Recurring concern

Unreliable hospital pre-alert systems

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First reported 9 Sep 2013•Latest report 19 May 2025

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures in the dedicated hospital pre-alert process, including deciding when a pre-alert is required, assigning responsibility for making it, conveying relevant clinical information to the hospital and auditing or assuring the system's effectiveness.

Not included

  • Excludes general ambulance, referral or clinical communication failures where no hospital pre-alert process is identified.
  • Excludes failures in hospital assessment, treatment or handover after the pre-alert has been reliably made and received.
  • Excludes generic audit, training or accountability deficiencies unless they directly impair the hospital pre-alert process.
  • Excludes routine notifications that do not function as a pre-alert for a seriously unwell patient.
Reports
5

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
6

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2025

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
13

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Ambulnz Community Partners Ltd.1
Department of Health and Social Care1
Dinnington Group Practice1
Kent Central Ambulance Service Ltd1
London Ambulance Service NHS Trust1
Northern Care Alliance NHS Foundation Trust1
North West Ambulance Service NHS Trust1
Welsh Ambulance Services NHS Trust1
Whittington Health NHS Trust1
Yorkshire Ambulance Service NHS Trust1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. North East Kent

    AI-generated summary

    Emily Rose STOKES · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Emily Stokes, a 17-year-old looked after child, became critically unwell after apparently taking MDMA at a music festival and died after suffering a cardiac arrest in hospital. Concerns included limited training of private ambulance staff in managing illicit substance use, unclear responsibility for pre-alerting the hospital, and ambulance equipment that was less comprehensive than that of an NHS ambulance.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of clarity about responsibility for making pre-alert calls to hospital

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) There was a lack of clarity regarding who had responsibility for making a pre alert call to the hospital and given this young girl was significantly unwell this should have been done. This in part may have been due to the lack of recognition of the seriousness of her symptoms and therefore potentially linked with training of staff. ”

    Source location

    Emily Rose STOKES · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Mandate internal clinical escalation through the Clinical Support Line and empower crews to pre-alert hospitals independently when concerned or uncertain.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Action Taken:”

    Source location

    Response from Kent Central Ambulance Service
    Page 6 · response
    Published 28 July 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver refresher training for all crews on hospital pre-alert criteria and documentation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• We have clarified our internal clinical escalation protocol, which now mandates that: ◦ If a crew has any concern, they must escalate via the Clinical Support Line, regardless of other clinician directions. ◦ Crews are now explicitly empowered to pre-alert independently if in doubt.”

    Source location

    Response from Kent Central Ambulance Service
    Page 6 · response
    Published 28 July 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Create and distribute a Medical Operational Plan for every event, covering staffing, response structure, communications and escalation pathways.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3. Mandatory Medical Operational Plans (MOPs)”

    Source location

    Response from Kent Central Ambulance Service
    Page 7 · response
    Published 28 July 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Distribute an event-readiness checklist covering equipment, clinical signs, contacts, escalation, hospital pre-alerts and documentation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “6. Deployment of Event Readiness Checklist”

    Source location

    Response from Kent Central Ambulance Service
    Page 7 · response
    Published 28 July 2025

    Open published response
  2. North Wales (East and Central)

    AI-generated summary

    Samantha Brousas · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Samantha Brousas became critically ill with suspected sepsis and was taken to hospital, where she was diagnosed with septic shock secondary to pneumonia and died from a naturally occurring infection. The report identified concerns about the absence of a pre-alert to the emergency department, the inability of paramedics to administer intravenous antibiotics, and the lack of a clear process for escalating concerns about delayed admission.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to require pre-alerts for suspected sepsis in life-threatening time-critical situations

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) During the course of the inquest I heard evidence that the two paramedics who attended the home address of the deceased identified her as having a NEWS score of 13 with suspected sepsis. Both paramedics made a joint decision not to pre alert the emergency department at Wrexham Maelor hospital whilst being aware that there were already ambulances waiting outside the emergency department. I heard evidence that this was against the Joint Royal Colleges Ambulance Liaison Committee (JRCALC) clinical guidelines that if sepsis is identified an alert SHOULD be made. At that time the Welsh Ambulance Service Trust (WAST) had in effect a Clinical Notice regarding the use of the ASCHICE mnemonic but not the circumstances under which it was to be used creating room for discretion to be exercised. It was accepted as part of a WAST investigation that a pre-alert should have been used. My finding on the evidence was that ‘the absence of a pre alert meant that the ED had no opportunity to prepare for Sam’s arrival and there could have then been no doubt as to the severity of her illness or her condition’ and ‘it would least have had the effect of alerting the department that a critically unwell patient was on their way and enabling them to make efforts to find or make a bed for the deceased’. To be clear my finding was that the absence of a pre alert did not affect the outcome. I heard evidence that in December 2018 WAST issued a further clinical notice clarifying the expectations for the use of the pre alert but this fell short of a mandatory requirement for a pre alert for suspected sepsis. My concern is that this creates a direction which is not compatible with the JRCALC guidelines and may result in a similar situation where a pre alert is not used in a life threatening time critical situation as happened with the deceased, which may present a risk to life. ”

