Recurring concern

Unreliable activation of emergency medical response teams

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First reported 16 Apr 2014•Latest report 23 Oct 2025

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of dedicated emergency medical team activation processes, including unclear activation criteria, missed or delayed calls, and failures to link deterioration or escalation triggers to activation of the appropriate emergency medical response team.

Not included

  • Excludes general failures to recognise or respond to clinical deterioration when no emergency medical response-team activation issue is identified.
  • Excludes delays in treatment or attendance after an emergency medical response team has been activated.
  • Excludes generic staffing, training, communication or escalation deficiencies unless they directly impair activation of an emergency medical response team.
  • Excludes non-medical emergency services and emergency alarm systems unless the assertion specifically concerns activation of an emergency medical response team.
Reports
9

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
9

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2014–2025

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
13

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

East London NHS Foundation Trust2
Bedfordshire Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust1
Betsi Cadwaladr University LHB1
Department of Health and Social Care1
Family1
Luton and Dunstable University Hospital1
Luton and Dunstable University Hospital NHS Foundation Trust1
Mid and South Essex NHS Foundation Trust1
Sandwell and West Birmingham Hospitals NHS Trust1
University Hospitals of Derby and Burton NHS Foundation Trust1
University Hospitals Sussex NHS Foundation Trust1
Welsh Government1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Black Country

    AI-generated summary

    Mrs Rashida Sultana · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mrs Rashida Sultana died on 20 November 2024 after choking on chips and water while admitted to hospital. Concerns included confusion among nursing staff about when to call the Emergency Medical Response Team when a DNAR was in place, and insufficient risk assessment regarding Speech and Language Therapy assessments for patients at risk of dysphagia.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of nursing staff understanding of when to call the EMRT during emergencies involving a DNAR

    Wider context from the report

    “2. My concern is that there was confusion and lack of understanding by nursing staff in relation to when the EMRT should be called in an emergency particularly when a DNAR was place. ”

    Source location

    Mrs Rashida Sultana · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  2. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    Lady Lola Kay Crouch · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Lady Lola Kay Crouch died at Broomfield Hospital on 26 February 2023 from multi-organ failure due to small bowel obstruction associated with leiomyosarcoma of the small intestine and abdominal adhesions. A December 2022 CT finding suggestive of malignancy was not followed up or communicated to her, and it was not included in her later hospital history. The report also identifies delayed medical review overnight because of doctor staffing levels.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to trigger a Medical Emergency call when elevated NEWS scores require medical review

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) Staffing levels – A Medical Emergency call was not triggered overnight on the surgical ward when elevated NEWS scores required medical review that was escalated but delayed due to doctor staffing levels. ”

    Source location

    Lady Lola Kay Crouch · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Share learning from the case and reinforce NEWS2 escalation, trigger-response-team and local escalation requirements with surgical staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Our ‘NEWS2’ escalation policy was in place at the time of Lady Lola’s attendances. The outcome of Lady Lola’s case was communicated at both our July 2024 and August 2024 general surgical audit meetings to share learning. During the meetings we highlighted the importance of compliance with the NEWS2 escalation policy again and reminded the surgical staff about the role of the trigger response team, and our local departmental escalation process. The trigger response and hospital out of hours team are automatically notified by the electronic observation system, NEWS escalations and attend the unwell patient.”

    Source location

    Response from Mid & South Essex NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 25 February 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Establish a hospital out-of-hours service in the surgical department to provide a more robust response and senior support to surgical wards.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Since Lady Lola’s case we have established the hospital out of hours service in the surgical department to provide a more robust response to the surgical wards. This process has been in place for other specialties previously and we know it works very well.”

    Source location

    Response from Mid & South Essex NHS Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 25 February 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Reiterate NEWS and local clinical escalation processes to new surgical residents during standard induction.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Along with the hospital wide trigger response team and hospital out of hours service, this provides the surgical team, with senior nursing support who can provide the more junior surgical resident with clinical support, vascular access, resuscitative support, and escalation prompting. We have further reiterated the NEWS and local clinical escalation process to the new residents as part of our standard induction process.”

