Recurring concern

Failure to reliably document the rationale for consequential decisions

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First reported 21 Aug 2013•Latest report 27 May 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures to record the rationale, evidence considered, decision basis or responsible decision-maker for consequential clinical, care, custodial or operational safety decisions where the record is needed for safe review, communication, accountability or continuity.

Not included

  • Excludes ordinary record-keeping omissions that do not concern the rationale or evidential basis of a consequential safety decision.
  • Excludes poor decisions where the rationale was adequately documented and the deficiency lies only in the decision’s substance or later implementation.
  • Excludes generic clinical communication, handover or documentation failures unrelated to recording the basis of a consequential decision.
  • Excludes routine administrative decisions with no identified patient, public or operational safety significance.
Reports
54

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
55

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
73

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care5
Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust4
College of Policing3
Greater Manchester Police3
Home Office3
Tameside and Glossop Integrated Care NHS Foundation Trust3
Cornwall Partnership NHS Foundation Trust2
HM Prison and Probation Service2
Metropolitan Police Service2
North East London NHS Foundation Trust2
Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust2
Barts Health NHS Trust1
British Vehicle Rental and Leasing Association1
Care UK1
Chippenham Community Hospital1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Dane Lee Pearson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Dane Lee Pearson, who had a history of mental health problems and amphetamine use, was found suspended from a ligature at his home on 13 December 2017. The investigation concluded that the death was suicide, with the medical cause recorded as hanging. Concerns included failures in the issuing and documentation of a Child Abduction Warning Notice, failure to assess or account for his vulnerability, inadequate recording of vulnerability markers, and failure to communicate that criminal proceedings had been discontinued.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of documentation explaining the rationale for CAWN issuance

    Wider context from the report

    “1. In this case, the CAWN had been issued on limited evidence particularly regarding identification. In addition, it had been issued many months after the allegation and after the authorisation. The inquest was told that the process had not been followed relating to timelines. There was no documentation in existence explaining the rationale for the issuing of the CAWN. ”

    Source location

    Dane Lee Pearson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require pre-service vulnerability risk assessments, documenting the rationale and potential impact on the suspect in Child Abduction Warning Notice records.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2) Carry out a risk assessment prior to the service of a CAWN to ensure that consideration is given to a suspect’s history, particularly relating to any intelligence about vulnerability or threats, and include the outcome of the risk assessment in the CAWN service forms.”

    Source location

    2019-0056-Responses
    Page 6 · response
    Published 6 June 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Operational and procedural concerns about police practice are for the police to address.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The matters of concern that you raised are primarily operational and procedural matters for the police who, I understand, will be responding to you separately.”

    Source location

    2019-0056-Responses
    Page 3 · response
    Published 6 June 2019

    Open published response
  2. London Inner (West)

    AI-generated summary

    Kurt Cochran and 5 others · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    On 22 March 2017, Khalid Masood drove a vehicle across Westminster Bridge, fatally injuring Kurt Cochran, Leslie Rhodes, Aysha Frade and Andreea Cristea, before fatally stabbing PC Keith Palmer at the Palace of Westminster. The report raised concerns about the protection of public entrances, officers’ access to and understanding of Post Instructions, use of the ADAM System, supervision and training, and wider protective security measures.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to record reasons for closing a Subject of Interest

    Wider context from the report

    “MC16: I suggest that the Security Service considers whether it would be practicable and beneficial to introduce a procedure whereby any decision to close a person as a Subject of Interest is recorded with brief reasons. ”

    Source location

    Kurt Cochran and 5 others · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 16 · concerns

    Open source report
  3. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Matthew Gerard Craven · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Matthew Gerard Craven was found dead at home on 19 April 2018 after consuming pregabalin in excess of his prescribed amount; toxicology showed a fatal dose of pregabalin. Concerns included repeated rejected referrals for psychiatric assessment, the absence of a challenge or escalation process, no agreed timescales for routine appointments, limited documentation of referral decisions, and inadequate sharing and review of mental health information.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to document the rationale for RAID decisions not to refer to a psychiatrist

    Wider context from the report

    “There had been a series of attendances at the emergency department and RAID referrals. The inquest heard that there was no documentation or rationale provided for why RAID did not refer him to a psychiatrist. ”

