Recurring concern

Unreliable integration of substance misuse services into patient care

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First reported 9 Dec 2015•Latest report 3 Mar 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures within an explicitly identified substance misuse service pathway, including referral, liaison, cooperative working or coordination needed to provide integrated care.

Not included

  • Excludes generic multidisciplinary or interagency working failures not explicitly tied to substance misuse services.
  • Excludes failures solely concerning the internal management, staffing or security of substance misuse services unless they directly prevent integrated patient care.
  • Excludes clinical assessment or treatment deficiencies that do not involve access to or coordination with substance misuse services.
Reports
15

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
15

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2015–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
31

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care3
NHS England3
Cumbria, Northumberland, Tyne and Wear NHS Foundation Trust2
Adferiad Recovery1
Betsi Cadwaladr University LHB1
Change, Grow, Live1
Cwm Taf Morgannwg University Local Health Board1
Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust1
G4S Care And Justice Services (UK) Limited1
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust1
Hampshire and Isle of Wight Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust1
HCRG Care Services Ltd1
Health Centre1
HM Prison and Probation Service1
Hopwood House Medical Practice1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Liverpool and the Wirral

    AI-generated summary

    Linsay Bushell · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Linsay Bushell, aged 37, died on 13 October 2014 after being found having self-ligatured under her bed while detained in a psychiatric ward; the medical cause was asphyxia due to compression of the neck due to ligature strangulation. The report identified concerns including inadequate access to psychological therapies, limited understanding and documentation of self-harm, poor handover and observation records, fragmented care, delays in finding suitable placement, and insufficient staff training and support.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Limited specialist intervention and multidisciplinary involvement for substance misuse-related self-harm risk

