Recurring concern

Unreliable police pursuit management and authorisation

First to latest report 13 Jul 2015 — 24 Oct 2025

Reports that mention this concern
7
Times this concern has been raised
10
Stated actions linked to this concern
9

What this concern includes

Includes failures in the dedicated police pursuit management process, including pursuit recognition and classification, continuation authorisation, control-room decision-making and timing expectations, policy and training alignment, operational guidance, risk assessment and dissemination of pursuit-safety learning.

What is not included
  • Excludes ordinary police driving, vehicle-control or road-safety failures that are not part of managing or authorising a police pursuit.
  • Excludes generic police training, communication or control-room deficiencies unless they directly impair the police pursuit management process.
  • Excludes emergency response or investigation failures after a pursuit has ended when pursuit management itself is not deficient.
  • Excludes unrelated police powers and authorisation processes, including communications-data authorisation, unless the assertion explicitly concerns police pursuit management.

Reports and published responses 7 reports

See individual reports that have raised this concern, and the actions taken in response

  1. Swansea and Neath Port Talbot

    AI-generated summary

    Alexander Rhys Lewis · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Alexander Rhys Lewis, a motorcyclist, died from chest injuries following a road traffic collision while being pursued by police. The report raises concerns that a pursuing officer had to undertake multiple tasks alone, limiting communication of dynamic risk assessments and causing vital information about risks, including a red-light contravention, to be missed. Evidence also indicated that double-manning the pursuit crew would be safer, although this would reduce the number of available trained units.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Single-manning of pursuit crews requiring one officer to undertake all pursuit tasks

    Wider context from the report

    “During the course of the inquest evidence was heard regarding the circumstances that the pursuit occurred and the events that unfolded. One such instance was that the pursuing police officer did not observe Alex contravening a red light due to having to control his vehicle as well as negotiating the other traffic and he would have had to be looking around to do this, whereas the dashcam fitted to the car that picked up the contravention of the red light continued to point straight ahead. The impact of this was that had he seen it, it may have raised the dynamic risk assessment to high and may have caused him to stand the pursuit down. The pursuing driver also stated that given the driving responsibilities there was no opportunity to communicate a dynamic risk assessment to the control centre, although he would have been undertaking a dynamic risk assessment throughout. The evidence of the officer in charge of driver training confirmed the evidence of the pursuing officer in that the pursuing officer would have to do a number of things including declaring a pursuit and negotiating the traffic. In his words “...there would be a lot going on in the car...”. He stated that the pursuing officer would be on their own in the car and as such have to undertake all the tasks involved in a pursuit themselves, and acknowledged that it would be safer for the crew to be double manned so the tasks can be shared, although you are then halving the number of TPAC trained units available to assist. I am concerned that in pursuit situations, pursuit officers are required to undertake a significant number of tasks on their own, and the decisions they take as a result of undertaking those tasks can have an impact on their safety, the subject vehicle’s safety as well as the safety of other road users and the general public. 1. There was no opportunity for the pursuing driver to communicate a dynamic risk assessment to the control centre, to assist the control centre in making a decision to authorise or stand down the pursuit. the control centre indicated that such information would go towards authorising the pursuit as opposed to standing it down in the present case 2. The number of tasks having to be undertaken by the pursuing driver meant that vital information as to the risks involved in continuing the pursuit were missed, in the present case that being a contravention of a red light 3. The officer in charge of driver training confirmed that from a safety perspective, it would be safer to have the crew in a pursuit situation “double manned”. ”

    Source location

    Alexander Rhys Lewis · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

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    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Default double-crewing for pursuits cannot be adopted because available resources would reduce specialist roads-policing coverage across the wider network.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Resourcing and Operational Realities Adopting a default position of double-crewing vehicles for pursuits would significantly reduce South Wales Police’s ability to maintain specialist roads policing coverage across the wider network. Our challenge is to fully address the concerns raised in the Reg 28 notice while safeguarding our statutory duty to serve the broader South Wales community and manage wider risk. When setting crewing models, we must strike a balance between operational effectiveness and resource availability. To sustain a strong capability for pursuits and TPAC tactics across the road network, single crewing remains the most practical option given the number of vehicles and trained officers required. This approach enables us to respond effectively to both planned and spontaneous incidents while maintaining public safety and operational resilience.”

