacity to review incidents, our clinical and leaders are engaged across services in completing incident reviews in order that we can review incoming incidents and avoid further delays developing.”

    Source location

    Response from Tees, Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 28 July 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Report weekly to Executive Directors on Duty of Candour compliance and review-related delays.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “have a clear term of reference for each review. We report weekly to the Executive Directors on our compliance with Duty of Candour to ensure there are no delays.”

    Source location

    Response from Tees, Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 July 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use an external incident-management specialist to review historical incident data and identify risks from delayed reviews.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “4) An external company specialising in incident management has reviewed our historical incident data so that we can address the potential risks of missing issues and learning due to a delay with some reviews.”

    Source location

    Response from Tees, Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 July 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Identify required review types earlier through daily patient-safety huddles using national PSIRF guidance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “5) We have adapted processes to facilitate much earlier identification of the type of review required (concise or full) – this now takes place at the daily patient safety huddle, and we follow the national, soon to be Patient Safety Incident Response Framework (PSIRF), guidance for this. It is anticipated that we will increase the number of concise reviews, where appropriate, in line with this national guidance.”

    Source location

    Response from Tees, Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 July 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Hold weekly review-progress meetings and monitor performance against the established trajectory with executive reporting.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “7) We have in place weekly sitrep / report out meetings to ensure we are sighted on the progress of each review and can provide any additional support to reviewers that may be needed. We will be monitoring our performance against the trajectory we have developed, and this is being reported to executive directors on a weekly and monthly basis.”

    Source location

    Response from Tees, Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 July 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Modify documentation, review report templates and use standard operating procedures to improve review efficiency and workflow.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “9) We have modified our documentation, reviewed our report templates and are utilising standard operating procedures to support efficient working and flow.”

    Source location

    Response from Tees, Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 July 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Increase Serious Incident Review Panel capacity to support quality assurance without delaying release of completed reviews.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “10) We have increased our internal Serious Incident Review Panel capacity to ensure we can be efficient in our internal quality assurance in order that this does not delay the release of reviews to families once completed.”

    Source location

    Response from Tees, Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 July 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue expanding subject-matter-expert categories to lead specific types of incident reviews.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “12) We will continue to expand our range of subject matter expert categories to lead specific types of reviews.”

    Source location

    Response from Tees, Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 July 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Establish senior patient-safety leadership roles to oversee review standards and provide reviewers with support and supervision.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “13) The Associate Director of Patient Safety commenced in post as planned from 19 July 23 and is being supported by the Deputy Chief Nurse who commenced at TEWV 3 July 2023. Together they are ensuring that reviews are of the right standard and that reviewers have the right support and supervision to complete high quality reviews.”

    Source location

    Response from Tees, Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 July 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Complete inspections of six inpatient and community mental health services and the trust’s leadership and governance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As well as powers to prosecute in some cases, CQC regulates NHS providers and can require providers to make improvements. In April and May 2023 CQC completed inspections of six of the trust’s inpatient and community mental health services and an inspection of the trust’s leadership and governance which will be published on 25th October 2023.”

    Source location

    Response from Care Qaulity Commission
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 July 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Serve a requirement notice requiring the trust to resolve serious incident, mortality, incident review and complaints backlogs and prevent recurrence.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To ensure the trust’s progress in this matter, CQC have served the trust with a requirement notice, as an outcome of our inspection processes under Regulation 17 (1) (2) (a) (b) Good Governance. This states that:”

    Source location

    Response from Care Qaulity Commission
    Page 3 · response
    Published 28 July 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue monitoring the trust’s progress in removing the serious incident backlog through the monthly quality board.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Due to the concerns relating to the backlog of serious incidents, CQC and other stakeholders have continued to monitor the trust’s progress with reducing this backlog and preventing reoccurrence of this issue.”