    Wider context from the report

    “The Court heard evidence that 40% to 50% of mentally disordered female patients suffered from EUPD rather than mental illness and yet there was no provision or priority for therapeutic psychological services to be commissioned in the NHS England Area. The Jury found: Para 3 1. Linsay Bushell was certified as having died on the evening of 13th October, 2014. at the Royal Liverpool University Hospital. 2. Linsay Bushell came by the fatal event that caused her death at 20.20 at room 2 on the Brunswick Ward at the Broad Oak Unit on 13th October 2014. 3. The medical cause of Linsay's death was Asphyxia due to Compression of the Neck due to Ligature Strangulation. 4. Linsay put herself in the position in which she was found however her intention was unclear. 5. At the time of her death and for most of her adult life, Linsay had suffered from a form of mental disorder namely an unstable borderline personality disorder. 6. The real and imminent risk of self-harm or suicide was recognised during Linsay's care at the Broad Oak Unit in the time leading up to her death. 7. The risk was managed adequately and effectively during Linsay's period as an in-patient. 8. The jury accept the admissions of Mersey Care NHS Foundation Trust and adopt the findings that the Trust has made. a. In the Trust Position Statement Mersey Care considers the death of any service user with the utmost seriousness and care. As an organisation it is committed to providing a high standard of care to service users generally. If, in connection with any patient under its care, mistakes have been made whether in the form of individual errors or as a result of system or structural defects, then the Mersey Care Trust Board is committed to uncovering those errors, correcting them and learning lessons from them. 2. Following the death of Linsay Bushell on 13th October 2014, Mersey Care instigated an investigation into her death, including the wider circumstances of her death, to find out whether there were shortcomings in the care provided to Linsay and, if so, devise ways of improving practice. That investigation was an internal review and root cause analysis by a multi-disciplinary panel which included an external medical reviewer. Its Terms of Reference were agreed by the Trust Board and were deliberately wide so as to pick up deficits in care or indeed examples of good practice throughout Linsay's involvement with the Trust and so enable as deep a learning exercise as possible in what was acknowledged to be a complex clinical picture. The review panel considered relevant documents and interviewed members of staff and the investigator's report was provided to Mersey Care Trust Board in December 2015. 3. Following the internal investigation, the Trust Board instructed ████████ the Chief Operating Officer of the Local Services Division to consider the report of the internal investigation and undertake her own review and appraisal of the circumstances of the death. She was also instructed to devise a workable and practical strategy to address the issues which were raised by the internal review and her own consideration of the material. 4. The Trust is committed to transparency and accountability. The purpose of this Position Statement is to advise the Court and Linsay's family of the Trust's response to the work which has been undertaken internally by the Trust and of the approach which will be taken to the forthcoming inquest into Linsay's death. It is hoped that, by doing so, the Court's case management task in respect of the forthcoming inquest will be facilitated; also importantly that Linsay's family will be reassured by their understanding that an approach which is consistent with the conclusions of the internal review of the death is to be adopted at the inquest. 5. The conclusions of the internal review include some examples of good or notable practice and many areas where the service or care provided to Linsay fell short of the desired standards. Following concerns raised by a member of staff, the Review Team considered the contents, including the conclusions, of the internal review undertaken. Having done so, the Review Team adheres to the conclusions which were expressed in the report. The Trust Board fully acknowledges that mistakes had been made in Linsay's care when she was a resident on Broad Oak Unit and that these mistakes afforded Linsay the opportunity to ligature on 13th October 2014. The Trust accepts responsibility for Linsay's death. Whilst understanding that no apology will fully assuage the feelings of Linsay's family and those who were close to her, the Trust nonetheless offers that apology. It is made with sincerity. 6. The review panel considered that Linsay's psychiatric condition was complex. Her condition fluctuated in response to stressors such as bereavement and illicit drug use. However, a main theme to emerge from the internal review panel report was the failure of the Trust to provide Linsay with a service that was psychologically driven at all levels of care. The Trust accepts this criticism. It is accepted that psychology interventions were not available on a consistent basis throughout Linsay's residence on the Unit and that ward staff were inadequately supported in their provision of such care and treatment. a. Whilst an attempt to understand the motivation for self-harming behaviour is apparent from the Acute Care Plans (which were not available to the panel) the Trust accepts that this was inadequate. The Trust also accepts that the record keeping and standard of documentation was inadequate so that a more detailed picture of Linsay's self-harming behaviour and its triggers was not available. As a result, staff were hampered in considering the best ways of limiting and controlling Linsay's self-harming behaviour. b. Whilst understanding that patients suffering from Personality Disorders may present a complex management problem, a focused and co-ordinated approach to finding the most appropriate establishment to meet Linsay's needs was not adopted. It was recognised that Brunswick Ward did not meet Linsay's short or long-term needs. Although efforts were made by the Care Co-ordinator to locate the most appropriate placement for Linsay, funding was not immediately available. This had the effect of causing Linsay distress and disappointment. The Trust accepts this criticism. c. Staff were not sufficiently trained and supported in their understanding of Emotionally Unstable Personality Disorders and the high suicide rate associated with this condition particularly during long term hospital stays. Again, the Trust accepts this criticism. 