Recurring concern

Unreliable documentation of safety risk assessments

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First reported 14 Jul 2014•Latest report 12 Jan 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures to document formal, informal or clinically judged safety risk assessments, risk discussions, risk formulations, assessor identities and material assessment details in the records used for ongoing care, custody, safeguarding or safety review. Includes the anchor assertion, post-triage risk assessments, mental-health risk-assessment details and comparable police or prison risk-assessment records.

Not included

  • Excludes failures to perform or clinically formulate a risk assessment where documentation is not itself deficient.
  • Excludes generic clinical, care or administrative record-keeping failures that do not specifically concern documentation of a safety risk assessment.
  • Excludes failure to communicate or act on a risk assessment after it has been accurately documented, unless the documentation process is also deficient.
  • Excludes hazard-specific or named risk systems, such as mental-health, falls, suicide, prisoner or safeguarding risk-assessment systems, when the assertion is confined to a distinct system with a more specific supported parent.
Reports
27

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
27

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2014–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
47

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care3
Devon Partnership NHS Trust3
Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust3
Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust2
Midlands Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust2
South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust2
Avon and Wiltshire Mental Health Partnership NHS Trust1
CAMHS East – Cross Street Clinic1
DHL Supply Chain Limited1
Doncaster Royal Infirmary1
East London NHS Foundation Trust1
Hampshire County Council1
Hc-One Limited1
HCRG Care Services Ltd1
Hellesdon Hospital1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Surrey

    AI-generated summary

    Melanie Jane ELMS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Melanie Jane Elms, an informal patient at the Abraham Cowley Unit with a history of schizo-affective disorder and suicidal attempts, left the unit on day leave on 30 January 2018 and was fatally struck by a train. The inquest identified that a mandatory pre-leave risk assessment was not carried out, concerns raised by her husband were not properly recorded or acted upon, and her leave was not adequately documented or managed. The report also raised concerns about the failure to provide the planned care package and the absence of a missing-person plan and contingency planning.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to record risk assessments prior to leave

    Wider context from the report

    “6. Risk assessment prior to leave was not recorded. ”

    Source location

    Melanie Jane ELMS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 7 · concerns

    Open source report
  2. Norfolk

    AI-generated summary

    Sheila Elizabeth Steggles · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Sheila Elizabeth Steggles, who had reduced mobility and several risk factors for thrombosis, collapsed on 5 November 2019 and died in an ambulance after suffering a cardiac arrest. The cause of death was recorded as acute pulmonary embolus arising from deep vein thrombosis. Concerns included the absence of a documented VTE risk assessment, insufficient consideration of reduced mobility and past DVT, inadequate staff training, and missed opportunities to provide prophylactic heparin.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to perform and document VTE risk assessments after reduced mobility from baseline

    Wider context from the report

    “Medical staff should follow the Trust’s protocols and perform and document a VTE risk assessment when the reduction in mobility is reduced (from their baseline) even if it is not known if/ how long the reduction will continue. ”

    Source location

    Sheila Elizabeth Steggles · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update medical trainee, local and junior doctor induction materials to cover physical health emergencies, diagnostic overshadowing, VTE assessment, prophylaxis and escalation guidance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Actions taken above the recommendations within the internal review are primarily to address the gaps in junior Doctors understanding and prompts to escalate concerns regarding physical health. To this end the Medical Director for medical trainees will be updating the Trust induction to include physical health”

    Source location

    2022-0042-Response-from-Hellesdon-Hospital_Published
    Page 1 · response
    Published 14 February 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Roll out face-to-face bite-size physical-health training across the Trust, including VTE and thrombolisation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “All agency and bank staff will be offered the “3 Ps” training which covers “Prevent, Promote, Protect” – observations and assessment, health promotion and screening. This will be available to all staff from support worker to ward manager level, the format is a set of e-learning modules accompanied by a workbook. The physical health team are rolling out “bite size” training across the trust including focus on VTE and thrombolisation, this training will be face to face. We have set up a working group to work with our flexible working colleagues to support an education ‘passport’ for health workers which will include; acute and chronic conditions, NEWS2 (deteriorating patient), managing Insulin and use of protective personal equipment (infection control measures) amongst other subjects.”

