Recurring concern

Electronic patient records failing to make relevant clinical information available and actionable

Pin Get email alerts Request correction

First reported 12 Sep 2013•Latest report 16 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of electronic patient-record systems or their dedicated workflows that prevent relevant information from being reliably accessed, displayed, preserved, shared, handed over or acted upon across clinical care.

Not included

  • Excludes failures concerning paper-only records or information sharing with no explicit electronic patient-record connection.
  • Excludes generic failures of clinical attention, staffing, training or communication unless the report directly ties them to the electronic patient-record system or its dedicated workflow.
  • Excludes concerns about the clinical decision itself where the electronic patient-record system did not contribute to the information-access or action failure.
  • Excludes unrelated information systems that are not electronic patient-record systems or directly integrated clinical-record workflows.
Reports
67

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
75

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
102

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care19
NHS England19
Care Quality Commission5
Avon and Wiltshire Mental Health Partnership NHS Trust3
University Hospitals of Derby and Burton NHS Foundation Trust3
Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust2
Greater Manchester Health and Social Care Partnership2
Ministry of Justice2
NHS Derby and Derbyshire Integrated Care Board2
Appello Careline Limited1
Association of Ambulance Chief Executives1
Association Of British Neurologists1
Barts Health NHS Trust1
Betsi Cadwaladr University LHB1
Birmingham Women'S and Children'S NHS Foundation Trust1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Suffolk

    AI-generated summary

    Kim Jeannette ROBINSON · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Kim Robinson died at home in Suffolk on 12 May 2024 after toxicological analysis identified a significantly toxic level of a medication obtained from an online pharmacy. The report identified concerns that the online prescriber could not access her GP records, the ordering process used incorrect details, and the medication was delivered in a quantity that gave her direct access to a fatal amount. The report stated that the online prescription system needed review.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of online prescribers to access patients’ records during consultations

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Following Kim’s tragic death the GP who had prescribed the prescription of ████████ to Kim, reviewed the current online system in place and identified five areas where in his evidence he identified changes could be made. The GP stated there was:- a) The need for online prescribers to be able to access a patient’s records (at least the Summary Care Records). These records could be attached to the consultation for review by the prescriber. b) All patients could be asked for consent to share the details of their prescriptions with their current GP and/or regular practitioner. When consent is given, it was suggested a notice should be sent to these healthcare providers at the same time the medicine is delivered to the patient. Without such consent, the patient’s order should not be accepted. c) Prescribers could have the ability to add comments when reviewing a consultation, whether it is approved or vetoed. d) All consultations could include the question: “Have you ever had suicidal behaviour or thoughts?” e) Prescriptions could be also for smaller quantities, taking into account the possible lethal dose of the medicine. If necessary, dispensing should be limited to weekly or reduced frequencies. Had these features been present on the on-line system, the GP stated he would not have issued a prescription of ████████ to Kim. In light of the evidence heard in this case I believe the current system of on-line prescription service needs to be reviewed. 2. It is of note, that the matter of concern regarding the ease in obtaining online prescriptions was previously raised by this court on 15th November 2019 in a Prevention of Future Death report following the tragic death of Deborah Headspeath on 3rd August 2017. ”

    Source location

    Kim Jeannette ROBINSON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  2. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Aarav Pal CHOPRA · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Aarav Pal CHOPRA died on 22 November 2023 after an intercostal artery was damaged during a liver biopsy, causing a haemothorax, cardiac arrest and hypoxic brain injury. The report identified concerns about inadequate planning and communication, delayed recognition and treatment of the haemothorax, unclear decision-making, trainee competence, consent, patient risk factors, prophylactic antibiotics, learning from deaths and access to complete electronic records.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of access to all clinical records when planning treatment

    Wider context from the report

    “6. Electronic patient records: I heard evidence that the lack of electric medical records meant clinicians found it difficult to see all of the patient’s medication details. My concern is that critical information can be missed if clinicians do not have access to all the clinical records when planning treatment. ”

    Source location

    Aarav Pal CHOPRA · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement an electronic patient record providing staff with accessible medication details and individual patient risk factors.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The importance of effective communication between colleagues will be reiterated across the workforce. In addition to this, the roll out of the Electronic Patient Record (EPR), which is due to go live in May 2025 will provide the ability to see at a glance individual patient risk factors.”

