Recurring concern

Failure to provide patient-centred care and decisions

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First reported 12 Mar 2014•Latest report 14 Jan 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures in patient-centred care delivery or patient-care decision-making where staff or services lose sight of the individual patient and fail to account for their needs, circumstances, preferences or relevant safety information.

Not included

  • Excludes failures belonging to a separately named clinical, safeguarding, statutory or operational system where that system provides the more specific supported boundary.
  • Excludes generic poor communication, documentation, staffing or governance deficiencies unless they directly result in non-patient-centred care or decisions.
  • Excludes dissatisfaction or disagreement with a clinical decision where the decision was individualised, adequately informed and appropriately involved the patient.
  • Excludes failures concerning family or carer involvement where patient-centred care is not the shared unsafe condition.
Reports
12

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
12

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2014–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
16

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care3
Kent and Medway Mental Health NHS Trust2
NHS England2
Tees, Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust2
Cumbria, Northumberland, Tyne and Wear NHS Foundation Trust1
Hampshire and Isle of Wight Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust1
HM Prison and Probation Service1
HM Prison Service1
Isle of Wight NHS Trust1
NHS Hampshire and Isle of Wight Integrated Care Board1
NHS Humber and North Yorkshire Integrated Care Board1
NHS Surrey and Sussex Integrated Care Board1
North Tees and Hartlepool NHS Foundation Trust1
Recipient name withheld1
Richmond Companions International (RCI)1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Kent and Medway

    AI-generated summary

    Stephen Taylor · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Stephen Taylor experienced worsening mental distress linked to work and financial concerns, with escalating risk indicators and repeated contact with health services. He died on 26 May 2025 after deliberately jumping from Louisa Bay Cliffs. The principal concerns were the lack of coordinated escalation and ownership of risk across services, reliance on his denial of immediate intent despite other risk indicators, routine rather than urgent referrals, and the absence of a same-day urgent face-to-face assessment despite family concerns.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to integrate significant indicators of elevated suicide risk into clinical decision-making

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) Clinical decision-making consistently relied on Mr Taylor’s denial of immediate intent and his stated ability to keep himself safe, despite significant indicators of elevated risk, including a previous serious suicide attempt, escalating distress, severe anxiety, sleep disturbance, reduced self-care, and repeated concerns raised by a close family member. ”

    Source location

    Stephen Taylor · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Facilitate a phased training and support package with NHS Talking Therapies Collaborative to improve referral matching and risk communication.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “KMMH and NHS Talking Therapies Collaborative are currently in discussion facilitating a phased training and support package to mutually ensure patients are placed with the best service provider to meet needs of patients at point of referral.”

    Source location

    Response from Kent and Medway mental Health NHS Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 21 January 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver a two-day CRAM training event for Urgent Mental Health Helpline staff to improve risk recognition, risk curiosity and co-produced care and risk management planning.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “With regard to improving risk recognition within the Kent & Medway Urgent Mental Health Helpline, the staff from this service are undergoing a 2-day Clinical Risk Assessment & Management (CRAM) training event to support improved risk recognition and risk curiosity, and to promote deeper questioning of patients who present with elevated risks and/or risk factors. This will include a focus on creation of a co-produced care and risk management plan.”

    Source location

    Response from Kent and Medway mental Health NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 21 January 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce visual prompts at every call station and workstation directing staff to arrange Rapid Response assessment within four hours when risk is concerning.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As a result of this very sad death, the Urgent Mental Health Helpline, has generated visual prompts at each call station to support clear identification and pathways for call handlers/clinicians to direct, where risk is of concern, a referral for a rapid assessment within 4 hours by our Rapid Response service. It is expected that our staff will not rely on a risk prompt tool but will be equipped to identify risk accurately and utilise a curious approach to seeking further risk information, from the patient, their families and referrers.”

