Recurring concern

Inadequate safety controls at high-risk road junctions

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First reported 2 Dec 2013•Latest report 11 Dec 2025

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures or hazards in road-junction layouts and dedicated safety controls where recurring collisions or serious collision risk indicate that the junction is not reliably made safe, including layout, signage, markings, speed or other junction-specific mitigation measures.

Not included

  • Excludes generic road-safety, highway-maintenance or collision concerns without a material road-junction safety condition.
  • Excludes failures limited to a specific road-marking, signage or inspection process where junction safety is not the shared unsafe condition.
  • Excludes pedestrian-crossing, railway, vehicle-design and non-junction hazards unless the assertion directly concerns safety of the road junction.
  • Excludes a single isolated collision or factual hazard where no continuing deficiency or recurring collision risk is identified.
Reports
55

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
85

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2025

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
126

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

National Highways8
Department for Transport6
Office of the Chief Coroner4
Transport for London4
Lincolnshire County Council3
Recipient name withheld3
A-One+2
Apple (UK) Limited2
Birmingham City Council2
Google UK Limited2
Leicester City Council2
Nottinghamshire County Council2
Slough Borough Council2
TomTom2
Wiltshire Council2

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Leicester City and South Leicestershire

    AI-generated summary

    Paul Millis · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Paul Millis died after riding his motorbike through the junction of Troon Way and Nicklaus Road in Leicester and colliding head-on with a car on 3 December 2013. The principal concerns were the short distances over which two lanes merged and opposing traffic joined, potentially causing delayed lines of sight, together with the acute movement of one lane into the carriageway.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delayed lines of sight between opposing traffic flows

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The merger of the 2 lanes occurs within a very short distance of the junction: approximately 35 metres. The process of merger by the 2 lanes is that the traffic moves in opposite directions – i.e. the inner lane moves to the right, thereby avoiding the verge, and the outer lane is directed by arrows to the left. 2. The westbound carriageway merges as described, and then as a single lane continues to the right until it straightens out into a single carriageway adjoining the eastbound traffic. The joining of the two flows of traffic occurs only 90 metres after the junction described above. 3. The situation described in 2 above means that any vehicle either behind another vehicle, or even beside it, will have a very delayed line of sight for traffic travelling eastbound, and likewise applies to eastbound traffic’s line of sight to a vehicle behind a first vehicle travelling westbound. As stated all of this movement of traffic is occurring in a very short distance and time. 4. It would appear that when the inner lane makes its sudden, very acute move to the right, that there is vacant verge area that would have allowed the lane to move less acutely. ”

    Source location

    Paul Millis · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Insufficient separation between the junction, lane merger and joining traffic flows

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The merger of the 2 lanes occurs within a very short distance of the junction: approximately 35 metres. The process of merger by the 2 lanes is that the traffic moves in opposite directions – i.e. the inner lane moves to the right, thereby avoiding the verge, and the outer lane is directed by arrows to the left. 2. The westbound carriageway merges as described, and then as a single lane continues to the right until it straightens out into a single carriageway adjoining the eastbound traffic. The joining of the two flows of traffic occurs only 90 metres after the junction described above. 3. The situation described in 2 above means that any vehicle either behind another vehicle, or even beside it, will have a very delayed line of sight for traffic travelling eastbound, and likewise applies to eastbound traffic’s line of sight to a vehicle behind a first vehicle travelling westbound. As stated all of this movement of traffic is occurring in a very short distance and time. 4. It would appear that when the inner lane makes its sudden, very acute move to the right, that there is vacant verge area that would have allowed the lane to move less acutely. ”

    Source location

    Paul Millis · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Acute rightward movement of the inner lane

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The merger of the 2 lanes occurs within a very short distance of the junction: approximately 35 metres. The process of merger by the 2 lanes is that the traffic moves in opposite directions – i.e. the inner lane moves to the right, thereby avoiding the verge, and the outer lane is directed by arrows to the left. 2. The westbound carriageway merges as described, and then as a single lane continues to the right until it straightens out into a single carriageway adjoining the eastbound traffic. The joining of the two flows of traffic occurs only 90 metres after the junction described above. 3. The situation described in 2 above means that any vehicle either behind another vehicle, or even beside it, will have a very delayed line of sight for traffic travelling eastbound, and likewise applies to eastbound traffic’s line of sight to a vehicle behind a first vehicle travelling westbound. As stated all of this movement of traffic is occurring in a very short distance and time. 4. It would appear that when the inner lane makes its sudden, very acute move to the right, that there is vacant verge area that would have allowed the lane to move less acutely. ”

    Source location

    Paul Millis · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Undertake a fourth road safety audit after 12 months, reviewing serious accident records and causes and making recommendations on potential design and safety issues.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A fourth safety audit is required to be undertaken after 12 months. This will take into account records of accidents and make recommendations for any changes where significant levels of risk to users are identified.”

