Recurring concern

Unreliable sharing of safety-critical risk information within prisons

Pin Get email alerts Request correction

First reported 14 Aug 2013•Latest report 8 Apr 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures within prison processes to communicate, transfer, receive, read or make available safety-critical risk information to staff responsible for a prisoner's care, supervision or risk management, including verbal and written information and information shared during custody or care handovers.

Not included

  • Excludes the separate prison healthcare-to-prison-staff interface when that narrower named process is the supported concern.
  • Excludes generic staff training, communication or documentation deficiencies unless they directly impair sharing safety-critical risk information within a prison.
  • Excludes failures to assess or manage risk after relevant information was reliably shared.
  • Excludes information-sharing with probation, families or external agencies unless the assertion also concerns the internal prison sharing process.
  • Excludes general prison staffing, supervision or observation deficiencies where no risk-information-sharing failure is identified.
Reports
19

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
25

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
32

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

HM Prison and Probation Service12
Ministry of Justice5
HM Prison Service3
Care UK2
Herefordshire and Worcestershire Health and Care NHS Trust2
Hewell Prison2
Nottingham Prison2
Belmarsh Prison1
Bristol Prison1
Central and North West London NHS Foundation Trust1
Dorset Healthcare University NHS Foundation Trust1
Elmley Prison1
Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust1
HCRG Care Services Ltd1
HM Inspectorate of Prisons1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Oxfordshire

    AI-generated summary

    John Wright · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    John Wright, aged 32, died at Bullingdon Prison on 15 December 2017 after being found partially suspended by an electrical cable in his cell. He had expressed suicidal thoughts and had previously been kept on constant watch, but observations were reduced to twice hourly during reception. The concerns relate to the receipt and sharing of information about heightened suicide risk and the guidance and decision-making processes for reducing observation levels.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure that reception staff have access to all available prisoner information

    Wider context from the report

    “There is a related concern about the availability and sharing of such information or documentation amongst prison or health care staff in reception. From the evidence I heard at inquest, it appeared to me that the system for ensuring the staff in reception have access to all available information is in need of improvement. The senior prison officer in this case did not have all relevant information and she said that, if she had, there may have potentially been a different decision (I understand her to mean that Mr Wright may have remained on constant cell watch). I understand the Governor has created a position of ‘Head of Early Days’ and a system is in place to improve the process of documentation so that it follows the prisoner. ”

    Source location

    John Wright · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement a reception communication process using direct telephone alerts, secure email, acknowledgement and routine inbox checks for incoming patient risk information.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A new process flow has been developed in partnership with the Liaison and Diversion team which specifies how to contact and share risk and special care needs information of patients from Police Custody (Via Court) to HMP Bullingdon Healthcare in Reception. The new process provides a direct telephone number to the Reception nurse from 08.00 to 20.45 Monday to Friday and 08.00-17.00 on Saturdays. The process flow now advises if there is no answer via telephone, the Reception nurse should be contacted via the prison communications room who will contact the nurse via their prison radio. Outside of these times detailed above, the prison communications team can contact the senior nurse on duty.”

    Source location

    2019-0175-Response-by-CARE-UK
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 August 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide NHS email accounts to all reception staff, including agency staff, to securely access incoming risk information.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “All staff, including agency staff, who work in Reception have been provided with an nhs.net email account to securely access the risk information in the email. In agreement with the Liaison and Diversion service this new system went live on 25th April 2019. The requirement of a prompt made via telephone which is clearly outlined in the new process flowchart, will provide assurance to Liaison and Diversion services that their information has been effectively communicated and received by Reception staff. A copy of the process is attached.”

    Source location

    2019-0175-Response-by-CARE-UK
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 August 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Remind escort contractors to alert reception staff when constant supervision preceded a prisoner’s arrival.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “With regard to your second concern, setting the appropriate level of observations for a prisoner who has been identified as being at risk is a difficult decision, and we have recently issued a learning bulletin to all prisons providing guidance about the issues to consider when making it. At HMP Bullingdon, the Governor has reminded the escort contractors of the importance of alerting reception staff in all cases in which constant supervision has been in place prior to a prisoner’s arrival. In all such cases the process is that the duty governor is informed and all documentation is studied to establish definitively the level of observations to which the prisoner has been subject, in order to avoid confusion over different organisational terminology.”