    Source location

    Samantha Brousas · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement pre-alert guidance for suspected sepsis, developed with Welsh Health Board clinical directors and the Royal College of Emergency Medicine Wales.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “At the time that the incident occurred, the Trust did not have pre-alert guidance in place. This was rectified in December 2018. The guidance was developed in conjunction with the Clinical Directors from each Health Board Area in Wales and Royal College of Emergency Medicine Wales. [ref Clinical Notice 16/2018]”

    Source location

    2019-0443-Response-from-the-Welsh-Ambulance-Services
    Page 1 · response
    Published 3 January 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver mandatory training and a national education session to help emergency medical services staff recognise sepsis red flags and use pre-alerts.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The 2017 Joint Royal Colleges Ambulance Liaison Committee (JRCALC) Supplementary Guidelines stated a pre-alert should be given for suspected sepsis, a message that was further reinforced on the Trust’s pre-alert guidance. In addition, the updated 2017 sepsis guidelines were covered during the 2018/19 mandatory training”

    Source location

    2019-0443-Response-from-the-Welsh-Ambulance-Services
    Page 1 · response
    Published 3 January 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    An exhaustive mandatory pre-alert policy is not feasible because clinical circumstances are too complex for an all-encompassing list.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It would not be feasible to create a policy which dictated all circumstances in which a pre-alert is needed as, by logical extension, doing so would also create a (longer) list of conditions that do not require pre-alert.”

    Source location

    2019-0443-Response-from-the-Welsh-Ambulance-Services
    Page 2 · response
    Published 3 January 2020

    Open published response
  3. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Fern-Marie CHOYA · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Fern-Marie Choya died from hypovolaemic shock caused by massive intra-abdominal bleeding following rupture of the abdominal gravid uterus during a monochorionic diamniotic pregnancy. Concerns included failure to communicate her pregnancy during the pre-hospital alert and on hospital arrival, a 16-minute delay in recognising the pregnancy and calling the obstetric team, and treatment focused on possible pulmonary embolism before free fluid was identified.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to include pregnancy information in pre-hospital alerts

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The London Ambulance Service (LAS) emergency operations centre (EOC) made a pre hospital alert telephone call to the Whittington Hospital emergency department, regarding the expected arrival eight minutes later of a patient in respiratory arrest. This was good practice. However, they failed to include in that alert the information that Ms Choya was pregnant. This was a crucial detail, which had been passed to the LAS at the very outset by her husband, and then again to the EOC by the emergency medical crew on scene. ”

    Source location

    Fern-Marie CHOYA · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Complete an EOC observation session for the crew to support learning from the incident.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Prior to the Inquest, a meeting was held with the crew regarding this incident and feedback provided during this de-brief meeting. In addition, the crew are also to attend an observation session in the EOC for learning purposes (to be completed by 14 October 2019). Furthermore, the relevant Clinical Team Leader will be reviewing, with the crew, what they have learnt from that session and seeking confirmation that they will be following a structured approach every time they share information with the EOC about patients or hand them over to an emergency department in the future.”

    Source location

    2019-0281-Resposne-by-London-Ambulance-Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 18 October 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review the crew’s learning from the EOC observation and confirm use of a structured information-sharing and handover approach.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Prior to the Inquest, a meeting was held with the crew regarding this incident and feedback provided during this de-brief meeting. In addition, the crew are also to attend an observation session in the EOC for learning purposes (to be completed by 14 October 2019). Furthermore, the relevant Clinical Team Leader will be reviewing, with the crew, what they have learnt from that session and seeking confirmation that they will be following a structured approach every time they share information with the EOC about patients or hand them over to an emergency department in the future.”