    Source location

    Response from South Wales Police
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 October 2025

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    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Single-crewed pursuit training and national standards are considered sufficient to prepare officers for live operations and dynamic risk decisions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Training and Operational Practice Police pursuit training, as delivered under the College of Policing’s Police Driving National Policing Curriculum (PDNCP) to all national forces, reflects real-world operational conditions. During both Initial Phase Pursuit (IPP) and Tactical Phase Pursuit (TPP) training, officers operate single-crewed, even when accompanied by an instructor, so that they replicate day-to-day working practices. This approach ensures officers are fully prepared for the responsibilities they will assume in live operations. While single-crewed, officers are trained to:”

    Source location

    Response from South Wales Police
    Page 1 · response
    Published 28 October 2025

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    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Chief Constables are responsible for operational crewing decisions and deployment of available police resources, based on local problems and demands.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Crewing Decisions on crewing are operational matters and at the discretion and judgement of Chief Constables who determine how to deploy available resources to deal with issues for which the force is responsible, considering specific local problems and demands.”

    Source location

    Response from Minister of State for Policing and Crime
    Page 3 · response
    Published 28 October 2025

    Open published response

  2. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Muhammad QASIM · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Muhammad QASIM died on 2 October 2023 after a high-speed BMW collision in which the vehicle left the road and struck two trees; he suffered unsurvivable traumatic head injuries. The report raises concerns about differing interpretations and training regarding spontaneous police pursuits, and about investigative responsibilities and the absence of a full forensic collision investigation report in fatal incidents involving a conduct investigation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inconsistent training of standard police drivers on spontaneous pursuits

    Wider context from the report

    “1. For the college of policing: The inquest heard evidence from 2 specialist police driving instructors in different police forces. Both had a different interpretation of when a spontaneous pursuit could occur as set out in the APP guidance. One force did not train officers who were standard drivers in relation to spontaneous pursuits as these were thought to be a type of pursuit and dependent on first satisfying the main definition of a pursuit under the APP guidance. The other force considered spontaneous pursuit to be a stand alone type of pursuit and trained standard driving officers in relation to it. The confusion around what amounts to a spontaneous pursuit and when one can occur, and the difference in training of police standard drivers, creates a risk of future deaths and action should be taken. ”

    Source location

    Muhammad QASIM · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review current police pursuit training requirements, including national standards and authorised training arrangements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have reviewed the current training requirements for police pursuits:”

    Source location

    Response from the College of Policing
    Page 1 · response
    Published 5 September 2025

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    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue working with NPCC leads and police forces to align national guidance and training with best practice and safe operational decision-making.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We are committed to ensuring that the learning from this case leads to meaningful and lasting improvements in policing practice and will continue to work closely with NPCC leads and police forces to ensure that national guidance and training reflect best practice and support safe operational decision-making. We aim to publish the revised guidance by December 2025, subject to consultation and governance processes. The College will continue to monitor and address any inconsistencies in training delivery through its QA frameworks and feedback mechanisms. We will also ensure that learning from this case is disseminated nationally through our operational learning channels, including bulletins and updates to training materials.”

    Source location

    Response from the College of Policing
    Page 2 · response
    Published 5 September 2025

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    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue monitoring and addressing inconsistencies in police pursuit training delivery through quality-assurance frameworks and feedback mechanisms.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We are committed to ensuring that the learning from this case leads to meaningful and lasting improvements in policing practice and will continue to work closely with NPCC leads and police forces to ensure that national guidance and training reflect best practice and support safe operational decision-making. We aim to publish the revised guidance by December 2025, subject to consultation and governance processes. The College will continue to monitor and address any inconsistencies in training delivery through its QA frameworks and feedback mechanisms. We will also ensure that learning from this case is disseminated nationally through our operational learning channels, including bulletins and updates to training materials.”

