Recurring concern

Unreliable communication of patient-care information between clinical staff

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First reported 21 Aug 2013•Latest report 27 Feb 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures to communicate relevant patient care, treatment or risk information between clinical staff responsible for the same patient's care.

Not included

  • Formal handover processes where handover itself is the more specific unsafe control
  • Communication between separate organisations or agencies governed by a named information-sharing process
  • Documentation failures where relevant information was otherwise reliably communicated
  • Failure to act after information was reliably communicated
Reports
124

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
133

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
193

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care17
NHS England13
Care Quality Commission7
Barts Health NHS Trust4
Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust4
University Hospitals of Leicester NHS Trust4
Blackpool Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust3
Doncaster and Bassetlaw Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust3
Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust3
Manchester University NHS Foundation Trust3
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence3
Royal London Hospital3
Tameside and Glossop Integrated Care NHS Foundation Trust3
Avon and Wiltshire Mental Health Partnership NHS Trust2
Betsi Cadwaladr University LHB2

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Keith HILL · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Keith Hill was admitted with biliary sepsis and underwent a liver biopsy, after which he developed bleeding requiring surgery and later suffered bowel haemorrhage. The report identified concerns about communication between specialists, inadequate medical records, and insufficient support and scrutiny around the prescription and dispensing of micafungin.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure communication between interventional radiology and hepatology specialists

    Wider context from the report

    “1. When the plan changed and the transjugular liver biopsy became a percutaneous one, there was no communication between the interventional radiologist and the hepatologists. Even if it had not changed the plan, Mr Hill’s management would have benefited from a robust discussion between the specialists in these two fields, and a more accurate record of the decision making. ”

    Source location

    Keith HILL · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct regular documented MDT discussions between medical teams and interventional radiologists, including discussions for non-elective patients outside formal MDT meetings.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “This case has led to a review of how decisions are discussed and documented between the treating team and the interventional radiology team. There are regular and documented discussions in the MDT meeting between the medical teams and the interventional radiologists; in addition there are conversations between referring teams and the interventional radiologists if non-elective patients are being treated without having been through a formal MDT discussion. In this context it is agreed between all clinical teams that at the time of the procedure the interventional radiologists will decide as to how to proceed based on their clinical knowledge, experience and the clinical situation at that point. Further conversations with the referring team at this point and in this case would not have changed the procedure performed.”

    Source location

    2019-0446-Response-from-Barts-NHS-Trust-R
    Page 1 · response
    Published 6 January 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Further discussions with the referring team at the procedure stage would not have changed the procedure performed.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “This case has led to a review of how decisions are discussed and documented between the treating team and the interventional radiology team. There are regular and documented discussions in the MDT meeting between the medical teams and the interventional radiologists; in addition there are conversations between referring teams and the interventional radiologists if non-elective patients are being treated without having been through a formal MDT discussion. In this context it is agreed between all clinical teams that at the time of the procedure the interventional radiologists will decide as to how to proceed based on their clinical knowledge, experience and the clinical situation at that point. Further conversations with the referring team at this point and in this case would not have changed the procedure performed.”

    Source location

    2019-0446-Response-from-Barts-NHS-Trust-R
    Page 1 · response
    Published 6 January 2020

    Open published response
  2. Mid Kent and Medway

    AI-generated summary

    Dorothy June MACEY · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Dorothy June MACEY sustained leg injuries when her legs went through a glass door and was later discharged home with district nurse dressing care. Antibiotics prescribed in September were not received promptly, and concerns were raised about wound assessment, information sharing, record-keeping, sepsis checks, medication monitoring, care planning and a missed visit. She was admitted to hospital for sepsis on 28 September 2018, developed gangrene in her left lower leg, and died at Medway Maritime Hospital on 7 October 2018.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to share and escalate delayed antibiotic treatment information