    Source location

    Matthew Gerard Craven · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  4. London Inner South

    AI-generated summary

    Name not published · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    The deceased died at St Thomas’s Hospital on 22 November 2017 from brain damage sustained after he hanged himself at home on 20 November 2017. Concerns included changes and prescribing of psychiatric and sedative medication, inadequate clinical records and review of past records, failure to make an urgent psychiatric referral, and uncertainty about the medication found after his death and what he had taken.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to record clinical presentations, diagnoses, medication-change rationale and attendances

    Wider context from the report

    “3. On 5 October 2017 the deceased saw Dr A again. The Zolpidem was swapped to Nitrazepam, a more potent sedative, as the deceased had said that after 2 weeks he had not found the Zolpidem to be effective. Expert evidence adduced at the inquest from ████████ was to the effect that the deceased’s presentation at this point should have triggered a further inquiry into his psychiatric history. ████████ said that he would have contacted the deceased’s home GP. 4. On 19 October 2017 the deceased saw Dr A again. He said he was feeling better on the Duloxetine but was still stressed and anxious and got a few anxiety attacks. Dr A prescribed him Propranolol, Nitrazepam and Xanax. Dr A also prescribed the deceased 6 months’ worth of Duloxetine. ████████ evidence was that it was “most unusual” to prescribe such a large amount of medication (6 months’ worth of Duloxetine) during the initial period where a patient’s medication had been switched and where close monitoring was needed. He opined that the first 6 weeks of the ‘switch’ period were ones in which the patient might get worse before getting better, might get worse and might develop suicidal thoughts. ████████ said that such a volume of medication was not merited clinically and could create a risk of overdose. 5. On 8 and 9 November 2017 the deceased saw Dr B. She made no notes of his presentation or diagnosis on any occasion when she saw him which she accepted she should have done. She also did not note her rationale for changing his medication which again ████████ said should have happened. He also considered that Dr B should have examined the past records for the deceased which she accepted she had not done in full. 6. There are a series of further issues with the medication Dr B prescribed the deceased and her records of the same. The electronic patient notes reflect a prescription for Xanax but she said in evidence that the deceased had not in fact accepted this. She prescribed him Temazepam but this is a controlled drug in this country and cannot be prescribed in the usual way. She changed this to Nitrazepam but the dose was incorrect and this was refused by the pharmacy. The next day she prescribed him Lorazepam without him returning the Nitrazepam prescription to her. She made an error in the dose for Lorazepam and had to correct that. When he attended on 15 November 2017 asking for more medication she made no note of his attendance. 7. ████████ evidence was that the multiple changes to the medication regime made by Dr B were not medically indicated and that the deceased had needed an urgent psychiatric referral. He said this was the case by 8 November 2017. 8. Overall ████████ said his impression was that Dr B did not understand what she was prescribing. 9. I accepted ████████ opinion on the various issues set out above. 10. Large numbers of boxes of medication were found at the deceased’s flat after his death by the police and his family. There remains some uncertainty as to where he obtained all the medication from, and what exactly he had taken and when. ”

    Source location

    Name not published · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  5. South Yorkshire (Western)

    AI-generated summary

    Keith Dransfield · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Keith Dransfield died in Northern General Hospital on 30 September 2017 from cerebral hypoxia due to hanging, with psychiatric depression also recorded. The inquest identified concerns about an inappropriate observation regime, inadequate risk assessment, failure to routinely consult patient records, and insufficient staff training.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to record the rationale for changes to patient observation regimes

    Wider context from the report

    “During the inquest, evidence showed:- Mr Dransfield was on an inappropriate observation regime with no written record of why he was moved from 10 minute observations to routine observations. There was not a clear risk assessment of Mr Dransfield. Staff did not routinely consult patients records. There was a lack of appropriate training. ”

    Source location

    Keith Dransfield · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review and revise the inpatient record-keeping procedure to clarify consistent documentation standards.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• The Trust’s Standard Operating Procedure for Record Keeping has been reviewed and revised to ensure that expected standards are clear, consistent and all staff are aware & fully understand requirements.”