    Source location

    Response from Care Qaulity Commission
    Page 6 · response
    Published 28 July 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Monitor the trust’s compliance with the requirement concerning serious incident, mortality, incident review and complaints backlogs and take regulatory action if improvement is inadequate.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To ensure the trust’s progress in this matter, CQC have served the trust with a requirement notice, as an outcome of our inspection processes under Regulation 17 (1) (2) (a) (b) Good Governance. This states that:”

    Source location

    Response from Care Qaulity Commission
    Page 3 · response
    Published 28 July 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Oversight of investigation quality is limited to inspecting and acting on delays or flaws in a provider’s investigation system.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “CQC share the Coroner’s concerns. These were highlighted to the trust during our inspection in relation to the delays in completion of reports. However, CQC have a limited role in the oversight of the quality of investigations beyond our ability to inspect and take action when there are delays and flaws in a provider’s system. The NHS Serious Incident Framework (2015) sets out that “Providers are responsible for the safety of their patients, visitors and others using their services, and must ensure robust systems are in place for recognising, reporting, investigating and responding to Serious Incidents and for arranging and resourcing investigations. Commissioners are accountable for quality assuring the robustness of their providers’ Serious Incident investigations and the development and implementation of effective actions, by the provider, to prevent recurrence of similar incidents.””

    Source location

    Response from Care Qaulity Commission
    Page 3 · response
    Published 28 July 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The trust’s commissioners are better placed to improve the quality of the trust’s serious incident investigation processes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “CQC share the Coroner’s concerns. These were highlighted to the trust during our inspection in relation to the delays in completion of reports. However, CQC have a limited role in the oversight of the quality of investigations beyond our ability to inspect and take action when there are delays and flaws in a provider’s system. The NHS Serious Incident Framework (2015) sets out that “Providers are responsible for the safety of their patients, visitors and others using their services, and must ensure robust systems are in place for recognising, reporting, investigating and responding to Serious Incidents and for arranging and resourcing investigations. Commissioners are accountable for quality assuring the robustness of their providers’ Serious Incident investigations and the development and implementation of effective actions, by the provider, to prevent recurrence of similar incidents.””

    Source location

    Response from Care Qaulity Commission
    Page 3 · response
    Published 28 July 2023

    Open published response
  4. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Heather FINDLAY · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Heather Findlay was detained under section 2 of the Mental Health Act at Mile End Hospital and ran away while on escorted leave on 11 June 2020. She was later found by a member of the public in a nearby park; the inquest concluded that she died by suicide, with a medical cause of death of hypoxic ischaemic encephalopathy and ████████ toxicity. The principal concerns included staff preparedness and procedures when a detained patient absconds, unclear responsibilities between ELFT and the police, communication of suicide risk, and the adequacy of risk grading and organisational learning.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Omissions from serious incident investigations

    Wider context from the report

    “6. ELFT staff all told me that, after Ms Findlay had run off, they still graded her as medium rather than high risk. She had had long term suicidal thoughts, had made previous attempts on her life and, prior to being admitted to hospital on 20 May 2020 had purchased ████████ and had planned to take this to kill herself. However, she had appeared to improve in hospital, and had been granted 15 minutes’ escorted leave twice a day since 1 June without incident. At one point in her evidence it appeared to me that the matron, taking the point that by running away Ms Findlay had acted in a manner that was wholly unexpected by the trust, was of the view that Ms Findlay should then have been re-categorised as high risk. However, following re-examination by counsel for ELFT the matron appeared to retract this and to return to her former position that, even after she had run away Ms Findlay was only of medium risk to herself. It is of course a matter of clinical opinion what risk grading a patient should be given, and no person can see into the future. However, • the jury found a failure by ELFT to recognise that, by 11 June 2020, Ms Findlay was at imminent risk of suicide by ████████; and • any investigation following a death like Heather Findlay’s presents an opportunity for sober and searching reflection. So I am concerned that an element of positional bias may have influenced the thinking of ELFT staff. I am concerned about this particularly because, when giving evidence at inquest, the ELFT serious incident investigation author was adamant that it was only appropriate for the HCA who called the police on 11 June 2020 after Ms Findlay had run away, to tell the police of a risk of self harm not of a risk of suicide. Her rationale for this was that the last time Ms Findlay had articulated a plan to kill herself, was when she was found in hospital with a ligature round her neck on 28 May 2020. This position seems lacking the necessary reflection. I draw your attention to earlier prevention of future deaths reports (PFDs) as follows: • Sent to ELFT on 8 June 2023 by Assistant Coroner Buckett following the inquest touching the death of Hilary (Billy) Guedalla, including concern regarding the failure of ELFT to inform the police of the serious suicide risk that the deceased posed to themselves; and the confusion among staff about who should be contacted and in what manner, once a patient was found to be missing. • Sent to ELFT on 25 January 2023 by me following the inquest touching the death of Andrew Largin, including concern about omissions from a serious incident investigation. • Sent to ELFT on 20 October 2021 by me following the inquest touching the death of Freeda Glausiusz, including concern about a lack of learning culture at ELFT. ”