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Protocol required district nurses to photograph the leg wounds to assist in the assessment and this was not done on any of the visits. I heard evidence that photographs on the patient electronic record cannot be accessed remotely on home visits limiting the shared information that should be available to conduct an assessment. (2) District nurses did not share information with the GP when it was established that there had been a delay in the prescribed antibiotic treatment regime, and this was not escalated within the team. (3) Incomplete recording- The district nurse electronic care and treatment records on iNurse were: a) very brief and did not contain information necessary to have a comprehensive assessment or understanding of deterioration or improvement in her condition b) difficult to access remotely and showed limited information, therefore the previous nurse attendance could not be seen on particular visits. Evidence was that the record was not accessed prior to the visit on 24th September and the delay in the treatment regime was not understood when antibiotics were requested on that day. (4) A sepsis pathway check was completed on 20th September. This was not completed when antibiotics were requested on 24th September. There is a concern that developing sepsis may be missed in a deteriorating patient. (5) There was no updated care plan in place for her leg dressings. District nurse support staff changed the type of leg dressings without approval of the qualified nurses, evidence was heard that this should not be done without discussion. (6) Medication administration charts completed by carers were incomplete. The antibiotic administration was not checked despite previous issues with the delay in the treatment regime becoming known to district nurses on 20th September. This record was shared with or escalated to the GP for advice when there was a lack of improvement in her condition. (7) A visit required for 28th September was incorrectly scheduled for 1st October and was not picked up within the Missed Visit protocol in place. ”

    Source location

    Dorothy June MACEY · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  3. Stoke-on-Trent and North Staffordshire

    AI-generated summary

    Julie MORREY · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Julie MORREY died in Royal Stoke University Hospital on 10 January 2019 after presenting with renal failure and bronchopneumonia. The report raised concerns about inadequate communication between hospital departments, a lack of proactive nursing management, insufficient fluids for over 24 hours, and no senior clinician review during that period.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of communication between hospital departments about responsibility for patient care

    Wider context from the report

    “1. There was a clear lack of communication between the hospital departments as to which department was responsible for the patient after she was assessed by a renal specialist and a plan made for her care and whilst she awaited a bed on the Renal Unit during which time she was looked after on the AMU. During this time she was without fluids for over 24 hours. ”

    Source location

    Julie MORREY · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Agree the renal admission pathway with advice clarifying the reason for referral.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1. The “Renal pathway for patients referred for admission from ED/AMU” has been agreed, which includes detailed advice about clarifying the reason for referral. Trust Internal Professional Standards have been amended with the support of the Medical Director to enhance fitness for purpose and to prevent recurrence of patient care failing due to misunderstanding between departments.”

    Source location

    2019-0353-Response-by-University-Hospitals-of-North-Midlands-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 22 November 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Amend Trust Internal Professional Standards to reduce failures caused by misunderstanding between departments.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1. The “Renal pathway for patients referred for admission from ED/AMU” has been agreed, which includes detailed advice about clarifying the reason for referral. Trust Internal Professional Standards have been amended with the support of the Medical Director to enhance fitness for purpose and to prevent recurrence of patient care failing due to misunderstanding between departments.”

    Source location

    2019-0353-Response-by-University-Hospitals-of-North-Midlands-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 22 November 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Escalate and document patients requiring specialty care through Emergency Department huddles and the Huddle Log.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “b. Any patient who requires speciality care is now escalated and discussed within ED huddles and the discussion is documented in the Huddle Log.”

    Source location

    2019-0353-Response-by-University-Hospitals-of-North-Midlands-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 22 November 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The absence of consultant review was not a separate error because existing senior-review mechanisms were robust; it resulted from misunderstanding responsibility for the patient.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3. Clinical teams would like to reassure H M Coroner that both Renal and Acute medicine do have robust mechanisms for ensuring senior review of patients. In this case, if either specialty had thought the patient to be under their care, they would have had a review. On this occasion, the lack of a consultant review was not a separate or additional error; it all stems from the misunderstanding of allocation at the beginning of the patient’s care. The corrective actions outlined in 1 and 2 above will prevent such a situation from arising in the future.”

    Source location

    2019-0353-Response-by-University-Hospitals-of-North-Midlands-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 22 November 2019

    Open published response
  4. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Kenneth John Daly · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Kenneth John Daly, who had chronic pain and anxiety and was prescribed multiple medications, was found dead at home on 4 December 2018. The inquest concluded that his death was drug related, involving multi-drug toxicity, after he overdosed on Morphine, Dihydrocodeine and Codeine alongside Pregabalin and benzodiazepine medication. Concerns included unclear guidance about using multiple opioid medications together and the absence of tailored written advice for Mr Daly.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to seek clarification of unclear prescribing advice