7. Further themes to emerge from the internal review included: the lack of implementing a co-ordinated approach to checking patients after handover; that handover documentation was scant; that documentation of observation levels was insufficiently clear; that there were limited interventions regarding substance misuse and its effect on Linsay's self-harming behaviour and that ward management needed greater support. All of these observations and criticisms are accepted by the Trust. 8. ████████ has been tasked with reviewing Linsay's care during her residence on Brunswick Ward and reviewing the conclusions of the internal report. She is involved in the wider Trust initiatives which include reducing the risk of suicide by patients and enhancing the understanding and treatment of those patients who suffer from Personality Disorders. She has set out the steps which have been taken in her statement. The key points are as follows: a. Given the wide understanding that those suffering from Personality Disorders are best managed in the community, a Personality Disorder Hub has been established in the community. This is now led by ████████ a Consultant Psychiatrist in Psychotherapy, and is intended to co-ordinate and manage the care of patients with Personality Disorders within the community. The objective is that, where possible, admissions to hospital are kept short, or avoided altogether. This involves close and collaborative working by all of those involved in the patient's care. This is facilitated by the PD Hub. b. Case managers have been recruited and assigned to service users who attend the emergency services regularly (as a consequence of self-harming behaviour). These case managers work closely with the PD Hub and focus care on the individual. The care given is psychologically based. It is targeted at helping the patient to devise strategies to limit self-harming behaviour. c. Borderline Personality Disorder Guidelines have been devised which stipulate that meetings of professionals should take place in complex cases and a specific Extended Care Plan should anticipate and considers care both in the community and in inpatient units. The objective is to provide a coherent and co-ordinated plan of care which is tailored to the particular needs and challenges posed by the particular patient. d. Nursing staff have received training in Personality Disorders. Complex Case discussions take place on all wards. This is intended to enable multi-disciplinary team discussion between professionals in particularly challenging cases. e. A daily Bed Management system has been introduced which, amongst other objectives, is intended to ensure that patients with Personality Disorders are discharged back into the community with minimum delay and with an appropriate support package. 9. Although ████████ describes in her statement the various responses which have been made by the Trust to improve the management of patients with Personality Disorders, the individual elements are intended to work as only part of an integrated model. The strength of the structure lies in its overarching objective of transforming the approach generally to meeting the needs of those with Personality Disorders, recognised as presenting a particular set of challenges to any healthcare organisation. 10. ████████ also addressed in her statement the further steps which have been taken to support staff in complying with Trust policies, including the Care Programme Approach, observation levels, suicide prevention and training, record keeping and shift handover documentation. Regular audits for compliance and ongoing support is undertaken. There has been a review of leadership roles within the Unit generally including Brunswick Ward and support and guidance for those occupying a leadership role is regularly provided. 11. As ████████ has stated, although much has changed since Linsay's death, there is no room for complacency. She and others within the Trust will continue their work and undertake a regular evaluation of service levels. 12. It is hoped that Linsay's family are encouraged in their understanding that the Trust have taken Linsay's death very seriously indeed. Lessons have been learned. Her death has been a catalyst for change for the better. b. In the implementation of Lessons learnt the Trust further accepts 1. The review team identified this as "a very complex case" and noted that "it is unclear whether or not LB harmed herself with a view to achieving death or in an effort to gain help from staff which had happened on many occasions before during her in-patient stay". a. The review team reached a number of critical conclusions relating to the care which Linsay received during the course of her involvement with the Trust. The principal conclusions were as follows:- b. Limited understanding and analysis of self-harming behaviour. The review team noted that Linsay was described as undertaking self-harming behaviour on many occasions and that her 'ligaturing' was used in the notes in a generic sense with no specific details given on many occasions. The review team concluded that despite repeated attempts at self-harm with the same behaviour, insufficient effort was made to look at this particular risk. They also concluded that the notes did not pick up exploration of the reasons behind many self-harm attempts. Instead, they thought it was generally assumed that Linsay's self-harming behaviour was as a result of either drugs or some