    Source location

    Heather FINDLAY · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 6 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review the Trust’s responses and related reports to determine whether further action is needed.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I do however take the concerns raised seriously, and I thank you for bringing them to my attention, together with the other Reports to Prevent Future Deaths you highlight concerning the care of other patients at the Trust. I have asked that NHS England is sighted on the Trust’s response to your Report, as well as the responses to the other cases and we will consider these carefully, to include whether any further action needs to be taken. I have already been sighted on the Trust’s Patient Safety Serious Incident Review Report on this matter and note that they have taken a learning to ensure that the police are provided with a direct dial number whenever reporting a patient absconding, which did not happen in this case.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 22 June 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Many concerns concern East London Foundation Trust and Metropolitan Police policy, making NHS England inappropriate to respond to them.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The concerns in your Report relate to organisational policy at East London Foundation Trust as well as policy within the Metropolitan Police Service. NHS England is not therefore the appropriate organisation to respond to many of the concerns raised.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 22 June 2023

    Open published response
  5. Milton Keynes

    AI-generated summary

    Alexander Shone BLEWITT · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Alexander Shone Blewitt died at Milton Keynes University Hospital on 11 July 2022 after returning to the emergency department with faecal incontinence and abdominal pain, following an earlier visit where he had been referred from an urgent care centre. A possible acute abdomen was confirmed by CT, and he suffered a cardiac arrest before surgery. Concerns included inaccurate communication of important symptoms and treatment information, inadequate clinical recording, and the absence of reliable records of intravenous fluids administered in the emergency department.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of incident investigations to provide detailed, evidence-challenging analysis

    Wider context from the report

    “[5] The Incident Investigation Report which is in part designed to assist with learning from adverse events was of a generally poor standard. There was a failure to consider issues in detail; there was a failure to challenge the statements of clinicians where there were obvious contradictions between statements made and the medical record; there was a failure to put in place measures to correct and monitor prescribing clinicians failure to sign off on IV fluid prescriptions so that the contemporaneous record would be available for clinicians coming after them and they could see whether a patient had satisfactory or unsatisfactory fluid management. The only record in the case was a typed note by a junior doctor to the effect that it was thought Mr Blewitt had received 2 litres of fluid since arrival. ”

    Source location

    Alexander Shone BLEWITT · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The patient's 9 July presentation was not typical for peritonitis, making the criticism of the diagnostic approach less clear-cut.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Incident Investigation Reports are reviewed through a weekly meeting (Serious Incident Review Group, SIRG) where there is some consistency of senior membership. This report was signed off by that group. The two key deficiencies which you infer were: acceptance of the diagnostic approach taken on 09 July; and identification of the issue of poor documentation on 11 July without further exploration of root causes or learning. Whilst I would accept both criticisms to a degree, I do not think they are as clear cut as your Regulation 28 Report implies. The 09 July presentation was not typical for peritonitis, although there were also several elements which cast some doubt over the putative diagnosis of urinary tract infection.”