    Source location

    2019-0175-Response-by-HM-Prison-Probation-Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 August 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require duty governors to establish prior observation levels from documentation when constant supervision preceded arrival.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “With regard to your second concern, setting the appropriate level of observations for a prisoner who has been identified as being at risk is a difficult decision, and we have recently issued a learning bulletin to all prisons providing guidance about the issues to consider when making it. At HMP Bullingdon, the Governor has reminded the escort contractors of the importance of alerting reception staff in all cases in which constant supervision has been in place prior to a prisoner’s arrival. In all such cases the process is that the duty governor is informed and all documentation is studied to establish definitively the level of observations to which the prisoner has been subject, in order to avoid confusion over different organisational terminology.”

    Source location

    2019-0175-Response-by-HM-Prison-Probation-Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 August 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Remind reception staff to share and record risk information on prisoner passports, and audit passport recording and use.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “All staff working in reception have been reminded of the importance of sharing risk information and ensuring that it is recorded on the prisoner passport. The first night custodial manager conducts regular audits of the prisoner passports to ensure that relevant information is being recorded, and that the document is being seen and used by staff working in reception.”

    Source location

    2019-0175-Response-by-HM-Prison-Probation-Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 August 2019

    Open published response
  2. Lancashire

    AI-generated summary

    John Martin Chapman · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    John Martin Chapman was transferred to HMP Wymott on 23 January 2014, and information about two previous self-harm or threatened self-harm incidents was not passed to the reception nurse. He was found hanging in his cell on 21 March 2014; the inquest concluded that he died as a result of accidental hanging. The report identified concerns about the lack of a formal mechanism for sharing relevant self-harm and welfare information between prison and healthcare staff during reception.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to routinely share prisoner self-harm and well-being information with reception healthcare staff

    Wider context from the report

    “1. TO THE GOVERNOR HMP WYмott Although evidence was heard to the effect that currently at reception at HMP Wymott the CNomis entries relating to a newly arrived prisoner are scrutinised by prison reception staff to ascertain whether there are any self-harm or welfare alerts, it did not appear that a direction exists to pass relevant information to the nurse carrying out the reception medical screen. 2. TO THE GOVERNOR AND HEAD OF HEALTHCARE There does not appear to be a mechanism at reception whereby information relevant to the self-harm or well-being of a prisoner is routinely shared by prison staff with medical staff carrying out a reception medical screen including alerts on the CNomis system. As a result, there appears to be a danger that significant alerts concerning a prisoner might not come to the attention of the reception nurse to enable the nurse to take appropriate action and make relevant entries within the medical records. Those in authority, giving evidence on behalf of the prison and healthcare on the subject of reception practice, saw merit in there being a formal procedure agreed between prison discipline staff on the one hand and healthcare staff on the other, for the sharing of information relevant to a prisoner’s well-being, and for this to be accomplished promptly. ”

    Source location

    John Martin Chapman · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide reception staff with PSI 07/2015, require them to read and comply with it, and monitor completion through performance records.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Every member of staff in reception at HMP Preston has been provided with a copy of the PSI and set an objective to read and comply with it in their Staff Performance and Development Record. Line managers will monitor the achievement of this objective. Copies of the PSI are also available in the reception area.”

    Source location

    2018-0007-Response-by-HM-Prison-and-Probation-Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 7 March 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Routinely pass PER forms to the reception nurse and require documentation in SystemOne that each form was received and considered.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As you note in your report, you were advised during the inquest that the prison and healthcare intended to hold a meeting to discuss ways in which the sharing of information during the reception process might be improved. I can advise you that this meeting took place recently on March 1st. As a result of the meeting between the prison and healthcare it has been agreed that henceforth PER forms will be passed to the reception nurse as a matter of routine and the nurse must then document within the SystemOne record that the form has been received and considered. It is hoped that this “check” may be incorporated into the record system, as part of the existing reception health screen template, and this possibility is currently being explored. Thank you once again for bringing your concern to my attention.”