    Source location

    Response from Mid & South Essex NHS Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 25 February 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    NEWS2 escalation, trigger response, out-of-hours support and consultant acting-down arrangements provide sufficient staffing safeguards for urgent surgical cases.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Our ‘NEWS2’ escalation policy was in place at the time of Lady Lola’s attendances. The outcome of Lady Lola’s case was communicated at both our July 2024 and August 2024 general surgical audit meetings to share learning. During the meetings we highlighted the importance of compliance with the NEWS2 escalation policy again and reminded the surgical staff about the role of the trigger response team, and our local departmental escalation process. The trigger response and hospital out of hours team are automatically notified by the electronic observation system, NEWS escalations and attend the unwell patient.”

    Source location

    Response from Mid & South Essex NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 25 February 2025

    Open published response
  3. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Nimo OSMAN · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Nimo Osman was in state detention under a Hospital Order and receiving psychiatric inpatient care when she collapsed on the ward on 21 April 2022. She was unresponsive for over half an hour before an ambulance was called and died in hospital on 23 April 2022 from hypoxic ischaemic brain injury. The principal concerns were delays in recognising the emergency and calling an ambulance, whether learning had been embedded among staff, completion of venous thromboembolism assessments, and ambiguity in the Trust’s venous thromboembolism policy.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to activate the emergency alarm system to summon the rapid response team promptly

    Wider context from the report

    “Following the discovery of Ms Osman’s collapse on Rosebank Ward on 21 April 2022, it took staff a significant number of minutes to recognise that instead of just lying on the floor, Ms Osman was actually unrousable. A few minutes later a nurse arrived on the scene, who decided to summon the duty senior nurse (DSN) by radio, rather than activating the alarm system, which would have summoned the rapid response team sooner. The DSN contacted the duty doctor to inform them that there was a medical emergency, prior to calling an ambulance. In total, Ms Osman had been on the floor and unresponsive for over half an hour before an ambulance was called. I also viewed the CCTV evidence covering this course of events. I heard evidence from a consultant neurosurgeon and a consultant neuroradiologist. Their evidence was such that, in Ms Osman’s case this delay would not have made a difference because she had suffered a catastrophic brain injury and her condition was likely to have been unsalvageable from the moment she was found unresponsive on the floor. However, I consider that a delay of circa 30 minutes in calling an emergency ambulance raises a considerable risk, if repeated in the case of another patient requiring emergency treatment at hospital. I was initially reassured by the evidence of a very senior member of nursing staff (Nurse A) about the work that has been done to educate all staff that anyone can call 999 for an ambulance if they consider it necessary, without seeking the advice of colleagues or the specific approval of a doctor. I was told by Nurse A that they were confident that the education and training undertaken with staff had had a positive impact and that a delay of this kind was unlikely to be repeated in the future. However, a senior nurse (Nurse B) who was on duty at the time of Ms Osman’s collapse told me in their evidence (over two years after Ms Osman’s death) that nursing staff cannot and would not call an ambulance of their own volition. Nurse B told me that she would only ever call an ambulance if told to do so by a more senior clinician. Nurse B went on to tell me that it was often the case that by the time an ambulance had been called and arrived, a patient would die; the manner in which this evidence was given led me to form the view that the Nurse B seemed to think that this was ‘just one of those things that happens’. While I was told by Nurse A (who seemed genuinely concerned) that this matter would be escalated and addressed, I was concerned that over two years since Ms Osman’s death this view was still held by a senior and experienced member of the nursing team who led a team of more junior nurses. My concern was such that I am not reassured that sufficient steps have been taken to prevent the recurrence of such a risk in the future. ”

    Source location

    Nimo OSMAN · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  4. North Wales (East and Central)

    AI-generated summary

    Vivienne Greener · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Vivienne Greener was taken by ambulance to Glan Clwyd Hospital after vomiting blood and died there on 20 March 2018 following a massive upper gastrointestinal haemorrhage. The report identified concerns including delayed admission and triage, delayed provision of blood products, failures to escalate and trigger haemorrhage pathways, insufficient staffing and the lack of out-of-hours emergency endoscopy.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of clarity about when to call the Emergency Treatment Team

