Recurring concern

Unreliable safety CCTV monitoring systems

First to latest report 12 Mar 2014 — 3 Apr 2025

Reports that mention this concern
23
Times this concern has been raised
30
Stated actions linked to this concern
11

What this concern includes

Includes failures of CCTV systems used for safety-critical monitoring across care, transport, public-access, custodial and operational settings, including coverage, availability, functionality, access, live monitoring, staff guidance, review, retrieval and provision of effective alternatives when CCTV is unavailable.

What is not included
  • Excludes CCTV used solely for general security, crime detection or retrospective evidence where no safety-monitoring function is identified.
  • Excludes failures limited to police access to CCTV information, custody CCTV monitoring, high-risk-location access monitoring or another separately named CCTV system when that narrower concern is the supported boundary.
  • Excludes generic staffing, training, communication or IT deficiencies unless they directly impair safety CCTV monitoring.
  • Excludes the underlying hazard or incident when no deficiency in the safety CCTV system is asserted.

Reports and published responses 23 reports

See individual reports that have raised this concern, and the actions taken in response

  1. City of London

    AI-generated summary

    Alexander Adnan Cardoza · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Alexander Adnan Cardoza, a 16-year-old child, died on 27 March 2025 after falling from a location in the City of London. The principal concerns were that barriers remained surmountable, could potentially be assisted by horizontal wiring and a movable object, and that operational security was insufficient to prevent the fall; there was also no CCTV security camera monitoring of the location. The report identifies an ongoing risk of further deaths, noting that two deaths had occurred in similar circumstances.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Absence of CCTV security camera monitoring

    Wider context from the report

    “1. On the 10th December 2024, I concluded the inquest into the death of ████████ and found that he died on ████████ after jumping from ████████. 2. Despite the subsequent structural and operational changes I was told about at the inquest, Alexander Cardoza was able to and did climb over ████████ and fall to his death on the 27th March 2025. 3. It seems that no or no sufficient action has been taken to prevent persons being able to fall from ████████ and that there is an ongoing risk of further deaths. The ongoing risk is exacerbated by the fact that there have now been two deaths in similar circumstances, thereby increasing the risk of others copying. 4. I am particularly concerned that, despite previous knowledge of the risks, (i) the barriers in place ████████ remain surmountable, (ii) the barriers include horizontal metal wiring which, it appears, may assist the surmounting of the barrier, (iii) the ████████ can be moved and can be used to assist a person to surmount the barriers, (iv) the nature and level of operational security in place on the 27th March 2025 was insufficient to prevent Alexander Cardoza from surmounting the barrier and falling, and (v) there is no CCTV security camera monitoring of ████████ in place. ”

    Source location

    Alexander Adnan Cardoza · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

  2. East London

    AI-generated summary

    Zara Natasha Aleena · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Zara Natasha Aleena died at the Royal London Hospital on 26 June 2022 after sustaining a severe traumatic brain injury during an unprovoked attack while walking home in Ilford. The report identifies concerns about understaffing, risk assessment, information sharing, supervision, recall procedures and coordination across the Probation Service, police and other agencies, as well as concerns about training and reporting of predatory behaviour.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unclear CCTV operator training on identifying sexual predators and stalking behaviour

    Wider context from the report

    “(19)The details of training for CCTV operators includes “training on sexual harassment”, but it is not clear whether this includes identifying sexual predators and stalking type behaviour. ”

    Source location

    Zara Natasha Aleena · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 5 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver CCTV operator training covering suspicious, predatory, stalking and sexual harassment behaviours.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The training for CCTV operators encompasses modules that cover behavioural body language training and are specifically designed to detect behaviours that would fall under the remit of ‘suspicious’. The training is based on established principles and techniques outlined in Tavcom training programs – suspicious behaviours can include gestures, mannerisms, alone or in a group, time, location, how someone is acting (i.e. drunk/disorientated), approaching people, being aggressive etc. The training given to all LBR CCTV officers to assist them in making inferences regarding suspicious behaviours that lend themselves to multiple situations (including drug dealing, knife attacks, theft, robbery, stalking, sexual harassment and intimidation).”

    Source location

    Response from London Borough of Redbridge
    Page 1 · response
    Published 2 August 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    CCTV operator training already covers recognising suspicious, predatory, stalking, sexual harassment and intimidation behaviours.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The training for CCTV operators encompasses modules that cover behavioural body language training and are specifically designed to detect behaviours that would fall under the remit of ‘suspicious’. The training is based on established principles and techniques outlined in Tavcom training programs – suspicious behaviours can include gestures, mannerisms, alone or in a group, time, location, how someone is acting (i.e. drunk/disorientated), approaching people, being aggressive etc. The training given to all LBR CCTV officers to assist them in making inferences regarding suspicious behaviours that lend themselves to multiple situations (including drug dealing, knife attacks, theft, robbery, stalking, sexual harassment and intimidation).”

