Recurring concern

Unreliable GMP computer system for safety-critical information

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First reported 12 May 2015•Latest report 15 Apr 2016

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of the GMP computer system and its directly associated workflows that impair classification, recording, retrieval, accessibility or timely use of safety-critical information, including occupation details and other information needed for risk assessment.

Not included

Excludes generic police information-sharing, staffing, training or communication deficiencies where the GMP computer system is not the deficient control.
Excludes failures of other named police systems, including the PNC, CAD, Merlin or Lorenzo, unless the assertion explicitly concerns the GMP computer system.
Excludes failures to act on complete and accessible GMP computer-system information when the system itself operated reliably.
Excludes non-safety-related administrative or technical problems that do not affect police risk assessment or operational decisions.

Reports: 2
Individual concerns: 2
Date range: 2015–2016
Stated actions: 4

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Greater Manchester Police2

HM Prison and Probation Service1

Home Office1

Ministry of Defence1

Ministry of Justice1

National Police Chiefs’ Council1

Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust1

Security Industry Authority1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

15 Apr2016
Manchester South
Concerns raised1
1. Failure of the GMP computer system to provide officers with timely access to important information
This report raised 3 other concerns. They are not shown here because they do not form part of this recurring concern.
Responses linked to these concerns
Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.
Actions described in response 2
1. Action
  Replace separate command, control, custody, intelligence, work allocation and property systems through the IS Transformation Programme.
  Stated by Greater Manchester PoliceStated in progress
2. Action
  Distribute mobile technology to operational staff to provide frontline officers direct access to GMP systems and information.
  Stated by Greater Manchester PoliceStated in progress
AI-generated summary

Adele Blakeman · Prevention of Future Deaths report

This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

Report summary

Adele Blakeman, who had a history of mental health difficulties and self-harming behaviour, died after taking her own life at Gateley Railway Station on 28 September 2015. The substantive concerns included failures in police information recording and access, classification and escalation of the call, timely allocation of resources, and understanding of the role of the Missing Persons Unit.

Read the report on judiciary.uk
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure of the GMP computer system to provide officers with timely access to important information
Wider context from the report
“1. The GMP computer system hinders officers and does not afford them easy access to important information within the time scales they have available to them, in order for them to adequately assess a situation. Concerns around the efficiency of GMPs antiquated computer system have been raised now on a number of occasions and have featured in several inquests ”
Source location
Adele Blakeman · Prevention of Future Deaths report
Page 2 · concerns
Open source report
Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
Replace separate command, control, custody, intelligence, work allocation and property systems through the IS Transformation Programme.

Verbatim wording from the response
“GMP is investing significantly in the replacement of technology through the IS Transformation Programme to replace existing separate command and control, custody, intelligence, work allocation, and property systems with one user experience and a more intelligence information management process that enables partner agency information sharing (iOPS). The programme will also improve integration of components outside of these core systems, replace ageing data warehouse capabilities and moving to a data centre managed externally by a reliable supplier. Also as part of this programme of work, mobile technology is being distributed to operational staff which is already demonstrating through a pilot site a significant forwards step in information access, input, and decision-making.”

Source location
2016-0145-Response-by-Greater-Manchester-Police
Page 1 · response
Published 15 April 2016
Open published response
Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
Distribute mobile technology to operational staff to provide frontline officers direct access to GMP systems and information.

Verbatim wording from the response
“GMP is investing significantly in the replacement of technology through the IS Transformation Programme to replace existing separate command and control, custody, intelligence, work allocation, and property systems with one user experience and a more intelligence information management process that enables partner agency information sharing (iOPS). The programme will also improve integration of components outside of these core systems, replace ageing data warehouse capabilities and moving to a data centre managed externally by a reliable supplier. Also as part of this programme of work, mobile technology is being distributed to operational staff which is already demonstrating through a pilot site a significant forwards step in information access, input, and decision-making.”

Source location
2016-0145-Response-by-Greater-Manchester-Police
Page 1 · response
Published 15 April 2016
Open published response
12 May2015
Manchester South
Concerns raised1
1. Lack of recording of offenders' bail conditions
This report raised 15 other concerns. They are not shown here because they do not form part of this recurring concern.
Responses linked to these concerns
Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.
Actions described in response 2
1. Action
  Use nationwide Libra and Portal systems to record bail conditions accurately and consistently.
  Stated by HM Prison and Probation ServiceStated completed
2. Action
  Remind staff to record bail conditions accurately on Libra and Portal in every case.
  Stated by HM Prison and Probation ServiceStated planned
Respondent positions 2
1. Position
  Greater Manchester Police is responsible for responding specifically about its handling of the individual’s bail conditions.
  Stated by Home OfficeRedirects responsibility
1. Position
  The current PNC process is considered a tried and tested reliable system for identifying bail conditions, despite occasional human error.
  Stated by Greater Manchester PoliceExisting arrangements considered sufficient
AI-generated summary

