Recurring concern

Unreliable access to relevant clinical records for safe care

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First reported 12 Sep 2013•Latest report 22 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures to retrieve, locate, present or provide access to relevant existing records for assessment, treatment and care decisions.

Not included

  • Excludes absent or inaccurate information that was never reliably recorded.
  • Excludes failures to transfer otherwise available information to another service or recipient.
  • Excludes failure to review records that were already available unless access or retrieval was also deficient.
Reports
122

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
129

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
192

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care23
NHS England22
Care Quality Commission6
Barts Health NHS Trust5
Betsi Cadwaladr University LHB5
HM Prison and Probation Service5
Cwm Taf Morgannwg University Local Health Board4
Manchester University NHS Foundation Trust4
Recipient name withheld4
Swansea Bay University Local Health Board4
Leicestershire Partnership NHS Trust3
North London NHS Foundation Trust3
Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust3
Royal London Hospital3
Tameside and Glossop Integrated Care NHS Foundation Trust3

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Mid Kent and Medway

    AI-generated summary

    Dorothy June MACEY · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Dorothy June MACEY sustained leg injuries when her legs went through a glass door and was later discharged home with district nurse dressing care. Antibiotics prescribed in September were not received promptly, and concerns were raised about wound assessment, information sharing, record-keeping, sepsis checks, medication monitoring, care planning and a missed visit. She was admitted to hospital for sepsis on 28 September 2018, developed gangrene in her left lower leg, and died at Medway Maritime Hospital on 7 October 2018.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of electronic care records to provide remote access to shared clinical information

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Protocol required district nurses to photograph the leg wounds to assist in the assessment and this was not done on any of the visits. I heard evidence that photographs on the patient electronic record cannot be accessed remotely on home visits limiting the shared information that should be available to conduct an assessment. (2) District nurses did not share information with the GP when it was established that there had been a delay in the prescribed antibiotic treatment regime, and this was not escalated within the team. (3) Incomplete recording- The district nurse electronic care and treatment records on iNurse were: a) very brief and did not contain information necessary to have a comprehensive assessment or understanding of deterioration or improvement in her condition b) difficult to access remotely and showed limited information, therefore the previous nurse attendance could not be seen on particular visits. Evidence was that the record was not accessed prior to the visit on 24th September and the delay in the treatment regime was not understood when antibiotics were requested on that day. (4) A sepsis pathway check was completed on 20th September. This was not completed when antibiotics were requested on 24th September. There is a concern that developing sepsis may be missed in a deteriorating patient. (5) There was no updated care plan in place for her leg dressings. District nurse support staff changed the type of leg dressings without approval of the qualified nurses, evidence was heard that this should not be done without discussion. (6) Medication administration charts completed by carers were incomplete. The antibiotic administration was not checked despite previous issues with the delay in the treatment regime becoming known to district nurses on 20th September. This record was shared with or escalated to the GP for advice when there was a lack of improvement in her condition. (7) A visit required for 28th September was incorrectly scheduled for 1st October and was not picked up within the Missed Visit protocol in place. ”

    Source location

    Dorothy June MACEY · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  2. Milton Keynes

    AI-generated summary

    Thomas Henry SMYTH · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Thomas Henry Smyth, aged 86, was admitted after a fall and died from a subdural haematoma on 3 August 2019 after anticoagulation medication was inappropriately restarted. The report raised concerns that staff could not access vital information recorded in the electronic notes and records, and about the use, training and effectiveness of the notes system.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure vital information in electronic notes is accessible to staff making care decisions

    Wider context from the report

    “During the course of the evidence I heard from consultants and more junior staff that they were unaware of certain facts relating to Mr. Smyth at the time that they were dealing with him and making decisions relating to his care, and yet the information was recorded in the electronic notes and records. It appears to me that staff are having difficulty accessing vital information that should be clearly available to them. I would ask that you carry out a review of the notes system to see whether or not it is being used correctly, whether staff members have been adequately trained with regard to its use and whether changes should be made as to how information is recorded and retrieved. Unless the system is working effectively I anticipate that further lives will be put at risk. ”

    Source location

    Thomas Henry SMYTH · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver and maintain eCARE training, materials and post-implementation support for clinical and temporary staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To ensure the system was introduced safely, and with the minimum of disruption to patients and patient care, we undertook an extensive programme of staff training in the lead up to the eCARE system going live across hospital inpatient areas (including the Emergency Department and Maternity – some areas, including Critical Care and Paediatrics, are in the next phase of the roll-out). This programme included individual and team training; dedicated staff to support wards and departments on the use of the system after go-live; training for all temporary staff; and training materials, including videos, as well as individual and team support remaining readily available.”

