Recurring concern

Failure to verify compliance and effectiveness of implemented safety changes

Pin Get email alerts Request correction

First reported 31 Oct 2014•Latest report 4 Jun 2025

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures to assess compliance with procedural changes or expectations, review continued compliance with safety alerts, or obtain evidence that implemented safety changes are effective, where the control is intended to assure that corrective or preventive changes have been embedded and work as required.

Not included

  • Excludes failures to implement or complete identified safety actions where no separate compliance or effectiveness-verification failure is identified.
  • Excludes routine audits or inspections not specifically intended to verify compliance with implemented safety changes or their effectiveness.
  • Excludes generic governance, training, documentation or learning deficiencies that are not tied to assurance of a specific implemented safety change, alert or corrective measure.
Reports
7

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
7

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2014–2025

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
11

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Associated British Ports1
Association of Ambulance Chief Executives1
Betsi Cadwaladr University LHB1
Lancashire Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust1
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence1
Neath Port Talbot County Borough Council1
NHS England1
Royal Free Hospital1
Royal National Lifeboat Institution1
Society For Endocrinology1
South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust1
West London NHS Trust1
West Midlands Ambulance Service University NHS Foundation Trust1
Worcestershire Acute Hospitals NHS Trust1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Swansea and Neath Port Talbot

    AI-generated summary

    DAVID CHIAKA EJIMOFOR · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    DAVID CHIAKA EJIMOFOR, aged 15, drowned after jumping into the sea from a breakwater at Aberavon on 19 June 2023. The principal concerns were the absence of lifeguards during higher-risk periods, despite their historical use to deter jumping, and the lack of evidence that alternative deterrence measures were effective.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of evidence that other breakwater deterrence measures are effective

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) There are no lifeguards stationed at the breakwater during higher risk periods in the spring and summer months (when the weather is good and the tides high), when children and young people have been seen/known to jump into the water from it. (2) Jumping from, and the water around, the breakwater is known to be dangerous. (3) The practice of placing a lifeguard at the breakwater at times of higher risk in the spring and summer months (when the weather is good and the tides high) had been in place historically and was known to be effective at reducing the risk. (4) I was not given, in evidence, a satisfactory or cogent explanation as to why that measure had been removed prior to DAVID’s death, nor why that measure continues to be absent today. (5) Nor was I shown any evidence that other deterrence measures put in place since DAVID’s death (including clearer signage and a limited-height barrier) are otherwise working effectively to reduce the risk. ”

    Source location

    DAVID CHIAKA EJIMOFOR · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Assess whether additional deterrent measures are necessary after monitoring analysis, in cooperation with RNLI and ABP.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Monitoring of the breakwater is ongoing. Once the analysis is complete, NPTCBC, in cooperation with RNLI and ABP, will be able to assess whether any additional deterrent measures are necessary to effectively reduce the identified level of risk still further.”

    Source location

    Response from NEATH PORT TALBOT COUNCIL
    Page 5 · response
    Published 11 June 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct and complete a signage, fencing and barrier review, including risk assessment of deterrence options.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We will seek to respond to the point of deterrence measures (including signage and a limited height barrier) that has been raised by the Coroner's concerns and to identify any changes to signage, barriers and/or fencing at the breakwater to mitigate the risk of any future death by undertaking a signage, fencing and barrier review and implementing any necessary actions identified by such review. The review has commenced and will risk assess each option to ensure that by reducing one risk it does not create another. The initial review is anticipated to be concluded by the end of”

    Source location

    Response from ASSOCIATED BRITISH PORTS
    Page 1 · response
    Published 11 June 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Universal signage and access restrictions are impracticable; fencing is cost-prohibitive and may be circumvented by people entering the water around it.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Restricting access or even universal provision of signage at all possible sites would be almost impossible and, in many locations, would prove to be highly unpopular.”