    Source location

    Response from the College of Policing
    Page 2 · response
    Published 5 September 2025

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    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Disseminate learning from the case nationally through operational learning channels, bulletins, and training-material updates.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We are committed to ensuring that the learning from this case leads to meaningful and lasting improvements in policing practice and will continue to work closely with NPCC leads and police forces to ensure that national guidance and training reflect best practice and support safe operational decision-making. We aim to publish the revised guidance by December 2025, subject to consultation and governance processes. The College will continue to monitor and address any inconsistencies in training delivery through its QA frameworks and feedback mechanisms. We will also ensure that learning from this case is disseminated nationally through our operational learning channels, including bulletins and updates to training materials.”

    Source location

    Response from the College of Policing
    Page 2 · response
    Published 5 September 2025

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    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Chief Officers are responsible for arranging pursuit-driver selection, training and authorisation, and determining operational deployment in accordance with national standards.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• The Code of Practice on the Management of Police Pursuits (Home Office, 2011) states that Chief Officers should arrange the selection, training, and authorisation of officers involved in pursuits in accordance with national standards. These national standards are set out in the Police Driving National Policing Curriculum and cover the initial phase pursuit, tactical phase pursuit, and command and control. It is the responsibility of each Chief Officer to determine the operational deployment of officers trained and authorised in both the initial phase (response drivers) and tactical phase (advanced drivers).”

    Source location

    Response from the College of Policing
    Page 1 · response
    Published 5 September 2025

    Open published response

  3. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Lewis Dean JOHNSON · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Lewis Johnson, aged 18, died following a motorcycle road traffic collision at Clapton Common A107 in London on 9 February 2016, after a police pursuit. The jury concluded that the Metropolitan Police Service failed to effectively implement, disseminate and train relevant staff on relevant policies. The report also identified inconsistent expectations among police officers about how long police control authorisation decisions generally take during pursuits.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a consistent expectation among police officers about police controller decision-making times for pursuit authorisation

    Wider context from the report

    “2. Although the jury did not comment on this specifically, it seemed to me from the evidence in court that there was not a consistent expectation among police officers of how long it generally takes a police controller to make a decision on authorisation of a pursuit. Whilst I do not suggest there should be a time limit on this, it would seem helpful if the expectation of the timing of police control decision making were to be roughly aligned between those making the decisions (in the police control room) and those waiting for the decisions (in police cars involved in the pursuits). ”

    Source location

    Lewis Dean JOHNSON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

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    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    A fixed timeframe for obtaining pursuit information cannot be aligned because each pursuit presents different circumstances and requires case-by-case assessment.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We cannot align a time limit as to how quickly this information is obtained, as each pursuit is different in what the pursuing vehicle is presented with. However, with both MetCC staff and pursuing officers knowing what questions are going to be asked and in what order, it allows the answers to be promptly given and allows the SI to make decisions in a timelier manner. Although each pursuit would need to be reviewed on its own merits, on a case-by-case basis, the aim is to authorise a pursuit as soon as practicable once relevant information has been obtained.”

    Source location

    2025-0241 Response from Metropolitan Police Service (MPS)
    Page 6 · response
    Published 29 May 2025

    Open published response

  4. West Yorkshire Eastern

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    Andrew David Kitson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Andrew David Kitson was walking on the pavement of the A61 Leeds Road on 9 June 2020 when a Peugeot being pursued by police lost control, mounted the pavement and struck him. He sustained multiple injuries and was pronounced dead at the scene. The concerns related to insufficient statistical evidence for evaluating spontaneous police pursuits and the burden placed on police personnel when assessing the safety of continuing high-speed pursuits in residential areas.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Insufficiently refined parameters and guidance for spontaneous police pursuits in residential areas

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) The rules governing spontaneous police pursuits in residential areas place an onerous burden upon police standards review continuously the safety of proceeding whilst at the same time driving at high speed. The pursuit manager who authorises the continuance of a pursuit is dependant upon fragments of verbal messages relayed over the radio, due to the perceived need to leave airtime for other TPAC units to input information. The Inquest heard evidence to the effect that real time camera pictures from the police vehicle are not always available due to IT issues. This means the pursuit manager must largely trust the judgement of the police driver. In order to lessen the burden upon the police driver in having to weigh numerous factors in a continuing, complex judgement, consideration should be given to a refinement of the parameters in which pursuits in residential areas are permitted. Such guidance to pursuit managers (informed by data regarding the effectiveness and risks arising in previous pursuits) would help to promote consistency and lessen the dependence upon a case-by-case judgement made in a pressured timescale. ”

    Source location

    Andrew David Kitson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Re-evaluate local pursuit arrangements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Following receipt of the Regulation 28 report, we undertook to re-evaluate our local arrangements at West Yorkshire Police and also to liaise with the NPCC National leads for Pursuit and Driving Standards to assess our compliance with National Standards.”

