Recurring concern

Failure to reliably document the rationale for consequential decisions

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First reported 21 Aug 2013•Latest report 27 May 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures to record the rationale, evidence considered, decision basis or responsible decision-maker for consequential clinical, care, custodial or operational safety decisions where the record is needed for safe review, communication, accountability or continuity.

Not included

  • Excludes ordinary record-keeping omissions that do not concern the rationale or evidential basis of a consequential safety decision.
  • Excludes poor decisions where the rationale was adequately documented and the deficiency lies only in the decision’s substance or later implementation.
  • Excludes generic clinical communication, handover or documentation failures unrelated to recording the basis of a consequential decision.
  • Excludes routine administrative decisions with no identified patient, public or operational safety significance.
Reports
54

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
55

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
73

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care5
Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust4
College of Policing3
Greater Manchester Police3
Home Office3
Tameside and Glossop Integrated Care NHS Foundation Trust3
Cornwall Partnership NHS Foundation Trust2
HM Prison and Probation Service2
Metropolitan Police Service2
North East London NHS Foundation Trust2
Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust2
Barts Health NHS Trust1
British Vehicle Rental and Leasing Association1
Care UK1
Chippenham Community Hospital1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Newcastle upon Tyne

    AI-generated summary

    Sheila Mary Hynes · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Sheila Mary Hynes died after an aortic and mitral valve replacement procedure in which a mechanical aortic valve was remounted in an inverted position and re-implanted. The resulting acute heart damage led to her death. Concerns included remounting the valve contrary to the manufacturer’s instructions, inadequate awareness of the associated risks, and directing a scrub nurse without relevant training or experience to remount it.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to discuss and record the rationale for departing from the manufacturer’s instructions for use

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) During Mrs Hynes operation a direction was given to remount the Sorin Carbomedics 23mm mechanical aortic valve on its holder whilst preparations to implant the valve were undertaken. Remounting the valve on its holder is contrary to the manufacturer’s instructions for use. Concerns arising are: a) The rational for departing from the manufacturer's instructions for use was neither discussed nor recorded. b) The primary surgeon and operating team were unaware of the risks of departing from the manufacturer's instructions for use namely potential inverted remount. c) A scrub nurse with neither training nor experience was instructed to remount the valve contrary to the manufacturer's instructions for use. The rational for this direction was neither discussed nor recorded. d) The primary surgeon with overall responsibility for the procedure did not instruct remounting of the valve; There are no recorded discussions with the primary surgeon on this issue. ”

    Source location

    Sheila Mary Hynes · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  2. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    David Ian Hamilton · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    David Ian Hamilton developed insomnia in October 2016, sought help from healthcare services, and was prescribed mirtazapine. He became increasingly anxious and reported thoughts of self-harm before being found dead at home on 7 February 2017; the investigation concluded that the death was suicide. Concerns included limited information-sharing between health professionals, unclear referral and escalation processes, lack of referral to sleep clinic services, and insufficient documentation of therapy selection.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to document or record therapy selection options and rationale

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Healthy Minds had no documentation or system of recording the selection process for therapy including the options given and rationale for the choice of therapy; ”

    Source location

    David Ian Hamilton · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Initiate a case-note process recording completion of treatment-options sessions, selected treatment modalities, and allocation to the appropriate treatment pathway.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “An additional process will be initiated whereby a case note shall clearly state in the patients clinical records that the patient has completed a treatment options session and has chosen 1:1/CBT/Group Interventions (identifying the treatment selected) and has been allocated to the appropriate treatment pathway.”

    Source location

    2017-0180-Response-by-Pennine-Care-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 4 August 2017

    Open published response
  3. Wiltshire and Swindon

    AI-generated summary

    Doreen Helen MILLER · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Doreen Helen MILLER, a vulnerable and housebound adult, was discharged home after an intermediate-care placement despite concerns about unusual toileting behaviour, possible cognitive impairment, self-neglect and limited provisions. She was found severely hypothermic in her cold, dark flat the next morning and died at hospital on 13 January 2016. The principal concerns included safeguarding referrals not being properly investigated, important cognitive information not being communicated, poor record-keeping and decision-making, insufficient assessment of mental capacity, and inadequate systems for reviewing serious incidents and learning from them.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to record the rationale for crucial decisions