    Source location

    2014-0176-Response
    Page 2 · response
    Published 17 April 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The junction design complies with mandatory standards, and the merge length, alignment, visibility and traffic arrangement are considered reasonable and customary.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I can confirm and provide assurance that the highway design does comply with relevant standards, including the Design Manual for Roads and Bridges (Volume 6, Section 2, Part 3 - TD 50/04). I can also confirm that although the A563 Troon Way is not a trunk road, the higher design standards for trunk roads have been applied during the design process. In particular, the mandatory standards relating to visibility on approach to junctions have been met.”

    Source location

    2014-0176-Response
    Page 1 · response
    Published 17 April 2014

    Open published response

  2. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Francis Nelson GOLDING · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Francis Nelson Golding, aged 59, died after the pedal cycle he was riding collided with a left-turning coach at the junction of Vernon Place and Southampton Row in London. The inquest heard that three cyclists had died at the junction in the previous ten years in collisions with left-turning vehicles, and raised concerns that the junction left cyclists particularly vulnerable, including because of the oncoming bus lane. Early consideration of improvements to the junction was requested.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Particular vulnerability of cyclists at the junction

    Wider context from the report

    “During the course of the inquest, I heard evidence of three fatalities at this junction in the last ten years, each involving a cyclist colliding with a left turning vehicle. Whilst of course every road user has a responsibility to take care at junctions, it does seem that this junction leaves cyclists particularly vulnerable. There is also, I heard, an issue with the oncoming bus lane not leaving any additional space for cycles. ”

    Source location

    Francis Nelson GOLDING · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Commission traffic consultants to model signals across the Holborn area scheme, including Vernon Place and Southampton Row, and assess options for improving cyclist facilities.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A brief will be issued to traffic consultants by the end of May 2014 to invite tenders for the next stage of development. Consultants will be commissioned to undertake traffic signal modelling for the whole Holborn area based scheme area, which includes the Southampton Row/Vernon Place junction. Under the current programme it is anticipated that consultants will be appointed in mid June 2014. A range of options will be considered as part of this commission which will explore possibilities to significantly improve facilities for cyclists. This stage of the process is expected to take 9 months.”

    Source location

    2014-0136-Response-by-Camden-Council
    Page 5 · response
    Published 14 April 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Collision data shows no consistent pattern at the junction requiring targeted safety action based on the reported cyclist vulnerability.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Collision statistics As part of Camden’s approach to improving road safety, officers undertake a robust analysis of casualty data for the whole borough, to identify those locations (corridors and neighbourhoods) with the highest number of KSI (killed and seriously injured) over the most recent three year period. This analysis includes looking at a level of detail that will enable officers to identify patterns or common issues, such as being a ‘left hook’ issue or all collisions occurring at a particular time of day (light or dark). This is the standard industry approach and is considered a sufficient period of time to pick up trends and identify areas of concern, not least to reflect that as traffic and vehicle movement patterns change over time, situations can be very different from longer periods ago.”

    Source location

    2014-0136-Response-by-Camden-Council
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 April 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Significant signal changes require Transport for London’s agreement and implementation, and it can veto highway works affecting the strategic road network.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The road network in Camden is large and complex with a number of different demands and it is necessary for Camden to take a strategic view of that network when implementing change and developing proposals. Implementing changes to any signal junction on the central London network impacts upon the wider area, and the result is that no significant change at any one location can or should be considered in isolation. Furthermore, the introduction of such changes is not solely within the control of Camden as it would require working closely with and approval from TfL, particularly in relation to what the wider impacts would be. I explain the wider roles of each authority below.”