    Source location

    Response from Birmingham Women's and Children's NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 13 January 2025

    Open published response
  3. Gloucestershire

    AI-generated summary

    Maria Simpson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Maria Simpson died on 24 August 2022 from massive recurrent pulmonary thromboembolism and deep vein thrombosis. The report states that referrals concerning anticoagulation were returned or not accessed before her death, and that this probably made more than a minimal contribution to her death. It also identifies concerns about non-uniform electronic record systems, delays when transferring records, and difficulty accessing historic referral information.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of interoperable electronic patient-record systems between general practices

    Wider context from the report

    “Evidence was given in the inquest to the effect that medical General Practitioners have no uniform national case management system for electronic storage of patients’ records. This leads to a situation whereby, upon transfer of patient records from one practice to another, the receiving practice is obliged to input all the records afresh if the practices operate different systems. This can lead to delay in the compilation of records. Further, it appears that a case management system is unable to store electronically all historic documents such as referral letters from one clinician to another, due to electronic capacity issues. This leads to a situation where some patient information is stored electronically and some in paper form making it difficult for the GP to note quickly all relevant patient information. ”

    Source location

    Maria Simpson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing GMS requirements and GP2GP enable electronic patient records to transfer between practices using different systems.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The NHS General Medical Services (GMS) contract regulations stipulate that contractors must keep ‘adequate’ patient records either on forms provided by NHSE, in computerised records, or a combination of both. The contract also states that any computer system must meet the requirements set out in the GPIT Operating model and that the contractor must have regard for the guidance laid out in Digital Primary Care: Good Practice Guidelines for GP electronic patient records.”

    Source location

    Response from DHSC
    Page 1 · response
    Published 13 January 2025

    Open published response
  4. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Stephen Charles Stringer · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Stephen Charles Stringer developed a hoarse voice from January 2023, but its persistence and deterioration were not recognised as a potential cancer warning sign until October 2023. He was diagnosed in January 2024 with stage 4 squamous cell carcinoma of the glottis and treated palliatively. The report identified concerns about delayed referral, gaps in electronic patient enquiry systems, fragmented oversight of his care, and limited awareness of persistent hoarseness as a possible cancer symptom.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to transfer administrative patient enquiries to the patient record and make them available to doctors

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The inquest heard evidence that the GP practice had in accordance with the local requirements introduced an electronic patient enquiry service alongside a telephone service. Patients contacting the surgery had to select which stream within the practice their enquiry went to. It was not always clear from the headings whether the query would be seen by a GP or the admin team. Information that went into the admin work stream from a patient did not go onto the patient record and was not seen by a doctor. The GPs at the practice were unaware of this and patients had no way of knowing that the information they had sent in was not in the patient record. The practice involved in this inquest had taken steps since identifying the issue to mitigate the risks. However the evidence before the inquest was that the software in question was widely used by GP practices within Derbyshire and nationally. ”

    Source location

    Stephen Charles Stringer · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Discuss adding record-keeping resources to the Hub Plus online information and support suite.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The DDICB will also liaise with HUB+ to discuss the possibility of Record Keeping being added to their suite of online information and support for general practice.”

    Source location

    Response from Derby and Derbyshire Integrated Care Board
    Page 5 · response
    Published 16 October 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Discuss high-quality patient-record and medical-record guidance at a Clinical Governance Leads patient-safety agenda item.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “At the Clinical Governance Leads meeting with general practice the below documents will be discussed as part of the Patient safety standard agenda item.”