    Source location

    2022-0042-Response-from-Hellesdon-Hospital_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 February 2022

    Open published response
  3. East London

    AI-generated summary

    Steven Paul David Gary Stout · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Steven Paul David Gary Stout was detained under section 136 of the Mental Health Act after cutting both wrists while intoxicated by alcohol, and was later admitted to a mental health ward. He was discharged on 18 October 2019 without a referral to the home treatment team and was found unresponsive, suspended by his neck from a ligature, on 4 November 2019; he could not be resuscitated. The concerns included failures to accurately record and file important medical records and to ensure an effective referral to the home treatment team.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to accurately record and file important medical records

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The failure of Turner Ward, Goodmayes hospital to accurately record and file important medical records including; decisions on discharge, risk assessments, and a crisis, relapse and contingency plan. ”

    Source location

    Steven Paul David Gary Stout · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide record-keeping training to Turner Ward staff on Trust expectations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust has taken into consideration concerns highlighted in the Regulation 28 report and agreed to take a number of actions to address your concerns. This includes:”

    Source location

    2021-0059 Response from North East London NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 8 March 2021

    Open published response
  4. South Wales Central

    AI-generated summary

    David Edwin BLINMAN · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    On 28 December 2018, David Edwin BLINMAN was walking home when he was struck by, or fell into the path of, a reversing articulated lorry and was crushed by its rear wheels. His death was declared at the scene. Concerns included inadequate risk assessments and mitigating measures for pedestrians in vehicle blind spots, the inability to conduct 360-degree checks while reversing without additional measures, and insufficient regard to Rule 202 of The Highway Code.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to document store operator and regular delivery driver views and experiences in DPRA risk assessments

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) DPRA’s do not mandate discussion with and documenting of, by the Risk Assessor, the views and experiences of the store owner/operator, nor of the drivers regularly delivering to the store, in relation to any particular hazards, or concerns. The Risk Assessor may not, therefore, be sufficiently informed of material which might assist him, or her in completing an adequate risk assessment. ”

    Source location

    David Edwin BLINMAN · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Apply the revised Nisa DPRA process across delivery locations using risk-based prioritisation and weekly management oversight.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The DPRA process for the Nisa account has been specifically reviewed by the contract’s Account Management, under the direction of the Vice President of Operations and in conjunction with their Safety Team. The revised Safety Arrangement has already been introduced for that account. The Nisa contract has around 4,100 delivery points and a risk based approach will be adopted to reviewing order of the DРRAs for the account. We anticipate that this process will take in the region of six months to complete across all delivery locations and will be managed and controlled by a weekly management call containing representatives from all operating locations.”

    Source location

    2021-0054-Response-from-DHL-Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 1 March 2021

    Open published response
  5. Shropshire, Telford and Wrekin

    AI-generated summary

    Name not published · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    The deceased had a history of mental health issues, self-harm and two suicide attempts, and was in contact with mental health services until the evening of 30 April 2018 before taking her own life the next morning. Concerns included a prolonged delay in accessing IAPT counselling and difficulties with the electronic recording, risk assessment and progress-note systems.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to accurately record progress notes and risk assessments

    Wider context from the report

    “2. Risk assessment and progress notes. a) The electronic records were hard for a lay person to follow or understand particularly when said to have been updated or validated with the potential for original entries to have been overwritten (as opposed to amended or deleted). If the user of the system understands it then that does not make it unfit for purpose but it was not clear how a user would readily see what had originally been written. b) This is distinct from progress notes and/or risk assessments being accurately recorded. It was not clear when and how often risk assessments should be updated and how and when they would be read in conjunction with the progress notes. Were risk assessments intended to be summaries if a user did not have time to read all the progress notes? What function were they intended to serve? Consideration should be given as to whether the system can be improved. ”

    Source location

    Name not published · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Remind staff to validate records and routinely audit unvalidated notes, providing audit feedback to clinical teams.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “validated by others. We have issued a reminder to staff to validate their records and a regular audit of un-validated notes is undertaken with feedback of the audit outcome being sent to the clinical teams.”