    Source location

    2014-0136-Response-by-Camden-Council
    Page 3 · response
    Published 14 April 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implementation of major junction changes cannot occur immediately because it depends on consultation, funding and coordination with other projects.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A brief will be issued to traffic consultants by the end of May 2014 to invite tenders for the next stage of development. Consultants will be commissioned to undertake traffic signal modelling for the whole Holborn area based scheme area, which includes the Southampton Row/Vernon Place junction. Under the current programme it is anticipated that consultants will be appointed in mid June 2014. A range of options will be considered as part of this commission which will explore possibilities to significantly improve facilities for cyclists. This stage of the process is expected to take 9 months.”

    Source location

    2014-0136-Response-by-Camden-Council
    Page 5 · response
    Published 14 April 2014

    Open published response

  3. Berkshire

    AI-generated summary

    Kenneth Gerald Aldridge · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Kenneth Gerald Aldridge, aged 68, died after the car he was driving collided with another vehicle on the A4 near Woolhampton and then crashed into a tree. The principal concern was the appropriateness and potential danger of access to a service road from a 70-mile-per-hour dual carriageway, including vehicles turning into or pulling out of the service road.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inappropriate location of the service-road access on a 70-mile-per-hour dual carriageway

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) For a vehicle to turn in to the service road running parallel to the A4 it would be necessary to slow considerably and then effect the manoeuvre. It is not possible to make a complete manoeuvre round to the left without then forming a u-turn which is not possible without either reversing and going forward again or encroaching onto the outside lane of the A4 to make a sweeping manoeuvre into the access. (2) In the course of the evidence, the Collision Investigator who investigated the crash on behalf of Thames Valley Police suggested that the ability to make such a manoeuvre on a fast dual carriageway is potentially dangerous. While the Officer expressed concerns about turning in, he was also concerned about vehicles pulling out of the service road on to the dual carriageway. (3) The evidence therefore gave rise to concern at the appropriateness of having an access to the service road at such a location, particularly given a speed limit of 70 miles per hour at that point. ”

    Source location

    Kenneth Gerald Aldridge · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce a 50mph speed limit on the A4, with its eastern start relocated approximately 140 metres west of the advertised location.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The speed limit on the A4 between the two A340 roundabouts was considered by the Council’s Speed Limit Task Group at its meeting in April 2010 when it was agreed that further traffic survey information was required. This section was reconsidered again in December 2010 when it was agreed to introduce a 50mph speed limit to cover the junctions with Beenham Industrial Estate and Beenham village. The task group also agreed that the existing speed limit on the remaining length of the A4, which included the dual carriageway, was appropriate.”

    Source location

    2014-0071-Response-by-West-Berkshire-Council
    Page 1 · response
    Published 24 February 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Consult local ward members and parish councils on proposals to block the first service-road entrance and create a replacement access.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To improve access into the service road the first entrance could be blocked up and a new access created as shown on the enclosed plan 213/002. This would prevent ‘U turn’ manoeuvres. However this could have the effect of vehicles entering the service road at speed. Due to the change in the nature of the road it is proposed to consult the local ward members and parish councils on the proposals and I will contact you again when I have received the comments to the consultation.”

    Source location

    2014-0071-Response-by-West-Berkshire-Council
    Page 3 · response
    Published 24 February 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The existing speed limit on the dual carriageway is considered appropriate and does not need reconsideration.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The speed limit on the A4 between the two A340 roundabouts was considered by the Council’s Speed Limit Task Group at its meeting in April 2010 when it was agreed that further traffic survey information was required. This section was reconsidered again in December 2010 when it was agreed to introduce a 50mph speed limit to cover the junctions with Beenham Industrial Estate and Beenham village. The task group also agreed that the existing speed limit on the remaining length of the A4, which included the dual carriageway, was appropriate.”

    Source location

    2014-0071-Response-by-West-Berkshire-Council
    Page 1 · response
    Published 24 February 2014

    Open published response

  4. Dorset

    AI-generated summary

    DANIEL WARWICK JONES · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Daniel Warwick Jones died from multiple injuries in a road traffic collision while riding a motorcycle on the A356, where his motorcycle collided with a motorcar turning right into a side-road junction. The inquest heard concerns that road users were unaware of the junction warning signage and road markings, and that signage, overtaking restrictions and speed limits at or near junctions may require consideration.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide sufficiently conspicuous warning and directional signage at A356 junctions