    Source location

    2019-0505-Response-from-Milton-Keynes-NHS-Foundation-Trust-Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 May 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Reinforce daily medication-chart and observation review during routine clinical rounding through staff training, including additional Emergency Department and Trauma and Orthopaedics training.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In this particular case, it is clear that important and relevant information was indeed recorded in the clinical record. Members of staff did not consistently review key elements of the record when assessing Mr Smyth; for example, the medication chart does not seem to have been reviewed daily when clinicians assessed Mr Smyth’s condition. Review of the medication chart and observations is a key element of routine rounding and this will be reinforced with staff. This will be addressed in training – with additional training in ED and Trauma and Orthopaedics. This specific case will be used for learning in plenary sessions during the year to reach a wide medical and multidisciplinary audience.”

    Source location

    2019-0505-Response-from-Milton-Keynes-NHS-Foundation-Trust-Redacted
    Page 3 · response
    Published 14 May 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Important information was recorded in the electronic record; the issue was inconsistent staff review rather than inability to access it.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In this particular case, it is clear that important and relevant information was indeed recorded in the clinical record. Members of staff did not consistently review key elements of the record when assessing Mr Smyth; for example, the medication chart does not seem to have been reviewed daily when clinicians assessed Mr Smyth’s condition. Review of the medication chart and observations is a key element of routine rounding and this will be reinforced with staff. This will be addressed in training – with additional training in ED and Trauma and Orthopaedics. This specific case will be used for learning in plenary sessions during the year to reach a wide medical and multidisciplinary audience.”

    Source location

    2019-0505-Response-from-Milton-Keynes-NHS-Foundation-Trust-Redacted
    Page 3 · response
    Published 14 May 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Proposed actions and the existing eCARE governance structure appropriately mitigate the risk of recurrence.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I am satisfied that with the actions proposed, and the governance structure in place to manage the use of and risks associated with eCARE, the risk of future recurrence is appropriately mitigated.”

    Source location

    2019-0505-Response-from-Milton-Keynes-NHS-Foundation-Trust-Redacted
    Page 4 · response
    Published 14 May 2020

    Open published response
  3. Swansea and Neath Port Talbot

    AI-generated summary

    Jane Diane Livingston · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jane Diane Livingston was receiving treatment for anxiety and depression and died by suicide after being found hanging in a multi-storey car park on Trawler Road, Swansea. The report identified concern that gateway assessors did not have access to her earlier review and stated concerns, potentially leading to an assessment and treatment plan based on incomplete information.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to make patients’ treatment wishes and concerns available for gateway assessment

    Wider context from the report

    “During the course of the inquest it was apparent that the deceased’s wishes for hospital treatment and the reasons behind the same were not available to the gateway assessors on the 14th of December 2018. In this case the deceased underwent further assessments therefore the effects of this situation were reduced. I am concerned however that in other cases this could result in situations where a patient’s own concerns are not addressed or taken into consideration when conducting an assessment that could lead to an assessment based on incomplete information and result in another patient taking their own life. 1. The gateway assessors did not have full access to the notes relating to the review and subsequent concerns that triggered the gateway assessment. This may result in the assessors not obtaining the full picture when assessing a patient and making a treatment plan based on incomplete information. ”

    Source location

    Jane Diane Livingston · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Request all PARIS electronic records when obtaining mental health notes for Coroner disclosure.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• When requesting a copy of mental health notes, a specific request is now also made for all PARIS electronic records by the Corporate Legal Team.”

    Source location

    2019-0359-Response-from-Swansea-Bay-University-Health-Board_Published.pdf
    Page 3 · response
    Published 22 November 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Identify all possible mental health patient-record locations and develop a checklist for auditing record completeness before disclosure to the Coroner.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• The Mental Health Quality and Safety team will identify all the possible locations of patient records across mental health Services, this information will be used to develop a checklist, which can be used to audit the completeness of records prior those records being disclosed to HMC Coroner. This will be completed by 21st December 2019.”