    Wider context from the report

    “4. There is not a clear understanding of when the Emergency Treatment Team should be called; ”

    Source location

    Vivienne Greener · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Display the Medical Emergency Team call process on NEWS charts for clinicians assessing observations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “With regards to understanding when to call the Medical Emergency Team (MET), evidence of the MET call process is included on the National Early Warning Score (NEWS) chart and is clearly visible to all clinicians assessing and reviewing patient recorded observations. For clarity, the Emergency Treatment Team is now known as the Medical Emergency Team.”

    Source location

    Response from Betso Cadwaladr University Health Board
    Page 5 · response
    Published 28 December 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The NEWS chart clearly identifies when clinicians should call the Medical Emergency Team.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “With regards to understanding when to call the Medical Emergency Team (MET), evidence of the MET call process is included on the National Early Warning Score (NEWS) chart and is clearly visible to all clinicians assessing and reviewing patient recorded observations. For clarity, the Emergency Treatment Team is now known as the Medical Emergency Team.”

    Source location

    Response from Betso Cadwaladr University Health Board
    Page 5 · response
    Published 28 December 2023

    Open published response
  5. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Gary OTTWAY · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Gary Ottway, aged 41, died after being found in cardiac arrest while detained alone in a seclusion room under constant nursing observation during a severe mental health episode. The report raised concerns about whether observation was constant or effective, delays in entering the room and obtaining emergency equipment, gaps in available medical training and resources, and ineffective chest compressions. The inquest determined that he died from natural causes involving two heart conditions.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in calling the rapid response team when non-respiration is suspected

    Wider context from the report

    “4. The senior duty nurse told me that the nurses would not enter the seclusion room until the rapid response team was present, but he did not call the rapid response team as soon as he suspected that Mr Ottway was not breathing. Instead, he started by going to get one of the other nurses, which took a couple of minutes; then he rang the duty doctor; and only after that did he radio for the rapid response team. ”

    Source location

    Gary OTTWAY · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  6. Bedfordshire and Luton

    AI-generated summary

    Pamela Evans · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Pamela Evans, aged 87, fell and hit her head at Bedford Hospital after becoming dizzy while walking to the toilet, and died on 4 November 2018 from a large right-sided acute on chronic subdural haematoma. Concerns included inconsistent understanding among nurses about when to call the critical care outreach team, limited action that team could initially take, errors in recording her NEWS, and failures to identify these issues through the Trust’s serious incident investigation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Mismatch between critical care outreach call guidance and nurses’ understanding of the call threshold

    Wider context from the report

    “(i)        A mismatch between: (a)        on the one hand, the expressed intention of senior nursing staff as to when nurses should call the critical care outreach team if the relevant medical team is unable to attend, namely that nurses should call when they have concerns about a patient, irrespective of the patient’s NEWS score and (b)        on the other hand, the understanding of at least some nurses that they cannot or will not call the outreach team, despite having concerns, unless the NEWS score exceeds a specific number (5 or above, according to the cardiac nurse practitioner who cared for the deceased; 7 or above, according to a doctor setting out her experience of some nurses’ practice). ”

    Source location

    Pamela Evans · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver direct NEWS2 training to nursing staff, including escalation based on clinical judgement as well as numerical scoring.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust takes patient safety seriously and is compliant with our duties to implement national patient safety initiatives. NEWS2 was launched in September 2018 and the trust had to report compliance by April 2019 and undertook:”

    Source location

    2019-0333-Response-by-Bedford-Hospital-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 10 November 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide tools and mechanisms for identifying deteriorating patients and clarify escalation routes using clinical experience alongside numerical scoring.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Absence of evidence that staff know the routes of escalation for deteriorating patients I apologise if at the time of the inquest Trust representatives were not able to provide you with assurance on staff knowledge regarding the routes for escalation for deteriorating patients. The trust has undertaken substantial work over the past two years on identifying and escalating deteriorating patients. Part of which has been to:”