    Wider context from the report

    “c) (Wiltshire Council, Wiltshire Health & Care and Great Western Hospital) As a general comment, my view in relation to the quality and substance of case notes was that they were poor in quality. My investigation was hampered due to the fact that the Archiving System at Great Western Hospital for Doreen’s therapy led healthcare notes failed in that the notes or at least the scanned images were lost and were not available. Given that some notes were recorded on the Wiltshire Council Care First System and the evidence was that the Healthcare records would not have been significantly different my concerns remain. Crucial and important decisions did not contain any rationale as to why and the basis upon which that decision was being made. As indicated when I summed up the evidence my view is that recording a rationale can act as a check in relation to the decision making process itself as it forces the author to consider the process and information that has led to that decision being made. I also have concerns in relation to the way MDT’s work and reach decisions. The decisions very much appear in relation to the case decision amongst relevant members of the team as opposed to an individual making the decision based on information provided by relevant team members. There was no leadership. My concern as regards this consensual approach is that no-one actually takes ownership and responsibility for the decision itself and a consensual approach as evidenced in Doreen’s case can in my view lead to a situation whereby there is a false sense of reassurance in believing that nothing more could be done for Doreen that in this case led to wrong decisions being taken. ”

    Source location

    Doreen Helen MILLER · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
  4. Portsmouth and South East Hampshire

    AI-generated summary

    Scott Douglas Hooper · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Scott Douglas Hooper, aged 46, died on 22 March 2016 after sustaining complex pelvic fractures in an unwitnessed workplace forklift accident and later suffering a pulmonary embolism and deep vein thrombosis. The principal concerns were that his weight was incorrectly recorded, affecting the prescribed anticoagulant dose, and that a decision to withhold a dose was not recorded with the decision-maker identified.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to record who made significant clinical decisions and why

    Wider context from the report

    “1. On admission to SGH on 12 March, Mr Hooper's weight was incorrectly recorded as 80kg when the reality was his true weight was 107 kg – a difference of 27 kg (or 3.5lbs) which is a considerable difference. This is important as the amount of anti-coagulant drugs to be given according to the SGH thromboprophylaxis protocol is calculated on weight. 2. As stated above, on 15 March when the clinical decision was made to withhold the morning dose of Tpx medication it could not be ascertained who made the decision. This was a significant clinical decision and it is a basic requirement that all clinical decisions are recorded in order to capture capturing who made the decision and why. In respect of both of these concerns, during the investigation I learned through the Root Cause Analysis that a Trauma & Orthopaedic Morbidity & Mortality meeting had been held. In addition, I was told during the inquest that a nonogram was now in use to improve weight estimation for those patients where it was not possible to obtain actual weight and that training was underway in relation to its use for elderly patients. I also heard that some new beds with built in weight indicating scales were to be purchased within 2 months subject to cost and commissioning. Whilst a valuable tool, a single T&O M&M meeting is only effective for those doctors and nursing staff who attend. I was not given any other detail as to how the valuable lessons to be learned from this case were to be spread to clinical staff across the T&O department or the whole Trust as weight estimation can be equally important in many other medical specialisms. I was told during the inquest that training was currently taking place in respect of elderly patients but I was not given a plan or timetable for other high risk patients such as Mr Hooper who was only 46 years old and suffered from an acute crush pelvic trauma which had the potential to be life threatening. Mr Hooper died on 22 March 2016 but as yet no active steps have been taken to address patients who fall into the same category. The same principle can be said to apply to bed purchase and it did not appear to be an agreed action that beds with scales would be used to improve the problem of weight estimation in order to ensure accurate dosage of essential medication. ”

    Source location

    Scott Douglas Hooper · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
  5. Leicester City and South Leicestershire

    AI-generated summary

    Francis James Lea · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Francis James Lea, who was living in a care home, was transferred to a new GP without his family being informed. After a hospital admission for a seizure, his prescribed anti-epileptic medication was not continued because the new GP was unaware of the admission and prescription. The report raised concerns about involving next of kin, recording the rationale and consent or capacity assessment for changing GP, and ensuring a safe transfer of care between the care home and GP surgeries.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to record the rationale and patient consent for a change of GP

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) There appeared to be no notes on the patient's medical record regarding the rationale for this change, or any consent from the patient that he was in agreement that it should take place. There was also no record of whether any consideration of his capacity had been undertaken, and if so what the outcome of that decision was. ”

    Source location

    Francis James Lea · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require providers to document discussions and information received from residents, record potential changes in care plans and clinical systems, and update records promptly.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Residents/patients are assumed to have capacity unless proved otherwise. As part of this project residents were given the choice as to whether to move practice. In future projects of this type, ELR CCG makes the following recommendations:”

    Source location

    2016-0447-Response-by-East-Leicestershire-and-Rutland-Clinical-Commissioning-Group
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Contact care homes to recommend policies and documentation standards for staff signing on behalf of residents who can consent but cannot physically sign.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “During the course of the investigation it was established that the care home manager had signed the form on behalf of Mr Lea although this was not made clear to the Practice. Therefore we will be contacting all care homes to recommend:”

    Source location

    2016-0447-Response-by-East-Leicestershire-and-Rutland-Clinical-Commissioning-Group
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Issue standard practice application forms to membership practices, including a section for signing on behalf of another person.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Since the time of this incident, we have issued standard practice application forms to all of our membership practices. This includes a section for signing on behalf of somebody else.”

