Recurring concern

Unreliable communication of patient-care information between clinical staff

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First reported 21 Aug 2013•Latest report 27 Feb 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures to communicate relevant patient care, treatment or risk information between clinical staff responsible for the same patient's care.

Not included

  • Formal handover processes where handover itself is the more specific unsafe control
  • Communication between separate organisations or agencies governed by a named information-sharing process
  • Documentation failures where relevant information was otherwise reliably communicated
  • Failure to act after information was reliably communicated
Reports
124

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
133

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
193

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care17
NHS England13
Care Quality Commission7
Barts Health NHS Trust4
Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust4
University Hospitals of Leicester NHS Trust4
Blackpool Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust3
Doncaster and Bassetlaw Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust3
Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust3
Manchester University NHS Foundation Trust3
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence3
Royal London Hospital3
Tameside and Glossop Integrated Care NHS Foundation Trust3
Avon and Wiltshire Mental Health Partnership NHS Trust2
Betsi Cadwaladr University LHB2

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Mid Kent and Medway

    AI-generated summary

    Kathryn Lynda Millard · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Kathryn Lynda Millard fell down stairs at a property where she was working on 10 May 2021 and was admitted to hospital with a fractured spine. She later developed green vomit, suffered a cardiac arrest on 13 May 2021, and could not be resuscitated; the jury recorded pulmonary embolism and deep venous thrombosis as the medical cause of death. Concerns included failure to document and implement a senior clinician’s direction, lack of awareness among nursing staff about anti-embolic stockings, and inadequate recording and communication following a review of her deteriorating presentation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to communicate prescribed anti-embolic stocking instructions to nursing staff

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) The medical records indicated that at least one doctor had indicated that Mrs Millard should have anti-embolic stockings applied. However, the nursing staff gave evidence that they were not aware of this. ”

    Source location

    Kathryn Lynda Millard · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to discuss patient presentation and prognosis with nursing staff

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) The nursing staff were concerned on the 12 May 2021 as to the presentation and prognosis of the deceased. Whomever attended (if they anybody did in fact attend), did not make any entry into Mrs Millard’s medical records. It is concerning that the Trust were not able to identify this individual and that they did not discuss the patient’s presentation and prognosis with the nursing staff. ”

    Source location

    Kathryn Lynda Millard · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver safety messages and local teaching to nurses about escalating indicated but unprescribed appliances.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust has also taken action to ensure that Anti-Embolic Stocking (AES) are prescribed and applied when indicated by the medical team. Safety messages and local teaching have occurred to ensure that nurses escalate incidents where an appliance has been indicated, but not prescribed.”

    Source location

    Response from Medway NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 April 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Audit anti-embolic stocking practice monthly, monitor compliance during ward and drug rounds, and share identified lessons at ward meetings.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Since the recipient of this letter, the team has again sent out safety message to all nursing staff as a reminder of the expected standard. Compliance with expected practice will be audited monthly, and monitored during ‘Ward Rounds’ and ‘Drug Rounds’ and lessons identified will be shared at ward meetings.”

    Source location

    Response from Medway NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 April 2022

    Open published response
  2. Bedfordshire and Luton

    AI-generated summary

    Mandy Jane DICKERSON · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mandy Jane Dickerson attended the Urgent GP Care Centre on 26 April 2020 after several days of diarrhoea and vomiting, but was discharged without assessment by the medical team. She died at home on 30 April 2020 from sepsis. The principal concerns included a non-mandatory and unreliable sepsis template, inadequate recording and communication of key observations, and confusion about referral responsibilities when specialist assessment was requested.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to convey key clinical information to medical registrars

    Wider context from the report

    “4. There was in my view a failure to record and then to convey key information to the medical registrar who consequently may have given advice which was ill-informed. The nurse practitioner told me, in oral evidence and in a statement provided at the eleventh hour the night before the Inquest, that the measurements had been performed but simply not recorded. However, the remainder of the note was particularly and contemporaneously detailed with these critical observations being conspicuous in their absence. I found that the observations had not been made. In addition, no record was made of the name of the medical registrar making investigation of this element difficult. ”