    Source location

    2019-0281-Resposne-by-London-Ambulance-Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 18 October 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update pre-alert guidance to require the EOC to ask for other specific and critical information during information read-back.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To support crews and the EOC, the LAS has also recently re-issued guidance (on 12 August 2019) to clarify the relevant details expected during pre-alert calls, to ensure that the appropriate clinical team is present on a patient’s arrival. This guidance stipulates the CASMEET mnemonic (please see attached Bulletin). As a result of our learning from Ms Choya’s death, the LAS has extended this guidance to include a request from the EOC for ‘any other specific and critical information’ at the end of the radio transmission when they repeat the information provided back to the crew. Operational staff will be made aware of this change.”

    Source location

    2019-0281-Resposne-by-London-Ambulance-Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 18 October 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Make operational staff aware of the updated pre-alert guidance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To support crews and the EOC, the LAS has also recently re-issued guidance (on 12 August 2019) to clarify the relevant details expected during pre-alert calls, to ensure that the appropriate clinical team is present on a patient’s arrival. This guidance stipulates the CASMEET mnemonic (please see attached Bulletin). As a result of our learning from Ms Choya’s death, the LAS has extended this guidance to include a request from the EOC for ‘any other specific and critical information’ at the end of the radio transmission when they repeat the information provided back to the crew. Operational staff will be made aware of this change.”

    Source location

    2019-0281-Resposne-by-London-Ambulance-Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 18 October 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update joint maternity training to include EOC staff alongside operational, midwifery and maternity support staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have also already recognised a gap in understanding of maternity calls, between the EOC, frontline operations and maternity units. As such, the LAS has undertaken extensive learning around handovers and this will continue as part of the joint learning with the Whittington Hospital. The LAS uses Managing Maternity Emergencies in Pre-Hospital Setting’ which was established in 2015. The LAS Practice Leads for pre-hospital maternity care updated this joint training in April 2019 to include staff working within the EOC. This was initially in response to identified areas for improvement regarding the communication and management of maternity calls from midwives working in the pre-hospital setting. Every multi-professional maternity training now involves operation road staff, EOC staff and midwives as well as maternity support workers.”

    Source location

    2019-0281-Resposne-by-London-Ambulance-Service
    Page 3 · response
    Published 18 October 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Replace the Emergency Department priority-call information sheet with a version prompting staff to ask whether a relevant patient is pregnant.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1. We have modified the Emergency Department ‘Priority call information sheet’ which is used when recording call details received from London Ambulance Service red phone. The sheet now includes a prompt for Whittington Health staff to ask if the patient is pregnant, where relevant. This new sheet replaced the original form in the”

    Source location

    2019-0281-Resposne-by-Whittington-Health-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 18 October 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The failure to communicate pregnancy information involved both the crew and emergency operations centre, not the emergency operations centre alone.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Notwithstanding the fact that our further review of the transcript has indicated that it was both the crew and the EOC, rather than the EOC alone which failed to pass on the information that Ms Choya was pregnant, LAS acknowledges that, had the correct information been passed, the focus of Ms Choya’s treatment may have been different.”

    Source location

    2019-0281-Resposne-by-London-Ambulance-Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 18 October 2019

    Open published response
  4. South Yorkshire (Eastern)

    AI-generated summary

    Lyndsey Holt · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Lyndsey Holt, who was 37 weeks pregnant, collapsed after a gastric ulcer perforated and caused catastrophic bleeding. She died the following morning after emergency surgery and resuscitation; concerns included the telephone prescribing of methadone without sufficient information, assessment, or early medical review, and the provision of a seven-day supply to a methadone-naïve patient.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Absence of systems to audit the effectiveness and reliability of the pre-alert system

    Wider context from the report

    “I have concerns regarding the reliability of the pre-alert system, particularly where Control have responsibility for activating such an alert and passing on of relevant information, as follows: (1) Absence of systems to audit the effectiveness and reliability of the pre-alert system. (2) A lack of knowledge/training of staff in Control to equip them with the skills to undertake reliable actioning of pre-alert requests, the importance of doing and conveyance of all relevant clinical information. ”

    Source location

    Lyndsey Holt · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of staff knowledge and training for reliable actioning of pre-alert requests

    Wider context from the report

    “I have concerns regarding the reliability of the pre-alert system, particularly where Control have responsibility for activating such an alert and passing on of relevant information, as follows: (1) Absence of systems to audit the effectiveness and reliability of the pre-alert system. (2) A lack of knowledge/training of staff in Control to equip them with the skills to undertake reliable actioning of pre-alert requests, the importance of doing and conveyance of all relevant clinical information. ”