    Source location

    2016-0447-Response-by-East-Leicestershire-and-Rutland-Clinical-Commissioning-Group
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require care homes to confirm patients’ awareness, consent and appropriate next-of-kin notification when capable residents change GP practice.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In order to avoid such a situation arising again, we will as a practice be liaising with the care homes to request that:”

    Source location

    2016-0447-Response-by-Northfield-Medical-Centre
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    There is usually no need to record the rationale for changing a patient's registered GP in the medical record.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “There is usually no need for documenting on patients medical records regarding rationale for change of GP.”

    Source location

    2016-0447-Response-by-Hazelmere-Medical-Centre
    Page 1 · response
    Published 12 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Care homes are responsible for confirming patient awareness, consent and, where appropriate, next-of-kin notification when facilitating GP practice changes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Where a patient, with capacity, who is resident in a care home, changes GP practice and this change is facilitated by the care home, arrangements are put in place for the care home to provide written confirmation that the patient is aware of the change, the patient gives consent to the change and that where appropriate the patient’s next of kin have been informed.”

    Source location

    2016-0447-Response-by-Northfield-Medical-Centre
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 February 2017

    Open published response
  6. Greater Manchester (North)

    AI-generated summary

    Thomas Martin Gallagher · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Thomas Martin Gallagher, aged 16, died by hanging after leaving home on 10 July 2015 and being found suspended from a tree in a nearby park the following morning. The report identified concerns about police handling of the missing-person call, including 14 unexplained delays, failure to allocate the incident or contact the family during the initial hour, inadequate staffing, and failures to follow relevant procedures.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to record rationale for decisions not to allocate additional cover or resources

    Wider context from the report

    “5. That when decisions were taken not to allocate additional cover/resources: i) no rationale was recorded, ii) no minutes were kept in relation to the decisions taken during the Monday meeting iii) no contemporaneous record was made by the Chief Inspector regarding his decision to reverse the earlier agreement to allocate additional resources &, iv) the Chief inspector did not communicated his decision to those who needed to know. ”

    Source location

    Thomas Martin Gallagher · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review, launch, disseminate and apply the FWIN Escalation Policy with defined responsibilities, risk assessment, escalation, resourcing and delay-recording requirements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The FWIN Escalation Policy has been reviewed by the OCB Senior Leadership Team (SLT) to include clearly defined roles and responsibilities for all OCB staff. The reviewed policy was prepared in June 2016 with a formal launch across Force in August 2016.”

    Source location

    Thomas-Gallagher-Response
    Page 2 · response
    Published 11 August 2016

    Open published response
  7. Cornwall and Isles of Scilly

    AI-generated summary

    Danny Sweet · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Danny Sweet, who had a long history of mental health issues, took a staggered paracetamol overdose on 23 October 2015 and died the next day in Treliske Hospital. Concerns included the rapid transfer and discharge between mental health services despite earlier consideration of informal admission, difficulties assessing his inconsistent presentation, inconsistent treatment decisions and records, and an incomplete Serious Incident Report.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to maintain consistent and adequately justified clinical records

    Wider context from the report

    “I raise also whether there should be training to ensure that the entries in the notes and records are consistent. By way of illustration, where ████████ and ████████ decide to discharge Mr Sweet from their respective caseloads, they should justify those decisions in light of ████████'s earlier concern that Mr Sweet may need an informal admission into hospital. ”

    Source location

    Danny Sweet · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue rolling out the SBAR structured record-keeping tool across all services.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust does provide training to staff in relation to record keeping and the importance of recording the rationale for decisions. We are already enhancing the record keeping of staff by implementing the “SBAR” (Situation, Background, Assessment, Recommendation) tool as standard in record keeping. This has been introduced to staff on our psychiatric inpatient wards and we will continue to filter this through across all services. We are therefore making efforts and taking action to introduce a more structured format to our records. This action is on-going.”