form of stress or 'loss' and that a more detailed exploration of her episodes of self-harm might have proved useful in terms of developing preventative strategies. Linsay did not have a "safety plan" as this was not Trust policy at the time. However, she did have a Care Plan. c. Failure to implement a co-ordinated approach towards checking the safety of patients following handover. Staff told the reviewers there was no co-ordinated approach to allocating tasks on the night in question. On that night there was no formal "walk around" undertaken by a qualified member of staff as required by policy. The review team concluded that it was essential that generic safety systems such as the handover check are implemented very robustly as they are the alternative to individual observations being used which in this case were thought to have a negative effect on Linsay. d. Poor quality of handover information. The handover notes were frequently scant in content. There was no standard template as to what should be included in handover. The review team was unclear how the nursing handover was quality controlled. On just one occasion it was mentioned in handover that Linsay had ligatured during the day but despite the frequency of this behaviour the handover notes did not capture this at all. e. Confusion about observation levels. There were occasions when it was unclear what level of observation Linsay was on. On the day of the incident staff told the reviewers they were informed that Linsay had been on leave with a member of staff and that it had gone very well, that she was settled and had just had a take-away meal. There was no discussion as regards any risk that Linsay may have been at, taking into account previous behaviour after leave. Recording of changes in observation levels were frequently unclear. f. No process to monitor the completion of CPA documentation. The review team could not identify the processes that were in place to ensure that all patients had an up to date risk management plan and care plan hence they found that the plans in place for Linsay were not current although Linsay did in fact have a current care plan. g. Limited content and poor quality of documentation. Documentation of observation levels was not as clear as it should have been and given her very high risk it was important to document any observation changes and the reasoning behind this. This might help build up a picture of the best way of mitigating any potential risk from any form of self-harm, particularly with that associated with ligaturing. It would also help staff adopt a more 'psychological' approach to care rather than using physical intervention like high observation levels or PRN medication if 'agitated', the latter of which was similar in a way to her 'substance misuse. The review team noted that staff did spend a lot of time talking to Linsay but the notes did not capture any questioning as to why she had tried to self-harm at a particular time. h. Limited interventions regarding substance misuse as an inpatient. Linsay's highest risk of suicide seemed to be in the aftermath of substance misuse. Whilst this was commented on, specialist measures to try and mitigate it were not put in place. The addiction case worker did not attend multi-disciplinary team meetings whilst on the ward, though they did see Linsay whilst she was an inpatient in Childwall Brook Nursing Home. The reviewers noted that the care appeared to be fragmented in that different parts of the services did not plan or deliver the care that was needed together. i. Poor coordination of referral to a specialist provider. The team pursued a variety of specialist placements in an attempt to meet Linsay's care needs going forwards. One of them, Cambrian Care, undertook an assessment and accepted Linsay as they felt that they had the ability to provide her with the appropriate care required. When the funding was requested it was rejected by the Clinical Commissioning Group (CCG). It was at this time that the funding of Out of Area Placements was being changed with the Trust being given the delegated responsibility for allocating resources on behalf of the CCG. Consequently Linsay's future needs were re-assessed and internal placements were considered in the Trust's own services. The review was completed a short time before Linsay's death, and recommended that an Out of Area specialist placement should be supported. The review team felt that the whole process of having Linsay assessed externally and then the process being stopped would have raised her expectations inappropriately. The significant delay in undertaking a review process was felt by the review team to have kept Linsay in an area that was recognised as not being able to meet all her short and long term needs. j. Ward Management. Brunswick ward was a very busy admission ward. The Ward Manager did not have a background in leading such a ward nor did the Modern Matron who came from a community background. This meant that senior challenge and specific clinical guidance for staff was not available. During interviews it was suggested that there had been some friction between nurse management on the ward that may have contributed to a background of poor team working. The review team advised that it was important staff were led by experienced managers who understand both the management processes and the clinical area they are responsible for. k. Transfer of Patients from one organisation to another. The review team identified and amongst staff that patients could not be transferred from one organisation to another until they were "stable". This was impracticable for cases like Linsay's as she was rarely, if ever, stable. She lived in an area inaccessible to her treating psychiatry service when she lived in Kensington whilst remaining under 5 Boroughs Partnership NHS Foundation Trust's care. The review team concluded that regular engagement with local Mersey Care services might have avoided Linsay's final admission. l. Lack of implementing a clear care pathway. Linsay had a diagnosis