    Wider context from the report

    “The court heard evidence from the car driver and her passenger, a rider of another motorcycle who was out with the deceased, two further independent witnesses and finally the Police Officer who conducted the accident investigation. It became clear from a number of witnesses who used the road on a regular basis that they were aware that there was a junction at this point but were unaware of the roadside warning triangle sign to indicate a junction or of the white arrow painted on the road surface to direct traffic travelling in the same direction as the deceased to pull into the nearside carriageway. This road is subject to 60 mph speed limit. Consideration needs to be given to improving the signage at this junction. Either by marking double white lines on the A356 to tell users that they must not overtake or improving the size and position of warning triangles indicating there is a junction, or both of those improvements together with anything further that would prevent a further accident at this junction. Further whether the speed limit at or around junctions on this road need to be reduced. The Police Officer who is an experienced road traffic officer who has to provide accident reports to the Coroners and other Courts was of the view that the signage at all junctions along the A356 may need to be considered. The inquest of course only heard evidence in connection with this junction. ”

    Source location

    DANIEL WARWICK JONES · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    60 mph speed limit at or around road junctions

    Wider context from the report

    “The court heard evidence from the car driver and her passenger, a rider of another motorcycle who was out with the deceased, two further independent witnesses and finally the Police Officer who conducted the accident investigation. It became clear from a number of witnesses who used the road on a regular basis that they were aware that there was a junction at this point but were unaware of the roadside warning triangle sign to indicate a junction or of the white arrow painted on the road surface to direct traffic travelling in the same direction as the deceased to pull into the nearside carriageway. This road is subject to 60 mph speed limit. Consideration needs to be given to improving the signage at this junction. Either by marking double white lines on the A356 to tell users that they must not overtake or improving the size and position of warning triangles indicating there is a junction, or both of those improvements together with anything further that would prevent a further accident at this junction. Further whether the speed limit at or around junctions on this road need to be reduced. The Police Officer who is an experienced road traffic officer who has to provide accident reports to the Coroners and other Courts was of the view that the signage at all junctions along the A356 may need to be considered. The inquest of course only heard evidence in connection with this junction. ”

    Source location

    DANIEL WARWICK JONES · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Erect additional “Side Road Ahead” warning signs with distance plates on both approaches to the junction.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The County Council will erect additional 'Side Road Ahead' warning signs on the offside, on both approaches to the above junction, along with distance plates at the first of the existing deflection arrow road markings. A 'SLOW' road marking will also be laid for eastbound traffic on the nearside.”

    Source location

    2014-0049-Response-by-Dorset-County-Council
    Page 3 · response
    Published 3 February 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lay a “SLOW” road marking for eastbound traffic near the junction.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The County Council will erect additional 'Side Road Ahead' warning signs on the offside, on both approaches to the above junction, along with distance plates at the first of the existing deflection arrow road markings. A 'SLOW' road marking will also be laid for eastbound traffic on the nearside.”

    Source location

    2014-0049-Response-by-Dorset-County-Council
    Page 3 · response
    Published 3 February 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The national speed limit remains appropriate for the A356 because its class, conditions and collision record do not justify a lower limit.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The road is subject to the national speed limit since this is appropriate to the class and conditions generally found along the A356. Lower limits are used to protect communities from traffic travelling at unreasonable speeds in built-up areas. 50mph limits are used on some routes or sections of road with a poor collision record but this does not apply in the case of the A356 in Dorset.”

    Source location

    2014-0049-Response-by-Dorset-County-Council
    Page 3 · response
    Published 3 February 2014

    Open published response

  5. West Yorkshire (Western)

    AI-generated summary

    Karl Olaf Nilsson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Karl Olaf Nilsson died minutes after suffering catastrophic injuries in a motorcycle collision at the junction of Victoria Road and the A657 Saltaire Road on 14 October 2012. The report raised concerns that the junction’s layout and the visibility of the STOP sign may have contributed to the fatality, and noted that this was the only junction along Victoria Road where drivers did not have right of way.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inconsistent driver priority at the junction