    Source location

    Response from Kent and Medway mental Health NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 21 January 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update Urgent Mental Health Helpline training expectations for CRAM through the revised Standard Operating Procedure.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Urgent Mental Health Helpline Standard Operating Procedure has undergone thorough review which has resulted in an update to:”

    Source location

    Response from Kent and Medway mental Health NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 21 January 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Define high-risk patient categories and relevant risk-factor demographics in the revised Standard Operating Procedure.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Urgent Mental Health Helpline Standard Operating Procedure has undergone thorough review which has resulted in an update to:”

    Source location

    Response from Kent and Medway mental Health NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 21 January 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require staff to review practicably accessible clinical records during triage, including CRAM risk event logs.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Urgent Mental Health Helpline Standard Operating Procedure has undergone thorough review which has resulted in an update to:”

    Source location

    Response from Kent and Medway mental Health NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 21 January 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    An urgent referral was not indicated because reported deterioration lacked evidence of dynamic risk, risky behaviour, suicide planning or intent.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Although Mr Taylor had not been reviewed directly by the clinical team, the Duty Team noted the concerns shared by his daughter, and agreed a plan with her, that a non-urgent referral was most appropriate and would be made to the Older Adult Mental Health Team. The rationale for this was that whilst Mr Taylor’s presentation had deteriorated and new risk factors had been reported, the absence of dynamic or immediate risk factors such as risky behaviour, or evidence of planning or intent towards a suicide attempt, meant that an urgent referral was not indicated and therefore unlikely to be accepted. However, due to an escalating presentation, additional support from the Older Adults Mental Health Team was still indicated.”

    Source location

    Response from Vita Health Group
    Page 3 · response
    Published 21 January 2026

    Open published response
  2. Kent and Medway

    AI-generated summary

    Mark Stuart VIDLER · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mark Vidler had severe depression and was receiving mental health care from Kent and Medway Mental Health NHS Trust. After serious suicide attempts on 30 April and 7 May 2025, he was discharged from the Home Treatment Team and was not reviewed by an out-of-hours clinician on the night of 7 May after a Rapid Response Team referral was declined. He was found dead at home on 8 May 2025, and the inquest concluded that his suicide was contributed to by a failure in care. Concerns included shortcomings in patient-centred care, clinical oversight and referral processes, risk recognition, discharge decision-making, continuity of care, care coordination, and the implementation and recording of suicidality management.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide patient-centred care

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Some staff at the Trust were so focused on 'process' that they lost sight of the need for patient centred care. This was accepted within the Trusts PSII report. I was insufficiently reassured that action has been taken to address this matter. ”

    Source location

    Mark Stuart VIDLER · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver dedicated CRAM training for Home Treatment and Rapid Response staff on risk questions, protective factors, masking symptoms, and collaboratively written care plans.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The revision of the Trust wide Home Treatment Team and Rapid Response Standard Operating Procedure review which is currently underway, is due for completion by 1 April 2026. In addition; to the revision of the SOP’s both the Home Treatment and Rapid Response Teams are booked to undertake CRAM training for both qualified and unqualified staff. This will be completed by April 2026. This training will specifically address the need for clinicians to be curious and ask specific risk questions around safety and protective factors as well as co-written plans of care in conjunction with carers and family where to do so. This will ensure person centred care is at the centre of all assessments.”

    Source location

    Response from Kent and Medway NHS Mental Health Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 21 January 2026

    Open published response
  3. Hampshire, Portsmouth and Southampton

    AI-generated summary

    Abigail Eleanor Ann Jelly · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Abigail Eleanor Ann Jelly, a 34-year-old mother of two experiencing post-natal depression, died on 12 November 2024 after intentionally harming herself, causing fatal blood loss. The report identified concerns about inadequate perinatal mental-health training, limits on urgent specialist visits, insufficient engagement with her parents, and wider failings in professional curiosity, escalation, decision-making and risk assessment.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Non-patient-centred decision making in trust services

    Wider context from the report

    “It was accepted that there were cultural issues within the trust services. A report into Abigail’s death concluded that these included ‘a lack of professional curiosity, lack of escalations of deteriorating patients, non-patient centred decision making and a linear approach to risk assessment and formulation.’ I am concerned that there are structural issues with the leadership of the Hampshire and Isle of Wight Healthcare Trust that is to the detriment of patients like Abigail, and I am concerned about the risk of future deaths. ”

    Source location

    Abigail Eleanor Ann Jelly · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  4. Suffolk

    AI-generated summary

    Timothy Robert DE BOOS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Timothy Robert DE BOOS was declared deceased at his home in Ipswich on 6 February 2024 after a self-inflicted domestic fire, with the medical cause of death recorded as smoke inhalation and severe burns. The report raises concerns about the lack of available Mental Health Unit inpatient beds and about the admission process when the patient, family, and an experienced mental health professional considered voluntary admission necessary.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to treat the views of experienced mental health professionals, patients and families as sufficient evidence in voluntary inpatient admission decisions