    Source location

    Response from Derby and Derbyshire Integrated Care Board
    Page 4 · response
    Published 16 October 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    GP practices choose which online consultation tool to use and may opt out of automated integration with electronic patient records.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “While the ICB is currently the contract holder for online consultation tools in use within Primary Care, the choice of which online consultation to utilise resides with the GP Practice.”

    Source location

    Response from Derby and Derbyshire Integrated Care Board
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 October 2024

    Open published response
  5. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    John Turner · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    John Turner died at Tameside General Hospital on 23 August 2023 from a pulmonary embolism due to a deep vein thrombosis, neither of which had been identified when he attended the Emergency Department three days earlier. The concerns included significant deviation from the Manchester Triage System, a requested D-Dimer test not being undertaken, delayed recording of a senior doctor’s findings, and reduced scope to identify atypical major or life-threatening illness during periods of unremitting demand.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in recording senior clinical findings in the electronic patient record

    Wider context from the report

    “In the present case, the court heard evidence as to significant deviation (which can particularly occur at times of high demand) from the Manchester Triage System which seeks to safely manage patient flow with reference to competing needs. In addition, it was almost 8 hours before the senior doctor who reviewed Mr Turner on 20th August 2023 recorded her findings in the electronic patient record, in all likelihood reflecting competing clinical demands on her time. In the light of the above, I am concerned, as a practical consequence of unremitting demand on this and other Emergency Departments, the scope for identifying major or life-threatening illness which presents atypically is significantly reduced. ”

    Source location

    John Turner · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  6. Staffordshire and Stoke-on-Trent

    AI-generated summary

    Alix Elizabeth Knowles · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Alix Elizabeth Knowles, aged 30, attended hospital on 8 December 2023 after attempting to cut her throat and threatening suicide, but was discharged home after a mental health assessment. In the early hours of 9 December 2023, she jumped from a bridge onto the road below and was hit by two motor vehicles. The substantive concerns were that bank staff could not access patient notes before assessments and that different NHS Trusts could not access one another’s patient notes because of incompatible computer systems.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of computer systems to enable different NHS Trusts to access patient notes

    Wider context from the report

    “2. Different NHS Trusts are unable to access patient notes, because the computer systems used do not allow this. ”

    Source location

    Alix Elizabeth Knowles · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Support NHS and foundation trusts to acquire modern electronic patient record systems and improve their effectiveness after deployment.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As a response to this, NHS England set up the Frontline Digitisation Programme (FLD) in 2021 and has been supporting NHS and Foundation Trusts in acquiring modern EPR systems and helping them develop their system’s effectiveness once deployed. The FLD programme comes with substantial financial and specialist IT support to bring all Trusts to an optimum level of digital maturity.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 4 October 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Support increased electronic patient record convergence across Integrated Care Boards.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The next phase of optimising digitisation in England is for the FLD programme to support increased EPR convergence across Integrated Care Boards (ICBs).”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 4 October 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide UHDB with a list of liaison bank and Crisis Home Treatment staff requiring patient-notes access.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Following this inquest, several meetings have taken place between MPFT and UHDB to consider the most efficient way for bank staff to obtain access to patient notes. As a result of these meetings, it has been agreed that a list of all liaison bank staff and Crisis Home Treatment staff have been provided to UHDB who will allow them access to their patient notes system V6. A joint Standard Operating Procedure for the ‘Referral Process to Liaison Psychiatry Team and Crisis Resolution and Home Treatment Team for patients 16 years old and over within the Emergency Department’ has also been developed to outline the referral process for all staff.”