    Source location

    2019-0359-Response-from-Swansea-Bay-University-Health-Board_Published.pdf
    Page 3 · response
    Published 22 November 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Health Board disputes that the duty assessment was unavailable to AHTT assessors before the gateway assessment.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Health Board confirms that the PARIS system has been audited during our investigation, and can confirm that the CMHT staff accessed the system at 12.29hrs on the 14th December 2018 to document the duty assessment conducted on Ms Livingston. Please see appendix 1 for assessment.”

    Source location

    2019-0359-Response-from-Swansea-Bay-University-Health-Board_Published.pdf
    Page 2 · response
    Published 22 November 2019

    Open published response
  4. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Julie Ann Barrow · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Julie Ann Barrow, who had significant learning disabilities, was admitted to hospital on several occasions for perianal pain, rectal bleeding and haemorrhoids. Following treatment for adjustment disorder and significant sedation, she fell at her family home on 1 April 2019, sustained an unsurvivable brain injury and died in hospital the next day. The principal concerns included the absence of a best interests meeting and reasonable adjustment care plan, ineffective communication and understanding of her needs, inadequate support for her parents, and the loss of the learning disability liaison role.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to make the needs passport accessible to all staff caring for the patient

    Wider context from the report

    “2. On each of her admissions her parents took her needs passport in with her. The inquest was told that this should be used to develop the reasonable adjustments care plan and be accessible to all staff caring for her. On her first admission there was no reasonable care plan put in place despite the fact that she had clear and significant disabilities that would have benefited from an effective plan and her passport was available. Her passport location was not known by all staff caring for her; ”

    Source location

    Julie Ann Barrow · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  5. Newcastle upon Tyne

    AI-generated summary

    Maia Hazel Ann Strachan · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Maia Hazel Ann Strachan was born on 6 July 2017 and died in hospital on 7 July 2017 after a complicated delivery involving shoulder dystocia, hypoxic ischaemic encephalopathy and severe macrosomia. The report identified concerns about inaccurate and suboptimal ultrasound assessment, inaccessible obstetric and diabetic records, missed opportunities for Caesarean delivery and joint decision-making, fetal scalp electrode use, documentation, and dissemination of expert findings.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unavailability of clinician access to obstetric and diabetic records

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) A system of joint obstetric and diabetic care operates without the facility for clinicians to access patients’ obstetric and diabetic records whether manually or electronically. Accessibility is essential to inform clinical decisions and should be urgently addressed ”

    Source location

    Maia Hazel Ann Strachan · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  6. Blackpool and the Fylde

    AI-generated summary

    James David FLETCHER · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    James David Fletcher died in hospital on 14 July 2018 following peritonitis caused by leakage of gastric contents after PEG tube insertion. The report identifies concerns including failure to consider or detect peritonitis, continued use of the PEG tube despite it being contraindicated, inadequate communication and record keeping, insufficient awareness of post-operative PEG risks, and difficulties ensuring essential medication was available.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Loss or inaccessibility of records material to ongoing patient care

    Wider context from the report

    “2) There is a risk of future deaths because both patient care and the opportunity to learn valuable lessons following a death may be compromised by issues pertaining to the quality of record keeping and to the retention of records. Whilst it is understood that “NEWS 2” is being introduced and supersedes the early warning score system being used at the time of the Deceased’s death and whilst the early warning score system in use at the time does not, therefore, form the subject matter of this report: a) I am concerned that the evidence revealed that substantial periods of time elapsed, at times measuring 9 or more hours, when no entry was made in the Deceased’s History Sheet, notwithstanding the deteriorating nature of the Deceased’s condition. This approach to record keeping carries the risk of material information concerning the condition and care of patients not being communicated between medical, nursing and other clinicians; b) Complete records were not provided to the Court in accordance with directions given prior to the inquest. It was understood from the Trust that complete records were unavailable and yet it transpired on the first day of the inquest that further records were available but had not been found and produced previously. I am concerned that the system of record keeping gives rise to a risk that patients’ records which are material to their ongoing care will be lost or otherwise inaccessible. c) I am concerned that, without records of appropriate quality being made and retained, the opportunity to learn lessons through the process of internal investigations and, should it arise, the Coroner investigation and inquest process will be compromised. ”