    Source location

    2019-0333-Response-by-Bedford-Hospital-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 10 November 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use trust-wide clinical updates, shared-learning sessions and safety bulletins to reinforce deterioration recognition and escalation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Absence of evidence that staff know the routes of escalation for deteriorating patients I apologise if at the time of the inquest Trust representatives were not able to provide you with assurance on staff knowledge regarding the routes for escalation for deteriorating patients. The trust has undertaken substantial work over the past two years on identifying and escalating deteriorating patients. Part of which has been to:”

    Source location

    2019-0333-Response-by-Bedford-Hospital-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 10 November 2019

    Open published response
  7. Derby and Derbyshire

    AI-generated summary

    Barbara Turner · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Barbara Turner, an 81-year-old woman, was admitted for an elective left total knee replacement and was later found unresponsive. She underwent a CT scan and was admitted to intensive care, where she died on 11 May 2015. The report identified concerns about resuscitation-call criteria, failures to recognise and respond to her critical illness, missed vital-sign observations, and the unsafe arrangements for transporting her to and from the CT scanner.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of resuscitation call-out criteria to identify critically ill unresponsive patients with initially normal vital signs

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The Trust Policy and Protocol for Resuscitation states at Appendix 3 that the call out criteria for the Adult Resuscitation Team is : All Cardiac Arrests All Respiratory arrests Any Unresponsive patient or visitor with Heart rate > 150 Heart rate < 40 Respiratory rate >40 Respiratory rate < 8 Systolic BP < 80 mmHg Oxygen Saturations < 90% Had these criteria been applied to Mrs Turner then the resuscitation team would not have been called, despite clinicians who gave evidence to the court that she was critically ill. The court heard evidence that person's suffering an intracerebral event or head injury can be critically ill and in need of resuscitation but have initial normal vital signs parameters. It may be that in the policy and protocol the parameters for critically ill unresponsive patients are too broad and as a consequence a proportion of critically ill patients will be denied the best possible chance of being treated by a skilled resuscitation team. ”

    Source location

    Barbara Turner · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  8. Brighton and Hove

    AI-generated summary

    Diana Maxine RITCHIE · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Diana Maxine Ritchie was recovering from major surgery when she deteriorated overnight on 5–6 March and suffered a cardiac arrest at around 12.20 hrs on 6 March. Concerns included missed opportunities to escalate care in response to raised NEWS scores, inaccurate or potentially delayed observations, and failures in the use of NEWS across the Trust.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to report raised NEWS scores to doctors or critical care outreach

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) That there were missed opportunities to escalate Mrs Ritchie's treatment arising from raised NEWS scores where there was no report of those raised scores either to the doctors on the ward or to the critical care outreach team. There were eight different NEWS scores taken between 06.30 on the 6th and 11.15 on the 6th. On two of them the scoring was inaccurate (one was scored 2 points too high and the other was scored 2 points too low). One of them scored at 4 but the remainder scored at 5 and above. As I say, none of them resulted in a call to critical care outreach or to the ward SHO. ”

    Source location

    Diana Maxine RITCHIE · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Improve ward staff familiarity with National Early Warning observations, scoring and escalation through reflection and additional training.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I recognise, as does the Trust's Interim Chief Nurse, that accurate completion and scoring of observations on the National Early Warning charts, and appropriate escalation, is very important. In the light of these events, considerable action has been taken on the ward concerned (in conjunction with their matron) to ensure that the individuals directly caring for Mrs Ritchie, as well as the rest of the ward team, are fully familiar with what is expected of them. They have reflected carefully on this, as well as attending specific additional training since these sad events to improve their knowledge and skills. The ward action plan is being presented to the monthly adult meeting for women's services, as well as feedback being taken to the safety and quality meeting for wider learning.”