    Source location

    Response from London Borough of Redbridge
    Page 1 · response
    Published 2 August 2024

    Open published response

  3. Inner South London

    AI-generated summary

    Fraser William Moore · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    On 25 March 2020, Fraser William Moore escaped from custody at London Bridge Station, entered the railway track area, and died after contacting a live rail before power could be severed. The report raised concerns that CCTV coverage ended at the station concourse and that footage was not immediately available to Route Control Rooms, with insufficient coverage beyond the platform ends.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to make station CCTV footage immediately available to Route Control Rooms

    Wider context from the report

    “The CCTV coverage/ footage ends at the end of the station concourse on both the city and country ends. Station footage does not get sent to Route Control. On a risk-based review, the chances of incidents happening in a busy cosmopolitan station must, by footfall and surrounding populations alone, increase the risk of an event. An event that should then be looked at. In order to look at an event, I accept that current CCTV is in place within the station confines but for these stations, I do not consider that I have received sufficient evidence to persuade me that the footages should not be available immediately to the Route Control Rooms or that the coverage should not extend up or down line beyond the end of the platforms. ”

    Source location

    Fraser William Moore · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide CCTV coverage beyond station concourses and platform ends

    Wider context from the report

    “The CCTV coverage/ footage ends at the end of the station concourse on both the city and country ends. Station footage does not get sent to Route Control. On a risk-based review, the chances of incidents happening in a busy cosmopolitan station must, by footfall and surrounding populations alone, increase the risk of an event. An event that should then be looked at. In order to look at an event, I accept that current CCTV is in place within the station confines but for these stations, I do not consider that I have received sufficient evidence to persuade me that the footages should not be available immediately to the Route Control Rooms or that the coverage should not extend up or down line beyond the end of the platforms. ”

    Source location

    Fraser William Moore · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

  4. County Durham and Darlington

    AI-generated summary

    Leanne DUNN · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Leanne DUNN died after falling from the bridge at Newton Cap; the inquest concluded that her death was suicide. Concerns related to pedestrian access to the bridge parapet and railing, the absence of monitored CCTV and lighting or other detection measures, and the risk of death to people falling or present at the foot of the bridge.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Absence of monitored CCTV, lighting or other means of detecting persons at immediate risk

    Wider context from the report

    “All concerns relate to the bridge ████████, which carries a road and two footpaths up to around 30m (100ft) above the reiver Weir (1) the bridge’s parapet and railing is accessible to pedestrians on the bridge; ████████ ████████ (3) there is absence of monitored CCTV and lighting or other means of detecting those at immediate risk; and (4) there is a risk of death to persons falling AND to those near the foot of the bridge at any time when persons fall. ”

    Source location

    Leanne DUNN · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    No further response is considered necessary at this stage after reviewing the existing submission and Regulation 28 report.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As you note in the report, Durham County Council provided a written submission to the inquest, dated 30 November 2022, which addresses the points raised. Having reviewed the Regulation 28 report and the letter of 30 November, I do not feel that there is anything further to add at this stage, other than to reaffirm the commitment of Durham County Council to suicide prevention.”

    Source location

    Response Durham County Council
    Page 1 · response
    Published 9 December 2022

    Open published response

  5. Norfolk

    AI-generated summary

    Ben Buster KING · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Ben Buster KING was detained under the Mental Health Act at Jeesal Cawston Park and died in hospital on 29 July 2020 after becoming unwell following respiratory problems and receiving sedative medication. The inquest identified concerns including failure to diagnose obesity hypoventilation syndrome, inadequate consideration of promethazine, failure to recognise the seriousness of a life-threatening situation, and wider care, observation, record-keeping and hospital communication issues.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unavailability of CCTV in residential care homes

    Wider context from the report

    “2. CCTV was shown at the inquest which revealed Ben King had been assaulted in the hours prior to his death and also that 1 to 1 observation was not carried out in accordance with the Observations Policy. CCTV is a reliable means of ensuring that staff comply with Policies and residents are treated with dignity. CCTV is not available in many if not all of the residential homes owned by JHL and JRCSL. ”

    Source location

    Ben Buster KING · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    CCTV is considered inappropriate in residential homes because it would intrude on residents’ rights and liberties.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. CCTV is often used in hospital settings, though only in shared public areas. CCTV would be totally inappropriate in the residential homes that we manage. It could be considered an intrusion in the rights and liberties of residents, who consider the house as their home.”