    Source location

    James David FLETCHER · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop a revised Electronic Document Management System business case for Executive Director consideration.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2) Concern regarding record keeping – Whilst the Trust has made progress with electronic access to general practice records and partial provision of electronic records within the Emergency Department we have not as yet implemented an Electronic Document Management System (EDMS). A business case was approved by the Trust Board in January 2018 but because of more pressing cost pressures it has not been possible to progress this to date. A revised business case is in development and due for consideration by Executive Directors by the end of this month.”

    Source location

    2019-0146-Response-by-Blackpool-Teaching-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 29 July 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Cost pressures have prevented implementation of the Electronic Document Management System, although a revised business case is being developed.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2) Concern regarding record keeping – Whilst the Trust has made progress with electronic access to general practice records and partial provision of electronic records within the Emergency Department we have not as yet implemented an Electronic Document Management System (EDMS). A business case was approved by the Trust Board in January 2018 but because of more pressing cost pressures it has not been possible to progress this to date. A revised business case is in development and due for consideration by Executive Directors by the end of this month.”

    Source location

    2019-0146-Response-by-Blackpool-Teaching-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 29 July 2019

    Open published response
  7. Blackpool and the Fylde

    AI-generated summary

    Tina Tait · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Tina Tait underwent elective ovarian cystectomy surgery on 8 May 2018 and subsequently experienced complications, including a colon perforation and later deterioration. She became unresponsive and died on 16 June 2018. The principal concern was the quality, legibility, accessibility and retention of clinical records, which delayed and compromised internal death reviews and could affect continuity of care and the learning of lessons.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to retain and make clinical records available

    Wider context from the report

    “I bear in mind that the quality of record keeping is an issue I have raised with the hospital trust previously. In October 2017 I sent to the Trust a letter of concern written in accordance with paragraph 37 of the Chief Coroner’s Guidance No. 5 (Reports to prevent future deaths). That letter was in relation to investigations conducted at this court into the deaths of WB and NM. The letter was felt to be necessary after the inquest into WB’s death had to be conducted in the absence of documentation which the Trust was unable to locate. In May 2017 this court received from the Trust a Sudden Untoward Incident Review into the death of NM which had been completed in the absence of some of the hospital records which could not be located. I was concerned that an improvement in relation to record keeping was essential because having access to quality documentation minimises the chance of, for example, an untoward clinical incident review being delayed or remaining incomplete; it avoids the risk that a coroner’s inquest is delayed. Also, and importantly in my view, it is obviously important that records are readily available to assist a coronial inquiry or indeed an internal hospital review not least in order to ensure any lessons which need to be learnt can be learnt and for this to be achieved as effectively as possible an accurate record of events should be available. In addition to the quality of some of the records relating to Mrs Tait’s care in hospital, the Trust’s internal review was delayed because the clinical records could not be located for some time resulting in a delay before witness statements could be compiled and the Sudden Untoward Incident Review completed the impact of which was the inquest had to be vacated from the original court slot allocated to it and re-listed. Other investigations have been affected by similar issues: a further investigation into the death of JS ultimately proceeded in the absence of hospital records which reportedly went missing after the death and could not be found. In deciding to write this letter I take into account that in response to my letter in October 2017 [see above] I received a response from the Trust dated 4th December 2017 which explained that the point was made that “it is worth noting that the Trust has somewhere in excess of 500,000 sets of patient records and that non-availability is a rare event”. The letter went on to helpfully explain that the Executive Directors had approved a business case for the introduction of an electronic document management system which would mean paper records would be immediately accessible to attending clinicians. Unfortunately, having monitored the situation since then I remain concerned that the Trust’s procedures in terms of accessibility but also to quality of clinical records pose a risk of future deaths if those procedures are jeopardising the likelihood of the correct lessons arising from a death investigation being learnt. ”

    Source location

    Tina Tait · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  8. Manchester North