    Wider context from the report

    “1) In oral evidence, the Consultant stated that no other opioids were to be taken once Morphine Sulphate and Co-Codamol had been prescribed but that prescribing of Pregabalin could continue. She set out her advice in a letter to Mr Daly’s GP dated 11 July 2018. The letter clearly stated that Fentanyl and Tapentadol should be stopped and Morphine sulphate (MST) 60mg started. The advice regarding the prescribing of pain relieving medications other than Fentanyl and Tapentadol is less clear. In relation to Dihydrocodeine and Tramadol it is stated that “He can continue using the Dihydrocodeine and very rarely Tramadol until he sees you for his next prescription. Together with the MST, I would recommend to allow him Co-Codamol 30/500mg 2 tablets up to four times a day...”. Following receipt of the letter, Tramadol and Dihydrocodeine continued to be issued by the GP practice albeit at lower quantities than previously prescribed. The GP did not seek any further guidance regarding the advice given in the letter of 11 July 2018 from the Consultant. 2) Mr Daly was a patient that was known to adjust his pain medication without seeking guidance from his GP. Whilst Mr Daly was copied in to the letter sent to his GP on 11 July 2018, he was not given any written guidance regarding his pain relief and the use of other medications (such as benzodiazepines) that was tailored to his needs as a patient. Specifically, he was not given any written advice regarding the risks of using multiple opioid medications in combination. ”

    Source location

    Kenneth John Daly · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
  5. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Miriam Tighe · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Miriam Tighe became a resident of Edge Hill Residential Home in August 2016 and later received hospital and residential nursing care before passing away on 28 February 2017. The report identified concerns that promazine and other sedative or antipsychotic medication continued to be prescribed and administered despite advice to stop promazine, and that communication between GPs and a psychiatrist was insufficient, leading to unsafe prescribing. The investigation recorded that her death followed naturally occurring disease, with high levels of sedation and immobility in the preceding months worsening her frailty.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of information sharing between GPs and psychiatrists about sedative and antipsychotic medication decisions

    Wider context from the report

    “Promazine was sought by the home manager at Edge Hill Residential Home and prescribed by the GPs at Royton & Crompton family practice after ████████ (Psychiatrist working in the Memory Clinic (part of Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust)) had advised that such medication be stopped on the 16th November 2016 and, again on the 16th December 2016. On both occasions, promazine continued to be prescribed by the GP and continued to be administered under the control of the manager at Edge Hill Residential Home. In the event, I found that Miriam Tighe had been over-sedated during her time as a resident at Edge Hill Residential Home. The psychiatrist had recommended alternative sedative and antipsychotic medication, which was also administered to Miriam Tighe. It was clear that the GPs and the Psychiatrist were not aware of decisions being made by each other in October to December 2016, which led to unsafe prescribing of sedatives and antipsychotic medication. ”

    Source location

    Miriam Tighe · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  6. Exeter and Greater Devon

    AI-generated summary

    Stuart Michael CLARK · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Stuart Michael CLARK died shortly after being recovered from a canal on 3 October 2017, after entering the water wearing a rucksack filled with weights. During a hospital admission before his death, he disclosed that he was a vulnerable adult and a suicide risk, but this was not escalated or followed by an assessment of his risk of self-harm or suicide. The report identified that senior clinical staff were not directly informed and that the relevant medical record entry was not available to other staff at the time.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to directly inform senior clinical staff of disclosed suicide risk

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The evidence revealed that Mr CLARK disclosed to a member of nursing staff on Lowman (Canpere) Ward at the Royal Devon and Exeter Hospital that he was a vulnerable adult and a suicide risk. This disclosure was not followed up with an assessment to determine if Mr CLARK had any intent, plan or history of self-harm or suicide. An assessment would have helped determine his risk and inform the decision on a referral to mental health services. Senior clinical staff were not directly informed of the disclosure. The SHO Dr responsible for Mr CLARK stated in her evidence that had she known about the disclosure she would have assessed his risk of self-harm and suicide, and if appropriate she would have referred him to the mental health services. The nurse made an entry in the medical records; however, the medical notes were not made up until the end of the day and therefore the information was not available to the other staff at the relevant time. ”

    Source location

    Stuart Michael CLARK · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review current training and support for recognising risk, escalating concerns and safeguarding adults.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    ““review procedures and training related to the actions to be taken when a disclosure is made to ward staff giving rise to the suspicion of the risk of self-harm or suicide”.”

    Source location

    2019-0125-Response-by-Royal-Devon-and-Exeter-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 15 July 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Run a two-day professional leadership forum to reinforce individual responsibility and accountability for patient safety and suicide prevention, with learning cascaded to teams.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “However, the Trust is always seeking to improve safety for its patients. We will be reinforcing individual responsibility and accountability for patient safety and suicide prevention to all staff. In June 2019, the Trust is running a two day ‘Care Matters’ professional leadership forum for Nurses, Allied Health Professionals and midwives. These sessions will be run and delivered in person by ████████ ████████ Deputy Chief Executive/Chief Nurse, and will reach over 100 leads who will then cascade to their respective teams. The focus of this forum is Professional Safety and this case will be used during this forum as an example to reiterate the importance of escalating concerns about vulnerable patients to ensure the appropriate assessments and support can be provided to them.”

