Recurring concern

Inadequate controls for fatal falls from bridges

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First reported 17 Mar 2015•Latest report 17 Feb 2025

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes bridge-specific hazards and dedicated controls intended to prevent, detect or mitigate fatal or serious falls, including parapets and barriers, anti-climb measures, CCTV or other monitoring, lighting, access restrictions, protection of landing areas, warnings and implementation of recommended safety works.

Not included

  • Excludes ordinary bridge maintenance, structural or aesthetic deficiencies where no material fall hazard or dedicated fall-prevention control is identified.
  • Excludes general suicide-prevention or fall hazards in non-bridge settings, including car parks, railway stations and buildings.
  • Excludes downstream rescue, medical treatment or investigation failures after a bridge fall where the bridge-fall prevention and detection controls were adequate.
  • Excludes generic road, pedestrian or water-safety concerns that do not involve a bridge-specific risk of falling.
Reports
12

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
22

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2015–2025

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
34

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Durham County Council2
National Highways2
Calderdale Borough Council1
Cornwall Council1
Devon County Council1
Hampshire County Council1
Hertfordshire County Council1
Humber Bridge Board1
Kirklees Borough Council1
NHS England1
NHS Hertfordshire and West Essex Integrated Care Board1
Salford City Council1
Suffolk County Council1
Suspension Bridge Trustees1
Sussex Police1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Suffolk

    AI-generated summary

    James Hall · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    James Hall, a Lincoln University student, returned to Ipswich and later left in the family car before being found beneath Orwell Bridge; efforts to resuscitate him were unsuccessful, and he was pronounced dead on 24 November 2015. The report raised concerns about the bridge’s easy access, low concrete walls, lack of deterrents to climbing, and absence of handholds or footholds to prevent or recover from a fall.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide handholds or footholds for recovery from the bridge wall

    Wider context from the report

    “The Orwell Bridge is a well known very high structure in Suffolk that can be easily accessed on foot. There are a number of locations that provide parking within close walking distance. Once on the bridge there is a pedestrian walkway on both sides which allows full access to its entire length. A concrete wall runs the length of the bridge on the river side of each walk way. A vehicle crash barrier separates each walkway from the carriageway. The bridge wall is between waist and low chest height for an adult and is approximately 30-40 cm in width. As such it is easy to straddle for the majority of reasonable fit adults or young persons. This relatively low concrete wall is the only barrier preventing a fall from the bridge. There is nothing in place that would make it either physically difficult or provide a deterrent against climbing onto the bridge wall. Further, the river side of the bridge walls are bare vertical concrete. As such should someone who had straddled the wall subsequently slip, there is nothing on the structure that would provide a hand or foothold allowing them the opportunity to climb back onto the bridge. This is by no means an isolated incident and I am aware that further inquests are to be held shortly in relation to other deaths resulting from falls from Orwell Bridge. ”

    Source location

    James Hall · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide a barrier that prevents or deters climbing onto the bridge wall

    Wider context from the report

    “The Orwell Bridge is a well known very high structure in Suffolk that can be easily accessed on foot. There are a number of locations that provide parking within close walking distance. Once on the bridge there is a pedestrian walkway on both sides which allows full access to its entire length. A concrete wall runs the length of the bridge on the river side of each walk way. A vehicle crash barrier separates each walkway from the carriageway. The bridge wall is between waist and low chest height for an adult and is approximately 30-40 cm in width. As such it is easy to straddle for the majority of reasonable fit adults or young persons. This relatively low concrete wall is the only barrier preventing a fall from the bridge. There is nothing in place that would make it either physically difficult or provide a deterrent against climbing onto the bridge wall. Further, the river side of the bridge walls are bare vertical concrete. As such should someone who had straddled the wall subsequently slip, there is nothing on the structure that would provide a hand or foothold allowing them the opportunity to climb back onto the bridge. This is by no means an isolated incident and I am aware that further inquests are to be held shortly in relation to other deaths resulting from falls from Orwell Bridge. ”

    Source location

    James Hall · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Commission and complete a stakeholder-informed review of preventative measures for Orwell Bridge.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Orwell Bridge opened to traffic in 1982. Recent years have seen a number of suicides and attempted suicides at the location. This prompted Highways England to commission a review possible measures that could be considered to reduce the likelihood of such tragic events in future. The review completed in March 2015 was carried out in consultation with a range of stakeholders. It identified a range of preventative measures taken in and around similar structures and assessed their likely effectiveness on the Orwell Bridge. The report also considered the psychological, socio and economic aspects of incidents.”