    Source location

    Response from Midlands Partnership University NHS
    Page 1 · response
    Published 4 October 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Work with other NHS trusts to maintain processes and safeguards that enable staff to access necessary patient records for safe care.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. Different NHS Trusts are unable to access patient notes, because the computer systems used do not allow this. While MPFT recognises this as an ongoing issue, we work closely with other trusts to ensure we have processes and safeguards in place to allow staff to access patient notes when required. We are unable to comment on the”

    Source location

    Response from Midlands Partnership University NHS
    Page 1 · response
    Published 4 October 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Reiterate to MPFT the available routes for obtaining emergency Meditech V6 access for bank staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “If it had been communicated to UHDB at the time that the bank staff member from MPFT could not access Meditech V6, Emergency Department staff could have shown the bank staff member themselves, printed a copy out on request, or with sufficient notice, have arranged emergency IT access for them using the same processes we have in place when using agency or bank staff at UHDB. We have re-iterated to MPFT these are options available to them if emergency access is required, and to formalise this, we are in the process of developing a written standard operating procedure for both organisations.”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals of Derby and Burton
    Page 2 · response
    Published 4 October 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop a written standard operating procedure with MPFT formalising emergency access arrangements for bank staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “If it had been communicated to UHDB at the time that the bank staff member from MPFT could not access Meditech V6, Emergency Department staff could have shown the bank staff member themselves, printed a copy out on request, or with sufficient notice, have arranged emergency IT access for them using the same processes we have in place when using agency or bank staff at UHDB. We have re-iterated to MPFT these are options available to them if emergency access is required, and to formalise this, we are in the process of developing a written standard operating procedure for both organisations.”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals of Derby and Burton
    Page 2 · response
    Published 4 October 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Work with MPFT to arrange Meditech V6 access for current short-term Liaison Psychiatry bank staff who lack it.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We are also working together with MPFT to arrange access to Meditech V6 for any of their current short term bank staff in the Liaison Psychiatry team who do not already have access.”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals of Derby and Burton
    Page 2 · response
    Published 4 October 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Local healthcare providers decide which electronic patient record systems to procure and deploy, based on local operational and financial factors.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “For information, local healthcare providers make the decision on which Electronic Patient Records (EPR) system to procure and deploy, and their decision may apply to either a single NHS organisation or across multiple NHS organisations within a single Integrated Care System (ICS) where convergence of EPR systems across an ICB or ICS is seen as the most beneficial model. These decisions are based on many factors including the required functionality, a system’s suitability for the service specialities on offer, user experience, cost, and ease of information sharing. Today, there are already many examples where EPR records are shared seamlessly between provider organisations to enhance care provision.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 4 October 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The response cannot comment on national NHS patient-record access arrangements, while addressing access locally with other trusts.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. Different NHS Trusts are unable to access patient notes, because the computer systems used do not allow this. While MPFT recognises this as an ongoing issue, we work closely with other trusts to ensure we have processes and safeguards in place to allow staff to access patient notes when required. We are unable to comment on the”

    Source location

    Response from Midlands Partnership University NHS
    Page 1 · response
    Published 4 October 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Cross-organisation record access is addressed where possible through access arrangements and information-sharing protocols, despite wider interoperability limitations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Across the NHS in England there are health and care services using different clinical systems that do not interact with each other, and it is accepted that there is a need for interoperability across the system. This is a national issue whose feasibility is being looked at as part of the long-term plan for the NHS. Given the broader context that applies and the complexities around digital infrastructure and transformation, we are unable to comment any further on this, except to say that we recognise the importance of effective information sharing between organisations. It is for this reason that we arrange access where possible and having sharing protocols in place as described above.”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals of Derby and Burton
    Page 2 · response
    Published 4 October 2024

    Open published response
  7. Berkshire

    AI-generated summary

    Wendy Ann AFFORD · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Wendy Ann Afford was bedbound and living alone with a package of care before developing worsening pressure damage and an infected pressure ulcer. After hospital treatment and discharge to a care home, her health declined and she died on 15 November 2023. Concerns included inadequate skin-integrity risk assessment and monitoring, incomplete repositioning records, unclear compliance with care plans, insufficient management oversight, and possible inadequate staff training.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unreliable use of electronic care-record repositioning prompts and mandatory tasks

