Recurring concern

Failure to escalate patient-safety concerns to senior oversight

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First reported 27 Nov 2013•Latest report 6 Feb 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures by clinical, care or operational staff and teams to recognise, report or escalate patient-safety concerns, significant care problems or serious safety matters promptly through the appropriate senior-staff or senior-management pathway.

Not included

  • Excludes failures to act after a safety concern has already been escalated; those concern senior oversight response rather than upward escalation.
  • Excludes escalation processes for non-safety matters, routine administrative issues or ordinary performance concerns.
  • Excludes escalation within a separately named safety system or pathway when that system provides the more specific supported boundary.
  • Excludes failures involving escalation of a clinical deterioration episode where the concern is solely obtaining immediate clinical treatment rather than reporting the underlying safety concern to senior oversight.
Reports
14

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
15

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
20

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Care Quality Commission2
Department of Health and Social Care2
Adullam Homes Housing Association Limited1
College of Policing1
Croydon Health Services NHS Trust1
General Medical Council1
Greater Manchester Police1
Heatherwood and Wexham Park Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust1
Joint Royal Colleges Ambulance Liaison Committee1
Milton Keynes University Hospital1
Mitie1
NHS Bedfordshire, Luton and Milton Keynes Integrated Care Board1
NHS Central East Integrated Care Board1
NHS England1
NHS Greater Manchester Integrated Care Board1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Devon, Plymouth and Torbay

    AI-generated summary

    Linda Brooks · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Linda Brooks, a 78-year-old care-home resident with respiratory and other comorbidities, was admitted after a fall and later died at Torbay Hospital on 17 May 2022. The inquest identified concerns about oxygen being switched off for an unknown period before her death, and about failures to report, investigate, escalate, and record the incident and related Datix referrals.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of staff training and understanding of responsibility to report and escalate serious clinical incidents

    Wider context from the report

    “1. There appeared to be a lack of training and understanding by staff at the Trust that it is everybody’s responsibility to report and escalate a serious clinical incident such as this ”

    Source location

    Linda Brooks · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Recruit and establish three Care Group Director of Nursing roles to lead governance and support patient safety.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To ensure it is everybody’s responsibility to report and escalate serious patient safety incidents, the Trust has strengthened its patient safety governance, training, and reporting infrastructure.”

    Source location

    2026-0085 - Response from Torbay and South Devon NHS Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 13 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver incident-reporting education and training for clinical staff, including medical staff and new starters.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “These roles support our clinical staff with the reporting of incidents, including education and training sessions for clinical staff, including medical staff. We have also just recruited 3 new Care group Director of Nursing roles to lead governance within our care group structures and to support patient safety.”

    Source location

    2026-0085 - Response from Torbay and South Devon NHS Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 13 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement DCIQ as the Trust incident-reporting system and communicate that all staff may report unexpected or unintended incidents.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A new reporting system [DCIQ] was implemented in the Trust in October 2023; the importance of reporting incidents formed a large part of the communication plan around this system.”

    Source location

    2026-0085 - Response from Torbay and South Devon NHS Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 13 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver additional community-hospital training and targeted communications reinforcing incident-reporting expectations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Since the inquest, additional community-hospital training and targeted communications have been delivered to reinforce incident reporting expectations, and a quarterly learning event programme will commence from June with incident reporting as a core topic. Effectiveness is monitored by the central Patient Safety Team through DCIQ reporting volumes and training compliance, reviewed monthly via PSIRG and escalated through care group governance where required.”

    Source location

    2026-0085 - Response from Torbay and South Devon NHS Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 13 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Commence quarterly learning events with incident reporting as a core topic.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Since the inquest, additional community-hospital training and targeted communications have been delivered to reinforce incident reporting expectations, and a quarterly learning event programme will commence from June with incident reporting as a core topic. Effectiveness is monitored by the central Patient Safety Team through DCIQ reporting volumes and training compliance, reviewed monthly via PSIRG and escalated through care group governance where required.”