    Wider context from the report

    “2. In Tim’s case, on the 2ⁿᵈ of February 2024 Tim’s family, Tim himself, and Tim’s Mental Health Care Coordinator (a Senior Mental Health Nurse who had been supporting Tim for a year), all wished for his admission to a Mental Health Unit as a voluntary patient. It was heard in evidence that a different team (the Crisis Resolution and Home Treatment Team) were the ‘gatekeepers’ for admission and this team could not review Tim until the next day. When reviewed by Crisis Resolution and Home Treatment Team staff (who had never met Tim before), they believed his crisis had subsided and his admission was denied. In evidence Tim’s Mental Health Care Coordinator was adamant that Tim should have been hospitalised on the 2ⁿᵈ February, as both his family and Tim himself had also wished. I am therefore concerned that the views of an experienced mental health professional, a patient’s family, and the patient themselves, is deemed insufficient evidence for an admission to a Mental Health Unit as a voluntary inpatient. ”

    Source location

    Timothy Robert DE BOOS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  5. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Roy Elton TRAVERS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Roy Travers died on 6 June 2022 from a spontaneous cerebral bleed after admission to Whittington Hospital on 2 June, where he was not initially scanned and the bleed was not diagnosed. Concerns included delayed review after melaena was noted, failure to withhold apixaban, uncertainty about whether identified learning actions took place, and concerns about the treatment of Mr Travers and the late disclosure of the hospital’s review to the coroner and family.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide non-discriminatory care for confused elderly patients

    Wider context from the report

    “4. Mr Travers’ sons told me at inquest that, when Mr Travers’ was nursed on Mary Seacole Ward, they felt that staff regarded this confused, elderly man as a nuisance. That is clearly unacceptable. In addition, Mr Travers’ family worried that this view of him clouded the judgement of those looking after him. ”

    Source location

    Roy Elton TRAVERS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing alerts, one-to-one supervision, documented support and staff skills were considered sufficient to manage the confused patient's needs safely.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “████████ Ward Manager of Mary Seacole, offers her sincere condolences to Mr Travers’ family. Ms Bakari advises Mr Travers had an electronic alert to notify staff of his additional care needs due to his dementia. Due to his risk of dehydration ████████ herself supported to insert a new intravenous cannula. A 1:1 was also implemented to support his safety (prevention of falls risks) whilst he was being nursed in a side room. There is clear documentation that nursing staff were supporting him with taking oral fluids and offering food and assisted him with his personal hygiene needs. Staff regularly care for patients with confusion but ████████ felt Mr Travers needs while confused were manageable on the ward and appropriate to the skills of the staff.”

    Source location

    Response from Whittington Health NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 9 November 2022

    Open published response
  6. Inner West London

    AI-generated summary

    Raymond Griffiths · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Raymond Griffiths was admitted to St George’s Hospital for coronary artery bypass grafting on 21 May 2013, underwent surgery the following day, developed acute on chronic liver failure post-operatively, and died in intensive care three days later. The inquest concluded that his care was beyond reproach and that his liver failure could not reasonably have been predicted or prevented. The report raised concerns about restrictions on cardiac surgical capacity, diversion of emergency and other patients, damage to public confidence, and the adequacy of the SJR process, which were considered capable of increasing risks to future patients.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Risk-averse surgical decision-making denying care to complex patients

    Wider context from the report

    “9. The restrictions at SGH may make surgeons more risk adverse and thus deny care to the most complex patients and so increase the risk of future deaths. ”

    Source location

    Raymond Griffiths · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 6 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement multidisciplinary referral teams with defined representation and records, and discuss significant complications at monthly mortality and morbidity meetings.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Recommendation 6 of the Review, for example, stated that “all referrals for cardiac surgery should be discussed at the relevant sub-specialist MDT, which should ensure the availability of all necessary data before review of the clinical care”. It further recommended that the MDT should have a pre-defined minimal quorum, with full representation from sub-specialist cardiac surgery, interventional and non-interventional cardiology, and radiology, and be appropriately recorded. We have implemented this recommendation and have established effective MDTs which reflect the good practice described in the recommendation from the Review. All significant complications are discussed at the monthly Mortality and Morbidity Meeting.”