    Source location

    2016-0275-Response-by-Cornwall-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 July 2016

    Open published response
  8. Sunderland

    AI-generated summary

    Paige Louise Bell · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Paige Louise Bell, aged 20, died at Sunderland Royal Hospital on 14 August 2014 after applying a ligature to her neck following an episode of self-harm. The inquest identified contradictions in the observation policy as a contributing factor. Concerns included case notes not being held together or fully transferred with the patient, and the need for consistent observation policies and updated guidance on managing patients with Borderline Personality Disorder.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Difficulties navigating records to establish event chronology and decision rationale

    Wider context from the report

    “Although a new Engagement and Observation Policy is to be implemented in April 2015 it may be that you would wish to review matters arising from the Inquest to enhance this further (if appropriate) so that there are no contradictions that may create ambiguity in its application. I appreciate that a lot of work has gone into the new policy. However, I note the following (and this is not an exhaustive list): - • The new Observation record does not allow sufficient space for commentary. • The front sheet does not appear to have the RIO reference. • On the face of the document it is not clear that staff must complete all parts of the record. • If the rationale for observations were to change then the form needs to provide for that. • It may be possible in the fullness of time for the record to be completed electronically (perhaps with a tablet) with a drop down box and a freehand note facility? This would also allow for mandatory completion of certain parts of a form. • If electronic, the engagement/observation record could be readily accessible possibly via hyperlink. The same could be done for incident report forms rather than being manually filed. No doubt there will be full training undertaken with regard to the new Policy. I was concerned that not all relevant information was readily available and although I appreciate events can be fast moving it can then become even more important for staff to have access to up to date and accurate information from the notes. All staff need time to be able to complete such records in a more timely way. That takes me to my final concern and that relates to the difficulty with navigation around the records. Whilst this may be easier via a screen it was extremely difficult (even with time to do it) to be able to have a clear chronology of events and to understand the rationale for decisions. That has the potential to compromise patient management and safety. I also enclose a copy of my report to the Secretary of State. ”

    Source location

    Paige Louise Bell · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Electronic RiO records and information-sharing through team meetings and handovers provide a more appropriate account than printed records alone.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In respect to the stated over the presentation of written copies of RiO records, ████████ explained that this is something which was identified in the Serious Incident Review. He explained that the RiO records are used by staff electronically, and a printed version does not properly reflect how they would be seen or used by staff. In particular the date and time of a meeting or incident is recorded in addition to when the record was made. This allows the entries to be recorded chronologically in relation to the date and time of the meeting or incident. As you heard in evidence, in a very busy and demanding mental health ward”

    Source location

    2015-0075-Response-by-Northumberland-Tyne-Wear-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 3 March 2015

    Open published response
  9. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Mary Fenton · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mary Fenton was admitted to Tameside Hospital on 26 April 2014 needing an urgent heart pacemaker and died on 30 April 2014 after delays and missed opportunities. Concerns included limited cardiology cover and facilities, shortages of Isoprenaline, failures relating to capacity and consent, delays in inserting pacing wires, inadequate facilities to manage complications, and poor communication.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to document unavailable consent or self-consenting rationale

    Wider context from the report

    “5. There was a failure of the medical staff to obtain “consent” to treatment or to document why such consent was unavailable and why they were “self-consenting”. (For Tameside Hospital) ”

    Source location

    Mary Fenton · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Roll out refresher training on mental-capacity, consent and communication policies.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As to the actions of the particular staff involved in the care of Mrs Fenton, and with particular reference to the assessment and documentation of mental capacity, consent and communication, we have reminded the clinicians of the relevant policies and advised them that we will be rolling out refresher training. All Cardiology staff have also been informed by the Lead Consultant Cardiologist that no usage of Isoprenaline should be permitted in the CCU / Ward 31 without the consent of a Consultant Cardiologist / the on-call Cardiologist for pacing out of hours.”

    Source location

    2014-0443-Response-by-Tameside-Hospital
    Page 5 · response
    Published 13 October 2014

    Open published response
  10. Portsmouth and South East Hampshire

    AI-generated summary

    Tessa Karen Elizabeth Summers · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Tessa Karen Elizabeth Summers, aged 20, was found collapsed in bed after taking an overdose of medication and died at hospital on 9 September 2013. Concerns included the failure to record the rationale for downgrading her self-harm risk assessment and allowing unsupervised access to medication, and the need for more training and support for Shared Lives Carers working with clients with mental health and emotional problems.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to record rationales for changes to risk assessments

    Wider context from the report

    “1. I heard in evidence that the social workers who decided on amendments to Tessa’s risk assessment did not record in that document their rationale for downgrading her from high to low risk of self-harm and allowing her to have access to her medication which she could then take without supervision by her Shared Lives Carer. I was told the social workers were not required to do so as a matter of routine to record why details of risk assessments for any of the clients were being changed. ”

    Source location

    Tessa Karen Elizabeth Summers · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    No further action is needed regarding the general system for assessing and managing risk.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In reviewing the practice in the support offered to Tessa and her family, we have not identified that any action is needed in respect of the system of assessing and managing risk more generally.”

    Source location

    2014-0383-Response-by-Hampshire-County-Council
    Page 2 · response
    Published 22 August 2014

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026