    Wider context from the report

    “3. It was not clear whether the carers were properly following the care plan and the records showing whether or not Mrs Afford was repositioned were incomplete. The records that did exist only recorded her position or stated ‘repositioned’ they did not record whether she was moved, for example, from left to right. The facility within the electronic care record system to highlight the need for carers to reposition Mrs Afford, and record the move, were not used reliably and I heard evidence from a manager which suggested they were not aware of the ability to set repositioning as a mandatory task for each visit. ”

    Source location

    Wendy Ann AFFORD · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  8. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    David Nicholas ALMOND · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    David Nicholas Almond was diagnosed with thrombophilia and deep vein thrombosis but was not placed on lifelong anticoagulation. After developing breathlessness that was investigated with an X-ray, he collapsed and was found to have a massive pulmonary embolism, dying in hospital on 5 January 2024. The principal concerns were incomplete access to and recognition of relevant GP records, and failure to arrange appropriate follow-up after the negative X-ray.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide clinicians with access to GP records across differing IT systems and geographical boundaries

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The inquest heard evidence that Macclesfield Hospital was part of East Cheshire NHS Trust and served a wide area a significant part of the area served was outside the footprint of the trust for example the High Peak in Derbyshire. The inquest was told that trust doctors were able to access GP records for patient’s registered with GPs in East Cheshire but not patients registered outside this area. The inquest was told there were discussions about how to try to resolve this but no firm steps or progress on this by the Trust. As a consequence doctors at the hospital were limited in understanding a patient’s history and crucial information was not always fully recognised/available. ”

    Source location

    David Nicholas ALMOND · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of differing NHS IT systems to support timely access to GP-record information

    Wider context from the report

    “2. The inquest was told that this inability to access information in GP records was a problem across the NHS due to differing IT systems and caused difficulties in providing effective and timely care to patients. ”

    Source location

    David Nicholas ALMOND · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide the National Care Records Service, including national services that enable authorised staff to access relevant patient information across care settings.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The National Care Records Service (NCRS) is the successor to the Summary Care Record application (SCRa) and by design removes a large amount of the reported barriers to adoption within many care settings, including the private sector. The NCRS provides a quick, secure way for health and care workers to access national patient information, to improve clinical decision making and healthcare outcomes. It is free to use and includes additional features and services beyond the legacy SCRa product. It provides access to a number of centrally provisioned national digital services that”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 31 July 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement Summary Care Record access for relevant clinical and discharge staff, including smart cards, training, induction, departmental support and troubleshooting.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Implementation Plan”

    Source location

    Response from East Cheshire Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 31 July 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Audit Summary Care Record use, access incidents, staff feedback and smart-card support data after implementation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Post-Implementation Review”

    Source location

    Response from East Cheshire Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 31 July 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Strengthen clinical information gathering by prioritising comprehensive patient histories and asking GPs to review older records when relevant information is unavailable.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Commitment to Professional Curiosity: Moving forward, the doctor has committed to demonstrating greater professional curiosity. This includes proactively asking the GP to review older records when we do not have access to the relevant information, ensuring that decisions are based on the most complete information available.”

    Source location

    Response from East Cheshire Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 31 July 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    East Cheshire NHS Trust is responsible for responding to concerns about its recording, sharing and access arrangements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “My response to your concerns focuses on those areas of concern that fall under the remit of national NHS England policy or programme work. Your concerns relating to East Cheshire NHS Trust’s recording sharing and access arrangements, along with your concerns about the care provided at the GP surgery, are more appropriately answered by the two organisations. The Standard General Medical Services (‘GMS’) Contract also sets out the requirements on GP Practices. Practices should provide enough appointments to meet the reasonable need of their patients, and provision of appointments and advice or care should consider their patients’ preferences where appropriate.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 31 July 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Local Integrated Care Boards are responsible for delivering Shared Care Records.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Responsibility for delivering Shared Care Records sits with local Integrated Care Boards (ICBs). Each ICB’s Shared Care Records are developed in response to the health and care needs of the local area, existing systems, and future planning. This means some of their Shared Care Records are available to neighbouring ICBs, while others are only supported within their own ICB. Future plans include making Shared Care Records link together regardless of where you live or receive care in England. Further information on Integrated Care Boards and Systems can be found here: NHS England » What are integrated care systems?”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 31 July 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    NHS England is addressing differing NHS IT systems and GP record access, so the Trust will not address this matter further.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust understands that NHS England will be addressing this matter in detail within their response to the PFD and therefore proposes not to address this further.”