    Source location

    Response from Midlands Partnership NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 31 May 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Extend mandatory clinical risk management training to cover the revised mental-health risk assessment and management procedures.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The SOP describes how the FACE Tool is used to gather information about risk, both current and historical, and then to use this information in formulation which is an evidence based clinical decision making process enabling a robust risk management plan to be developed specifically addressing the individual patient’s needs. This risk management plan will then be incorporated into the patient’s overall care plan. Monitoring of this care plan is through the patient’s progress notes. When there is a significant change in presentation the risk assessment is re-evaluated, risk management plan updated and reference made to this in the progress notes. In order to ensure that staff are competent in this process, the clinical risk management training, which is mandatory for all clinical staff to complete every 3 years, will cover the revised Standard Operating Procedures.”

    Source location

    Response from Midlands Partnership NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 31 May 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Automatic validation of all electronic records is not achievable because some staff entries must be validated by other staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In regard to the validation of notes, legally it is only students who must have their records validated by a qualified member of staff. All other staff are required to validate their own entries. The action of validating the entry represents the electronic signature of the accuracy and confirmation of that entry. The Trust has explored with our healthcare information colleagues whether the default could be an automatic validation which is then “unticked” but this is not achievable given that some staff must have their entries”

    Source location

    Response from Midlands Partnership NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 31 May 2024

    Open published response
  6. Nottinghamshire

    AI-generated summary

    George Goldby · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    George Goldby choked on a sandwich on 20 March 2017, was taken to hospital, and died on 24 March 2017. The principal concerns were that staff did not follow his speech and language therapy recommendations, including one-to-one supervision and dietary requirements; choking risk assessments and care plans were inadequately managed; and choking incidents were not properly reported or followed by appropriate referrals and reviews.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequate and disorganised choking risk assessment record keeping

    Wider context from the report

    “(5) The care plan records and in particular, the choking risk assessments in respect of Mr Goldby were inadequately completed and record keeping has been incomplete and/or wholly disorganised. ”

    Source location

    George Goldby · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Complete swallowing risk assessments with independent validation and Care Manager sign-off of updates.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. Completion of the swallowing risk assessment with independent validation from another senior colleague to ensure accurate scoring and corresponding actions to mitigate risk are adhered to. This system remains in place with the Care Manager reviewing and signing off any updates.”

    Source location

    2018-0104-Response-by-HC-One
    Page 1 · response
    Published 17 June 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Rewrite residents’ care plans to specify detailed individual care requirements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “6. Once this initial work was completed at Stoneyford, we sought advice from senior clinicians within the company for governance and oversight, which resulted in the care plans being rewritten to specify the detailed plan of care for each Resident.”

    Source location

    2018-0104-Response-by-HC-One
    Page 2 · response
    Published 17 June 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce dining registers and quick-reference guides for managing specialist diets, with formal review and update governance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “7. Additional advice was sought from the company Hospitality specialist to establish if there were any further processes or mechanisms to help support the safe and effective management of people who require a specialist diet. As a result we have introduced a new system of dining registers with quick reference guides, which were put into place and help colleagues or any agency workers to reflect the handover documentation.”

    Source location

    2018-0104-Response-by-HC-One
    Page 2 · response
    Published 17 June 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement daily ‘Resident of the day’ care-plan reviews and report changing needs through the clinical risk register.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “8. The manager and staff at the home have implemented a ‘Resident of the day’ approach to care plan reviews which means that a designated Resident has their care and support needs reviewed every day to ensure any changes are reflected in updated care plans and shared with colleagues who support them. Any changes in need are reported monthly through to the clinical risk register, which is monitored by the Senior Turnaround Manager working at the home and the Area quality management Team.”