    Source location

    2019-0125-Response-by-Royal-Devon-and-Exeter-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 July 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Issue a safeguarding newsletter reminder about procedures following disclosures of possible suicidal intent, including the suicide-support leaflet.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust is satisfied that this was an isolated incident and staff are aware of their safeguarding obligations. However, the Safeguarding Team is going to issue a reminder to all staff in an upcoming newsletter (which reaches all clinical staff) about safeguarding procedures when there is a disclosure about possible suicidal intent. This briefing will include information about the ‘It’s safe to talk about suicide’ leaflet, a copy of which is attached. This is available on the Trust’s safeguarding intranet page but we want to raise awareness further of this issue. The leaflet was produced by Exeter Medical School in conjunction with Suicide Charities and Devon County Council for staff to use to support people when suicidal intention is disclosed.”

    Source location

    2019-0125-Response-by-Royal-Devon-and-Exeter-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 July 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing training, policies, safeguarding support and mental health provision are considered sufficient to ensure staff recognise and escalate suicide risks.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “There is a mandatory training programme that is completed by all staff on induction with the Trust, whatever their role. Regular updates are required at a maximum interval of every three years. The training programme has the following objectives:”

    Source location

    2019-0125-Response-by-Royal-Devon-and-Exeter-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 15 July 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The incident is considered isolated, and staff are considered aware of their safeguarding obligations and required actions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust is satisfied that this was an isolated incident and staff are aware of their safeguarding obligations. However, the Safeguarding Team is going to issue a reminder to all staff in an upcoming newsletter (which reaches all clinical staff) about safeguarding procedures when there is a disclosure about possible suicidal intent. This briefing will include information about the ‘It’s safe to talk about suicide’ leaflet, a copy of which is attached. This is available on the Trust’s safeguarding intranet page but we want to raise awareness further of this issue. The leaflet was produced by Exeter Medical School in conjunction with Suicide Charities and Devon County Council for staff to use to support people when suicidal intention is disclosed.”

    Source location

    2019-0125-Response-by-Royal-Devon-and-Exeter-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 July 2019

    Open published response
  7. Nottinghamshire

    AI-generated summary

    Kathleen McGeary · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Kathleen McGeary died on 6 March 2018 from a head injury sustained in a fall at Tuxford Manor Care Home after her discharge from hospital. Concerns included inadequate assessment and treatment before discharge, unclear responsibility for discharge decisions, inadequate discharge documentation and communication, and her leaving hospital without prescribed antibiotics.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of clear communication between clinicians and nursing staff

    Wider context from the report

    “2. No clinician took clear responsibility for discharging decision making. The recording of the identity of the discharging clinician was incorrect and communication between clinicians and nursing staff was unclear. ”

    Source location

    Kathleen McGeary · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement a CDU pathway document to support communication between the main hospital department and CDU on admission.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “the patient pathway. It also has CDU pathway document that aids the communication between the main hospital department and CDU on admission. This has now been implemented.”

    Source location

    2019-0081-Response-by-Doncaster-and-Bassetlaw-Hospital-NHS-Trust
    Page 5 · response
    Published 9 June 2019

    Open published response
  8. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Michael William Flynn · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Michael William Flynn underwent elective hip replacement surgery and required a blood transfusion. He subsequently experienced inadequate Early Warning Score monitoring, failures to follow escalation procedures, incomplete fluid-balance monitoring, and a lack of timely clinical review before suffering cardiac arrest and dying on 17 July 2018.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to communicate deterioration between ward doctors and nursing staff

    Wider context from the report

    “5. The ward was staffed by ward doctors throughout the day but there was no documentation to suggest communication between the ward doctors and nursing staff in relation to Mr Flynn and his deteriorating picture ”

    Source location

    Michael William Flynn · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of consultants to communicate about patients with ward staff

    Wider context from the report

    “7. There was no evidence that the consultant had communicated with staff about Mr Flynn or that the relevant registrar had reviewed Mr Flynn on visits to the ward. ”