    Source location

    2016-0296-Response-by-Brighton-and-Sussex-University-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 18 August 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Disseminate National Early Warning System safety guidance to all staff through the weekly Spotlight on Safety message and Patient Observation Policy link.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In order to extend this learning more widely, I used the Spotlight on Safety, in my weekly message to all staff, to focus on NEWS, saying - among other things - “it is vital that NEWS scores are calculated correctly and acted on appropriately if we are to provide safe care for our patients” and providing a direct link to the Trust's Patient Observation Policy.”

    Source location

    2016-0296-Response-by-Brighton-and-Sussex-University-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 18 August 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Circulate a monthly patient-safety bulletin highlighting recognition and escalation of care for deteriorating patients.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust's Patient Safety team sends a “Patients 1st” bulletin each month to all staff. This uses a fictionalized story to draw attention to things that may go wrong and sets out good practice. Since the death of Mrs Ritchie, such a bulletin has been circulated, which focused on the recognition and appropriate escalation of care for a deteriorating patient.”

    Source location

    2016-0296-Response-by-Brighton-and-Sussex-University-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 18 August 2016

    Open published response
  9. Bedfordshire and Luton

    AI-generated summary

    Sari Marlene KEEN · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Sari Marlene KEEN underwent surgery to remove colon tumours on 23 October 2013, developed a faecal anastomotic leak causing peritonitis and shock, and died following cardiac arrest on 24 October 2013. The substantive concerns were insufficient staffing and failures to recognise deterioration, escalate care, and call the Hospital Crash Team when her blood pressure became unrecordable.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of staff to recognise an un-recordable blood pressure as a medical emergency requiring a crash call

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) It was apparent that many Senior and Junior Members of Staff were not aware that an ‘un-recordable blood pressure’ was a ‘medical emergency’ and should have resulted in a crash call going out for immediate resuscitation. Perhaps the Protocols for the Crash Team need to be reviewed. ”

    Source location

    Sari Marlene KEEN · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Pilot a revised observation and escalation process, with registered nurses observing patients requiring observations more frequently than every four hours.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• A revised observation and escalation process is currently being piloted on 4 wards. A key change is the introduction of registered nurses to undertake the observations of all patients who require observations more than 4 hourly. Health Care Assistants also undertake observations but it was noted that the registered nurse has a greater ability and opportunity to identify other factors that might indicate deterioration where a Health Care Assistant would not be skilled enough to identify the patient during the actual observation process. Early indications are that there is a more timely escalation from nurses at the earlier signs of deterioration.”

    Source location

    2014-0180-Response-by-Luton-Dunstable-University-Hospital
    Page 3 · response
    Published 16 April 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Emphasise Medical Emergency Team availability during mandatory basic life support training for all staff groups.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition, we have a separate “Medical Emergency Team” policy, designed to be activated in situations where a patient is deteriorating but is not yet in cardiac arrest. This involves activation of the bleeps of the medical registrar and the ITU registrar by switchboard with a message asking the medical emergency team to go to ward X immediately. For patients deteriorating between 8am and 10pm, we have the third option of summoning the ITU Outreach team to review the patient. This can be initiated by either medical or nursing staff, and results in a review by a nurse trained in assessment of critically ill patients who can then escalate to either the medical team or the ITU team as appropriate.”

    Source location

    2014-0180-Response-by-Luton-Dunstable-University-Hospital
    Page 3 · response
    Published 16 April 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Evaluate current nurse and doctor training on identifying deteriorating patients and develop an improvement proposal informed by cardiac-arrest learning.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Evaluation of the current training for nurses and doctors on the identification of the deteriorating patient is in progress with a proposal to improve the content as reflected in the learning from Root Cause Analysis of cardiac arrests.”

    Source location

    2014-0180-Response-by-Luton-Dunstable-University-Hospital
    Page 4 · response
    Published 16 April 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing cardiac-arrest protocols, medical-emergency procedures and mandatory training are considered sufficient arrangements for activating the appropriate response.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have very clear and specific protocols for activation of the cardiac arrest process, which every member of staff is expected to be conversant with. It is taught through basic life support, which is an element of mandatory training for all clinical staff.”

    Source location

    2014-0180-Response-by-Luton-Dunstable-University-Hospital
    Page 3 · response
    Published 16 April 2014

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026