    Source location

    Response from East Cheshire Trust
    Page 5 · response
    Published 31 July 2024

    Open published response
  9. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    James Neil COCKBURN · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    James Neil Cockburn had severe aortic stenosis and was awaiting assessment for suitability for open heart surgery when he suffered a myocardial infarction and died at home on 26 May 2023. The report identified delays in cardiology appointments and essential tests, together with communication delays between NHS trusts caused by separate IT systems, as substantive concerns affecting treatment planning and decision-making.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of separate trust IT systems to transmit test information into the other trust’s patient records

    Wider context from the report

    “The inquest heard that despite the referral being in August 2022 he had to wait months for his appointment due to the demand on cardiac services. This was significant across Greater Manchester but reflected a national picture of significant delays in patients waiting to see a cardiologist. As a consequence patient/s with cardiac issues are subject to delays in treatment plans and decision making regarding suitability for potentially lifesaving surgical procedures. In Mr Cockburn’s case he died whilst waiting assessment for his suitability for open heart surgery. It was 9 months since the first referral. The position the inquest was told is exacerbated due to significant wait times for essential tests such as trans oesophageal echocardiograms to be carried out due to a shortage of suitably quailed professionals to carry them out. In his case the position was further exacerbated by delays in communication between two different trusts – NCA and MUFT. Their IT systems are completely separate and cannot transmit information into the others patient records easily. This meant that it was almost a month before the system at MUFT was updated with the test results from Salford Royal. ”

    Source location

    James Neil COCKBURN · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Collaborate across patient-safety and digital-clinical-safety teams to extract learning from EPR incidents and provide scenarios for evaluating systems and processes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Future plans include collaboration between the NHS England Patient Safety and Digital Clinical Safety Teams to take learning from incidents concerning EPR related patient safety and other relevant digital implementations, and to provide scenarios that Trusts can use to evaluate their systems and processes when preparing for their EPR implementations.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 3 · response
    Published 4 July 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue improving interoperability between primary, secondary, tertiary and wider care information technology systems.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Inter-operability of different information technology systems to enable efficient and effective communication across primary care, secondary care, tertiary care and wider system partners is a challenge. This is both at a Greater Manchester level and wider. We continue to work towards improving this as a system.”

    Source location

    Response from GMIC
    Page 2 · response
    Published 4 July 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Challenge digital transformation leaders to examine interfaces between secondary and tertiary care systems and improve provider collaboration.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We acknowledge that there is still further work to do in relation to this and we will be challenging the leaders who support our digital transformation programmes to look in more detail at improving the interface between secondary and tertiary care systems and our providers in these sectors as to how they work together to enable this.”

    Source location

    Response from GMIC
    Page 3 · response
    Published 4 July 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing EPR optimisation programmes at MUFT and NCA are considered sufficient to address concerns about separate clinical information systems.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In 2022, MUFT secured funding to support levelling up capabilities following the acquisition of the North Manchester General Hospital site, to ensure the same level of EPR maturity as the other nine hospital sites within MUFT.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 3 · response
    Published 4 July 2024