    Source location

    2018-0104-Response-by-HC-One
    Page 2 · response
    Published 17 June 2018

    Open published response
  7. Sunderland

    AI-generated summary

    Mrs Sheila Sullivan Ross (Sheila) · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mrs Sheila Sullivan Ross died at Sunderland Royal Hospital on 12 November 2017 after an unwitnessed fall at a care home, sustaining bilateral pubic rami fractures and subsequently deteriorating with urinary sepsis. Concerns included an outdated falls risk assessment tool, limitations in the care home buzzer system that could prevent timely assistance, and poor communication with Sheila’s family.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to record falls risk consistently with the assessment score

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The falls risk assessment tool used by the Care Home staff appeared to be outdated, and the subsequent level of falls risk recorded by staff was not in keeping with the score generated by the assessment tool. ”

    Source location

    Mrs Sheila Sullivan Ross (Sheila) · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  8. South Yorkshire (Eastern)

    AI-generated summary

    Gordon Frank Thornhill · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Gordon Frank Thornhill, a 61-year-old man, developed abdominal pain, attended A&E twice, and collapsed and died at home on 13 April 2017. The report identified incomplete VTE risk assessment, failure to identify that omission, undocumented consultant assessment, and a delay of more than 24 hours in providing thromboprophylaxis; the inquest conclusion was natural causes, with death from pulmonary embolism following DVT development.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to document consultant VTE assessments

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) The Consultant carried out his own assessment as a “mental exercise” and did not document his assessment. ”

    Source location

    Gordon Frank Thornhill · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Advise consultants and associate specialists to ensure VTE assessments are completed and documented during post-take ward rounds and to support trainees.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. I am advised by the Director of Education that VTE prophylaxis is addressed at induction and there is an electronic package approved by Health Education England which trainees have to complete for their annual review (ARCP). This is monitored through the post graduate schools on behalf of Health Education England. This should be supplemented by on-site support and monitoring by consultants. In light of the events that you highlight I have personally written to all consultants and associate specialists advising them of the importance of ensuring that VTE assessments are completed and documented on the post-take ward round and to that end to provide the required support for trainees.”

    Source location

    2017-0359-Response-by-Doncaster-and-Bassetlaw-Teaching-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 11 February 2018

    Open published response
  9. West Sussex

    AI-generated summary

    Janet Silva Müller · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Janet Silva Müller, a patient detained under Section 2 of the Mental Health Act 1983 at Millview Hospital, died on 13 March 2015 after being found in the boot of a burning car; the circumstances were recorded as unlawful killing following her absconding from hospital. The principal concerns were incomplete and contradictory records, handovers, risk assessments and care plans, inadequate staffing, and insufficient measures to prevent detained patients from absconding.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to maintain complete, sufficient and consistent nursing records, handovers, risk assessments and care plans

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Nursing records, handovers, risk assessments and care plans were often incomplete, insufficient and at times contradictory. Whilst we were told that regular auditing is carried out by the Trust of nursing records it is clear that this is not fit for purpose as it is did not identify the fact that there were gaps in Janet’s nursing records and other key documents. The lack of proper record keeping increased Janet’s risk. ”

    Source location

    Janet Silva Müller · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  10. Staffordshire South

    AI-generated summary

    Annabel Mae LEWIS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Annabel Mae LEWIS, aged 15, died by asphyxia from external airway obstruction after placing a plastic bag over her head at home. The report raised concerns about CAMHS referral handling, including the lack of recorded risk assessment, follow-up arrangements, attempts to engage her parents, and proactive support after she declined an appointment because of difficulty accessing the venue.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to record risk, contact details, appointment information and follow-up arrangements

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) At the inquest it was evident that Annabel had been referred by her GP to your team in November 2015 but that referral had not been accepted. She was referred again on 20/10/2016 by her school. This time the referral was accepted and your team made contact with her by telephone on 21/10/2016. She declined an appointment because she felt she could not get to the venue. No level of risk was recorded and next of kin details were not available. The date of appointment offered and declined were not recorded. Alternative time for appointment was not recorded. No follow up arrangements were recorded. There was no attempt to contact Annabel thereafter. An unsuccessful attempt to contact the referrer was made on 4/11/2016- the day Annabel took her own life. The time period between referral and initial contact and attempted follow up appears considerable. No attempt appears to have been made to engage with her parents who would have been in a position to assist with transport arrangements. The expectation that young people such as Annabel would 'opt in 'to the system may be unrealistic given the difficulties that she had in engaging. Annabel might well have benefitted had she been offered a more proactive service. ”

    Source location

    Annabel Mae LEWIS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
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Data last updated 7 September 2026