    Source location

    2026-0085 - Response from Torbay and South Devon NHS Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 13 February 2026

    Open published response
  2. Worcestershire

    AI-generated summary

    Vauna LEEMING · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Vauna Leeming was admitted to hospital after an accidental fall at home that caused a fractured right neck of femur. After surgery, her condition deteriorated, she tested positive for Covid-19, suffered a pulmonary embolism and died in hospital. Concerns included incomplete documentation of anticoagulation and compression-stocking measures, failures to report omissions, and insufficient awareness among employed and agency nurses of these duties.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to report omissions in important documentation to a senior colleague

    Wider context from the report

    “2) It was of particular concern that for 5 consecutive days, no nurse had noticed or raised with a senior colleague that the prescription charts had not been completed to show that compression stockings had been fitted. This suggests either that there is little understanding of a nurse’s professional duty to report such omissions, or that the practice of not checking and completing such important documentation is commonplace; ”

    Source location

    Vauna LEEMING · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  3. Milton Keynes

    AI-generated summary

    Alexander Shone BLEWITT · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Alexander Shone Blewitt died at Milton Keynes University Hospital on 11 July 2022 after returning to the emergency department with faecal incontinence and abdominal pain, following an earlier visit where he had been referred from an urgent care centre. A possible acute abdomen was confirmed by CT, and he suffered a cardiac arrest before surgery. Concerns included inaccurate communication of important symptoms and treatment information, inadequate clinical recording, and the absence of reliable records of intravenous fluids administered in the emergency department.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to bring issues of concern to the attention of hospital authorities

    Wider context from the report

    “[2] Despite the 8 month interval between Mr Blewitt's death and the Inquest the issues of concern had not been brought to the attention of hospital authorities. ”

    Source location

    Alexander Shone BLEWITT · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  4. East London

    AI-generated summary

    Winbourne Gregory Charles · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Winbourne Gregory Charles was found unresponsive on 10 April 2021, suspended on a mental health ward, after being admitted under the Mental Health Act following an attempt to take his own life. The principal concerns included failures in risk assessment, observation practices, emergency response, record keeping, and governance processes.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to identify and escalate observation suspension in the 72-hour report

    Wider context from the report

    “6. Governance process failings. a. A datix incident report created on the evening of 10ᵗʰ April 2021 by a senior nurse and Modern Matron contained misleading information that suggested that emergency response policies were followed when in fact they were not. b. The Datix failed to mention that observations had been suspended by the shift coordinator, a fact that was understood at that time. This obvious and significant piece of information that should have been escalated through the Trust governance team for action. c. The Trust 72 hour report was written by the Modern Matron and was signed-off by an integrated care director on 15th April 2021. This document also failed to identify or escalate the significant issue of the suspension of observation at 16.00 on 10th April 2021. d. The Trust SI report was not prepared to fully address the poor risk assessment or inadequate datix & 72 hr reports. ”

    Source location

    Winbourne Gregory Charles · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement the new PSIRF framework, including panel review and sign-off of all 72-hour reports.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. Implementation of new PSIRF framework, all 72hr reports will be reviewed and signed off by the panel.”

    Source location

    NELFT NHS Foundation Trust Action Plan
    Page 9 · response
    Published 5 May 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Concerns about care provision and coordination are mainly for the NHS Trust to address.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Your report raises concerns over the provision and coordination of care that Winbourne received at North East London NHS Foundation Trust, which are mainly for the Trust to address. I understand that the Trust has already carefully considered the matters of concern in your report and has provided you with a comprehensive response as well as a copy of its action plan setting out the actions to be taken to improve care quality and patient safety.”

    Source location

    Response from Department of Health and Social Care
    Page 1 · response
    Published 5 May 2023

    Open published response
  5. Manchester North

    AI-generated summary

    Liam Kenyon · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Liam Kenyon was found unconscious in his supported housing accommodation on 17 July 2020 after a suspected opioid overdose, refused hospital admission, and was later found deceased on 18 July 2020. The concerns included unclear responsibilities for supported housing staff, failure to conduct agreed hourly checks and other welfare and risk-management actions, inadequate escalation of staffing difficulties, and a deficient Serious Incident Review process.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to escalate operational problems to the on-call manager

    Wider context from the report

    “6. The Court heard that at a weekend there are less staff to cover all the sites and on the 18th July the staff were dealing with a number of incidents involving residents, meaning to conduct hourly checks would have been difficult. However no member of staff escalated to the on call manager the fact that there were problems. ”

    Source location

    Liam Kenyon · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  6. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Mary Brady · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mary Brady, who had vascular dementia and lived in a care home, was found unresponsive after being left unobserved in a communal area. A used pair of latex gloves was removed from her airway, and she died shortly after midnight on 11 March 2019. Concerns included accessible open waste baskets, improper disposal and insufficient escalation of used gloves, and failures to document and risk-assess her previous ingestion of non-food items or update her care plan.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to escalate recurring unsafe clinical waste disposal to senior managers