Paul Mc Guigan · Prevention of Future Deaths report

This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

Report summary

Paul Mc Guigan was shot and unlawfully killed by a close protection work colleague on 9 August 2009 while both were working as armed private security contractors in Baghdad. The report identified missed opportunities and failings in managing the offender’s escalating offending behaviour and risk, and stated that G4S had not adequately vetted him before deployment. Concerns also included failures in information sharing, recording bail conditions, police disclosure processes, and the supervision and risk assessment of offenders.

Read the report on judiciary.uk
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Lack of recording of offenders' bail conditions
Wider context from the report
“I heard evidence that in respect of GMP systems and processes there was nowhere on the GMP computer system where bail conditions are recorded, although this used to be possible. It is of concern that there is no system of recording on the GMP computer of offenders bail conditions so that this information can be known by officers and appropriately shared. ”
Source location
Paul Mc Guigan · Prevention of Future Deaths report
Page 2 · concerns
Open source report
Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
Use nationwide Libra and Portal systems to record bail conditions accurately and consistently.

Verbatim wording from the response
“A major contributory factor to the tragic sequence of events that resulted in the murder of Paul McGuigan was the failure by agencies involved properly to record and share information about the residence condition in ████████ bail order. In 2009, bail conditions were recorded manually. This proved to be problematic in ████████ case, as his bail conditions were not recorded accurately or consistently and were overlooked by the offender manager as well as by partner organisations and additionally by the court at a subsequent appearance. We have taken steps to ensure accurate recording of conditions by introducing two nationwide ICT systems – Libra for magistrates’ courts and Portal for the Crown Court. Staff have been trained in the use of these systems and we will remind them of the importance of accurate recording of bail conditions on these systems in all cases.”

Source location
2015-0185-Response-by-Greater-Manchester-Police-NOMS-SIA
Page 5 · response
Published 12 May 2015
Open published response
Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
Remind staff to record bail conditions accurately on Libra and Portal in every case.

Verbatim wording from the response
“A major contributory factor to the tragic sequence of events that resulted in the murder of Paul McGuigan was the failure by agencies involved properly to record and share information about the residence condition in ████████ bail order. In 2009, bail conditions were recorded manually. This proved to be problematic in ████████ case, as his bail conditions were not recorded accurately or consistently and were overlooked by the offender manager as well as by partner organisations and additionally by the court at a subsequent appearance. We have taken steps to ensure accurate recording of conditions by introducing two nationwide ICT systems – Libra for magistrates’ courts and Portal for the Crown Court. Staff have been trained in the use of these systems and we will remind them of the importance of accurate recording of bail conditions on these systems in all cases.”

Source location
2015-0185-Response-by-Greater-Manchester-Police-NOMS-SIA
Page 5 · response
Published 12 May 2015
Open published response
Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
Greater Manchester Police is responsible for responding specifically about its handling of the individual’s bail conditions.

Verbatim wording from the response
“Finally, you raise a concern in relation to the recording and sharing of the bail conditions imposed on Daniel Fitzwilliam in May 2009. Greater Manchester Police will need to respond specifically in relation to their handling of this. More generally, all bail conditions are recorded by the court. Where necessary, agencies are informed immediately of the nature of such conditions. The conditions and their practical effect should be made clear to the defendant.”

Source location
2015-0185-Response-by-Home-Office
Page 2 · response
Published 12 May 2015
Open published response
Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
The current PNC process is considered a tried and tested reliable system for identifying bail conditions, despite occasional human error.

Verbatim wording from the response
“I am entirely satisfied with the current process in GMP. It is clear that the official reference point for bail conditions is the PNC. Whilst there will always be errors in human systems, we have a tried and tested reliable system.”

Source location
2015-0185-Response-by-Greater-Manchester-Police-NOMS-SIA
Page 2 · response
Published 12 May 2015
Open published response

Data last updated 7 September 2026

What this concern includes

Not included

Reports over time

Concerns raised1

Failure of the GMP computer system to provide officers with timely access to important information

Actions described in response An action is something a respondent says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to the concern raised.2

Concerns raised1

Lack of recording of offenders' bail conditions

Actions described in response An action is something a respondent says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to the concern raised.2

Respondent positions A position is what a respondent says about the concern when they do not describe a specific action.2

Actions described in response 2

Actions described in response 2

Respondent positions 2