    Source location

    2018-0007-Response
    Page 1 · response
    Published 7 March 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Explore incorporating a PER-form receipt check into the existing reception health-screen template.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As you note in your report, you were advised during the inquest that the prison and healthcare intended to hold a meeting to discuss ways in which the sharing of information during the reception process might be improved. I can advise you that this meeting took place recently on March 1st. As a result of the meeting between the prison and healthcare it has been agreed that henceforth PER forms will be passed to the reception nurse as a matter of routine and the nurse must then document within the SystemOne record that the form has been received and considered. It is hoped that this “check” may be incorporated into the record system, as part of the existing reception health screen template, and this possibility is currently being explored. Thank you once again for bringing your concern to my attention.”

    Source location

    2018-0007-Response
    Page 1 · response
    Published 7 March 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    CNomis is not managed by healthcare, and reception nurses are not routinely granted access to it.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As a result there appears to be a danger that significant alerts concerning a prisoner might not come to the attention of the reception nurse” It is, of course, recognised that it is important to share relevant information and the reception nurse would expect prison officers always to communicate any significant information regarding risk or welfare of which they were aware – whether this be contained in a PER document, on CNomis, or otherwise. As you were made aware during the inquest, it was not the practice, at the time, for the PER document to be passed by prison officers to the reception nurse and, regards CNomis, this is not a system managed by healthcare and nurses are not routinely granted access to it.”

    Source location

    2018-0007-Response
    Page 1 · response
    Published 7 March 2018

    Open published response
  3. Preston and West Lancashire

    AI-generated summary

    Christopher Talbot · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Christopher Talbot, a prisoner at Preston Prison, was found with a plastic bag over his head after being identified as vulnerable and at risk of suicide. Resuscitation initially restored breathing and cardiac output, but he later died in hospital. Concerns included inadequate reception training, the absence of a breathing guard during resuscitation, insufficient sharing of information about similar deaths, and failures to request immediate assistance and maintain constant observation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to inform staff of the manner of unnatural prisoner deaths

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) It is understood that following the death of a prisoner a notice to this effect is issued to the prisoners and staff but that staff are not informed of the manner of an unnatural death. Thus, it appeared that staff attending to give evidence at the inquest were unaware of another recent previous death involving a plastic bag, knowledge of which might have led to extra vigilance in the case of Mr Talbot, when as a vulnerable prisoner, he was observed holding a plastic bag. ”

    Source location

    Christopher Talbot · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  4. Central Hampshire

    AI-generated summary

    Haydn James Burton · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Haydn James Burton, a prisoner at HMP Winchester, was found suspended from a ligature point in his cell on 15 July 2015 and died in hospital on 18 July 2015 from the delayed effects of ligature suspension. The concerns included inadequate implementation of ACCT plans and observations, uncertainty about confidentiality rules in the Prison Listener scheme, and limitations in recording and communicating information about closed ACCT plans.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to train Listeners to pass information about imminent suicide risk to prison staff

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) The Prison Listener scheme rules as to prisoner confidentiality appeared to be confusing to the listener involved in this case. The HMP Winchester Listener Scheme Protocol dated October 2012 makes no reference to situations where an “at risk” prisoner admits to having made active plans for suicide and threatens to self harm in the future (as in this case). I consider the protocol for Listeners should make it another exception to the principle of confidentiality so that they can pass such information to prison staff and that Listeners should be trained to do so if they have reason to believe there is an imminent risk of suicide even if the prisoner is already subject to an ACCT. ”

    Source location

    Haydn James Burton · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to make Case Notes for all ACCT plans

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) The case highlighted the limitations of the NOMIS database in relation to recording details of closed ACCT plans meaning that prison staff are frequently unaware of important information about individuals gathered previously. The case showed that despite the national policy requiring Case Notes to be made of all ACCT plans this does not happen for all prisoners so that staff are ignorant even of the fact that there was a previous ACCT in place let alone the reason for it. The ACCT post-closure process should therefore be reviewed. I consider this is particularly relevant where an ACCT is closed and the prisoner is later released and then re-imprisoned or is transferred to a different establishment. ”

    Source location

    Haydn James Burton · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the Listener Scheme protocol to specify an exception to confidentiality for imminent suicide risk