    Open published response
  10. Staffordshire and Stoke-on-Trent

    AI-generated summary

    Glennis CONNELLY · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Glennis CONNELLY died at home on 11 November 2022 from end-stage renal failure due to tubulo-interstitial nephritis caused by tazocin, despite a previously identified allergy to the drug. The principal concerns were that this allergy was not recorded in the hospital records at Queens Hospital Burton upon Trent and that electronic patient records across the same trust did not automatically share allergy information.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of electronic patient records to automatically share renal team entries between hospitals

    Wider context from the report

    “Although the Queens Hospital Burton Upon Trent and the the Royal Derby Hospital are governed by the same hospital trust, they have different electronic patient records. Entries made by the renal team at the Royal Derby Hospital are not automatically visible to medical staff at the Queens Hospital, "allergies" do not automatically cross populate despite entries being made on the Lorenzo system and the GP records being updated on 6th & 12th February 2020. ”

    Source location

    Glennis CONNELLY · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of allergy information to automatically cross-populate between records

    Wider context from the report

    “Although the Queens Hospital Burton Upon Trent and the the Royal Derby Hospital are governed by the same hospital trust, they have different electronic patient records. Entries made by the renal team at the Royal Derby Hospital are not automatically visible to medical staff at the Queens Hospital, "allergies" do not automatically cross populate despite entries being made on the Lorenzo system and the GP records being updated on 6th & 12th February 2020. ”

    Source location

    Glennis CONNELLY · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement the unified electronic patient record across Trust sites, with staged rollout underway and allergy functionality planned for the first phase.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Whilst the incident was multifactorial, the unification of the EPR systems is something the Trust is working hard to remedy. As noted, the Trust currently has two enterprise wide systems which include all patient administrative and clinical functionality, appointments, waiting lists, test results, medications, emergency care, maternity and clinical noting.”

    Source location

    Response from Derby and Burton NHS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 June 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide cross-record patient links between the two electronic patient records and links to the GP Summary Care Record through the Master Patient Index.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Pending implementation of a unified system, the Trust has created a Master Patient Index, enabling us to create a patient context link from each EPR to the other, meaning that staff would be able to click a link to be taken to a mobile version of the other EPR/eCasenote systems without needing to log in or search for the patient again. Similarly, access was created to link the GP surgery held Summary Care Record (SCR). Patients have to agree to share their information on SCR in order for the information to be accessible.”

    Source location

    Response from Derby and Burton NHS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 June 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Establish a multidisciplinary allergy working group to ensure robust systems for managing allergies and alerts.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “4. Setting up an allergy working group”

    Source location

    Response from Derby and Burton NHS
    Page 4 · response
    Published 6 June 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Trust cannot extend an existing EPR across all sites because of contractual, technical, support-life and specialist-function constraints.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Implementing an entirely new system is not a small undertaking. It is important to get this right for the five hospital sites now and into the future. These EPR systems are not created by the Trust, but rather bought under contracting arrangements with their associated contractual periods, support and shelf life. As was heard at inquest, it has not been possible to extend one of the existing systems to the whole site as they need to function effectively across all specialisms. In the case of one system it is reaching the end of its support life. Any system has to be then integrated into the wider Trust in a safe way, operating alongside our other systems.”

    Source location

    Response from Derby and Burton NHS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 June 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Care Quality Commission will assess the incident and determine whether further regulatory action is needed.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Where there is any death or serious injury at a provider or service registered by the CQC, the CQC will consider this in line with their specific incident guidance to identify if a patient has suffered avoidable harm or they were placed at significant risk of avoidable harm. This includes when there are issues relating to digital systems, and a specific incident review would consider the role of the system, as well as the registered providers involved.”

    Source location

    Response from DHSC
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 June 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The University Hospitals of Derby and Burton NHS Foundation Trust will address specific local actions in its separate response.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I understand that the University Hospitals of Derby and Burton NHS Foundation Trust will be separately responding to the report and commenting on specific local action in their response.”

    Source location

    Response from DHSC
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 June 2024

    Open published response
Back to top

Data last updated 7 September 2026