    Wider context from the report

    “2. The gloves were clinical waste and had been disposed of other than in the clinical waste bin in the secure area. The inquest heard that there had been previous instances of used gloves being found in the waste baskets. However the issue had not been escalated to senior managers and no steps had been taken to avoid the issue reoccurring. ”

    Source location

    Mary Brady · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing glove-disposal policies, staff awareness, safety checks, and the new PPE policy and checking system were considered sufficient responses.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It would be good practice for staff to discuss such incidents with the manager so these could be addressed at a senior level. There were clear policies for the disposal of gloves and all staff were aware of the correct procedure. Therefore, any failure to dispose of gloves appropriately (or escalate incidents where gloves had not been appropriately disposed of) does not seem to be attributable to failings of a registered person. The CQC understood that these previous incidents were dealt with as isolated incidents and were not considered to be a trend or ongoing risk presented by visiting external health care services.”

    Source location

    2020-0105-Response-from-Care-Quality-Commission_Redacted-1.pdf
    Page 5 · response
    Published 5 June 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing CQC regulatory action and continued monitoring are considered sufficient to reduce further risks at the care home.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “You issued your report to the Care Quality Commission (CQC) and Departmental officials have made enquiries with the CQC on the regulatory activity in relation to this incident. I am therefore aware that following a review of the circumstances of Mrs Brady’s death; information provided by the registered provider and the action it has taken; and the findings of a CQC inspection conducted in February 2019, the CQC is satisfied that sufficient action has been taken to reduce further risks within the Balmoral Care Home and that there was insufficient evidence that a breach of the Regulations¹ had occurred. The CQC’s response to your report provides further detail on its considerations in relation to this case.”

    Source location

    2020-0105-Response-from-the-Department-of-Health-and-Social-Care.pdf
    Page 1 · response
    Published 5 June 2020

    Open published response
  7. Exeter and Greater Devon

    AI-generated summary

    Stuart Michael CLARK · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Stuart Michael CLARK died shortly after being recovered from a canal on 3 October 2017, after entering the water wearing a rucksack filled with weights. During a hospital admission before his death, he disclosed that he was a vulnerable adult and a suicide risk, but this was not escalated or followed by an assessment of his risk of self-harm or suicide. The report identified that senior clinical staff were not directly informed and that the relevant medical record entry was not available to other staff at the time.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to directly inform senior clinical staff of disclosed suicide risk

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The evidence revealed that Mr CLARK disclosed to a member of nursing staff on Lowman (Canpere) Ward at the Royal Devon and Exeter Hospital that he was a vulnerable adult and a suicide risk. This disclosure was not followed up with an assessment to determine if Mr CLARK had any intent, plan or history of self-harm or suicide. An assessment would have helped determine his risk and inform the decision on a referral to mental health services. Senior clinical staff were not directly informed of the disclosure. The SHO Dr responsible for Mr CLARK stated in her evidence that had she known about the disclosure she would have assessed his risk of self-harm and suicide, and if appropriate she would have referred him to the mental health services. The nurse made an entry in the medical records; however, the medical notes were not made up until the end of the day and therefore the information was not available to the other staff at the relevant time. ”

    Source location

    Stuart Michael CLARK · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review current training and support for recognising risk, escalating concerns and safeguarding adults.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    ““review procedures and training related to the actions to be taken when a disclosure is made to ward staff giving rise to the suspicion of the risk of self-harm or suicide”.”

    Source location

    2019-0125-Response-by-Royal-Devon-and-Exeter-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 15 July 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Run a two-day professional leadership forum to reinforce individual responsibility and accountability for patient safety and suicide prevention, with learning cascaded to teams.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “However, the Trust is always seeking to improve safety for its patients. We will be reinforcing individual responsibility and accountability for patient safety and suicide prevention to all staff. In June 2019, the Trust is running a two day ‘Care Matters’ professional leadership forum for Nurses, Allied Health Professionals and midwives. These sessions will be run and delivered in person by ████████ ████████ Deputy Chief Executive/Chief Nurse, and will reach over 100 leads who will then cascade to their respective teams. The focus of this forum is Professional Safety and this case will be used during this forum as an example to reiterate the importance of escalating concerns about vulnerable patients to ensure the appropriate assessments and support can be provided to them.”