    AI-generated summary

    Mr Nicky Raymond Reilly · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr Nicky Raymond Reilly, also known as Mr Mohamed Saeed-Alim, was an inmate at HMP Manchester after spending six years at Broadmoor High Security Hospital. He was found hanging by a ligature in his cell on 19 October 2016 and was pronounced deceased at 14.43. The report raised concerns about the lack of continuation of the Care Program Approach, incomplete multidisciplinary records and coordination, limited psychological input and record keeping, insufficient staff training, separation of mental health and psychology records, and medication-refusal processes.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to record and make psychology records accessible to psychologists

    Wider context from the report

    “The Court received a copy of the psychology records kept by ████████ which the Court heard were the only Psychology records available. It was evident to the Court that there was little to no recording of information within the Psychology department. NR’s psychology medical records were at best, woeful. Moreover, as they were not kept in the Psychology department they were not available access to any other Psychologists. ”

    Source location

    Mr Nicky Raymond Reilly · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide shared access to mental-health and psychology records

    Wider context from the report

    “The Court heard how the Mental Health team providing mental health services within HMP Manchester have a completely separate record keeping system (system 1) to the Psychology Team. Whilst acknowledging the Psychologists are employed by HMP Prison Service. However not all the psychologists were forensic psychologists as the Court heard ████████ was a clinical psychologist. There will inevitably be prisoners who require clinical psychological input for a range of diagnosis. Within a community setting such psychological services would be provided by the Mental Health Trust. Hence Psychologists would have access to the patients mental health records within the same Trust, where the same existed. Where a prisoner is receiving both Mental Health input and Psychological input within a prison, there should be access to the appropriate medical records in order for each service to have a clear understanding of the patients clinical presentations and need. Having access to the totality of the information should then assist in appropriately assessing a patients risk to self and others. ”

    Source location

    Mr Nicky Raymond Reilly · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inform prison psychology staff how to request access to patients’ NHS clinical records.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Where a prisoner is receiving input from the prison psychology team access to the NHS record can be requested by the psychologist responsible for delivering that input to the patient, subject to the normal consent being given. The prison psychology team have been informed of how they can gain access to the patient's clinical record. Where such access is given, it is expected that the psychologist will document their involvement with the patient in the clinical record, to inform the multi-disciplinary healthcare team of the input that is being provided. Psychology access to the system will allow them to see the current package of care that is being delivered by medical and mental health services.”

    Source location

    2019-0014-Response-by-Greater-Manchester-Mental-Health-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 24 May 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Audit psychology staff access, records viewed, and clinical entries documented in the system.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “An audit of psychology access to the system, patients viewed and documented entries made, will be conducted by the Head of Healthcare. Mental Health and psychology staff now attend the weekly Complex Case meeting, which are minuted, where those prisoners with complex needs are reviewed by the multi-disciplinary team. This allows a multi-disciplinary approach to care planning and a forum for the sharing of information. HMP Manchester has just received funding from NHS England from the 1st April 2019, to increase mental health services within the prison. Part of this funding will be used to fund a psychologist, employed by Greater Manchester Mental Health Trust, to provide psychoeducationally informed, evidence based specialist support for all those assessed as requiring interventions to address mental health, personality disorder, and support for individuals with learning disabilities.”

    Source location

    2019-0014-Response-by-Greater-Manchester-Mental-Health-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 24 May 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require the funded psychologist to document every patient interaction in the patient’s clinical record.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As a GMMH employee this psychologist will be expected to document all patient interactions within the patient's system clinical records.”

    Source location

    2019-0014-Response-by-Greater-Manchester-Mental-Health-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 24 May 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Medical confidentiality requirements prevent combining mental health and psychology records, so information sharing must use existing multidisciplinary forums.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “You have referred to mental health and psychology services record-keeping operating separately, with clinical records being held on SystmOne to which psychologists do not have access. While I recognise that this separation does carry the risk that information is not effectively shared, I must respect the medical in-confidence issues that make this necessary, and I expect all staff working in prisons to use the many forums available to them to work in a multi-disciplinary, collaborative way to ensure that decisions about prisoners are made with all available information.”