    Source location

    2021-0250-Response-from-Jeesal-Residential-Care-Services_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 July 2021

    Open published response

  6. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Flora Shen · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Flora Shen died on 6 January 2020 at Lime House station after falling from the platform and being struck by a train. The report raised concerns about the reliance on members of the public to notice hazards and activate alarms, and about limited CCTV coverage and the response process on the driverless DLR system.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inability of the central CCTV monitoring system to watch all stations simultaneously

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) The central DLR CCTV monitoring system cannot watch all stations at the same time and the safety of persons slipping, falling or collapsing on to a line on the DLR system seems to rely on ability of members of the public to notice the hazard and activate the alarm on either the platform or the train. ”

    Source location

    Flora Shen · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    On-train and CCTV obstacle-detection technology is considered insufficiently mature for reliable operation on the DLR network.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. We will continue to research and collaborate with suppliers to identify potential solutions and improvements in the area of hazard/obstacle detection. We are currently exploring an emerging CCTV product that can detect persons and/or objects on the track, and have held preliminary discussions with its developer to assess its potential for testing on the DLR. We should know by December 2020 if a trial can be taken forward. However, this is partly dependent on the existing CCTV network being capable of supporting such a trial.”

    Source location

    2020-0115-Response-from-TFL_Redacted.pdf
    Page 6 · response
    Published 11 June 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing risk controls were considered appropriate and reasonably practicable, so additional platform screen doors were not required.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “ORR has confirmed that the risk assessments jointly undertaken by DLR and KAD include for the events of a person falling or jumping onto the track and the consequent potential events. This assessment identifies a range of control and mitigation measures for these events. These include, amongst other things, the alarm points on stations and random CCTV monitoring, and station signage, platform markings and surface finish. Measures also include wider initiatives such as proactive liaison with local police and mental health services.”

    Source location

    2020-0115-Response-from-Office-of-Rail-and-Road_Redacted.pdf
    Page 2 · response
    Published 11 June 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    DLR, KAD and TfL held responsibility and power to investigate and implement additional technological or operational safety solutions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is for these reasons that ORR considers that the concerns in the Coroner’s report would be better directed to DLR, KAD and TfL. These organisations hold the responsibility for health and safety and have the power to investigate and implement additional or alternative new technological and operational solutions that could reduce further the risks to persons on the track.”

    Source location

    2020-0115-Response-from-Office-of-Rail-and-Road_Redacted.pdf
    Page 3 · response
    Published 11 June 2020

    Open published response

  7. Staffordshire South

    AI-generated summary

    Evha Jannath · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Evha Jannath, aged 11, fell into deep water during a water rapids ride at Drayton Manor Theme Park after being projected from a boat and later falling from a wet conveyor belt. She was located and recovered after 18 minutes. The principal concerns included inadequate CCTV monitoring, lack of safety warnings, worn or incomplete signage, insufficient water-rescue training and equipment, and unclear emergency procedures.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequate training in monitoring ride CCTV

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The ride had been staffed with one attendant, one operator and a trainee operator. The ride operator tasks included stopping and starting the lift to space boats in order to assist the attendant with loading, unloading and turning empty boats. Additionally on this day the operator had training responsibilities. Consequently it was not possible to monitor the CCTV adequately. The operator training in respect of monitoring the CCTV was limited to being told to watch it. ”

    Source location

    Evha Jannath · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to adequately monitor ride CCTV

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The ride had been staffed with one attendant, one operator and a trainee operator. The ride operator tasks included stopping and starting the lift to space boats in order to assist the attendant with loading, unloading and turning empty boats. Additionally on this day the operator had training responsibilities. Consequently it was not possible to monitor the CCTV adequately. The operator training in respect of monitoring the CCTV was limited to being told to watch it. ”

    Source location

    Evha Jannath · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

  8. Inner West London

    AI-generated summary

    Alfonso Sinclair · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Alfonso Sinclair entered the Victoria Line tunnel at Warren Street station on 31 August 2018 and was struck and killed by a train approximately 19.5 minutes later. The principal concerns were that staff did not identify or track his unusual behaviour on CCTV, that there were no alarms at the platform-end barriers, and that staff working systems and CCTV monitoring could be improved to help prevent similar deaths.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a system for staff to alert and track individuals of concern on CCTV

    Wider context from the report

    “1. That there is no apparent system for staff to alert odd behaviour and then track an individual of concern on CCTV. ”

    Source location

    Alfonso Sinclair · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue evaluating camera-based detection technologies and equipment that could alert staff to dangerous or potentially suicidal behaviour.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is not possible for us to continuously monitor every single one of our roughly thirteen thousand cameras that are positioned around our stations. We therefore continue to assess and evaluate new and evolving camera-based detection technologies that can alert staff to certain behavioural traits and actions that could pre-empt an act of self harm or people unintentionally putting themselves in danger of being struck by a passing train.”