of Emotional Unstable Personality Disorder which is associated with a high suicide rate long-term. This is particularly increased during extended in-patient stays. Staff stated during interview that they had not had training related to self-harming behaviour or in the care of people with an Emotionally Unstable Personality Disorder. The reviewers could not identify a clear pathway that was being followed to care for Linsay which took into account her complex needs. Whilst staff appeared to have worked hard at building a relationship up with Linsay the review team concluded that it was generally at a superficial level. The review team noted that the Trust had a Borderline Personality Disorder strategy and guidance but could not find that it was implemented or understood by staff. The review team recognised the national view is that admissions for people with a Borderline Personality Disorder are often counterproductive to improving the mental state of a patient and at worst contribute to difficulties and worsening of the condition. How and when clinicians feel able to take managed and considered “positive” risks is important. How these issues are factored into an extended care plan and the support that clinicians can receive on these cases needs to be clear and thought through by the Trust. The review team are aware that this work was on going within the organisation. m. Lack of specialist psychological work/guidance to staff. The review team found that specialist interventions were not available on a consistent basis. The review team found that there was inconsistent availability of psychology on the ward environment during the last period of Linsay's admission. The review team were told that Linsay was not amenable to psychological interventions and had tried different modalities in the past. It was a concern that whilst Linsay may not have wanted or been able to avail herself of therapy the overall strategy of care should have been directed and guided from a more psycho-therapeutic perspective. 2. The review team could not identify one specific root cause but felt that the contributory factors interacted together to create a situation whereby Linsay remained distressed on the ward, with limited up take of psychological therapy to help reduce the distress seemingly enhanced by her recent losses. The staff clearly tried hard to work with her but with limited knowledge. There was a sense of fragmented care in that specialist services such as those offered by the addiction team were not engaged in the ward discussions despite Linsay engaging with them during her short stay at Childwall Brook Nursing Home. The period to identify a suitable placement for Linsay seemed overly protracted and seemed to focus thoughts on an external answer to the escalating situation. Discontinuity of Care/Management of Care 3. The Trust has done a lot of work looking at how to develop the service it offers to service users with a diagnosis of personality disorder. It has developed Guidelines for the management of these individuals and established a Personality Disorder Hub (PD Hub) headed by ████████ a Consultant Psychologist, in November 2014. These Guidelines are produced at pages 311 - 355 of the Inquest Bundle B. 4. The Trust's Borderline Personality Disorder Guidelines advise that in complex cases there should be a meeting of professionals followed by the development of a specific Extended Care Plan (ECP). The ECP starts with a formulation/summary of the history and care provided, and then describes the type of care that should be provided in different settings including inpatient units. 5. Evidence suggests that prolonged or repeated hospital admissions are not helpful for service users with a diagnosis of personality disorder. The PD Hub aims to keep admissions to hospital as short as possible and to avoid them altogether where appropriate. The Trust has recruited individual psychologists and nurses trained and qualified in managing patients with a personality disorder diagnosis to work as case managers for this group of service users. They are responsible for managing the care of the most complex service users regardless of where the service user goes and thus are able to provide continuity of care and work with other care teams to provide consistency of approach. 6. The team initially identified 40 service users who attended A&E on a regular basis and allocated these to the 4 case managers then in post so that each case manager was responsible for 10 service users. Given the success of this work more case managers have been recruited so that the most complex service users who have increased need now have a specialist case manager. 7. The case managers are focussed care for the individual. The approach to care is psychologically based and will include the case manager working with the service user to look at their risk taking and what triggers it. They will then work with the service user to develop strategies to enable the service user to cope with these triggers. Triggers may include memories of past abuse. 8. The Trust is working towards extending the recently introduced day service available for people with personality disorder as part of our evidenced based PD pathway. 9. The aim is to help the service user to manage their condition differently and thus avoid hospital admission if possible. Risk Assessment/Care Planning 10. Linsay's mental state, level of distress, reported symptomology and self-harming or suicidal behaviour fluctuated quite markedly during her admission. I accept that there was an unstructured approach to reviewing and planning interventions with Linsay which meant there was no collaboratively developed understanding of her risk. 11. Staff are expected to reassess the risks following each ligature incident and episode of self-harm and document the fact that an assessment had taken place and the conclusions reached. Such reviews ought to have included a detailed exploration of Linsay's mental state, her thoughts and feelings and the level of observation she required. ”