    Source location

    Response from ROYAL NATIONAL LIFEBOAT INSTITUTION
    Page 3 · response
    Published 11 June 2025

    Open published response
  2. Lancashire and Blackburn with Darwen

    AI-generated summary

    Margaret Clement · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Margaret Clement, aged 92, died at Royal Blackburn Hospital on 15 June 2022 after developing significant rectal bleeding, vomiting blood and an upper gastrointestinal bleed following hospital admission after a fall. Concerns included inadequate nursing records and handovers, ineffective prioritisation of urgent tasks, failure to seek urgent clinical assistance for significant rectal bleeding, and inadequate assessment of compliance with procedural changes.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequate assessment of compliance with procedural changes and expectations

    Wider context from the report

    “(6) Inadequate measures have been taken to assess compliance with procedural changes and expectations that have been set following the Trust investigation into this matter ”

    Source location

    Margaret Clement · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Monitor recommendations from the SOP046 audit through a SMART action plan overseen by the Trust Clinical Audit team.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The SOP046 MDT will be updated to reflect the requirement that both medical and nursing staff check that the doctor’s tasks have been completed before they leave the ward. An audit of this SOP has been undertaken and was presented at the Clinical Effectiveness Group in July 2024, which identified recommendations. These have been transferred to a SMART action plan which will be monitored by the Clinical Audit team within the Trust.”

    Source location

    Response from East Lancashire Hospitals
    Page 3 · response
    Published 15 May 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update the central action-monitoring process by adding Patient Safety Group assurance requirements and informing divisions to include PSII action-plan monitoring in governance meetings.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Since the conclusion of Margaret’s inquest, the Trust has updated its central process around monitoring of actions by adding assurance regarding completion of action plans to the PSG [Patient Safety Group] TOR (Terms of Reference) and agenda and all divisions have been informed that they must ensure that they have PSII action plans assurance monitoring included within the governance meetings. On agreement of all actions being completed, evidence will then be uploaded on the Trusts Incident Management System DATIX.”

    Source location

    Response from East Lancashire Hospitals
    Page 4 · response
    Published 15 May 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use the approved divisional report template to govern PSII action plans through the Corporate Patient Safety Group and escalate delays or problems for discussion and support.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To support the change to PSG agenda and TOR a new divisional report template has been designed and approved. The report includes a section on PSII action plans, and these will be governed by the Corporate PSG. Any delays or issues with actions plans not being completed within timescales will be escalated within the report to PSG for discussion and support.”

    Source location

    Response from East Lancashire Hospitals
    Page 4 · response
    Published 15 May 2024

    Open published response
  3. West London

    AI-generated summary

    Tom Sweeting · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Tom Sweeting experienced a sudden deterioration in his mental health in August 2021 and was assessed by liaison psychiatry after reporting suicidal thoughts. On 20 August 2021, he was found suspended by a ligature at home after locking himself in the garage, and resuscitation attempts were unsuccessful. Concerns included incomplete clinical assessment documentation, failures in discharge communication and treatment-plan communication, delegation of family collateral information gathering to a junior trainee, and a lack of evidence that new training and procedures had been effectively audited.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of auditing of training, templates and supervision effectiveness

    Wider context from the report

    “4. The Trust showed good intentions of reviewing the training programme, but were unable to evidence that planned 6 monthly audits had actually taken place, and so there was no evidence before the court that the new training that had arisen from the serious incident findings was effective. Introducing new training, templates and supervision performance appraisals all seem to be positive interventions, but in the absence of any process to audit their effectiveness, it is concerning that the Trust have no way in which to judge their impact. ”

    Source location

    Tom Sweeting · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  4. Worcestershire

    AI-generated summary

    DAVID ERNEST MASON · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    David Ernest Mason, aged 82, fell at home on 5 March 2022, fractured his hip and was taken to hospital after an ambulance delay. He had Addison’s disease and died in the early hours of 7 March 2022 after developing an acute adrenal crisis. The principal concerns were that clinicians and ambulance staff did not recognise the need for additional steroid replacement after trauma and physiological stress, and that relevant clinical guidance, call-handler pathways and documentation prompts did not sufficiently address this risk.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unclear NHS England monitoring of compliance with National Patient Safety Alerts

    Wider context from the report

    “2) Evidence heard at the inquest confirmed that no prompts exist on emergency department/clerking documentation at WAHT for clinicians to check whether a patient suffers from adrenal insufficiency. Although the inquest was informed that changes have been made in this regard by WAHT to some peri-operative patient documentation, the National Patient Safety Alert (NatPSA/2020/005/NHSPS) requires acute trusts to review admission/assessment/clerking documentation to ensure such prompts are included. It is not clear what follow-up action is taken by NHS England in relation to monitoring of compliance by NHS Trusts following National Patient Safety Alerts being issued. ”