    Source location

    2019-0125-Response-by-Royal-Devon-and-Exeter-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 July 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Issue a safeguarding newsletter reminder about procedures following disclosures of possible suicidal intent, including the suicide-support leaflet.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust is satisfied that this was an isolated incident and staff are aware of their safeguarding obligations. However, the Safeguarding Team is going to issue a reminder to all staff in an upcoming newsletter (which reaches all clinical staff) about safeguarding procedures when there is a disclosure about possible suicidal intent. This briefing will include information about the ‘It’s safe to talk about suicide’ leaflet, a copy of which is attached. This is available on the Trust’s safeguarding intranet page but we want to raise awareness further of this issue. The leaflet was produced by Exeter Medical School in conjunction with Suicide Charities and Devon County Council for staff to use to support people when suicidal intention is disclosed.”

    Source location

    2019-0125-Response-by-Royal-Devon-and-Exeter-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 July 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing training, policies, safeguarding support and mental health provision are considered sufficient to ensure staff recognise and escalate suicide risks.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “There is a mandatory training programme that is completed by all staff on induction with the Trust, whatever their role. Regular updates are required at a maximum interval of every three years. The training programme has the following objectives:”

    Source location

    2019-0125-Response-by-Royal-Devon-and-Exeter-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 15 July 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The incident is considered isolated, and staff are considered aware of their safeguarding obligations and required actions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust is satisfied that this was an isolated incident and staff are aware of their safeguarding obligations. However, the Safeguarding Team is going to issue a reminder to all staff in an upcoming newsletter (which reaches all clinical staff) about safeguarding procedures when there is a disclosure about possible suicidal intent. This briefing will include information about the ‘It’s safe to talk about suicide’ leaflet, a copy of which is attached. This is available on the Trust’s safeguarding intranet page but we want to raise awareness further of this issue. The leaflet was produced by Exeter Medical School in conjunction with Suicide Charities and Devon County Council for staff to use to support people when suicidal intention is disclosed.”

    Source location

    2019-0125-Response-by-Royal-Devon-and-Exeter-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 July 2019

    Open published response
  8. Surrey

    AI-generated summary

    Terrence Arthur Albert Smith · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Terrence Smith died in hospital on 13 November 2013 after developing amphetamine-induced Excited Delirium/Acute Behavioural Disturbance, being subjected to prolonged restraint, and stopping breathing while being transported to hospital. The principal concerns included failures to recognise the condition as a medical emergency, inadequate assessment and training, excessive restraint, delayed conveyance to hospital, and deficiencies in relevant emergency response, clinical, police and custody policies and training.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of timely escalation of serious ED/ABD safety matters to senior management

    Wider context from the report

    “I was told by the Chief Executive Officer of SECAMB that he was not aware of Terry’s death and SECAMB’s involvement in it, nor of the issues arising at the Inquest, until very shortly before being required to give oral evidence at the Regulation 28 hearing. Given the length of the Inquest and the seriousness of the issues arising in relation to SECAMB (including their failure to recognise that Terry was suffering ED/ABD and to ensure he was treated as a medical emergency and taken to an Accident and Emergency Department), I am concerned that there is no system in place to ensure that such matters are drawn to the attention of the most senior management in a timely manner so as to ensure there is strategic planning for the prevention of other deaths. ”

    Source location

    Terrence Arthur Albert Smith · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 8 · concerns

    Open source report
  9. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Ann Swoffer · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Ann Swoffer died on 02/09/18 after an oesophageal perforation developed following dilatation during naso-jejunal tube insertion. The report identified concerns about the procedure being contrary to accepted practice, delayed recognition and treatment of the perforation, inadequate escalation to senior staff at the weekend, and inconsistent practices and protocols across hospital sites.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of junior staff to identify deterioration and escalate to senior staff

    Wider context from the report

    “2. The deceased deteriorated as a result of a late perforation over the August Bank Holiday weekend. Junior staff did not identify the problem and did not escalate this to senior staff. I was told a “work force issue” meant senior staff were not present in the hospital at the time. Patients who become ill at the weekend need to receive the same standard of care as in the week. Consideration needs to be given to how this can be addressed. ”

    Source location

    Ann Swoffer · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Increase weekend consultant availability and establish gastroenterology consultant ward rounds at Good Hope Hospital.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “At the time of Ms Swoffer’s admission, there was a consultant available on call at Good Hope Hospital and an upper gastrointestinal consultant surgeon on call and on site in Birmingham Heartlands Hospital. There was however no escalation to the consultants available over the weekend. We have worked with the clinical teams to ensure there is appropriate communication with senior medical staff regarding emergent complications regardless of time of day, or day of week. We have further increased routine on site attendance by a range of consultant staff over the weekend, to facilitate access to consultant opinions and help clarify lines of communication outside the times they are present. For example, at Good Hope Hospital there were no planned gastroenterology consultant ward rounds over the weekend at the time of the deceased’s admission.”