    Source location

    2018-0273-Response-by-Sheffield-Health-and-Social-Care-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 30 October 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Pilot handheld tablets on Maple Ward to improve timely clinical-record entry and identify observation-level changes and authorisation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Maple Ward is piloting various clinical improvements, including the use of hand held tablets to improve timeliness and ease of recording clinical information and to move away from paper systems. The system will enable the Trust to extract information about changes to observation levels and more clearly identify who made or authorised the change. ‘Insight’, the Trust’s electronic care record system is not able to provide this information which would have assisted the Coroner’s enquiries had this been available at the inquest.”

    Source location

    2018-0273-Response-by-Sheffield-Health-and-Social-Care-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 30 October 2018

    Open published response
  6. Blackpool and the Fylde

    AI-generated summary

    Adam James Carter · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Adam James Carter died on 10 September 2017 after absconding from The Harbour mental health facility during escorted leave and falling from the fifth floor of a car park. The principal concern was inadequate record keeping about Adam’s risks, leave arrangements, leave authorisation and assessment before leave, which could affect staff decisions about patient safety.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Insufficient recording and care planning of patient leave, including its rationale, benefits and risks

    Wider context from the report

    “The concern relates to record keeping. During his independent review of this matter, a Consultant Psychiatrist identified some discrepancies within the medical records including the following: • Although he felt that the therapeutic team had an understanding of the extent to which Adam posed a risk of: - aggression and violence; - self harm; - suicidal behaviour; - absconding; He did not feel that these risks were documented or clearly formulated in the medical notes. • He stated that there was very little detail in the documentation as regards Adam’s use of leave nor of care planning of his leave. The rationale for leave having been granted was not recorded nor were the benefits and risks associated with leave. • He was unable to find a record of an assessment of Adam’s clinical state by nursing staff immediately before the period of escorted ground leave on 10th September 2017 as required by trust policy (although he did not feel that this would have any bearing on the decision to afford Adam leave on this occasion). • He could not find a copy of the Leave Authorisation that granted Adam leave and felt that documentation of leave fell short of the guidance laid out in the Trust policy for the authorisation of section 17 leave of absence. Clearly the quality of record keeping is important in the context of a detained mental health patient. Adam had spent some time in a Psychiatric Intensive Care Unit and then a number of days on an acute inpatient ward prior to the events of 10th September 2017. The level of risk such a patient poses as regards issues such as the risk of self harm and absconding are fundamental to the care provided. Plans were being made for Adam to be discharged and into the community rather than back to his parents’ home and he was being afforded the opportunity to build towards that discharge by granting him leave which was an important step in progressing towards that goal. However, such decisions need to be made appropriately and informed by how the risk a patient poses is viewed at that time. It is vital that the basis for such decisions is clear from the records. If this does not happen then I have a concern that future deaths may result – inevitably patients such as Adam are cared for by a team consisting of different staff performing different shifts. Staff taking over the care of a patient such as Adam ought not to have to rely on the verbal information provided to them and handover of that patient’s care but need to have the opportunity to read the records and to remind themselves how the risk their patient poses is viewed by for example the relevant Consultant Psychiatrist, and why he or she has been granted leave. The court heard that escorted grounds leave was granted to Adam but that nursing staff had discretion as regards whether that leave went ahead and they may exercise such discretion subject to how Adam presented, his behaviour on the ward etc. If they cannot access accurate and informative records, such staff may make decisions that are not in the interests of their patients. Leave may proceed on a basis not felt to be safe. Leave may be declined because the staff member – unable to access the relevant information – decides to err on the side of caution and declines leave to the detriment of that patient’s progress and the condition of his / her mental health. It seems to me that if an independent consultant psychiatrist has conducted a review and identified these issues in relation to records it should inevitably prompt a concern on my part that unless I write a report such as this one future deaths may result. I therefore raise the concern. I cannot be prescriptive about what action should be taken and I make no recommendations but simply raise the issue. At the conclusion of the inquest, I indicated to the Properly Interested Persons that I proposed to write to the Department of Health by way of a report in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 7 of Schedule 5 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. ”

    Source location

    Adam James Carter · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Consider amending the Leave Policy to include additional requirements for care planning regular patient leave.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Leave that is given regularly to a patient is already discussed and agreed in the context of the Multi Disciplinary Team, and should be documented in the clinical record, however some points around how this is care planned are not currently included in our Leave Policy and so the Mental Health Law Manager will consider a minor amendment to the policy by 28 September 2018.”