    Source location

    Mandy Jane DICKERSON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Audit patient records monthly for compliance with specialty-consultation recording requirements and discuss identified issues at joint clinical governance meetings.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “4. As to paragraph 5 of your concerns, it is of course for each individual practitioner (in accordance with their relevant regulatory body and their professional obligations) to ensure that they record the key information about a patient and the patient’s presentation and that they accurately report the same to any other practitioner that they may contact in respect of a patient. It is now, however, part of Atrumed’s policy that practitioners must record (in a patient’s records) the name and times of any specialty clinicians that they speak to (please see attached) We carry out monthly audits of the records to ensure that this is happening and any issues that are identified are discussed with the Trust out our joint clinical governance meetings.”

    Source location

    2022-0100 - Response from Atrumed Healthcare
    Page 4 · response
    Published 26 April 2022

    Open published response
  3. West Yorkshire (Western)

    AI-generated summary

    Edward Arthur AKROYD · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Edward Arthur Akroyd was delivered by forceps on 13 January 2018 at Calderdale Royal Hospital after concerns arose during his mother’s labour, including pre-eclampsia and abnormal CTG tracing. He was transferred to Leeds General Infirmary for intensive treatment and died there on 17 January 2018. The principal concerns included inadequate monitoring and treatment of his mother’s elevated blood pressure, incomplete handover and medical records, failure to communicate laboratory results, and delayed recognition and interpretation of non-reassuring CTG findings.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to communicate laboratory results to treating clinicians

    Wider context from the report

    “3. After a diagnosis of pre-eclampsia was made at Huddersfield birthing centre and Prior to transfer, various samples were obtained and sent for laboratory analysis, some of the results were received at Huddersfield Birthing Centre and phoned through to the labour ward at Calderdale Royal Hospital. From the evidence presented, the results were not passed to Mrs Akroyds attendant midwife or treating registrar. The subsequent internal review did not appear to investigate and determine the reason why this did not occur. I am concerned that if this were to reoccur, important information may not be provided which could pose a risk to the wellbeing of an expectant mother and their unborn child ”

    Source location

    Edward Arthur AKROYD · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement automatic transfer of laboratory results into the primary patient record and display them on the Trust-wide system home screen.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The computer system for reporting results has changed since 2018. As soon as results are put onto the laboratory computer system those results are pulled through to the primary patient record and can then be seen on the “home” screen of the Trust wide system. Any doctor or midwife can therefore check on the blood test results, including remote access, for example, on an on call consultant accessing the system from home. This means there is no need for the results to be phoned through or passed on verbally.”

    Source location

    Response from Calderdale and Huddersfield NHS Foundation Trust (1)
    Page 4 · response
    Published 8 March 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The internal investigation could not pursue why laboratory results were not passed on because the recipient could not be identified.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It should be noted that there was no diagnosis of pre-eclampsia at the Huddersfield Birthing Centre. High blood pressure was recognised. Nevertheless, the results of the blood tests should have been accurately passed on. It was not felt possible to pursue the matter in the”

    Source location

    Response from Calderdale and Huddersfield NHS Foundation Trust (1)
    Page 3 · response
    Published 8 March 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Automatic laboratory-result availability in the primary record is considered sufficient, removing the need for results to be phoned through or verbally passed on.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The computer system for reporting results has changed since 2018. As soon as results are put onto the laboratory computer system those results are pulled through to the primary patient record and can then be seen on the “home” screen of the Trust wide system. Any doctor or midwife can therefore check on the blood test results, including remote access, for example, on an on call consultant accessing the system from home. This means there is no need for the results to be phoned through or passed on verbally.”

    Source location

    Response from Calderdale and Huddersfield NHS Foundation Trust (1)
    Page 4 · response
    Published 8 March 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Trust considers the doctor’s changed practice, including proactive information review and communication training, sufficient to address handover and record-review concerns.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Please see the response to concern 5 above.”