    Source location

    Response from Milton Keynes University Hospitals
    Page 5 · response
    Published 23 June 2023

    Open published response
  6. East London

    AI-generated summary

    Winbourne Gregory Charles · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Winbourne Gregory Charles was found unresponsive on 10 April 2021, suspended on a mental health ward, after being admitted under the Mental Health Act following an attempt to take his own life. The principal concerns included failures in risk assessment, observation practices, emergency response, record keeping, and governance processes.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of serious incident investigation to address risk-assessment and reporting deficiencies

    Wider context from the report

    “6. Governance process failings. a. A datix incident report created on the evening of 10ᵗʰ April 2021 by a senior nurse and Modern Matron contained misleading information that suggested that emergency response policies were followed when in fact they were not. b. The Datix failed to mention that observations had been suspended by the shift coordinator, a fact that was understood at that time. This obvious and significant piece of information that should have been escalated through the Trust governance team for action. c. The Trust 72 hour report was written by the Modern Matron and was signed-off by an integrated care director on 15th April 2021. This document also failed to identify or escalate the significant issue of the suspension of observation at 16.00 on 10th April 2021. d. The Trust SI report was not prepared to fully address the poor risk assessment or inadequate datix & 72 hr reports. ”

    Source location

    Winbourne Gregory Charles · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review Serious Incident processes and revisit the adequacy of evidence and learning captured in reports.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “17. Review of SI report and HR processes.”

    Source location

    NELFT NHS Foundation Trust Action Plan
    Page 8 · response
    Published 5 May 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Concerns about care provision and coordination are mainly for the NHS Trust to address.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Your report raises concerns over the provision and coordination of care that Winbourne received at North East London NHS Foundation Trust, which are mainly for the Trust to address. I understand that the Trust has already carefully considered the matters of concern in your report and has provided you with a comprehensive response as well as a copy of its action plan setting out the actions to be taken to improve care quality and patient safety.”

    Source location

    Response from Department of Health and Social Care
    Page 1 · response
    Published 5 May 2023

    Open published response
  7. Nottinghamshire

    AI-generated summary

    Jodie Catherine McCann · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jodie Catherine McCann, a 22-year-old woman, developed gallstone pancreatitis, suffered a cardiac arrest, and required critical care and ventilation. After her tracheostomy tube became displaced and could not be replaced, she suffered a prolonged cardiac arrest caused by lack of oxygen and died. Concerns included inadequate planning and preparation for difficult airway management and tracheostomy displacement, equipment and staffing availability, and delays in the serious incident review.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to follow the Mortality Review policy and complete serious incident reviews promptly

    Wider context from the report

    “The Mortality Review policy was not followed, leading to a significant delay in completing the serious incident review, delaying Trust learning, and delaying the family’s understanding of the circumstances of Jodie’s death. There is limited evidence of progress in implementing the national Patient Safety Incident Response Framework at the Trust ”

    Source location

    Jodie Catherine McCann · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review and revise the mortality governance policy against neighbouring Trusts, national guidance, and identified failings, then seek governance-group approval.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Review surrounding Mortality Governance Processes and revision of the Monitoring Mortality and Learning from Review Policy”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals of Derby and Burton NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 6 · response
    Published 27 April 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Generate and audit 72-hour reports for severe-harm incidents and unexpected deaths to assure proportionate review and compliance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “4. For incidents with an actual impact of severe harm/unexpected death or any other incident of concern, these are reviewed at Divisional level and a 72-hour”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals of Derby and Burton NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 6 · response
    Published 27 April 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Disseminate the revised mortality review policy through Divisional presentations, Trust learning fora, and the Senior Leaders forum.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A communications strategy is planned to disseminate the revised Monitoring Mortality and Learning from Deaths Review policy which will include presentation to Divisions and discussion at Trust learning fora including the Learning from Deaths”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals of Derby and Burton NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 7 · response
    Published 27 April 2023