    Source location

    2018-0226-Response-by-Lancashire-Care-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 September 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Pilot leave diaries in secure services to assess whether they improve the quality of post-leave documentation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “How leave went for the patient should already be documented and discussed in the wider MDT forum; in addition a pilot of “leave diaries” is currently taking place in our secure services, if it is found to increase the quality of post leave documentation this will later be rolled out to all wards.”

    Source location

    2018-0226-Response-by-Lancashire-Care-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 September 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Write to consultants and ward managers reiterating the need to document the rationale, risks and benefits for each patient accessing leave.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Clinical Director will write to consultants and ward managers about these actions by 14 September 2018 and reiterate the importance of documenting the rationale, risks and benefits for each individual accessing leave.”

    Source location

    2018-0226-Response-by-Lancashire-Care-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 September 2018

    Open published response
  7. Surrey

    AI-generated summary

    Stephen Ian William Tidey · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Stephen Ian William Tidey was found deceased on 22 December 2016, having been found hanging from a tree outside the cabin where he was residing, with self-inflicted wounds to both wrists. The report raised concerns that a high-risk MASH referral, made after he lost his job, was not followed up and that there were no safeguards to ensure referrals were acted upon, including outside normal office hours.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to record the basis for reduced risk-of-self-harm assessments

    Wider context from the report

    “He was assessed by a member of the Criminal Liaison and Diversion Service (CLDS) on the same day and was initially assessed by them as being at risk of self-harm. The member of the CLDS subsequently telephoned the Home Treatment Team to discuss referring him to the service. Mr Tidey was then re-assessed by the same member of the CLDS who stated he appeared calmer and was no immediate risk to himself. No notes were recorded on the Police or Mental Health Service computer system to record how this assessment of reduced risk of self-harm had been reached. ”

    Source location

    Stephen Ian William Tidey · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Triage SCARF referrals by checking factual content, risks, vulnerabilities, warnings, previous referrals and escalation needs, with risk ratings adjusted and justified where necessary.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Police Officers submit a risk assessment form called a Single Combined Assessment of Risk Form (SCARF) to the Police MASH where it is triaged.”

    Source location

    2018-0140-Response-by-Surrey-Police
    Page 1 · response
    Published 1 July 2018

    Open published response
  8. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    MARK ANTHONY DOYLE · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mark Anthony Doyle was found suspended by a ligature attached to his cell window bars on 21 March 2017 and died in hospital on 28 March 2017 from injuries sustained in the suspension. The inquest identified concerns including errors in recording a significant anniversary on his ACCT, his transfer from F Wing, and a delay in responding to his cell bell. Further concerns related to ACCT review and information-sharing practices, unclear criteria and recording for transfers from F Wing, and the lack of mandatory first-aid training for existing prison officers.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of process for recording transfer decisions, reasons and decision-maker identity

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) Decisions that prisoners are fit to be transferred from F Wing are made and conveyed to prison staff by the charge nurse on duty that morning annotating by hand a list of the prisoners on the Wing. There appears to be no clear criteria for assessing when a prisoner is fit for transfer; the information that should be considered in making this determination is left to the discretion of the decision maker; and there is no process for recording the decision, the reasons for it or the identity of the decision maker in the prisoner’s records or otherwise. ”

    Source location

    MARK ANTHONY DOYLE · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use a Patient Wing Movement Assessment requiring senior clinical review, documented fitness decisions and reasons, regular review meetings, and communication of outcomes before transfers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Response: We agree the system described above requires improvement. We have therefore, with immediate effect, implemented a Patient Wing Movement Assessment. This is similar system to what we have in the in-patients unit as follows.”