    Source location

    Response from West Yorkshire Police
    Page 1 · response
    Published 8 March 2022

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    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Liaise with national pursuit and driving standards leads to assess compliance with national standards.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Following receipt of the Regulation 28 report, we undertook to re-evaluate our local arrangements at West Yorkshire Police and also to liaise with the NPCC National leads for Pursuit and Driving Standards to assess our compliance with National Standards.”

    Source location

    Response from West Yorkshire Police
    Page 1 · response
    Published 8 March 2022

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    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing dynamic risk assessment, trained decision-makers and ground commander primacy are retained rather than imposing more limited pursuit parameters.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is an operational reality that every pursuit has different and distinct dynamics which relate to: environmental factors; suspect identity, capability and intent; suspect vehicle capability; police officer capability; police vehicle capability; offence severity; and the ongoing risk assessment. Taking these into account, and in order to provide the best possible decision-making capability, West Yorkshire Police’s Driver Training utilises Authorised Professional (National) Practice, in conjunction with robust training around the use of the National Decision Model, which outlines the relevant roles and responsibilities as below.”

    Source location

    Response from West Yorkshire Police
    Page 3 · response
    Published 8 March 2022

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Redefining pursuit parameters using statistical data requires national-level discussion to ensure consistency across police forces.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In order to lessen the burden upon the police driver in having to weigh numerous factors in continuing, complex judgement, consideration should be given to a refinement of the parameters in which pursuits in residential areas are permitted. Such guidance to pursuit managers (informed by data regarding the effectiveness and risks arising in previous disputes) would help to promote consistency and lessen dependence upon a case-by-case judgement made in a pressured timescale”

    Source location

    Response from West Yorkshire Police
    Page 3 · response
    Published 8 March 2022

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    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Operational policing, including spontaneous pursuits, is assigned to the Chief Constable, while the Mayor’s role is limited to accountability without fettering operational independence.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The use of spontaneous police pursuits is a matter of operational policing concerning the deployment of police officers which falls under the direction and control of the Chief Constable. As the Mayor of West Yorkshire with Police and Crime Commissioner responsibilities, my statutory role is to hold the Chief Constable of West Yorkshire to account for the performance of his functions without compromising or fettering his operational independence (s.1 Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 and Policing Protocol Order 2011).”

    Source location

    Response from Mayor of West Yorkshire
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 March 2022

    Open published response

  5. London Inner (North)

    AI-generated summary

    Henry David Hicks · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Henry David Hicks died after losing control of a moped during a road traffic collision on Wheelwright Street in Islington on 19 December 2014. Two unmarked police cars had been following the moped, and the jury determined that Henry was aware of the police and that this was a police pursuit. The principal concern was that, by implication, the Metropolitan Police Service standard operating procedure for pursuits was not complied with.

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    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to seek authorisation to continue a police pursuit

    Wider context from the report

    “The driver and operator of police car 1 and the driver and operator of police car 2 (Officers A, B, C & D) all gave evidence in court that they were never in a position to signal to the rider of the moped to pull over, though this was what they wanted to happen. All four gave evidence that they believed at the time of the collision, and that they still believed at the time of the inquest, that the rider was unaware of police behind him wanting him to stop. For these reasons the officers said, they did not consider themselves to be in pursuit and therefore did not seek authorisation to continue. The jury made a determination that Henry Hicks was aware of the police behind him and that this was a police pursuit within the definition of the Metropolitan Police Service standard operating procedure. The jury also made a determination that Henry’s attempt to avoid the police was a contributory factor in the collision. Whilst I appreciate that we do not know whether, if the police officers had sought authorisation, this would have been granted, and so whether, if they had treated this as a pursuit, the outcome would have been different, it seems to me that this is a matter I must bring to your attention. All four officers gave a proper understanding of the MPS relevant standard operating procedure. However, by implication, the jury did not accept that this SOP was complied with on 19 December 2014. ”