    Source location

    Response from Calderdale and Huddersfield NHS Foundation Trust (1)
    Page 6 · response
    Published 8 March 2022

    Open published response
  4. West Yorkshire Eastern

    AI-generated summary

    Alexander George Theodossiadis · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Alexander George Theodossiadis, aged 25, died in hospital on 28 January 2020 after treatment for bacterial meningitis, a fall from a hospital bed, and a resulting head injury. Concerns included difficulty obtaining a timely GP appointment and insufficient symptom assessment, inadequate hospital transfer handover and care planning, uncertainty about meningitis management, and failure to assess or communicate his risk of falling.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to communicate identified falls risk to the receiving ward

    Wider context from the report

    “(4) Despite spending 10 hours in A&E and displaying increasing signs of confusion he was seen to be trying to get off his hospital bed which created a risk of falls, no assessment of the falls risk was carried out. In consequence, the receiving ward J27 at St James’s University Hospital, Leeds were not forewarned of the risk of falls. He fell from his hospital bed within approximately 10 minutes of being placed in a side room on his own. ”

    Source location

    Alexander George Theodossiadis · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require cross-city transfers to include a written nursing handover document recording the patient’s falls risk.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “For cross-city transfers we must ensure a robust handover of care between nursing staff in the ED and on the receiving ward. This may take the form of a telephone conversation but this should always be accompanied by a written handover document. Currently in the Emergency Department this takes the form of a written document that is then scanned into the electronic patient record (PPM+). The Trust is currently trialling a stand-alone electronic transfer document and it is anticipated that this will be rolled out to all areas of the Trust in due course.”

    Source location

    2021-0412-Response-from-St-Jamess-University-Hospital_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 10 December 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Seek an agreement with Yorkshire Ambulance Service not to accept transfers without a handover document recording falls risk.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “seeking an understanding with YAS that they will not accept patients for transfer without a handover document which clearly records the patient’s falls risk.”

    Source location

    2021-0412-Response-from-St-Jamess-University-Hospital_Published
    Page 3 · response
    Published 10 December 2021

    Open published response
  5. Norfolk

    AI-generated summary

    Ben Buster KING · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Ben Buster KING was detained under the Mental Health Act at Jeesal Cawston Park and died in hospital on 29 July 2020 after becoming unwell following respiratory problems and receiving sedative medication. The inquest identified concerns including failure to diagnose obesity hypoventilation syndrome, inadequate consideration of promethazine, failure to recognise the seriousness of a life-threatening situation, and wider care, observation, record-keeping and hospital communication issues.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to communicate prior emergency department attendance to the respiratory consultant

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Guidance was sought by Emergency Department (ED) when Ben King attended on 10 July 2020 from a Respiratory Consultant, who was not made aware that Ben King had attended some 6 hours earlier with the same symptoms. 2. The Respiratory on call consultant was not contacted when Mr King returned to NNUH two days later on the 12 July 2020 with the same symptoms. 3. At the time of Ben King’s attendance at NNUH, Ben King was under the Respiratory Team and had been seen a few days earlier, on the 3 July 2020. The Respiratory Team was not made aware of Ben King’s attendances at ED on 9, 10 or 12 July 2020 with respiratory problems ”

    Source location

    Ben Buster KING · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Hold daily multidisciplinary morning report meetings to discuss cases and make appropriate specialty referrals.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “That said, the importance of effective communication is clearly recognised and to promote good quality handovers the Respiratory team now hold a daily morning report meeting, attended by all the on-call specialities. At these meetings cases are discussed and referred to other specialities as appropriate.”

    Source location

    2021-0250-Response-from-Norfolk-and-Norwich-University-Hospitals_Published
    Page 1 · response
    Published 23 July 2021

    Open published response
  6. Blackpool and the Fylde

    AI-generated summary

    Coral Amy O’Donnell · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Coral Amy O’Donnell developed severe pneumonia after presenting with cough and cold-like symptoms and died in hospital on 17 May 2019 after prolonged intensive care. Concerns included failure to consider PVL Staphylococcus aureus promptly, limited awareness of relevant guidance and internal systems, problematic communication between critical care and microbiology teams, and insufficient microbiology staffing.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of critical care and microbiology teams to communicate relevant patient information