    Source location

    2019-0026-Response-by-University-Hospitals-Birmingham-NHS-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 23 May 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Improve communication with senior medical staff so emergent complications are escalated regardless of time or day.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “At the time of Ms Swoffer’s admission, there was a consultant available on call at Good Hope Hospital and an upper gastrointestinal consultant surgeon on call and on site in Birmingham Heartlands Hospital. There was however no escalation to the consultants available over the weekend. We have worked with the clinical teams to ensure there is appropriate communication with senior medical staff regarding emergent complications regardless of time of day, or day of week. We have further increased routine on site attendance by a range of consultant staff over the weekend, to facilitate access to consultant opinions and help clarify lines of communication outside the times they are present. For example, at Good Hope Hospital there were no planned gastroenterology consultant ward rounds over the weekend at the time of the deceased’s admission.”

    Source location

    2019-0026-Response-by-University-Hospitals-Birmingham-NHS-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 23 May 2019

    Open published response
  10. Manchester North

    AI-generated summary

    Mr Gregory Rekowski · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr Gregory Rekowski was detained under the Mental Health Act after being found trying to tie a ligature, discharged from hospital, and later posted “last goodbyes” on social media. He was found hanging at his home on 29 October 2017. The report identified concerns about delays, communication breakdowns, unclear responsibilities and procedures among Pennine Care NHS Trust, Greater Manchester Police and North West Ambulance Service, including the lack of a face-to-face assessment.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to escalate welfare incidents to the on-call senior manager

    Wider context from the report

    “No-one considered, at any stage the escalation of this incident to the on-call Senior manager when they were having difficulties contacting the emergency services or when GMP had provided the advice to contact NWAS. ”

    Source location

    Mr Gregory Rekowski · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop a pan-Greater Manchester response protocol defining roles, responsibilities, shared risk assessment, communication and escalation arrangements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have now drawn together a pan-GM protocol for response, developed specifically in order to achieve a common understanding of roles and responsibilities; to ensure a shared view of risk; and to promote communication and escalation at the first point that a common understanding may falter.”

    Source location

    2018-0411-Response-by-GMCA
    Page 3 · response
    Published 28 December 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Establish the Greater Manchester Responding to Crisis Board to oversee cascading, embedding and delivery of the response protocols.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Clearly, it is one thing to develop protocols, and quite another to embed them across the workforce. For this reason, we will now seek to embed these protocols within their respective agencies. I will ask them to agree to do so at a coming meeting of a new GM Responding to Crisis Board – a meeting I have convened in part in response to a common desire all partners have to enhance our broader offer around members of the community confronted with such risk. This Board will hold responsibility as part of its work programme for ensuring that these protocols are cascaded, rooted, and delivered upon.”

    Source location

    2018-0411-Response-by-GMCA
    Page 3 · response
    Published 28 December 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Embed the response protocols within partner agencies and cascade them across their workforces through the Responding to Crisis Board.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Clearly, it is one thing to develop protocols, and quite another to embed them across the workforce. For this reason, we will now seek to embed these protocols within their respective agencies. I will ask them to agree to do so at a coming meeting of a new GM Responding to Crisis Board – a meeting I have convened in part in response to a common desire all partners have to enhance our broader offer around members of the community confronted with such risk. This Board will hold responsibility as part of its work programme for ensuring that these protocols are cascaded, rooted, and delivered upon.”

    Source location

    2018-0411-Response-by-GMCA
    Page 3 · response
    Published 28 December 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Issue a memo to all staff increasing awareness of the requirement to seek support from on-call managers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “PCFT have issued the memo (attached) to all staff to ensure that there is greater awareness of the requirement to seek support from the On-Call managers.”

    Source location

    2018-0411-Response-by-Pennine-Care-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 December 2018

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026