Recurring concern

Electronic patient records failing to make relevant clinical information available and actionable

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First reported 12 Sep 2013•Latest report 16 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of electronic patient-record systems or their dedicated workflows that prevent relevant information from being reliably accessed, displayed, preserved, shared, handed over or acted upon across clinical care.

Not included

  • Excludes failures concerning paper-only records or information sharing with no explicit electronic patient-record connection.
  • Excludes generic failures of clinical attention, staffing, training or communication unless the report directly ties them to the electronic patient-record system or its dedicated workflow.
  • Excludes concerns about the clinical decision itself where the electronic patient-record system did not contribute to the information-access or action failure.
  • Excludes unrelated information systems that are not electronic patient-record systems or directly integrated clinical-record workflows.
Reports
67

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
75

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
102

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care19
NHS England19
Care Quality Commission5
Avon and Wiltshire Mental Health Partnership NHS Trust3
University Hospitals of Derby and Burton NHS Foundation Trust3
Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust2
Greater Manchester Health and Social Care Partnership2
Ministry of Justice2
NHS Derby and Derbyshire Integrated Care Board2
Appello Careline Limited1
Association of Ambulance Chief Executives1
Association Of British Neurologists1
Barts Health NHS Trust1
Betsi Cadwaladr University LHB1
Birmingham Women'S and Children'S NHS Foundation Trust1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Mark Hancock · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mark Hancock had a history of severe clinical depression and was receiving treatment at the Priory Hospital. On 12 February 2014, he was found at his parents’ house with serious self-inflicted wounds after concerns about his deteriorating presentation had been escalated but hospital admission did not occur because no bed was available. The report identified concerns about poor or absent records, the lack of a documented risk assessment, insufficient reassessment after concerns were escalated, and the absence of a procedure for admission when no bed was available.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to maintain a complete, accessible multidisciplinary patient record

    Wider context from the report

    “- The quality of the records kept in relation to the deceased was poor and in some circumstances non-existent. No records were kept of the Multi-Disciplinary Team Meetings. - The Consultant notes were brief and are not kept on the Care Notes system. Such a diverse practice means that there is no overall record of a patient so that all those who have involvement with a patient do not have all relevant, pertinent information available to them. ”

    Source location

    Mark Hancock · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  2. West London

    AI-generated summary

    Brian Christopher Dalrymple · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Brian Christopher Dalrymple died at Colnbrook Immigration Removal Centre on 31 July 2011 after a fatal rupture associated with extreme hypertension, which he declined to have treated and monitored for most of his detention. The report raised concerns that indicators of his deteriorating mental health were not recognised or communicated to healthcare staff, that medical practitioners lacked necessary knowledge, that medical visits to segregated detainees were inadequate, and that clinical records were not comprehensive or accessible.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Absence of a comprehensive and accessible computerised clinical record for each detainee

    Wider context from the report

    “(5) The absence of a comprehensive and accessible (computerised) clinical record relating to each detainee at IRCs Harmondsworth and Colnbrook. ”

    Source location

    Brian Christopher Dalrymple · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    No practicable steps can be taken concerning Harmondsworth working practices because management responsibility transferred to Mitie.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As the Contract for the management of Harmondsworth IRC passed to Mitie on 01st September 2014, there is of course no practicable steps GEO can take in relation to the working practices at Harmondsworth.”

    Source location

    2014-0410-Response-by-The-GEO-Group-UK-Ltd
    Page 1 · response
    Published 18 September 2014

    Open published response
  3. Norfolk

    AI-generated summary

    Graeme Alexander Kidd · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Graeme Alexander Kidd was found hanging at home on 6 March 2014 and died in hospital on 7 March 2014. The report identified concerns about locum doctors’ access to records and knowledge of local mental health services, delays in GP referrals, the lack of medication advice when the prescribing doctor was unavailable, and the delayed implementation of an action plan addressing these matters.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of locum doctor access to electronic care records and related systems

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Locum Doctors do not have access to electronic CareNotes and other electronic records and systems relating to Patients ”

    Source location

    Graeme Alexander Kidd · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  4. South London