    Source location

    Linsay Bushell · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

  2. Preston and West Lancashire

    AI-generated summary

    Stephen McDermott · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Stephen McDermott was found deceased at home on 25 May 2015, having died sometime earlier as a result of the intentional application of a ligature; the inquest recorded the medical cause of death as hanging and concluded suicide. In the preceding months, he had presented repeatedly after overdoses and being recovered from train tracks, but was discharged without mental health follow-up. The principal concerns included fragmented and poorly used records, incomplete assessments and record keeping, insufficient consideration of overlapping mental health and substance misuse issues, missed opportunities for face-to-face assessment, limited information sharing between services, and an incomplete incident review.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of mental health and substance misuse services to share patient information

    Wider context from the report

    “7) It was apparent that when patients are assessed and treated by other services, in this case Discover Drug and Alcohol Recovery Services provided by Greater Manchester West NHS Foundation Trust [‘GMW’], LCFT do not have access to GMW records and vice versa. In a case such as this, where there is a significant overlap between mental health issues and substance misuse issues, it is of significant concern that services do not / cannot share information to assist in their assessment processes to ensure that they are in possession of the full picture of an individual’s presentation; ”

    Source location

    Stephen McDermott · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

  3. Southampton and New Forest

    AI-generated summary

    Grant David Burns · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Grant David Burns took an excess quantity of methadone, heroin and Alprazolam while alone at The Booth Centre between 20.05 on 22 July and 15.15 on 23 July 2016, and died from Morphine, Methadone and Alprazolam Toxicity. Concerns included a lack of co-operative working and communication between mental health, substance misuse and partner agencies, and an incomplete Root Cause Analysis report due to missing input from a key worker.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of co-operative working between early intervention in psychosis and substance misuse services

    Wider context from the report

    “The death was the subject of Root Cause Analysis report by Southern Health NHS Foundation Trust who provided the Early Intervention in Psychosis Service (EIPS) for the deceased, which found there was a lack of co-operative working between the EIPS and the Substance Misuse Service based at New Road Southampton provided by Solent NHS Trust ”

    Source location

    Grant David Burns · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Maintain a shared spreadsheet of clients receiving Adult Mental Health and Substance Misuse Services, with updates through joint and standing meeting agendas.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “After a full assessment, it has been found that in this incident there was a lack of co-operative working between Southern Health mental health services (Early Intervention in Psychosis Team) and Substance Misuse Services. After some discussion, the action now required is to compile a spread-sheet of those clients identified as being worked with by Adult Mental Health and Substance Misuse Services. This spread-sheet needs to be updated at the Southampton Drug and Alcohol Recovery Service Management meeting with regular communication with Southern Health Foundation Trust. This action was put in place on the 27th of March 2017 and is due to end on the 1st of April 2017. The desired outcome of this action is to improve clients’ experience of services, working cohesively and consistently to support risks and the individuals’ recovery.”

    Source location

    2017-0048-Response-by-Solent-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 5 March 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement a referral process that identifies mental health involvement, initiates cross-service contact and joint working, assigns responsibility, and escalates unanswered contacts.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The second action concerns referrals which are screened in Substance Misuse Services. The Change Grow Live Manager with the Solent NHS Trust Clinical Manager will identify if there is any involvement from mental health services. If Adult Mental Health is involved, contact is to be made via telephone call/letter or email with the mental health treating team to make them aware that the Substance Misuse Services are also involved in the patient’s care. A meeting will then be arranged to start the joint working process. A named staff member will be identified to take responsibility for this action, which will usually be the Change Grow Live Care Co-Ordinator. Should there be no response from the mental health team following the substance misuse workers making contact, they will escalate this to their line manager to raise with the Area Manager – Southampton Mental Health Team Manager.”

    Source location

    2017-0048-Response-by-Solent-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 5 March 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review the Dual Diagnosis Policy across Southern Health Foundation Trust and Solent NHS Trust to include the joint-working process as staff best practice.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The third action is to review the Dual Diagnosis Policy within Southern Health Foundation Trust and Solent NHS Trust to ensure that the action above is included within it as best practice for staff to follow. This action commenced on the 3rd of April 2017 and is due to end on the 1st of May 2017.”

    Source location

    2017-0048-Response-by-Solent-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 5 March 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Create a Joint Working Practice document setting communication, joint-working and escalation standards for Substance Misuse Services and Adult Mental Health.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Finally the seventh action is with regard to the third issue of the lack of communication between partner agencies. The action is to create a bespoke Joint Working Practice document to outline the standards expected of staff in Substance Misuse Services and Adult Mental Health with regard to communication between organisations where patients are supported by both. These standards should cover, though are not limited to: Frequency of contact; Joint visits/meetings and escalation process. This action commenced on the 3rd of April and is due to end on the 18th of April 2017. The outcome of the action is to maintain consistent shared knowledge of patients’ risks and needs, and how these can be addressed. It is anticipated that there will then be a clear understanding by patients and carers regarding the involvement of different services, including their roles and functions.”