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) The Prison Listener scheme rules as to prisoner confidentiality appeared to be confusing to the listener involved in this case. The HMP Winchester Listener Scheme Protocol dated October 2012 makes no reference to situations where an “at risk” prisoner admits to having made active plans for suicide and threatens to self harm in the future (as in this case). I consider the protocol for Listeners should make it another exception to the principle of confidentiality so that they can pass such information to prison staff and that Listeners should be trained to do so if they have reason to believe there is an imminent risk of suicide even if the prisoner is already subject to an ACCT. ”

    Source location

    Haydn James Burton · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Operate additional management assurance and quality checks of ACCT documentation, care, case management, Caremap actions and NOMS records, with monthly trend review and follow-up.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Governor has recently introduced additional management assurance checks to ensure that staff are completing ACCT documents correctly and to the required standard, and that the appropriate level of care is given any person who requires additional support provided during the ACCT process. These assurance checks are completed by Orderly Officers, Duty Governors and the Safer Custody Team. The results are collated and will be discussed at the monthly Safer Custody meeting where trends will be identified and appropriate actions taken. In addition quality assurance checks will consider the role of ACCT Case Managers to confirm compliance, and identify any development needs. ACCT Caremap actions are checked by the Safer Custody Supervising Officer and Custodial Manager who ensure that appropriate actions have been identified and taken forward.”

    Source location

    2016-0346-Response-by-NOMS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 4 October 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement and embed a post-closure ACCT process requiring daily notification, plan circulation, interview updates, core-record filing and NOMS recording of ACCT openings and closures.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “PSI 64/2011 requires staff to ensure that “The closure must be recorded within the case notes section of NOMS giving a brief summary of the relevant issues” (italics indicate a mandatory requirement). The Governor at Winchester has introduced a process whereby Wing Supervising Officers are informed each day of any ACCT post closure reviews which are due to be held, and provided with copies of the relevant ACCT plans. When the post closure interview has taken place, the ACCT is updated and returned to the Safer Prisons team to be filed within the prisoner’s core record. All Case Managers have been reminded of the importance of ensuring that the NOMS case notes are updated following an ACCT case review, and are using the ACCT alerts on NOMS to record the dates of an ACCT being opened and closed.”

    Source location

    2016-0346-Response-by-NOMS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 4 October 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Winchester will not add an exception to Listener confidentiality because national confidentiality arrangements are considered necessary to preserve prisoners’ trust.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As the Samaritans have set out in their separate response to your report, the principle of total confidentiality is central to their work, and applies equally to the work of Listeners. This is reflected in the national partnership agreement between NOMS and the Samaritans that governs the operation of the Listener scheme, and the NOMS safer custody policy set out in PSI 64/2011. In the light of this it is not appropriate for Winchester to adopt a different policy on this point. Without the assurance of confidentiality, prisoners may not feel able to approach Listeners and talk freely in an atmosphere of total trust. Any change to this approach may lead to a reduction in the number of prisoners accepting this vital source of support and sharing their concerns.”

    Source location

    2016-0346-Response-by-NOMS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 4 October 2016

    Open published response
  5. Worcestershire

    AI-generated summary

    Liam SMITH · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Liam Smith was admitted to HMP Hewell on 7 August 2014 and died after taking a combination of prescribed and illicitly obtained medication in his cell. The concerns included possible failures to follow mandatory ACCT procedures, inadequate dissemination and recording of medical information, and limited healthcare interaction with high-risk drug users, potentially resulting in warning signs being missed.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to disseminate relevant medical risk information to staff involved in prisoner care

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) Evidence was given that certain medical information which arrived at the prison with Mr Smith was not disseminated to those in reception for those who had later dealings with him which meant that they were unaware of the potential risk of suicide or self harm. It was suggested by some witnesses that documentation "goes astray" and is only found much later. ”

    Source location

    Liam SMITH · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review reception procedures and establish recorded communication between reception staff and escort providers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is accepted that the reception processes in relation to communicating with escort staff were not as robust as ideally they should have been. Both the prison and healthcare provider have reviewed their procedures in respect to ensure that systems are in place that communication between reception staff and the escort provider is recorded appropriately. In Mr Smith's case it appears that the Person Escort Record (PER) was not used appropriately, in that the medical in confidence information provided by health care professionals in the court was not attached to the PER.”