    Wider context from the report

    “That communication between the critical care and microbiology teams was problematic and neither team considered PVL until there was established damage to her lungs identified on a chest x-ray. Senior clinicians had not mentioned a susceptibility to skin infections to the microbiologists which may have resulted in Coral receiving the correct treatment at an early stage of admission. The lack of communication between Microbiology and the clinical team appears to have in part been contributed to by a previous cessation of the thrice weekly joint microbiology and critical care ward rounds, which the court heard have not been re-instated; ”

    Source location

    Coral Amy O’Donnell · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Operationalise reinstatement of thrice-weekly joint Critical Care and Microbiology ward rounds.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “There are currently no joint ward rounds between the Critical Care Team and the Microbiology team, but there is better day to day communication and discussion at the Antimicrobial Stewardship Committee. At present, the day to day system is via telephone conversations with the Microbiology team, as and when required, plus the Critical Care Consultants will send e-referrals when they require Microbiology advice. However, we acknowledge that this falls short of what is ideal, and this needs to be improved. It has been highlighted that there is an objective to reinstate the three times a week joint ward round with the Consultant Microbiologist and Consultant Intensivist and the discussions to operationalise this are taking place. There are also imminent changes to the consultant staffing model that we believe will further improve matters.”

    Source location

    2021-0152-Response-from-Blackpool-Victoria-Hospital-Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 18 May 2021

    Open published response
  7. Stoke-on-Trent and North Staffordshire

    AI-generated summary

    Alex Louise Shaw · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Alex Louise Shaw, who had methylmalonic aciduria and chronic kidney failure, died on 22 October 2018 after developing fluid overload, pulmonary oedema and respiratory failure during hospital treatment. The principal concerns were poor communication and documentation of her clinical observations and telephone advice between clinicians at Royal Stoke University Hospital and Birmingham Children’s Hospital, including failure to communicate her rising heart rate.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to communicate patients’ clinical condition and observations between clinicians when telephone advice is sought

    Wider context from the report

    “[BRIEF SUMMARY OF MATTERS OF CONCERN] (1) There was poor communication of the patient’s clinical condition/observations between the Registrar at the Royal Stoke University Hospital and the Consultant at the Birmingham Children’s Hospital when advice was sought by telephone. There was also poor documentation of the contents of the information that had been provided during that conversation and the timing of when the call was made. The evidence of the Consultant at the Birmingham Children’s Hospital was that her advice would have been different if she had been made aware of the patient’s rising heart rate. (2) The evidence also revealed it was a “judgment call” when the clinician felt that a dialogue between clinician’s at a different hospital needed to be documented. (3) Consideration should be given as to how a patient’s observations are communicated to the clinician’s between the University Hospital and the Birmingham Children’s Hospital, the time, content, advice and documentation of the conversations. ”

    Source location

    Alex Louise Shaw · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop a structured electronic Paediatric Advice Proforma with mandatory fields and prompts for documenting inter-hospital clinical advice.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1) The paediatric team are in the process of developing a facility on the Trust electronic Iportal System which will provide a structured note ‘Paediatric Advice Proforma’ to aid electronic documentation of conversations between hospitals when seeking advice on patient care; this will include prompts for important discussion points and will have mandatory fields for vital signs (such as heart rate, BP etc.) which will ensure that the clinician includes such information in conversation. Matters are currently being developed with the IT team and we hope to have a solution by September 2021.”

    Source location

    2021-0141-Response-from-Royal-Stoke-University-Hospital-Redacted
    Page 1 · response
    Published 7 May 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Scope improvements to recording patient information for patients needing specialist advice while off site.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is acknowledged that this will result in inconsistencies in practice and as a result, the Trust’s Chief Clinical Information Officer (CCIO) as Associate Chief Medical Officer for IT and Information, together with the Trust’s Chief Technology Officer and Data Protection Officer for the Trust are scoping how the recording of information pertaining to patients who are not on our premises but who need specialist clinical advice can be improved.”