    Source location

    Henry David Hicks · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

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    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to identify a police pursuit in accordance with the standard operating procedure

    Wider context from the report

    “The driver and operator of police car 1 and the driver and operator of police car 2 (Officers A, B, C & D) all gave evidence in court that they were never in a position to signal to the rider of the moped to pull over, though this was what they wanted to happen. All four gave evidence that they believed at the time of the collision, and that they still believed at the time of the inquest, that the rider was unaware of police behind him wanting him to stop. For these reasons the officers said, they did not consider themselves to be in pursuit and therefore did not seek authorisation to continue. The jury made a determination that Henry Hicks was aware of the police behind him and that this was a police pursuit within the definition of the Metropolitan Police Service standard operating procedure. The jury also made a determination that Henry’s attempt to avoid the police was a contributory factor in the collision. Whilst I appreciate that we do not know whether, if the police officers had sought authorisation, this would have been granted, and so whether, if they had treated this as a pursuit, the outcome would have been different, it seems to me that this is a matter I must bring to your attention. All four officers gave a proper understanding of the MPS relevant standard operating procedure. However, by implication, the jury did not accept that this SOP was complied with on 19 December 2014. ”

    Source location

    Henry David Hicks · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review pursuit guidance following the inquest and retain the existing policy unchanged.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    ““I can say we remain confident in our policy, training and tactics, which are kept under constant review and revision. We reviewed our guidance as a matter of course... following the findings of the recent inquest touching the death of Henry Hicks, the result of which was that the existing policy remains unchanged...If any officer is unsure of the pursuit policy, they should consult their local Safer Driver Manager.””

    Source location

    2016-0244-Response-by-Metropolitan-Police
    Page 3 · response
    Published 4 July 2016

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    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review found no systemic issues or specific lessons requiring changes to existing pursuit policy, training or management.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Our experts were of like mind, finding nothing, following review, in our wider practices and protocols which were called into question by the particular facts of the current case.”

    Source location

    2016-0244-Response-by-Metropolitan-Police
    Page 2 · response
    Published 4 July 2016

    Open published response

  6. Shropshire, Telford and Wrekin

    AI-generated summary

    Stefen Neil BOSWELL · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Following a car-key burglary in Craven Arms on 6 June 2014, Stefen Neil Boswell was involved in a police pursuit and died after the vehicle lost control at Emstrey Island. The jury concluded that he died from multiple injuries due to a road traffic collision. Concerns included differences between local and national police-pursuit policies, communication about travelling on the wrong side of a dual carriageway, and the absence of dash-camera recording from the pursuing police vehicle.

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    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure explicit communication of wrong-way dual-carriageway travel during police pursuits

    Wider context from the report

    “7) At the time of the pursuit the pursuing police driver believed that the supervising inspector would have known that he was travelling on the wrong side of the dual carriageway. The supervising inspector, who was not based in the immediate area, did not know and when she did the pursuit was abandoned. Local knowledge cannot be guaranteed in a regional police force and systems should be in place that if such a situation were to reoccur, the police driver should expressly state, and the supervising inspector expressly request, if the police vehicle is travelling on the wrong side of a dual carriageway. ”

    Source location

    Stefen Neil BOSWELL · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

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    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to align local police pursuit policy and training with national guidance