    Open published response
  8. Worcestershire

    AI-generated summary

    DAVID ERNEST MASON · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    David Ernest Mason, aged 82, fell at home on 5 March 2022, fractured his hip and was taken to hospital after an ambulance delay. He had Addison’s disease and died in the early hours of 7 March 2022 after developing an acute adrenal crisis. The principal concerns were that clinicians and ambulance staff did not recognise the need for additional steroid replacement after trauma and physiological stress, and that relevant clinical guidance, call-handler pathways and documentation prompts did not sufficiently address this risk.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of internal investigation coordination and learning from patient-safety incidents

    Wider context from the report

    “4) Evidence heard at the inquest confirmed that the investigation lead at WMAS had not been shown the inquest disclosure bundle, which had been disclosed to the legal department at WMAS a number of months prior to the inquest. This bundle contained relevant evidence from a different internal investigation (by WAHT), suggesting that the likely cause of Mr Mason’s deterioration and death was an acute adrenal crisis and not, as had been considered when a coronial referral had initially been made, hyperkalaemia and rhabdomyolysis (following a fall and long lie). This lack of internal co-ordination within WMAS prevented full internal investigation and learning in respect of the care given to Mr Mason by WMAS. ”

    Source location

    DAVID ERNEST MASON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
  9. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Andrew Mark Largin · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Andrew Mark Largin died by suicide after asphyxiating himself in the early hours of 6 February 2022 at the home where he lived. Concerns included delays in allocation to the neighbourhood rehabilitation team, failure by the crisis team to reassess him after being told he remained very depressed, inadequate recording and investigation of decision-making, and a lack of clarity about referral pathways and response times between teams.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of serious incident investigations to interview relevant decision makers and provide feedback

    Wider context from the report

    “4. The SI reviewer giving evidence in court said that the SI reviewing team had not even spoken to that crisis team member as part of their investigation, let alone fed back to her. 5. He said they did not at the time realise that she still worked for ELFT, though he accepted that it would have been an extremely straightforward matter to find out. The crisis team member’s manager gave evidence that she thought the relevant decision maker had left the team before Mr Largin’s death, so between 3 and 6 February 2022. When I invited that manager to make a call while the inquest was ongoing to check, she later told me that the team member had not left the crisis team until 29 April 2022. ”

    Source location

    Andrew Mark Largin · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Amend the Serious Incident reviewer responsibilities document to require relevant staff to be contacted through Human Resources for review involvement.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I was troubled that the Trust’s SI review did not highlight that the relevant crisis team member did not record their rationale explaining why Mr Largin should remain with WWNT. I asked the Trust’s Associate Director of Governance and Risk to explore this further.”

    Source location

    Response from East London NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 30 January 2023

    Open published response
  10. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Kamil Iddrisu and Youngson Nkhoma · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Kamil Iddrisu and Youngson Nkhoma collapsed during separate military selection runs at Whittington Barracks and later died after being taken to hospital. Both were found to have metabolic acidosis, acute kidney injury, rhabdomyolysis and sickle cell trait; the final causes of death remained under investigation, with the most likely cause of collapse described as sickle cell trait combined with military exercise. The principal concern was the risk of death or harm to non-UK selection candidates, including the need to consider screening for sickle cell trait.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a system to audit incident processing and investigation