    Source location

    DAVID ERNEST MASON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 5 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Ask regional colleagues to engage relevant Integrated Care Boards about trusts that remain non-compliant with the patient safety alert.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In this case, Worcestershire Acute Hospitals NHS Trust declared compliance in March 2022. There are currently three Trusts who remain non-compliant. The national team at NHS England has asked regional colleagues to engage with the relevant ICBs regarding these Trusts. It is ultimately the role of the Care Quality Commission (CQC) to ensure the implementation of actions set out in alerts, which is made clear in all NatPSAs, through the following statement; ‘Failure to take the actions required under this National Patient Safety Alert may lead to CQC taking regulatory action’.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 3 · response
    Published 26 April 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    NHS England’s national team is not responsible for overseeing NHS Trust compliance with National Patient Safety Alerts.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Alert compliance data for NatPSAs is published monthly on the Central Alerting System website. Guidance issued to NHS staff in August 2022, outlines the separate roles and responsibilities of the national Patient Safety Team, the region, the Integrated Care Board (ICB) and the providers regarding issuing and complying with alerts. The national team at NHS England has statutory responsibilities for identifying new or under-recognised issues and issuing NatPSAs when required but are not responsible for overseeing compliance. It is the role of ICBs to have local mechanisms in place to support compliance with any actions required in NatPSAs, in line with NHS Standard Contract requirements and the national Patient Safety Strategy. Regions and ICBs are expected to have sight of providers who do not complete actions by the required dates and provide support and assurance where this occurs.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 3 · response
    Published 26 April 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    ICBs are responsible for local compliance mechanisms, while the CQC is responsible for regulatory enforcement of alert implementation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Alert compliance data for NatPSAs is published monthly on the Central Alerting System website. Guidance issued to NHS staff in August 2022, outlines the separate roles and responsibilities of the national Patient Safety Team, the region, the Integrated Care Board (ICB) and the providers regarding issuing and complying with alerts. The national team at NHS England has statutory responsibilities for identifying new or under-recognised issues and issuing NatPSAs when required but are not responsible for overseeing compliance. It is the role of ICBs to have local mechanisms in place to support compliance with any actions required in NatPSAs, in line with NHS Standard Contract requirements and the national Patient Safety Strategy. Regions and ICBs are expected to have sight of providers who do not complete actions by the required dates and provide support and assurance where this occurs.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 3 · response
    Published 26 April 2023

    Open published response
  5. North Wales (East and Central)

    AI-generated summary

    Trevor Reynolds · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Trevor Reynolds died at Glan Clwyd Hospital on 15 May 2021 after a CT scan identified a pulmonary clot that was not acted upon until 10 May, despite the result requiring immediate attention. The inquest found concerns about delays in implementing revised working practices, obtaining staff acknowledgement of the new procedure, and auditing compliance, allowing known risks to patients to continue.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to audit compliance with and effectiveness of introduced changes

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Although it was identified quickly that existing working practices (whereby an irregular scan report had been placed on the desk of a clinician by a secretary and due to the absence of the clinician this report had not been seen and acted upon in a timely manner), the health board did not fully implement a new Standard Operating Procedure, which was introduced to address this issue, until December 2021, seven months after the death of Mr Reynolds. 2. Furthermore an acknowledgement of the existence of the new SOP by Oncology and Haematology Secretaries was not completed until the 22nd of February 2022. 3. Finally at the time of the inquest, eleven days prior to the anniversary of Mr Reynolds’ death the health board had not completed an audit process to ensure that the changes which had been introduced were being complied with and were therefore effective. 4. I am concerned that the length of time which it takes to implement changes and to ensure that new safe working practices are introduced and adopted by staff, results in the health board allowing known risks to patients to continue and therefore presents a risk to life. ”

    Source location

    Trevor Reynolds · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Embed the urgent radiology-results escalation procedure through staff induction, meeting agendas, training, audit and regular review.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Within the Cancer Division, all clinicians and secretaries in oncology and haematology have been made aware of the Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for the Escalation of Urgent Radiology Results Containing Unexpected Findings. The SOP has been added to the Induction Checklist for all new starters who commence within the Cancer Division and it has been added as a regular agenda item on all secretarial meetings. The learning from this matter has been shared with other health board services.”