    Source location

    Response from St George's University Hospital NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 11 · response
    Published 10 May 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Embed EuroSCORE II risk assessment in practice and record risk predictions and material variances in patient consent and electronic records.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Recommendation 7 of the Review stated that risk-scoring, using up-to-date risk scoring algorithms, should be embedded in practice and that all risk factors should be considered, and accurate risk prediction made, and the risk prediction be recorded on the consent form. We have implemented this recommendation and all patients are risk assessed, normally using the EuroSCORE II risk assessment algorithm. This has been embedded in practice and the risk according to EuroSCORE II is recorded on the patient’s consent form. If the risk of surgery is considered to be significantly different from that calculated by EuroSCORE II, the reason for the variance is recorded on the electronic patient record.”

    Source location

    Response from St George's University Hospital NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 11 · response
    Published 10 May 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    There is no evidence that complex patients were denied care; transfers for ECMO or VAD support remain clinically appropriate irrespective of restrictions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We are not aware of any evidence that complex patients have been denied care. While there is no formal definition of complexity, it may be helpful to consider the term as including two groups of patients – firstly, those whose predicted post-operative mortality (for instance, as estimated by EuroSCORE II) is high (for instance, greater than 5%), and secondly, those patients whose anticipated post-operative care needs include particularly specialised interventions not routinely provided in all cardiac surgery units, and not provided at the Trust. These interventions are ECMO and VADs. In our response to Matters of Concern 1 and 2 above, we believe we have provided assurance that patients with a predicted risk of death of more than 5% were not denied care during the period of the now-lifted restrictions.”

    Source location

    Response from St George's University Hospital NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 18 · response
    Published 10 May 2022

    Open published response
  7. North Yorkshire and York including North Yorkshire Western District

    AI-generated summary

    Zoe Emma ZAREMBA · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Zoe Emma ZAREMBA, who had a history of repeated self-harm and suicide attempts, ingested an unknown quantity of a substance after going missing from home and was found unresponsive on 21 June 2020; her death was established as resulting from the ingestion. The report identified concerns about clinicians’ failure to understand and adapt care to her autism, the unsubstantiated attribution of Emotionally Unstable Personality Disorder, inadequate coordinated mental health support, and the absence of effective care planning and risk assessment.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of person-centred autism-informed holistic care planning

    Wider context from the report

    “The evidence indicated: 1 Zoe was diagnosed at age 16 years as being autistic by CAMHS with a designation of Asperger’s Syndrome. Her medical records recorded that. 2 In or about 2016 she was wrongly attributed by the Mental Health Service, TEWV, clinicians - who knew of her autism -as undergoing Emotionally Unstable Personality Disorder (“EUPD”). 3 That attribution was not formally diagnosed, and not discussed with Zoe who found out by chance when looking at her records. She continued to be regarded and treated as if she was experiencing that condition and clinicians would not adapt to her distress caused by that attribution. There was inertia and excessive delay (to May 2020) in removing reference to EUPD which had been discounted in October 2018 all of which added to her distress. These actions and inactions destroyed her relationship with community mental health clinicians and she did not trust them enough to try to restore any effective care relationship. 4 She suffered repeated trauma derived from her autistic condition revisiting the causes of her distress which she re-experienced time and again with ‘film reel’ recollection. That trauma was again not understood. 5 In short, her autism (and thus risk assessment) was misunderstood by the clinicians tasked to keep her safe. 6 TEWV’s provision for cares of autistic conditions were underdeveloped, reflecting national want of provision, to include:- A no multidisciplinary clinical assessment and formulation addressed her autism; B no reasonable adjustments were then made in terms of her sensory and environmental needs in any timely fashion, or at all; C no person centred (thus autism centred) holistic plan was developed to work in partnership with Zoe that took account of her autism, and her gender. As the evidence revealed one “cannot uncouple autism and other psychological/psychiatric experiences”. Instead, she withdrew from engagement with TEWV community health clinicians. D there was no local provision within TEWV for specialist autism assessment and adapted psychological therapy. Commissioned providers of these essential cares were outwith TEWV, requiring specific Funding Request (which was granted) for a course of assessment and therapy. Those providers did not offer statutory acute mental health services support, including out of hours/crisis support. TEWV did not provide what the commissioning providers were supplying. There was a want of effective communications between these ‘teams’ not least as patient data was not accessible by one to the others electronic records (patient consent permitting) and the fact of disengagement. There was a sense of ‘silo’ working, militating against partnership working, that encouraged unfavourably the undesirable “uncoupling” of experiences; E statistical evidence indicated that autistic individuals are more at risk of suicide than those with no neurodevelopmental condition, and females at greater risk than their male counterparts; F there was a clinical (but not measured) experience that more patients were presenting to the statutory service with autistic conditions and, it follows, more patients would be at risk of suicide; G from 2016 to her death, Zoe was detained under ss 2/3 MHA 1983 17 times and presented to A and E around 37 times with evident self harm and apparent attempts on her life. She repeated high risk behaviours. She had no Care Co-ordinator nor effective Care Plan (which ought to have been in place) because she had not engaged with TEWV community services; H Zoe lurched from crisis to crisis remaining at high risk to her own safety; she died because she could no longer cope with the sense of injustice caused by others that overwhelmed her thinking. She felt she was not being listened to by community mental health services. Her therapy from outside providers - which was proving helpful to her - was disrupted by COVID-19 limitations on face to face consultations; Both locally, including regional, but also nationally the evidence revealed a number of serious issues that require urgent and immediate action to support autistic people well, not just from a sensory and environmental basis (which TEWV have started to improve albeit from a low baseline according to the evidence received). Urgent solutions are required to prevent future deaths of autistic patients especially with mental health needs. ”