    Source location

    2021-0141-Response-from-Birmingham-Womens-and-Childrens-NHSFT-Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 7 May 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Work with the Norse supplier to transition to the system’s latest version and additional features.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have a limited deployment of an electronic product called Norse. This facilitates a typed ongoing conversation between a clinician’s at this Trust and at another centre. This system includes some features including an ability for our staff to request baseline information at the start of the conversation and include other clinicians as appropriate in the conversation. At conclusion of the discussion, it is then possible to retain the detail of the dialogue.”

    Source location

    2021-0141-Response-from-Birmingham-Womens-and-Childrens-NHSFT-Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 7 May 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Roll out Norse across a number of clinical services to strengthen required documentation of inter-centre clinical advice.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have a limited deployment of an electronic product called Norse. This facilitates a typed ongoing conversation between a clinician’s at this Trust and at another centre. This system includes some features including an ability for our staff to request baseline information at the start of the conversation and include other clinicians as appropriate in the conversation. At conclusion of the discussion, it is then possible to retain the detail of the dialogue.”

    Source location

    2021-0141-Response-from-Birmingham-Womens-and-Childrens-NHSFT-Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 7 May 2021

    Open published response
  8. West Sussex

    AI-generated summary

    John Ashley · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    John Ashley took his own life while suffering a deterioration in his mental illness, according to the inquest conclusion. The report identified concerns about failures to update his care and treatment plan, record and share key information, review his deterioration and medication non-compliance, and provide adequate clinical oversight and cover arrangements.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a clear procedure for Care Coordinators to update GPs about changed treatment plans

    Wider context from the report

    “8. There was no clear procedure for GPs to be updated by Care Coordinators with details of a patient’s current treatment plan if it had been changed. This was particularly important where there was no regular assessments by a Psychiatrist who would in the normal course of events be providing such updates. ”

    Source location

    John Ashley · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing practice of sending GPs clinical letters, care plans and relevant assessment information is considered sufficient for treatment-plan updates.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Mr Ashley should have had a medical review on an annual basis and I wish to assure you that it is our practice to send a clinical letter to the GP as well as a copy to the patient. It is also Trust practice to send a copy of the care plan and information about changes to medication or physical health assessments undertaken by our service. I am informed that the GP practice received copies of Trust letters from the last medical review and copies of the assessments undertaken by the Mental Health Liaison Team and these contained details of the perceived risk and action plan agreed with the patient.”

    Source location

    2020-0071-Sussex-Partnership-NHS-Foundation-Trust_Redacted
    Page 6 · response
    Published 8 April 2020

    Open published response
  9. Inner West London

    AI-generated summary

    Rebecca Jane Hursey · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Rebecca Jane Hursey died at St George’s Hospital on 4 May 2018 after taking an aspirin overdose while detained under Section 3 of the Mental Health Act and receiving care on the Avalon Ward. The report identifies concerns about suicidal-risk information not being verbally communicated during handover, observations and searches not mitigating her self-harm risk, and the prolonged failure to find a suitable alternative placement.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to verbally communicate increased suicidal risk to the responsible nurse

    Wider context from the report

    “2. That practitioners who recognise increase in suicidal risk of a patient should pass this on verbally to the nurse on charge of the ward or the nurse allocated to the patient. ”

    Source location

    Rebecca Jane Hursey · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
  10. Manchester City

    AI-generated summary

    Kieran Luke Hubbard · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Kieran Luke Hubbard, who had a history of depressive disorder and recurrent suicidal thoughts, was found dead on 8 February 2019 after hanging himself at a building site. The principal concerns were failures to expedite and properly coordinate an inpatient bed, failures to communicate and escalate the decision to abandon the bed search, inadequate guidance about driving during a mental health crisis, and shortcomings in the post-death investigation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to update the responsible psychiatrist so that the position can be reconsidered

    Wider context from the report

    “5 3 The decision to abandon the search for a bed was taken by healthcare professionals without knowledge of exactly what information, if any, PCFT required to consider the request and without updating the psychiatrist in charge of the deceased care in order for them to consider and reassess the position This appears to be a wholly inappropriate and unsatisfactory position ”

    Source location

    Kieran Luke Hubbard · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report
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Data last updated 7 September 2026