    Source location

    Response from Betsi Cadwaladr University Health Board
    Page 1 · response
    Published 9 May 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review the clinical-audit approach and align the audit programme with identified risks, including serious incidents and inquest matters.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Additionally, we are currently in the process of reviewing our approach to clinical audit. We will closer align our audit programme with the risks that we have identified through issues such as serious incident reporting and inquest matters. We have also recently procured a new electronic audit system and we are in the process of rolling this out. This system will improve the digital completion of audits and the reporting of assurances.”

    Source location

    Response from Betsi Cadwaladr University Health Board
    Page 3 · response
    Published 9 May 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Roll out the newly procured electronic audit system to improve audit completion and assurance reporting.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Additionally, we are currently in the process of reviewing our approach to clinical audit. We will closer align our audit programme with the risks that we have identified through issues such as serious incident reporting and inquest matters. We have also recently procured a new electronic audit system and we are in the process of rolling this out. This system will improve the digital completion of audits and the reporting of assurances.”

    Source location

    Response from Betsi Cadwaladr University Health Board
    Page 3 · response
    Published 9 May 2022

    Open published response
  6. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Patrick Stephen Moran · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Patrick Stephen Moran was admitted with severe peripheral vascular disease, left foot gangrene and ongoing leg pain. During angiography and angioplasty, he suffered an iliac artery rupture; his left leg became non-viable and was amputated, while his right leg later deteriorated. The report identified concerns about a tenfold insulin dosing error involving use of a standard syringe, the lack of mandatory diabetes and insulin-device training, and the absence of an organisation-wide process to review compliance with safety alerts.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a process to review continued compliance with CAS alerts

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) During the procedure under local anaesthetic on 25 July 2017 Mr Moran continued to bleed due to the unknown existence of the rupture at that time. He developed hyperkalaemia and was administered an insulin-dextrose infusion. He was to be infused 10 units (0.1ml) on insulin but was mistakenly infused with 100 units (1ml). The serious incident investigation identified that the ST4 Anaesthetist did not use an insulin syringe but instead used a normal 1ml syringe. The use of this syringe was common practice within the anaesthetic department in spite of the issue of alert NPSA/2010/RRR013. (2) Since 2010 diabetes was removed from the mandatory training requirements across the organisation. As a result there is currently no mandatory training provided to doctors within the Trust to advise them of use of insulin specific devices when drawing up and administering insulin. It is apparent from the action plan that emails have been sent to Consultant Anaesthetists in this regard. (3) There is currently no process across the organisation to review continued compliance with CAS alerts and ensure that changes made across the Trust still reflect the requirements of previously issued alerts. ”

    Source location

    Patrick Stephen Moran · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  7. Inner South London

    AI-generated summary

    CHRISTOPHER TOKE AJAYI · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Christopher Toke Ajayi, who had schizo-affective disorder and insulin-dependent type II diabetes, was discharged into unsupported accommodation and was found decomposed there on 17 September 2012 after apparently receiving no professional or carer visits for about a month. The report identified concerns about discharge planning, lack of supported accommodation and GP care, failures to communicate his medical needs, and failure to follow up missed appointments, medication and insulin treatment. The inquest found the cause of death to be hyperosmolar non-ketotic coma associated with diabetes mellitus, with neglect contributing.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of audit and assurance of departmental safety changes