    Source location

    Zoe Emma ZAREMBA · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide autism training, supervision and consultation for clinical and non-clinical staff on risk, diagnosis, needs and holistic care planning.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Additionally, we offer as a trust a full day Understanding Autism Training which has a focus on risk assessment for autistic people, diagnosis and associated risks and needs. This training is further consolidated through the offering of individual Autism supervision and consultation for clinical staff.”

    Source location

    Response from Tees Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust (21 June)
    Page 4 · response
    Published 27 April 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require autism-informed care, treatment, safety summaries and safety plans within multidisciplinary team processes, including patient and advocate involvement where possible.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To assist staff in practically achieving this goal, additional measures have been introduced into the MDT process to ensure that, where a patient has a diagnosis of autism, their care, treatment, safety summary and safety plan take that diagnosis into account and provide a comprehensive assessment of need. MDT formulation now includes patients and their advocates, wherever possible, in order to ensure honest and transparent communication when reaching a diagnosis.”

    Source location

    Response from Tees Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust (21 June)
    Page 4 · response
    Published 27 April 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop and embed an autism-informed care-planning process with evaluation and sustainability work for person-centred holistic plans.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As a trust we offer a full day Understanding Autism training for both clinical and non-clinical staff, which has a focus on developing holistic plans of care for autistic people and reflects diagnosis and associated risks and needs. This is consolidated through the offering of individual autism supervision and consultation for clinical staff. The utilisation of supervision and consultation has increased over the last twelve months ensuring that care plans consider the needs of the autistic patient. Work is actively taking place to ensure that Autistic people’s needs can be reflected within the new care planning process.”

    Source location

    Response from Tees Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust (21 June)
    Page 5 · response
    Published 27 April 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Adopt nationally recommended collaborative care planning using holistic, individualised recovery plans based on the DIALOG model.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We are adopting the nationally recommended changes to care planning to ensure that this is more collaborative and focussed on holistic needs with individualised recovery plans based on the DIALOG model. Increasingly, across the system, we ████████ ████████”

    Source location

    Response from Tees Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust (21 June)
    Page 7 · response
    Published 27 April 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    TEWV is responsible for delivering core mental health care and making reasonable adjustments for patients with autism.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “This is therapy which is beyond that which TEWV can provide as the primary mental health provider. That does not change the expectation that TEWV be in a position to make appropriate adjustments to their mental health support for those with any neuro development diagnosis. By this we mean that we would expect TEWV to be in a position to support those with a mental health condition even where they have a diagnosis of autism spectrum disorder however it is recognised by the CCG/ICB that there may be cases where there is additional specialist input required. This is when IFR requests are made. The CCG/ICB accepts that this is becoming more frequent and the reasons for this are not clear but are sufficient for the CCG/ICB to be considering the commissioning pathway for this type of therapy.”