    Source location

    Lyndsey Holt · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  5. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Martin Daffydd Barker · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Martin Daffydd Barker became unwell after taking MDMA at a large event on 9 December 2012 and was transported to Salford Royal Hospital, where he was pronounced deceased; his cause of death was confirmed as MDMA toxicity. Concerns included the absence of clear guidance for independent medical providers to pre-alert hospitals about critically ill incoming patients, resulting in the hospital not being prepared for his arrival, and difficulties accessing the resuscitation unit overnight.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of clear national guidance and routing for independent providers to pre-alert hospitals and place them on standby

    Wider context from the report

    “1. There appears to be no national guidance on how independent national providers of medical services (particularly those covering large scale public events) can put NHS hospitals on standby for incoming urgent patients, something which is normal procedure for the regional ambulance services. 2. There is confusion as to whether the independent providers should place a call to the regional ambulance services who would then act as “gatekeeper” in forwarding this information to the respective hospital. 3. Without clear guidance there is a risk that the most critically ill people who are being transported to hospital are at risk as the hospitals have received no pre-alert, have not had the opportunity to place teams on standby and are not expecting their arrival. ”

    Source location

    Martin Daffydd Barker · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Write to the Health and Safety Executive to bring the case to its attention regarding independent ambulance-service access to receiving emergency departments.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I therefore intend to write to the HSE to bring this case to their attention. Responsibility for licensing, including arrangements for medical cover at events, sits with local authorities. It should, for example, be possible for HSE to amend the Purple Guide to indicate more explicitly the arrangements that need to be in place for independent ambulance services to contact and access receiving emergency departments. It may be reasonable that local authorities should satisfy themselves that this has been adequately addressed before granting an application. However this would ultimately be a matter for the HSE to decide.”

    Source location

    2013-0226-Response-by-Department-of-Health
    Page 3 · response
    Published 29 January 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Local meetings among the ambulance provider, receiving Trust and ambulance service are considered sufficient to prevent a similar incident.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I am satisfied that meetings and discussions that have taken place locally involving Manchester Medical Services, Salford Royal NHS Foundation Trust and the North West Ambulance Service, as set out in their responses to you, will help to ensure that a similar situation does not arise again with these organisations.”

    Source location

    2013-0226-Response-by-Department-of-Health
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 January 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Licensing and medical-cover arrangements at public events are the responsibility of local authorities.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I therefore intend to write to the HSE to bring this case to their attention. Responsibility for licensing, including arrangements for medical cover at events, sits with local authorities. It should, for example, be possible for HSE to amend the Purple Guide to indicate more explicitly the arrangements that need to be in place for independent ambulance services to contact and access receiving emergency departments. It may be reasonable that local authorities should satisfy themselves that this has been adequately addressed before granting an application. However this would ultimately be a matter for the HSE to decide.”

    Source location

    2013-0226-Response-by-Department-of-Health
    Page 3 · response
    Published 29 January 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Amending the Purple Guide to specify independent ambulance access arrangements is ultimately for the HSE to decide.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I therefore intend to write to the HSE to bring this case to their attention. Responsibility for licensing, including arrangements for medical cover at events, sits with local authorities. It should, for example, be possible for HSE to amend the Purple Guide to indicate more explicitly the arrangements that need to be in place for independent ambulance services to contact and access receiving emergency departments. It may be reasonable that local authorities should satisfy themselves that this has been adequately addressed before granting an application. However this would ultimately be a matter for the HSE to decide.”

    Source location

    2013-0226-Response-by-Department-of-Health
    Page 3 · response
    Published 29 January 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    NWAS should not and cannot act as gatekeeper for NHS hospital standby numbers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In relation to the day to day operation of private ambulance services, it is our position that NWAS should not, and cannot be, the “gatekeeper” for NHS hospital standby numbers. These numbers are owned by the hospitals and it is a matter between them and MMS, or any other private ambulance service providers, as to whether or not the number is shared. We submit the guidance from the Department of Health may assist in relation to these matters.”

    Source location

    2013-0226-Response-by-North-West-Ambulance-Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 January 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Hospitals and private ambulance providers must determine whether hospital standby numbers are shared.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In relation to the day to day operation of private ambulance services, it is our position that NWAS should not, and cannot be, the “gatekeeper” for NHS hospital standby numbers. These numbers are owned by the hospitals and it is a matter between them and MMS, or any other private ambulance service providers, as to whether or not the number is shared. We submit the guidance from the Department of Health may assist in relation to these matters.”

    Source location

    2013-0226-Response-by-North-West-Ambulance-Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 January 2014

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026