    Source location

    Response from Care UK
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 February 2018

    Open published response
  9. West Sussex

    AI-generated summary

    David Edward Jackson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    David Edward Jackson, a 76-year-old man, fell at home and remained on the floor for about two weeks before he died on 17 July 2017. His death was recorded as accidental, with severe pressure sores associated with sepsis, toxaemia and rhabdomyolysis following prolonged immobility. Concerns included long-term repeat prescribing of Co-dydramol and Soneryl without regular face-to-face medical review, and unclear arrangements for prescription collection or delivery.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequate recording of medication reviews and reasons for repeat prescribing

    Wider context from the report

    “Over the next 10 years, the records note a medication review was conducted by ████████ on 21 Oct 2008 and 2 March 2010 but on the records alone. There is one entry on the patient record for ████████ on 23 November 2015 noting only ‘medication review done’. When giving evidence, ████████ indicated that when ████████ retired in 2015 she took over Mr Jackson as a patient but she had never actually seen him. Her recollection was that she had conducted annual medication reviews by considering the patient's past history but only one is noted on the record printout. GMC good practice guidance was discussed with ████████ as follows: • Good medical practice (2013) – para 16: In providing clinical care you must prescribe drugs or treatment, including repeat prescriptions, only when you have adequate knowledge of the patient's health, and are satisfied that the drugs or treatment serve the patient's needs; and, • Prescribing and Managing Medicines (2013) – paragraphs 51; 54; 55; 56; 59 o 51: Whether you prescribe with repeats or on a oneoff basis, you must make sure that suitable arrangements are in place for monitoring, follow-up and review, taking account of the patients' needs and any risks arising from the medicines. o 54: Pharmacists can help improve safety, efficacy and adherence in medicines use, for example by advising patients about their medicines and carrying out medicines reviews. This does not relieve you of your duty to ensure that your prescribing and medicines management is appropriate… o 55: You are responsible for any prescription you sign, including repeat prescriptions for medicines initiated by colleagues, so you must make sure that any repeat prescription you sign is safe and appropriate. You should consider the benefits of prescribing with repeats to reduce the need for repeat prescribing. o 56: As with any prescription, you should agree with the patient what medicines are appropriate and how their condition will be managed, including a date for review. You should make clear why regular reviews are important and explain to the patient what they should do if they: a) suffer side effects or adverse reactions, or b) stop taking the medicines before the agreed review date (or a set number of repeats have been issued), You must make clear records of these discussions and your reasons for repeat prescribing. o 59: When you issue repeat prescriptions or prescribe with repeats, you should make sure that procedures are in place to monitor whether the medicine is still safe and necessary for the patient. You should keep a record of dispensers who hold original repeat dispensing prescriptions so that you can contact them if necessary. 1. When asked about current practice in relation to issuing prescriptions for drugs such as Soneryl or Co-dydramol ████████ acknowledged national guidance had tightened up particularly in respect of issuing prescriptions to patients for opiate based drugs. She accepted that medical thinking had moved on considerably. She was candid and accepted that in respect of Mr Jackson he had not been seen for 10 years and must have fallen through the cracks in terms of medication reviews including a period when the surgery had a shortage of doctors. This suggests a need to review: a. how and when medication reviews are carried out in the Fitzalan Medical Group; b. a potential training need for group doctors in GMC good practice; or, c. the development of a local CCG/Group policy. ”

    Source location

    David Edward Jackson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  10. Swansea and Neath Port Talbot

    AI-generated summary

    Christopher John Llewellyn Roberts · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Christopher John Llewellyn Roberts was pronounced dead at his home on 19 October 2015 after an overdose involving prescribed opiate medication. He was receiving treatment for mental illness, and his medication use was described as chaotic. The report raised concerns that a care plan review was not recorded, including whether a recent overdose attempt had been considered, and that nomad trays may be unsuitable for some patients.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to document consideration of recent suicide attempts during care plan review

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The care plan review was not recorded which would not allow another person reviewing the file to ascertain that a care plan review had taken place and what the outcome of that review was. It was also the case that a lack of documentation would not demonstrate whether CMHT had considered the matter of the attempt on his own life by the deceased in the weeks leading up to that review, when considering whether to amend or retain the care plan in place at the time. ”

    Source location

    Christopher John Llewellyn Roberts · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
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Data last updated 7 September 2026