    Wider context from the report

    “1) The West Mercia Police policy states that ‘at no time must police patrols pursue the wrong way along dual carriageways/motorways’. 2) This policy appears at variance with national policy. A report from the Association of Chief Police Officers, Police Pursuits Review Group, dated 3rd November 2014 (the ACPO report) states, in part: • ‘we draw reference to the views of the national ACPO portfolio on pursuits, which consider that in exceptional circumstances such decision making may be justifiable’. • ‘entering a dual carriageway contrary to the normal directional flow is extremely high risk and potentially very dangerous for reasons which are obvious. Such decision making is one for the officer himself to justify ... It is the view of the ACPO pursuits group that such decisions should only be made in rare and exceptional circumstances’. • ‘travelling the wrong way down a dual carriageway is not something we would endorse as suitable unless exceptional circumstances prevail and it is necessary and proportionate to attempt this tactic based upon the high degree of threat, risk and harm required to justify this decision’. 3) The evidence of the police driver training instructor, since retired, was that he had trained the police driver concerned in accordance with national guidance, in so far as the police driver, as accepted by the jury, followed the stolen car on the wrong side of the dual carriageway and justified his decision to do so. 4) Without challenging the evidence given by the driver training instructor West Mercia Police state that the training, as given, differed from and was not their policy. 5) On the face of it therefore is a difference between local and national policies, resulting in the possibility that a police officer, in one area, may pursue a vehicle on the wrong side of a dual carriageway, when another officer in the same set of circumstances, in another area, may not. 6) The ACPO report stated that the national Authorised Professional Practice (APP) document covering police pursuits should be the guide and accepted policy for pursuit management, thereby ensuring consistency and standards are applied. ”

    Source location

    Stefen Neil BOSWELL · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Emphasise timely risk updates, train pursuit commanders to call off inadequately informed pursuits, and require OCC inspectors to prompt and challenge risk assessments.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In order to provide effective command across the Alliance, we have now moved to a model of one Operational Control Centre (OCC) Inspector across the two forces. It is, therefore,”

    Source location

    Response from West Mercia Police
    Page 1 · response
    Published 8 January 2016

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Align pursuit policies, driver-training materials and learning outcomes with College of Policing Authorised Professional Practice.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In the intervening time since the collision, West Mercia Police and Warwickshire Police have gone through a period of harmonising policies and procedures. During this time we have taken the opportunity to align these with the Authorised Professional Practice (APP) as set out by the College of Policing. As an Alliance we follow APP and conduct pursuit training to this standard. There no longer exists an Alliance or force policy in relation to pursuits, accepting APP as best practice. All driver trainers train to APP and all lesson plans and learning outcomes refer to it. We have consulted with the National Police Chiefs’ Council lead on Pursuits, DCC Anthony Bangham, and he is also reassured that the Warwickshire and West Mercia position does not differ from the APP.”

    Source location

    Response from West Mercia Police
    Page 1 · response
    Published 8 January 2016

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    No separate Alliance or force pursuit policy is maintained because the forces follow College of Policing Authorised Professional Practice.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Training and Policies - Police Pursuits”

    Source location

    Response from West Mercia Police
    Page 1 · response
    Published 8 January 2016

    Open published response

  7. Inner South London

    AI-generated summary

    Viktoria Was · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Viktoria Was died on 6 January 2013, aged 13, after being injured in a road traffic collision while travelling as a rear-seat passenger in a Volkswagen Polo. The concerns included insufficient regard for injured third parties at the scene, inadequate evidence that lessons had been learned from police pursuits, and insufficient refresher training for police officers.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Insufficient learning from police pursuit deaths

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) Evidence was placed before me from other unrelated deaths in police pursuits. There was an insufficiency of material to satisfactorily conclude that lessons had been learnt about police pursuits. ”

    Source location

    Viktoria Was · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to disseminate police pursuit lessons about impacts on third parties to officers promptly

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) Police Officers were not required to attend for sufficient ‘refresher’ training; either at all, at satisfactory intervals, or of a sufficiently rigorous nature. This revealed a gap in continued learning and skills updates. In this regard, I would be concerned to learn if lessons to be learnt from this investigation about the potential impact of police pursuits on third parties were not disseminated to officers as soon as reasonably possible. ”

    Source location

    Viktoria Was · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    There is solid quantitative and qualitative evidence that lessons from Safer Driving 3 improved management of vehicle pursuits.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “However, according to ████████ Crime Intelligence Analyst with the Directorate of Professional Standards Specialist Investigations Unit, the quantitative evidence that is available, albeit on a very small numerical base, does indeed show a welcome downward trend:”

    Source location

    2015-0271-Response-by-Metropolitan-Police
    Page 14 · response
    Published 13 July 2015

    Open published response

Actions and positions describe what organisations say in published responses. Implementation is not independently verified.

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Data last updated 7 September 2026