    Source location

    Response from Highways England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 12 May 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Toe holds will not be installed because they could encourage climbing, create workforce safety risks, and have unproven effectiveness.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The installation of toe holds on the outer face of the bridge would create an extended climbing face that could encourage unauthorised access. Their installation would also present a significant health and safety risk to the workforce. We are not aware of the use of such toe holds on the outward facing side of similar structures and therefore their effectiveness in preventing such incidents is unproven. In light of this and the other factors outlined above, we are not intending to take further action in this respect.”

    Source location

    Response from Highways England
    Page 3 · response
    Published 12 May 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Additional solid parapets or panels will not be installed because their weight and wind effects could significantly compromise bridge stability.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The 2015 review identified that the installation of physical barriers were likely to be one of the most effective means to deter suicides. The parapets fully comply with height requirements designed to prevent pedestrians accidentally falling from the structure. In relation to Orwell Bridge, the review concluded that the use of additional barriers such as solid parapets or panels would add considerable weight to such a long span structure. The addition of such weight when combined with effects of high winds would have a significant impact on the stability of the structure.”

    Source location

    Response from Highways England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 May 2016

    Open published response

  2. West Sussex

    AI-generated summary

    Alasdair Neal Penny · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Alasdair Neal Penny, a 23-year-old man, jumped from a road bridge onto the road below on 4 May 2014 and died from multiple injuries. The bridge had previously been the site of a suicide, and the concern was whether additional protection could make it more difficult to use the bridge as a suicide site and minimise recurrence.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of bridge railings to prevent easy mounting

    Wider context from the report

    “This Bridge has been the site of 2 suicides in 2011 and 2014; I am unaware if there have been any other successful suicides at this location before then, but if so, not in the very recent past. In each of the 2 cases the deceased jumped from the bridge on to the road below, a distance of 10-11 metres. The 2 footpaths that bound the carriageway each have a metal railing and the height of the railing is such that they can be quite easily mounted. There is a series of discrete notices on the mesh infill to the railings, giving details, I understand, of the Samaritans. I cannot, and do not, offer a solution I certainly recognise that merely raising the level of the railing may not prevent the determined person to climb up and jump. But it might well stop the spontaneous jumper. I understand that I do not know whether it is possible/feasible to provide extra/or some other form of protection in order to make it more difficult for the bridge to be used as a suicide site. However, I do believe that the whole situation should be reconsidered in case something can be reasonably implemented to minimise the possibility of a recurrence. ”

    Source location

    Alasdair Neal Penny · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Investigate the technical feasibility of increasing the College Lane Bridge parapet height to deter future jumps.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “While we would caution that it is unlikely that any engineering solution would be 100% effective we will be investigating whether it is technically feasible to increase the height of the current parapet to deter as far as practicable similar events occurring in the future. If an appropriate solution can be determined we intend to undertake the alterations within this financial year, subject to any design and programming constraints. If an appropriate technical solution cannot be realised I will write to you again explaining the reasons why.”

    Source location

    2015-0106-Response-by-West-Sussex-County-Council
    Page 2 · response
    Published 17 March 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Participate in the planned update meeting on potential bridge alterations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The potential alterations to the bridge are being managed by WSCC and an update meeting is planned between Peter Lawrence (WSCC), Julie Holden (EGTC) and PS Graeme Prentice (Sussex Police) on the 20th May 2015.”

    Source location

    2015-0106-Response-by-Sussex-Police
    Page 2 · response
    Published 17 March 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    WSCC is responsible for managing decisions and delivery concerning potential alterations to the bridge.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The raising of the parapets, which was the partners preferred recommendation, was referred to WSCC and was discussed at the County Local Committee meeting in late 2014. WSCC reported that the vegetation could not be cut back and a report was being prepared as to the reasons why.”

    Source location

    2015-0106-Response-by-Sussex-Police
    Page 2 · response
    Published 17 March 2015

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026