    Source location

    Response from Humber and North Yorkshire Health Care Partnership
    Page 2 · response
    Published 27 April 2022

    Open published response
  8. Sunderland

    AI-generated summary

    Richard Burgess · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Richard Burgess died at Holy Cross Nursing and Residential Care Home, Sunderland, on 30 November 2018 after being punched three times in the head by another patient on 31 August 2018. The principal concerns related to dementia care, including multidisciplinary staffing, proactive assessment and risk management, family engagement, person-centred care, and converting policy into practice.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide individualised person-centred care from the person’s perspective

    Wider context from the report

    “I did not have a sufficient level of confidence about: • the provision of a multidisciplinary team of professionals with suitable skills, qualifications and competencies commensurate with their role and the specialty of dementia care; • a prevention model and approach for dementia care that proactively uses detailed assessment, intervention and evaluation of changing care, needs and risks of the individual in order to provide therapeutic interventions and reduce the need for medication; • the evidence of assessments or the application of assessments of the impact of a person’s difficulties, including cognitive and neurological difficulties, polypharmacy, psychological and personality, mental and physical health, social, environmental and care practices, emotions, belief and thoughts of the person; • a continuous engagement with the family in the “triangle of care”, including regular communication and updating life stories; • a focus on the person, asserting absolute value of the person, in an individualised approach, while understanding the world from the person’s perspective and provision of a social environment that supports psychological and physical needs; • converting policy into practice. The Trust had done a lot of work since the death of Mr Burgess, and I should also be pleased to hear from the Secretary of State about wider learning for other Trusts. ”

    Source location

    Richard Burgess · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver more person-centred, coordinated social care responsive to individual needs, promoting choice and maintaining independence.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In summary, we recognise that personalised care is vital to those people that need care and support. It has demonstrated the ability to improve outcomes and enhance quality of life, enabling people to take control and responsibility for the things that are important to them as well as the care they need. Work is underway to deliver more person-centred, co-ordinated social care, that is responsive to individual needs, promotes choice, and maintains independence.”

    Source location

    2021-0163-Response-from-Department-of-Health-and-Social-Care_Published
    Page 3 · response
    Published 24 May 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Apply a preventative, person-centred dementia-care model using assessment tools, tailored activities and proactive behavioural support plans.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2.1. As presented at the inquest, the Trust does adopt a preventative approach to person centred care. Tools such as the Newcastle Model, life stories, dementia mapping etc., are used to help formulate care plans, which include activities linked to these assessments and ways to engage patients in therapeutic interventions that are tailored to their specific needs. Stage behaviour support plans also, by their very nature, set out proactive steps to try and prevent behaviour from escalating from one stage to another, with medication prescribed only if required.”

    Source location

    2021-0163-Response-from-St-Nicholas-Hospital-Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 24 May 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Engage families and friends in care planning and incorporate life stories and ongoing assessment information into regularly reviewed care plans.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “4.1. As presented at the inquest, triangulation of care is an important aspect of care and the Trust regularly engages with families to help formulate care plans. As per ████████ evidence, care planning is an ongoing process, which evolves with the patient. Whilst the Trust uses life stories in the first instance to inform care plans, other information”

    Source location

    2021-0163-Response-from-St-Nicholas-Hospital-Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 24 May 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing person-centred models, life stories and tailored activities are considered sufficient to address individuals’ psychological, physical and social needs.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “5. A focus on the person, asserting absolute value of the person and individualised approach, whilst understanding the world from the person’s perspective and provision of a social environment that supports psychological and physical needs.”

    Source location

    2021-0163-Response-from-St-Nicholas-Hospital-Published
    Page 3 · response
    Published 24 May 2021

    Open published response
  9. Brighton and Hove

    AI-generated summary

    Bethany Tengquist · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Bethany Tengquist hanged herself on 29 December 2018 after two telephone charging cables had been removed from her room but her dressing gown cord remained available. The report raises concerns that room checks and the removal of dangerous items were incomplete and flawed, and that staff may not have been properly trained.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of patient-centred involvement in care plan updating