    Source location

    2017-0048-Response-by-Solent-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 5 March 2017

    Open published response

  4. Nottinghamshire

    AI-generated summary

    Philip Anthony Denning · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Philip Anthony Denning, who had a history of substance misuse and mental health problems, died from diamorphine intoxication on 23 July 2015 after using heroin. The report raised concerns about fragmented services, limited psychology provision, poor information-sharing between organisations, and a lack of clarity in primary care about accessing appropriate support for people with both substance misuse and mental health needs.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Risk of future deaths from fragmented provision by a separate substance misuse organisation

    Wider context from the report

    “6. Even aside from the question of shared access to key records held by Nottinghamshire Healthcare and CRI, I am concerned that the current approach of having a separate organisation dealing only with substance misuse carries a risk of future deaths. Commissioners and providers will need to consider these matters carefully. ”

    Source location

    Philip Anthony Denning · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

  5. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Jake Robinson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jake Robinson died at home on 23 August 2015 after taking his own life; the recorded cause of death was hanging and illicit drug use. Concerns included failures to share information about prescribing diazepam, the failure to identify this issue in the review of his death, fragmented substance-misuse services, and the unexplained rearrangement of a Community Mental Health Team appointment shortly before his death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Fragmented substance-misuse care requiring young people to engage with an age-inappropriate second service

    Wider context from the report

    “3) The fact that Phoenix Futures have no ability to prescribe medication to their services users was a concern. It meant that young people with substance misuse issues have to be referred to Trafford Aim, who are a service for people over the age of 26. Jake had a good relationship with Phoenix Futures but he did struggle to engage with services. The fact that he then had to engage with two services added to what in the Courts view was a disconnected approach to dealing with Jakes increasing difficulties. ”

    Source location

    Jake Robinson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Maintain an established protocol enabling under-25 service users needing medication review to access Trafford Aim quickly.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The number of service users under the age of 25 who require medical intervention and treatment for a drug problem is very small. However, the Trust recognises that on occasion this can occur and has an established protocol between both services that allows those service users under the age of 25, who require a medicines review, to quickly assess the service. All efforts to reduce duplication and streamline the pathway for the service users are made.”

    Source location

    2015-0474-Response-by-Greater-Manchester-West-NHS-Mental-Heath-Foundation-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 9 December 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Operate the Dual Diagnoses Steering Group to develop partnership working, joint assessment and joint casework across relevant services.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust acknowledge that whilst this process and close working relationship between Trafford Aim and Phoenix Futures exist, the disjointed nature of the commissioned services is not ideal. The Trust had developed a Dual Diagnoses Steering Group to review how the services and mental health services work together. There has already been two planning meetings. The aim is to ensure effective partnership working by collocating services, effective joint assessment and joint working of cases with dual diagnosis.”

    Source location

    2015-0474-Response-by-Greater-Manchester-West-NHS-Mental-Heath-Foundation-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 9 December 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Send all mental health service commissioners NHS England expectations for commissioned arrangements covering urgent correspondence, clinical risk assessment, shared care, incident learning, and vulnerable patients who miss appointments.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In order to reduce the risks of recurrence of a similar incident at these and other organisations across Greater Manchester so that referrals are managed and monitored by the responsible commissioning and provider organisations I intend to undertake the following actions by 29 April 2016.”

    Source location

    2015-0474-Response-by-GMCA
    Page 2 · response
    Published 9 December 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    An established protocol enables under-25 service users needing medication reviews to access the relevant service quickly despite separate commissioning arrangements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Both Phoenix Futures and Trafford are commissioned to meet the needs of different groups of service users however they work closely together.”

    Source location

    2015-0474-Response-by-Greater-Manchester-West-NHS-Mental-Heath-Foundation-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 9 December 2015

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026