    AI-generated summary

    Liam Hardy · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Liam Hardy, a 15-year-old schoolboy, died after tying his school tie around his neck at his grandfather’s home on 19 November 2012. The inquest recorded concerns that his complex behavioural and emotional problems were not adequately assessed or managed, that information was not fully shared or accessed, and that the risks associated with self-harm were not adequately managed. A further concern was that the electronic patient record system did not clearly flag or summarise significant events and primary concerns for clinicians.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the electronic patient record system to flag or summarise significant events and primary concerns in a single place

    Wider context from the report

    “The nurse who assessed Liam after an episode of self harm was unaware of some of the significant events in Liam’s history. She explained that the RiO system (an electronic patient record system used in many Trusts) did not flag up or summarise such events or primary concerns and issues in a single place, and there was insufficient time to read all of the notes (which might be voluminous) before seeing a patient. Had she been aware of the full history her actions may have been different in Liam’s case, but her comments about the RiO system were general, and the difficulties are apparently encountered even today. ”

    Source location

    Liam Hardy · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  5. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    THOMAS PATRICK MAHER · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Thomas Patrick Maher fell on a ward at Trafford General Hospital on 3 February 2014 and fractured his acetabulum. The report identified concerns about missing clinical records, assessments and alarm arrangements relating to falls risk, delays and problems in transferring him between hospitals, ward placement, medication administration, notification of next of kin, and the transfer of patient notes. The investigation recorded the medical cause of death as chest sepsis, hospital-acquired pneumonia and a left acetabulum fracture of the hip, with other conditions also listed.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of patient-note transfer between paper-based and electronic hospital systems

    Wider context from the report

    “8. There is an apparent major problem with regard to patient notes where those at MRI are ‘paper based’ whereas those at Trafford are electronic. I was told that it will be at least two years before this situation is reconciled. This is inherently dangerous in that the treating doctors may not have the up to date notes available to them. Both senior doctors who gave evidence to me described the system of transfer of notes between hospitals as “impossible”. ”

    Source location

    THOMAS PATRICK MAHER · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop and roll out the Chameleon electronic patient-record system across the Trust in stages.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “There is a longer term aim that all patient records, including nursing notes and charts, will be electronic across the whole of the Trust using a system called Chameleon. This will minimise the risks that documentation will be lost. The timeframe for this to be complete across the entire Trust is 2018. However, this is being developed and implemented in stages so it is likely that Trafford will be fully electronic before then.”

    Source location

    2014-0252-Response-by-Central-Manchester-University-Hospital-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 5 June 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement electronic patient records on Ward 16 so clinicians at both sites can access up-to-date notes without transferring paper records.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Medical records at Trafford Hospital are electronic and are easily accessible to all medical staff at MRI on any computer. However, until February this year Ward 16, which is a ward based at Trafford but managed by Manchester Royal Infirmary, were still using paper documentation. This is why ████████ was unable to access Mr Maher's records. Ward 16 is now using the EPR system in line with the rest of Trafford Hospital. Therefore, up to date case notes are now available to Clinicians at both sites with no further need for transfer of paper notes between sites.”

    Source location

    2014-0252-Response-by-Central-Manchester-University-Hospital-NHS-Trust
    Page 5 · response
    Published 5 June 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Electronic records were accessible at both sites, so no further transfer of paper notes was considered necessary.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Medical records at Trafford Hospital are electronic and are easily accessible to all medical staff at MRI on any computer. However, until February this year Ward 16, which is a ward based at Trafford but managed by Manchester Royal Infirmary, were still using paper documentation. This is why ████████ was unable to access Mr Maher's records. Ward 16 is now using the EPR system in line with the rest of Trafford Hospital. Therefore, up to date case notes are now available to Clinicians at both sites with no further need for transfer of paper notes between sites.”

    Source location

    2014-0252-Response-by-Central-Manchester-University-Hospital-NHS-Trust
    Page 5 · response
    Published 5 June 2014

    Open published response
  6. South London

    AI-generated summary

    Simon William McAndrew · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Simon William McAndrew died in hospital on 3 July 2011 after being found hanging from a tree at the residential home where he lived and subsequently suffering severe brain injury. The principal concerns were poor communication and confusion between services about responsibility for his psychiatric care, including the sharing of key information and provision of appropriate crisis guidance to the residential home.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure key clinical staff can access important electronic information held in different NHS trusts