    Wider context from the report

    “1. There are a number of factors which could, in my opinion have caused or contributed to this fatality. Victoria Road is an absolutely straight road which is aligned in almost a perfect north-south direction. It is a wide avenue type of road, with large trees visible on both the east and west pavements. On both sides of the road there are parking bays, and the cars are able to park fully on the road, whilst still leaving ample room for cars to pass in both directions. The layout is the same on both sections of Victoria Road – both before and after it is bisected by the A657 Saltaire Road. There is a gradient of approximately 1:7 stretching uphill from north to south. The slope of the road is only interrupted by the A657, which is perfectly level, but due to the slope of the road, it is not seen until the driver is approximately 20 meters from the junction. Moreover, due to the slope of the road, the STOP sign and stop line painted on the road is only really visible when the driver is approximately 20 meters from the junction. The overall layout of the road (i.e. it being perfectly straight with a sort of symmetrical appearance on both sides) contrives to almost create an optical illusion. The driver’s eye is drawn to the horizon in the centre – and as such, the STOP sign at the mouth of the junction is only in the driver’s peripheral vision. 2. I am concerned that the overall layout of this junction was a substantial contributing factor to this fatal accident. 3. I am concerned that the STOP sign is not clearly visible in its current 4. Furthermore, I understand from the evidence which was given to me that this is the only junction on the entire length of Victoria Road where the driver does not have right of way. It is possible that Mr Nilsson became confused as to where he was on Victoria Road. ”

    Source location

    Karl Olaf Nilsson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the junction layout to provide clear driver orientation

    Wider context from the report

    “1. There are a number of factors which could, in my opinion have caused or contributed to this fatality. Victoria Road is an absolutely straight road which is aligned in almost a perfect north-south direction. It is a wide avenue type of road, with large trees visible on both the east and west pavements. On both sides of the road there are parking bays, and the cars are able to park fully on the road, whilst still leaving ample room for cars to pass in both directions. The layout is the same on both sections of Victoria Road – both before and after it is bisected by the A657 Saltaire Road. There is a gradient of approximately 1:7 stretching uphill from north to south. The slope of the road is only interrupted by the A657, which is perfectly level, but due to the slope of the road, it is not seen until the driver is approximately 20 meters from the junction. Moreover, due to the slope of the road, the STOP sign and stop line painted on the road is only really visible when the driver is approximately 20 meters from the junction. The overall layout of the road (i.e. it being perfectly straight with a sort of symmetrical appearance on both sides) contrives to almost create an optical illusion. The driver’s eye is drawn to the horizon in the centre – and as such, the STOP sign at the mouth of the junction is only in the driver’s peripheral vision. 2. I am concerned that the overall layout of this junction was a substantial contributing factor to this fatal accident. 3. I am concerned that the STOP sign is not clearly visible in its current 4. Furthermore, I understand from the evidence which was given to me that this is the only junction on the entire length of Victoria Road where the driver does not have right of way. It is possible that Mr Nilsson became confused as to where he was on Victoria Road. ”

    Source location

    Karl Olaf Nilsson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Construct the junction improvement scheme with stronger signing, lining, junction demarcation, detection loops and queue-triggered puffin crossing control.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A public realm scheme for Victoria Road has recently been awarded funding. This will involve the restoration of Victoria Road back to it's historical beginnings. One of the proposals is to remove all the trees for both sides of Victoria Road as the trees were a later addition to Victoria Road and did not feature in the original plan for the street. A consultant is currently taking place on this. As part of the public realm/safety improvements, a junction improvement scheme is about to be constructed (please find attached plan). The design incorporates stronger signing and lining and a clear, on-road demarcation of the junction from both approaches into Saltaire Road. An addition of detection loops to Victoria Road will assist with right turning vehicles into Saltaire Road. A puffin crossing 10 yards away from the junction will be triggered (i.e.”

    Source location

    Response from Bradford Metropolitan District Council
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 February 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Remove five trees at each corner of the junction to improve visibility.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I concur with your assessment of the junction under Item 5, Coroner's concerns with the exception of 5.6. The trees (trunks and canopies) assisted with the uneven effect by masking the building lines at the junction. Therefore the optical illusion effect was enhanced by this. This was qualified by attending police officers at the time of the incident. Under my duties as Principal Engineer, I arranged for five trees to be removed at each corner of the junction. This immediately opened up the building lines and improved the visibility of the junction.”

    Source location

    Response from Bradford Metropolitan District Council
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 February 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The assessment under item 5.6 is disputed: trees masked building lines and enhanced the junction’s optical illusion.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I concur with your assessment of the junction under Item 5, Coroner's concerns with the exception of 5.6. The trees (trunks and canopies) assisted with the uneven effect by masking the building lines at the junction. Therefore the optical illusion effect was enhanced by this. This was qualified by attending police officers at the time of the incident. Under my duties as Principal Engineer, I arranged for five trees to be removed at each corner of the junction. This immediately opened up the building lines and improved the visibility of the junction.”

    Source location

    Response from Bradford Metropolitan District Council
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 February 2014

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026