    Source location

    2015-0382-Response-by-NOMS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 18 September 2015

    Open published response
  6. West Yorkshire Eastern

    AI-generated summary

    William Thomas Anderson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    William Thomas Anderson died in his cell at HMP Wealstun on 19 September 2010 after taking prescription medication belonging to others and drinking hooch, having appeared intoxicated or under the influence of alcohol or drugs the previous afternoon. The concerns included insufficient vigilance around inmate gatherings involving drugs and alcohol, incomplete staff training and recording of observations, failure to use an emergency code, and delay in summoning paramedic assistance.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to record relevant inmate behaviour and presentation information in the Wing Observation Book

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) The Deceased’s behaviour and presentation on the 18th September 2010 was not recorded by any member of Wing staff in the C Wing Observation Book. Evidence was adduced in the course of the Inquest as to the importance of recording all relevant information in the said Observation Book, thereby apprising all members of Wing staff on all shifts of all material facts and matters. In the circumstances, all relevant information in relation to, for example, an inmate’s behaviour and general presentation should be brought to the attention of all Wing staff and should be done so via an appropriate entry/entries in the Wing Observation Book. All Wing staff (Wing Managers, Prison Officers and Operational Support Grades) should be made aware of the importance of such, and should ensure information is recorded accordingly; ”

    Source location

    William Thomas Anderson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  7. Manchester City

    AI-generated summary

    Michael James Meyler · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Michael James Meyler died in hospital on 1 January 2011 after being found hanging by the neck in his prison cell on 28 December 2010 and sustaining a hypoxic brain injury. The principal concerns were that information about his recent self-harm and suicide risk was not adequately circulated, read, or attached to his ACCT plan, limiting the ability of prison staff and healthcare personnel to make informed decisions about his welfare.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to circulate Risk of Self-Harm / Suicide information promptly to relevant prison functions

    Wider context from the report

    “1. I am concerned that if a Risk of Self-Harm / Suicide document enters the prison after the prisoner has undergone first Reception Screening, that the information in this document is not adequately circulated to all those who would need to know about it within the prison system. Whilst I am now told that the information is made the subject of an Intelligence or Information Report, which is disseminated (after being “sanitised”) to the Head of Healthcare, the Deputy Head of Healthcare and the Head of Safer Custody, it unclear to me why it is not sent as a priority to Healthcare in the first instance as the information contained within it must be passed on without delay. ”

    Source location

    Michael James Meyler · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 5 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure by Healthcare to read and disseminate important Risk of Self-Harm / Suicide documents

    Wider context from the report

    “5. I am concerned that Healthcare are simply scanning important documents like a Risk of Self-Harm / Suicide document into their system so that they have “a contemporaneous note” rather than actually reading the content. There should be a way of ensuring that these documents are not just scanned to be read in the event that the prisoner has an appointment with someone from Healthcare at a later stage, but that they MUST be read and disseminated in order that they actually make a difference. ”

    Source location

    Michael James Meyler · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 6 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure that Risk of Self-Harm / Suicide information is read and considered by Senior Wing Officers after prisoner moves

    Wider context from the report

    “2. Furthermore, I am concerned that the information in the Risk of Self-Harm / Suicide document is not brought to the attention to the Senior Officers on Wings which the prisoner may move to at a later stage during their incarceration. I believe that a copy of the Risk of Self-Harm / Suicide document is contained in the prisoner’s physical (buff) folder, which goes with them from Wing to Wing, however there needs to be a safeguard to ensure that this information is read and considered at each stage of the prisoner’s term of imprisonment. ”

    Source location

    Michael James Meyler · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 5 · concerns

    Open source report
  8. Worcestershire

    AI-generated summary

    Reggie Johns · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Reggie Johns, a prisoner on constant watch after two attempts to hang himself, was transferred to HMP Hewell on 19 October 2010. His constant watch status was discontinued after a review by two prison officers, and he was found hanging from a bed-sheet ligature about six hours later; he died in hospital the next day. Concerns included inadequate communication between prisons and healthcare staff, insufficiently robust review of his ACCT status, and failure to involve appropriate qualified personnel.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to communicate constant watch status to relevant prison staff