    Source location

    2019-0014-Response-by-HM-Prison-and-Probation-Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 24 May 2019

    Open published response
  9. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Dawn Patricia GILL · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Dawn Patricia Gill, a long-term drug user, died from a methadone overdose after taking illicit drugs while in the Royal London Hospital alongside prescribed medication. Concerns included the absence of a nursing care plan addressing her drug use, the loss of her drug chart, failures to detect her in her room during searches, and confusion about when to alert hospital security after she was thought to be missing.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to retain and make available drug charts

    Wider context from the report

    “2. Ms Gill was prescribed methadone in hospital and died of a methadone overdose, but her drug chart was not available at inquest and appears to have been lost. If the drug chart was lost during her life, then that has implications for her care. If it was lost after her death, then that would not have affected care but, how ever innocent the true explanation, it leaves the trust open to an accusation of trying to cover up evidence. When ever it was lost, its absence is very disappointing. The Barts legal representative at inquest was unaware until I asked to see it on the day that it was missing. He had taken on the file from a colleague a week earlier. He noted that my coroner’s officer had not provided the trust with the report of the post mortem examination until the day before, so he had not known that death was the result of a methadone overdose. This was because the trust had not provided the statements requested. However, Ms Gill had been found in her room on the ward surrounded by drug paraphernalia, so it would have been evident to staff at the outset that drug toxicity was a potential cause of death. ”

    Source location

    Dawn Patricia GILL · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Move to electronic prescribing to eliminate paper drug charts and reduce the risk of charts being lost.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust agrees that the inability to locate the drug chart after her death and in preparation for the inquest was a serious failure, and apologises for this. We have since examined the controlled drugs register, which has confirmed that the prescribed doses of methadone in this case had been administered. The Trust accepts that the circumstances of this death made it even more important than usual that the prescribing chart was available after her death, and apologises for this failure. The Trust is moving in 2019-20 to electronic prescribing. This will eliminate the need for paper based drug charts, and the attendant risk of them being mislaid or lost.”

    Source location

    2018-0354-Response-by-Barts-Health-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 25 April 2019

    Open published response
  10. Inner West London

    AI-generated summary

    Jennifer Anne Lacey · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jennifer Anne Lacey was found deceased in a hotel room in Morden on 4 June 2018, having consumed a large amount of alcohol and 210 tramadol tablets. The concerns were that potentially dangerous and addictive drugs were freely available over the internet, could be prescribed without contact with the patient’s regular doctor or access to medical records, and might be dispensed by UK pharmacies without further checks.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to access the patient’s medical records before prescribing potentially dangerous and addictive drugs

    Wider context from the report

    “1. That such potentially dangerous and addictive drugs are so freely available over the internet. 2. That they can be prescribed without any contact with the patient’s regular medical practitioner or access to the patient’s medical records. 3. That such prescriptions of such potentially dangerous and addictive drugs may be being filled in UK pharmacies without any further checks. ”

    Source location

    Jennifer Anne Lacey · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Ensure NHS online consultations provide safe, secure access to an appropriate clinician connected with the patient’s GP practice.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “These issues are important for NHS England and we will ensure that NHS online consultations provide a safe and secure way for patients to discuss their health concerns with an appropriate clinician connected to their own GP practice and place centred around their needs. NHS England has adopted a robust system of quality assurance, safety and security standards so that patients and clinicians can feel confident in using online consultations.”

    Source location

    2018-0315-Response-by-NHS-England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 February 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The death appears unrelated to NHS services because the consultation, prescription and medication were obtained outside the NHS.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “With regard to this case, and based on the information provided within the Regulation 28, it appears that this death was not the result of services provided by NHS, but from services outside of the NHS. It is unclear whether this doctor or company were registered and the site from which the deceased obtained the consultation, prescription and medication. Nevertheless, the provision of remote consultations and the supply of medicines through distance selling remains a concern. We are working with other health regulators who have a greater role in responding to this challenge.”

    Source location

    2018-0315-Response-by-NHS-England
    Page 3 · response
    Published 23 February 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    CQC and MHRA are better placed to explain and address online prescribing safety work.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NHS England remains committed to improving the safety of controlled drugs and online prescribing. We will continue to work across the system with key partners nationally, regionally and locally to ensure patient safety. We would also suggest that contact is made directly with the CQC and MRHA would be better placed should you wish to understand the work in this area further.”

    Source location

    2018-0315-Response-by-NHS-England
    Page 3 · response
    Published 23 February 2019

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026