    Wider context from the report

    “Sickle cell trait (SCT) screening process and identifying SCT in candidates: 1. The Inquest heard evidence that since these tragedies there had be 12 (13 as one incident includes 2 people) near misses where the process that had been put in place following these tragedies had not be followed. This resulted in 3 candidates at High Risk for SCT according to their family origins questionnaire undertaking the 2km run. 1 of these had self-identified to a Group Leader prior to the exercise but was directed to complete the RFT(E) run element in any case. This raises a concern about the screening process may be safe and effective. 2. The inquest was told that the Air force and Navy are not screening any candidates for SCT. The Army are. Both services are recruiting from the Commonwealth. Medical evidence at the inquest confirmed screening was the only way to safely identify candidates at risk. This raises a concern that the recruitment process is not safe and effective. Training and Education 1. The near miss incidents lead to a concern that staff involved in the selection process and RFT assessments are still not aware of the risk associated with SCT given that in one case the person was directed to undertake the run despite knowing he was at high risk of developing exertional rhabdomyolysis associated with SCT. 2. The lack of screening in the Navy and Air Force leads to a further concern about the level of understanding regarding the risks associated with SCT – the evidence at the inquest said this risk was unpredictable . 3. The inquest heard evidence that there is no standardised way to identify SCT candidates who are going through the selection process as the different services were considering using different colours wrist bands in different services. The raises a concern about the ability to identify those candidates who have SCT. 4. There should be a review of the wording used and rationale for including questions for candidates regarding ‘cola coloured urine’ in the PMSA. Dr Gupta, an expert haematologist at the inquest, informed the court that this is not always a sign of SCT as an individual can get cola urine from hepatitis. This raises a concern about the level of understanding of the significant of "cola coloured urine" and what it might indicate. Reporting and investigation 1. The inquest heard how Capita have set up a clinical oversight board to review any incidents. First this board did not appear to have reviewed or audited any of the near misses referred to above and second it does not include a representative from the Army. This raises concerns about the lack of joined up thinking for an incident between Capita and the army and the safety of the new process. 2. Reporting of incidents: the majority of the 12 near misses were not investigated at the time they occurred which indicates the present process is not safe and effective. 3. There is no system to audit whether incidents are being correctly processed and investigated. 4. The reporting system continues to use two parallel reporting forms for Capita (Casper) and the Army (Durals). These are on separate IT systems. This raises a concern that there is no "one version of the truth". The inquest heard evidence that Capita were unclear if they had resolved the issue in their Casper system associated with the drop down menu options and the fact that non work related incidents close investigations automatically. 5. It was unclear from the evidence whether the Recruiting Group has a clear identifiable person to take responsibility for the review health and safety incidents and to ensure adequate investigation is undertaken. Specifically it was still not clear that any oversight of the medical incidents fell within the remit of the Capita Head of Health and Safety. 6. It was unclear from the evidence whether the Recruiting Group act as one entity regarding health and safety issues with a clear lines of responsibility for global risk assessment (and promoting information gathering & investigation) of incidents of any nature. The Inquest heard evidence that ‘H&S at work’ is considered differently to any medical risk, which is supported by the lack of investigation of the near misses. Medical response: 1. Inquest heard how Lichfield had specialist medical staff on site in the medical training unit but there was no system for getting urgent medical attention on the base if needed. There was no mechanism to put a tannoy out for a medical emergency but the Inquest heard evidence that this could be done for a cake sale. 2. All the services should consider whether there should be a generic policy for the treatment of exertional collapse (of any cause) as per US Army where during training there is a clear medical plan with availability of essential medical treatment (eg oxygen and fluids) before hospitalisation. ”

    Source location

    Kamil Iddrisu and Youngson Nkhoma · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Audit incident processing through Clinical Oversight Board, joint assurance forums, Defence oversight and a commissioned external review of Sickle Cell Trait risk management.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As detailed in the response to Matter of Concern 3a above, all actual and ‘near miss’ incidents are reviewed at the monthly Clinical Oversight Board. Audit takes place at the quarterly Joint Health and Safety Executive Manager’s Conference, the quarterly Joint”

    Source location

    2019-0416 - Response from Secretary of State for Defence and Capita
    Page 11 · response
    Published 30 December 2019

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026