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The extent of communication between HMP Hewell and HMP Bristol was unclear because no written record was kept of discussions held between the respective governors or their staff. Whilst it seems clear that some individuals at Hewell were aware that Mr Johns was on an open ACCT they were not made aware of his constant watch status. (2) Whilst the prison staff were aware of the "then" Prison Service Order 2700 and the requirement to hold a multi disciplinary meeting the reasons which they gave for not doing so were inadequate. It was also of concern that one of the officers left the review after some 10 minutes and there was a significant doubt as to whether in fact either or both of the officers spoke to any member of Healthcare. This when coupled with a lack of formal record keeping as between HMP Hewell and HMP Bristol seems significant concern about the quality of communication between individuals, the robustness of the review process for a prisoner deemed to be a high risk and the involvement of appropriately qualified individuals in the conduct of the review. Although the Treasury Solicitors on behalf of HMP Hewell provided me with confirmation that the present Safer Custody Policy has "effected change" in these matters it remains of concern that the policies at the time (the Prison Service Order in particular) appeared not to be followed. (3) Further concerns involved the failure of the nurse to be provided with the ACCT document when Mr Johns was interviewed by her and her further failure to make any entry within that document detailing her professional view. Put simply there was a concern in the matter that despite the known and understood protocols at the time there was a lack of communication and a lack of sufficiently robust and detailed review of Mr Johns involving all appropriate personnel. Whilst the Safer Custody process has, I am assured, been strengthened those involved should take steps to ensure that all members of staff are fully familiar and trained in the requirements of the policy documents. ”

    Source location

    Reggie Johns · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Ensure appropriate information is communicated to receiving prisons when prisoners transfer from Trust-supported prisons.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Messrs ████████ and ████████ will ensure that appropriate information is communicated to receiving prisons”

    Source location

    2013-0202-Response-by-Worcestershire-Health-Care-NHS
    Page 1 · response
    Published 16 September 2013

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing healthcare, discipline-team and prison-transfer communication arrangements are considered sufficient to address information-sharing concerns.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Whilst this concern largely focuses on the issue of communication between HMP Bristol and HMP Hewell I think it is appropriate to seek to reassure you about communication between the healthcare team at HMP Hewell and other HM Prisons. There is continuous dialogue within HMP Hewell between the healthcare and the discipline teams. Some of this is formalised through various meetings and forums and some is informal and reflects a relatively constant ebb and flow of communication on patient specific issues, task related discussion, operational issues and joint working. If prisoners are transferring to other prisons the prisoner’s healthcare record is transferred to the receiving prison. In some cases the Nurse in Reception at HMP Hewell will contact the receiving prison to raise specific issues or concerns.”

    Source location

    2013-0202-Response-by-Worcestershire-Health-Care-NHS
    Page 1 · response
    Published 16 September 2013

    Open published response
  9. Dorset

    AI-generated summary

    JORDAN ANTHONY BUCKTON · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    JORDAN ANTHONY BUCKTON, aged 20, was found hanging by a ligature in his cell at HMYOI Portland on 28 January 2012. Concerns included failures to share information about his previous self-harm, to follow up after antidepressant medication was prescribed, and to continue an Emotional Wellbeing course after staff absence.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to share relevant verbal and written risk information with prison staff

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Information Sharing Mr Buckton had previously hung himself in his cell at Exeter Prison on 14th February 2011 but was saved by prison staff and hospital treatment. He had also committed 3 acts of self-harm within that prison. At the Inquest none of the wing staff at Portland were aware of his history of such acts nor had they read the C-NOMIS Record of the Potential Identified Risks form. Evidence was given by medical witnesses that a history of previous self-harm is one of the most significant indicators of a future risk of suicide. This is also recorded in PSO 2700 and in the Self-harm Guidance issued by NOMS. The jury reported that there was a failure to share verbal and written information within the prison in a suitable manner that all the staff members were informed so as to be able to carry out informed actions. ”

    Source location

    JORDAN ANTHONY BUCKTON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
Back to top

Data last updated 7 September 2026