    Wider context from the report

    “Mr Ajayi was aged 45 when he died. He had a long history of mental illness and a forensic history. He suffered with severe mental illness with a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia in 1989 which was amended to schizo-affective disorder in 2002. He was a wanderer and also not always compliant with medication. He was single and had little or no contact with his family in the time leading up to his death. In the last hospital admission before his death he was diagnosed with HONK – Hyperosmolar non-Ketotic coma. This means his blood sugar was high. He now required insulin to control his diabetes and he was, when discharged, to administer this to himself twice a day. On the 9th August 2012 there was a discharge planning meeting at the Maudsley (his last hospital admission). His Care Coordinator attended. It was known by then, because of his poor history of being non-compliant, that he would be being discharged with a Community Treatment Order in place. His named Care Coordinator does not seem to recall much about this meeting but has acknowledged that he would have been told that Mr Ajayi was now insulin dependent. From thereon, it appears that nothing of value was done in relation to Mr Ajayi's discharge planning. He was eventually discharged, wrongly, into unsupported accommodation with no care package, where no GP was caring for him and no Diabetic nurse aware of his discharge. Whilst his named Care Coordinator was on leave his colleague, another Care Coordinator, equally did not ensure everything was in place. Both argued that as Mr Ajayi was placed by Southwark Council, after discharge, into accommodation out of the borough, that militated, practically, in relation to them visiting post discharge. No one was to visit him. To use the words that Counsel for the family used, this group of staff (Care Coordinators) carry an enormous responsibility. The job must be carried out with great diligence and care. Staff must be of the right calibre, and have the right training, and support, to carry out their tasks well. The evidence revealed that these members of staff have a high degree of delegation imposed upon them. They are dealing with probably the most vulnerable people in society. It cannot be uncommon for a mentally unwell person to be discharged from hospital whilst suffering from a physical condition. One impinges on the other when that person is required to self-administer life-saving treatment to themselves. Therefore, they are particularly vulnerable. I acknowledge that patients such as Mr Ajayi, who frequently disengage with treatment, can only have their risk of harm/death reduced, not eliminated. However, this case highlighted so very many missed opportunities, mainly within the department of Care Coordinators. I have heard some evidence about resources impinging upon matters. Certainly, in this case, the accommodation which would be available for an individual such as Mr Ajayi (who was on the Sexual Offender's list as well as having the problems cited above), is, and was, limited. However, this report is not concerning that issue. It concerns the ability of this group of staff to carry out their jobs ensuring the lowest possible risk to their users as can be achieved. If necessary, Mr Ajayi should have (as would have been likely), stayed in hospital until the right discharge arrangement was in place (supported accommodation or unsupported with an intensive package of care). The caring element of the Care Coordinator role was missing. I am assured that the team that was responsible for Mr Ajayi's community care have developed a more structured multi-disciplinary approach including monitoring of 7 day follow up and I am told is robustly monitored in respect of compliance with the seven day follow up), and the identification of high risk patients such as Mr Ajayi. I am further assured that discharge planning is expected to be comprehensively and carefully planned before discharge. Sadly, I did not find this evidence reflected in the Care Coordinators' evidence. I have not been shown any audit figures to prove that changes have been checked as in action comprehensively, and the evidence was not impressive in relation to changes within this particular department. No re-training was evident. Both Care Coordinators were experienced and both also knew Mr Ajayi and his history, albeit not acting upon his new diagnosis. The evidence as a whole came across as still a service dealing with extremely vulnerable members of the public, where crucial decisions and follow up impinge directly on those individual's well-being, as well as others in the community. There appears to have been no root and branch overhaul of the department. Further, there was inconsistent evidence as to supervision, which in itself, would only account for supervisory control over some users of the service, at that particular time. I have concerns that the named Care Coordinator told me that his supervision was two weekly, where his manager told me it was monthly. Other than more supervision, I am struggling to find any other tangible changes that I am sure have been made, to prevent this group of staff from allowing the same circumstances to occur again. ”

    Source location

    CHRISTOPHER TOKE AJAYI · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Audit seven-day follow-up and discharges involving patients with unstable diabetes to assess follow-up, communication and forward planning.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• The community team involved have undertaken two specific audits: (a) Team 7 day follow-up performance (Oct-Dec 2014) showed no missed reviews; (b) Discharge of two patients with unstable diabetes (Dec 2014) demonstrated extensive communication and forward planning prior to discharge, appropriately involving all partners.”

    Source location

    2014-0558-Response-by-South-London-and-Maudsley-NHS-Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 31 October 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Audit implementation of discharge planning, follow-up and care-coordinator support, then report and review results through safeguarding and Trust governance committees.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Robust discharge planning and follow up and support to care coordinators are supported by the actions outlined in this report. However, the Trust will undertake an audit in March 2015 to assure itself and partners that implementation has been effective.”

    Source location

    2014-0558-Response-by-South-London-and-Maudsley-NHS-Trust
    Page 8 · response
    Published 31 October 2014

    Open published response
Back to top

Data last updated 7 September 2026