    Wider context from the report

    “Mr McAndrew had a drug misuse issue and a mental health issue. Each was dealt with by different specialist psychiatrists. After a long period of in-patient treatment at the Gordon Hospital Mr McAndrew was located in a residential home in another Borough. His key caseworker was not easily able to keep in touch with him. His methadone management was managed by Lantern House, a local NHS facility in the London Borough of Croydon. When acute psychiatric issues arose Lantern House staff ordinarily worked in close liaison with the local acute mental health trust (SLAM). At the material time it was not appreciated that Mr McAndrew’s psychiatric care remained with the Gordon Hospital. Correspondence from one trust to another was copied to the consultant psychiatrist at Lantern Hall but was not seen by her. This might have been because she was on leave when it was received and the copy letter was then scanned into the electronic patient record but not left in the consultant’s ‘in-tray’ for perusal on her return. An opportunity was missed to ensure effective communication with the Gordon Hospital staff. Junior staff, whether medical or nursing, had no ‘front page’ on the electronic patient record that contained information that the primary psychiatric care was held by the Gordon Hospital; so an inappropriate referral was made to SLAM. For so long as the national computer database for all NHS patients is a far-off ideal, some better method must surely be devised to ensure that key clinical staff can access important information held electronically in a different NHS Trust. This is especially important in psychiatric illness, where patients may not be able to provide the relevant, important information themselves. ”

    Source location

    Simon William McAndrew · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide prominent accurate and up-to-date information identifying the responsible mental health professional

    Wider context from the report

    “The Trust may also like to consider the unintended consequences of the use of different computer databases in Trusts and how this might better be managed. Even within individual computer systems, the evidence heard in this case suggests that the information may be available but often staff - particularly junior staff - do not know to look for it, may not know where to look for it and might not have the time to delve deep into the electronic record to find it. If a "front of file" note could be created in each case to record basic, essential information this may assist medical staff in discerning the appropriate mental health professional with overall care in any particular case. Of course, such information must be accurate and up-to-date. ”

    Source location

    Simon William McAndrew · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
  7. Avon

    AI-generated summary

    Felix Stefan CEMBROWICZ · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Felix Stefan CEMBROWICZ was found hanging after deterioration in his mental health while awaiting a planned mental health assessment, was admitted to Bristol Royal Infirmary, and subsequently died. The report raised concerns that the electronic Rio record system did not transfer important records, including relapse management plans, for some discharged patients, potentially leaving staff unaware of relevant histories or delaying assessments.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to transfer important historical mental health records, including relapse management plans, into the electronic Rio record system

    Wider context from the report

    “The electronic Rio record system used by staff to access patient histories was introduced in May 2011 when only the documentation for current patients at that date was migrated across to the new system. Discharged patients, with both a long and recent history of contact with mental health services do not appear to have had important records transferred including relapse management plans leaving staff unaware of a patients history or delaying assessments until old records can be obtained. ”

    Source location

    Felix Stefan CEMBROWICZ · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require staff to check for historic relapse or other management plans in RiO when patients are re-referred.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In response to your concerns, we have taken the following steps:”

    Source location

    2013-0204-Response-by-Avon-Wiltshire-NHS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 September 2013

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require staff to search historic electronic and paper records for specified recent clinical documents and copy identified documents into RiO.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In response to your concerns, we have taken the following steps:”

    Source location

    2013-0204-Response-by-Avon-Wiltshire-NHS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 September 2013

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Communicate the new record-checking requirements through staff supervision processes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We are using our supervision processes with staff to communicate these new requirements as well as updating our RiO and information governance training packages. We also see the inclusion of this information in the RiO record as a clinical and quality indicator and plan to audit the implementation of this change through our records audit plan.”

    Source location

    2013-0204-Response-by-Avon-Wiltshire-NHS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 September 2013

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update RiO and information-governance training packages to reflect the new requirements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We are using our supervision processes with staff to communicate these new requirements as well as updating our RiO and information governance training packages. We also see the inclusion of this information in the RiO record as a clinical and quality indicator and plan to audit the implementation of this change through our records audit plan.”

    Source location

    2013-0204-Response-by-Avon-Wiltshire-NHS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 September 2013

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Audit implementation of the record-checking and document-transfer requirements through the records audit plan.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We are using our supervision processes with staff to communicate these new requirements as well as updating our RiO and information governance training packages. We also see the inclusion of this information in the RiO record as a clinical and quality indicator and plan to audit the implementation of this change through our records audit plan.”

    Source location

    2013-0204-Response-by-Avon-Wiltshire-NHS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 September 2013

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026