    Wider context from the report

    “4. Care Plan not Up-dated. It was accepted by the Trust that Beth’s Care Plan had not, contrary to requirements of the Care Programme Arrangement, been updated in any meaningful way throughout Beth’s three month section 3 detention prior to her death. As the Clinical Lead Nurse Manager conceded, in the absence of patient centred involvement in the up-dating of the Care Plan, it risks becoming “meaningless” to the patient. In circumstances where a co-authored and co-produced document that actively involves and engages the patient is simply not up-dated meaningfully at all, then the aims and purposes of the CPA risk being undermined. In the context of a patient with Beth’s co-morbidities, the impact may be very serious indeed. The jury’s conclusions in this respect are informative and clear. ”

    Source location

    Bethany Tengquist · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 5 · concerns

    Open source report
  10. West London

    AI-generated summary

    Sophie Bennett · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Sophie Elizabeth Alice Bennett died at Kingston Hospital from injuries caused by applying a ligature at Lancaster Lodge, a care home operated by RPFI. The Jury identified concerns about inadequate governance, staffing, training, documentation, leadership and oversight, and found contributory errors or omissions in risk management, including failure to follow advice to take Sophie to A&E, inadequate observation and poor control of access to ligature items.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Decision-making without firsthand knowledge of the service and residents

    Wider context from the report

    “The governance of Lancaster Lodge, and of the staff, and others, working there during the material period, was inadequate in the following respects: 1. There was no “registered manager” who met the statutory criteria. 2. The staff were (despite RPFI’s assertions to the contrary), generally, untrained, unqualified and too few in number. 3. There were no, or no adequate, checks and controls by the staff, or by the acting manager, on the keeping of essential documents, including risk assessments and progress notes, which were, in consequence, themselves inadequate, unreliable and misleading - with corresponding risk to the safety of the residents. 4. The changes to which the determined circumstances refer were made following an audit by ████████ out: • ████████ was not qualified clinically, or in the field of mental health, to conduct that audit; • the audit conducted by him (which led to the proposals for change) took only a single day, which was grossly inadequate; • there was no, or no adequate, consultation with the staff, or by the staff with the residents, regarding the substantial changes introduced, and to be made; and • the changes were introduced at a “launch”, with no, or no adequate regard to the negative impact of their sudden introduction on the mental stability of the residents. 5. Leadership and oversight by the Board of RPFI was grossly inadequate, in relation to: • the need to have in place robust employment procedures; • the matters listed under paragraphs 1 to 4 above; • the appointments of the clinically unqualified ████████ and, later, the clinically unqualified art therapist as Clinical Lead, of a statutorily-approved registered manager, and of an adequate number of trained and qualified staff; • supervision and control of the changes introduced at ████████ instigation; • decisions made by the (unqualified) acting manager and staff in relation to the treatment to be given to the residents, and other steps required to meet their needs, and safety; • communication with other agencies involved in the care of the residents; • the keeping and production (including to the Court, for the purpose of the inquest) of the Board’s own records, communications and contracts; and • knowledge and performance of the Board’s fundamental obligations, including their duty of candour (not least in the Board having failed to fulfil its mandatory obligation to report to the CQC five instances of admission of Lancaster Lodge residents to hospital). 6. Advice to the acting manager was provided by ████████ - the founder of RPFI - and significant decisions regarding Lancaster Lodge and the residents, were made by her (in each case as a “consultant” to the Board, rather than by the Board of RPFI), and were followed by RPFI staff, when: • ████████ was neither a director, nor a Trustee, of RPFI (one Board member describing her role as “somewhat ambiguous”, and the evidence suggesting that she was a “shadow director”); and • ████████ had never visited Lancaster Lodge, and had never met (or had any knowledge, firsthand, knowledge of the residents). 7. The possibility of there being: • a conflict between the interests of ████████ (who, it appears, may have had a personal or family connection with the ownership of Lancaster Lodge) and those of RPFI itself; and • financial impropriety, in relation to the lease under which Lancaster Lodge was (it seems) held. 8. The post-death investigations carried out on behalf of RPFI: • were inadequate, verging on self-serving, and not objective; and • give rise to concerns as to their veracity and accuracy (the authorship of certain supposedly contemporaneous statements being denied by the staff member whose name appears on them as their maker). 9. The facts that: • a director and trustee of RPFI is also the Chairman of RCI; and • ████████ appears to have some family connection with the owner of RCI’s premises give rise to concerns in relation to RCI corresponding to those itemised under paragraphs 5 to 7 above. ”

    Source location

    Sophie Bennett · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
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Data last updated 7 September 2026