    Source location

    2019-0141-Response-by-Transport-for-London
    Page 4 · response
    Published 14 June 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing CCTV arrangements are considered appropriate for local congestion management, incident support and incident review rather than continuous real-time tracking.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Moving on to the second part of this concern, CCTV cameras are in place in all LU stations but it is worth noting that their primary purpose is not to track the movement or actions of individuals in real time. Station operations rooms are not continuously staffed and CCTV camera views are not continuously monitored. Where station staff are alerted to unusual behaviours, the images from the CCTV can be viewed locally in the station operations room or remotely in the London Underground Control Centre (LUCC).”

    Source location

    2019-0141-Response-by-Transport-for-London
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 June 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continuous CCTV monitoring is not possible, and behavioural detection technologies are considered too immature for reliable London Underground operation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is not possible for us to continuously monitor every single one of our roughly thirteen thousand cameras that are positioned around our stations. We therefore continue to assess and evaluate new and evolving camera-based detection technologies that can alert staff to certain behavioural traits and actions that could pre-empt an act of self harm or people unintentionally putting themselves in danger of being struck by a passing train.”

    Source location

    2019-0141-Response-by-Transport-for-London
    Page 4 · response
    Published 14 June 2019

    Open published response

  9. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Catherine Mary GIBBON · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Catherine Mary Gibbon suffered a seizure while swimming at a gym on 1 June 2018 and remained face down in the water for around ten minutes. She sustained a hypoxic-ischaemic brain injury following non-fatal drowning and died. Concerns included inadequate pool monitoring and CCTV arrangements, a broken camera, insufficient staff training and emergency equipment, and gaps in first-aid certification systems.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to train and guide reception staff in CCTV monitoring

    Wider context from the report

    “3. The pool was not under continuous supervision and there was no legal requirement for a lifeguard, but it was under CCTV surveillance. The CCTV monitor was in reception. However, no training or guidance was given to the gym receptionist about what she should look for on the monitor and what she should do if all was not as she expected. Most especially, she was not given any instruction as to how frequently to check the monitor. ”

    Source location

    Catherine Mary GIBBON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequate CCTV screen visibility for pool activity

    Wider context from the report

    “4. The receptionist also gave evidence that in her opinion, the screens (the monitor was split into four screens for the four cameras) were too small to see the pool activity clearly. ”

    Source location

    Catherine Mary GIBBON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to maintain CCTV cameras and provide alternative surveillance when one is non-operational

    Wider context from the report

    “5. In fact, one of the four cameras had been broken since 24 May. It had not reported and no alternative measures had been taken since it had become non operational. ”

    Source location

    Catherine Mary GIBBON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

  10. West Yorkshire (Western)

    AI-generated summary

    Jordan Ryan Sheils · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jordan Ryan Sheils went missing from his father’s home on the evening of 3 April 2017 after sending worrying text messages, and his body was found beneath the North Bridge on 4 April 2017. The report concerned measures to deter similar incidents at the bridge, including anti-climbing mesh and prominently displayed CCTV cameras, and noted that their introduction should be expedited.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unavailability of prominently displayed CCTV cameras overlooking the bridge

    Wider context from the report

    “During the inquest I heard very helpful evidence from ████████, Highway Asset Manager, who told me that the council are currently in the process of considering of obtaining planning permission for anti-climbing mesh at the location, although it is not thought it will be implemented until early next year. • To review the existing measures for deterring such tragedies with a view to expediting their introduction particularly with regard to prominently displayed CCTV cameras overlooking the bridge. ”

    Source location

    Jordan Ryan Sheils · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Complete feasibility, CCTV coverage and temporary fencing reviews for North Bridge safety measures.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3.1 To review existing measures for deterring such tragedies with a view to expediting their introduction particularly with regard to prominently displayed CCTV cameras overlooking the bridge”

    Source location

    2018-0319-Response-by-Calderdale-Council
    Page 1 · response
    Published 24 February 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Install an additional CCTV camera providing coverage of North Bridge.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3.3 Provision of CCTV camera”

    Source location

    2018-0319-Response-by-Calderdale-Council
    Page 1 · response
    Published 24 February 2019

    Open published response

Actions and positions describe what organisations say in published responses. Implementation is not independently verified.

Back to top

Data last updated 7 September 2026