    Source location

    Michael William Flynn · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Addressed orthopaedic NEWS-policy noncompliance through staff discussions and circulated responsibilities for recording and escalation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Matron for the Orthopaedic Unit has provided assurances that formal discussions have taken place with the nursing staff identified through our investigation as failing to comply with Trust Policy in respect to the regularity, recording and appropriate escalation of NEWS observations, and consideration given to identified support or training needs. Additionally, I understand the ward manager has circulated a newsletter to all staff reiterating their responsibilities and accountability with regards to the appropriate recording and escalation of NEWS, including -”

    Source location

    2019-0008-Response-by-Tameside-and-Glossop-Care-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 May 2019

    Open published response
  9. West London

    AI-generated summary

    Henry Curtis-Williams · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Henry Curtis-Williams died from hanging at Acton Cemetery on 17 May 2018; the inquest conclusion was hanging and suicide. Concerns included inadequate contemporaneous recording, discharge by junior doctors without prior senior review, and informal communication without records of important messages.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to formally record and communicate important messages between staff members

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) Communication between staff members was very informal with no record kept of important messages relayed. For example, the member of staff who held a one to one meeting with Henry was not present at the ward round where Henry’s case was discussed but said she had verbally passed a message to the ward round nurse. This was normal practice on this ward. There was no record of the message, or of it being passed or that it was considered at the ward round. ”

    Source location

    Henry Curtis-Williams · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Issue an internal alert directing inpatient wards to reflect on how information from different sources is received and captured.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “There is no current single evidence-based tool which can be implemented to eliminate this potential. However, shared understanding amongst staff of the processes of receiving information is critical to reduce variance. Following some recent learning, the Trust has issued an internal alert to all inpatient wards directing reflection on the points where information is received from differing sources eg service users, families and carers and whether there is a shared process or understanding of how to ensure that information is captured. Where there may not be a shared understanding the ward will work to address this. Feedback from this alert is being received currently which will then be shared across the wards to promote wider learning.”

    Source location

    2018-0397-Response-by-Norfolk-and-Suffolk-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 5 April 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    No single evidence-based communication tool can currently be implemented to eliminate the risk of important information failing to reach ward rounds.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “There is no current single evidence-based tool which can be implemented to eliminate this potential. However, shared understanding amongst staff of the processes of receiving information is critical to reduce variance. Following some recent learning, the Trust has issued an internal alert to all inpatient wards directing reflection on the points where information is received from differing sources eg service users, families and carers and whether there is a shared process or understanding of how to ensure that information is captured. Where there may not be a shared understanding the ward will work to address this. Feedback from this alert is being received currently which will then be shared across the wards to promote wider learning.”

    Source location

    2018-0397-Response-by-Norfolk-and-Suffolk-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 5 April 2019

    Open published response
  10. South Wales Central

    AI-generated summary

    Mrs Ruth Ellen Edwards · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mrs Ruth Ellen Edwards died at home on 31 August 2018 after hanging herself from an attic ladder, following a long history of mental health problems and previous suicide attempts. Concerns included her discharge after a drug overdose without psychiatric liaison assessment, inadequate risk assessment and inaccurate communication about the overdose, and potentially insufficient medication reviews despite access to many medications at home.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to communicate accurate overdose information to liaison psychiatry

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) The consultation at the UHW on 23rd August was poor. The history-taking was inadequate, as it did not reveal the true extent of Mrs Edwards’ risk in terms of previous suicide attempts and deep-seated mental health problems. Furthermore, inaccurate information was communicated to liaison psychiatry: they were told that Mrs Edwards had taken 2 tablets, when she had taken 20. ”

    Source location

    Mrs Ruth Ellen Edwards · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Remind staff through Clinical Board quality, safety and experience structures to take complete, diligent mental-health histories using all available information.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The care and attention to detail taken by doctors and other healthcare professionals when taking histories and information from mental health patients.”

    Source location

    2018-0395-Response-by-University-Health-Board
    Page 3 · response
    Published 17 May 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The documentation error stating two tablets were taken did not influence the clinical decision because clinicians knew twenty tablets had been taken.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The consultation at the UHW on 23 August was poor. The history taking was inadequate as it did not reveal the true extent of Mrs Edwards risk in terms of previous suicide attempts and deep seated mental health problems. Furthermore, inaccurate information was communicated to liaison psychiatry; they were told that Mrs Edwards had taken 2 tablets when she had taken 20.”

    Source location

    2018-0395-Response-by-University-Health-Board
    Page 2 · response
    Published 17 May 2019

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026