Recurring concern

Unreliable root cause analysis processes

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First reported 3 Dec 2013•Latest report 14 May 2024

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of the dedicated root cause analysis process, including initiation, investigator competence and training, evidence and stakeholder input, critical analysis, identification of lessons, action planning, completion and confirmation of resulting actions.

Not included

  • Excludes generic incident investigation or organisational-learning failures where root cause analysis is not the specifically identified process.
  • Excludes failures in implementing safety actions where no root cause analysis or root cause analysis action plan is involved.
  • Excludes generic clinician training deficiencies unrelated to undertaking root cause analysis.
  • Excludes deficiencies in the underlying clinical or operational process investigated when the root cause analysis process itself is not unsafe.
Reports
26

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
27

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2024

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
56

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

NHS England3
Royal Stoke University Hospital3
Cwm Taf Morgannwg University Local Health Board2
Department of Health and Social Care2
Devon Partnership NHS Trust2
Enteral (GB) UK2
International Organization for Standardization2
Nursing Times2
University Hospitals Sussex NHS Foundation Trust2
Axminster Medical Practice1
Black Country Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust1
Care UK1
Central and North West London NHS Foundation Trust1
Derriford Hospital1
Dudley Integrated Health and Care NHS Trust1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. West Sussex

    AI-generated summary

    Leilani Chute · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Leilani Chute was delivered by Caesarean section after an unsuccessful trial of instrumental delivery and was in a moribund condition, with terminal bradycardia and no other signs of life. The inquest concluded that she died shortly after birth from hypoxic brain injury and umbilical cord occlusion. The principal concerns were the use of an unendorsed practice of manually pushing back the cervix and inadequate disclosure of relevant risks when obtaining consent for instrumental delivery rather than proceeding directly to Caesarean section.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of Root Cause Analysis investigations to identify care and service delivery problems

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) That neither of the above matters had been identified as a “Care and Service Delivery problem” by the Trust’s Root Cause Analysis investigation and hence no steps had been taken by the Trust to address these issues. ”

    Source location

    Leilani Chute · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review processes for investigating perinatal deaths using RCOG and CQC best-practice models.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “i. Processes for planning investigations when perinatal deaths have occurred”

    Source location

    2016-0251-Response-by-Western-Sussex-Hospital-NHS-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 15 July 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Obtain Trust governance-team support to make Serious Incident root-cause analyses rigorous and objective.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A review of existing processes for these investigations is underway using existing models of best practice from the RCOG and CQC with a half day governance meeting scheduled for October to consider any emerging proposals. The Trust governance team has also been asked to provide support for the division to ensure that RCA’s undertaken for Serious Incidents are rigorous and objective.”

    Source location

    2016-0251-Response-by-Western-Sussex-Hospital-NHS-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 15 July 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement the NHS England/Department of Health National Perinatal Mortality tool at the Trust when available from late 2017.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “From late 2017 it is anticipated the planned NHS England/Department of Health National Perinatal Mortality tool will become available and will be implemented at the Trust. The newly developed tool adopts a standardised approach for the investigation of perinatal deaths and will incorporate national reporting and learning.”

    Source location

    2016-0251-Response-by-Western-Sussex-Hospital-NHS-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 15 July 2016

    Open published response
  2. West Sussex

    AI-generated summary

    Valerie Margaret Ellis · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Valerie Margaret Ellis, an 83-year-old woman, died at home on 6 September 2015 after a massive gastrointestinal bleed associated with Apixaban. The report identified concerns about inadequate counselling on the medication, communication and call-handling problems in NHS 111, premature closure of an IC24 case, and aspects of ambulance triage.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to arrange a joint RCA of KMSS 111 and IC24 investigations

    Wider context from the report

    “4) The results of investigations by both KMSS 111 and IC24 should result in a joint RCA. This has not occurred as yet and no date has apparently been arranged. ”

    Source location

    Valerie Margaret Ellis · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Confirm a date with IC24 to share the Trust’s Serious Incident report findings.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Turning to the matter of a joint RCA, our Trust is always open to cross-NHS collaboration and review to strive to ensure safe patient care can be provided. However the regulation 28 report does not comment on what is expected to be achieved by a joint RCA and therefore it is difficult to respond. I am aware that both our Trust and IC24 have completed Serious Incident (SI) reports and are happy to share findings and if not already in place a date can be set. However our organisations are independent of each other and we do not receive communication from an out of hours provider following such a disposition being reached and a referral passed. In turn we have no further control in the matter unless we receive a further call either following up for an out of hours call or due to a change in condition. In each case KMSS 111 is able to appropriately process the call.”

    Source location

    2016-0252-Response-by-South-East-Coast-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 June 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct a joint IC24–KMSS meeting to discuss cross-organisational learning and review the case.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A Joint meeting took place between IC24 and KMSS NHS 111 on 31 December 2015. At this meeting learning across the organisations was discussed and in particular Mrs Ellis case was reviewed. The note of that meeting is attached to this letter for your ease of reference.”

    Source location

    2016-0252-Response-by-Integrated-Care-24-Limited
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 June 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Trust has no further control after an out-of-hours referral is passed between independent organisations unless another call is received.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Turning to the matter of a joint RCA, our Trust is always open to cross-NHS collaboration and review to strive to ensure safe patient care can be provided. However the regulation 28 report does not comment on what is expected to be achieved by a joint RCA and therefore it is difficult to respond. I am aware that both our Trust and IC24 have completed Serious Incident (SI) reports and are happy to share findings and if not already in place a date can be set. However our organisations are independent of each other and we do not receive communication from an out of hours provider following such a disposition being reached and a referral passed. In turn we have no further control in the matter unless we receive a further call either following up for an out of hours call or due to a change in condition. In each case KMSS 111 is able to appropriately process the call.”

    Source location

    2016-0252-Response-by-South-East-Coast-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 June 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    A further joint RCA is considered unnecessary because joint learning has occurred and existing/new processes and actions are expected to yield no new learning.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A Joint meeting took place between IC24 and KMSS NHS 111 on 31 December 2015. At this meeting learning across the organisations was discussed and in particular Mrs Ellis case was reviewed. The note of that meeting is attached to this letter for your ease of reference.”

    Source location

    2016-0252-Response-by-Integrated-Care-24-Limited
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 June 2016

    Open published response
  3. Stoke-on-Trent and North Staffordshire

    AI-generated summary

    Nadim Muzzfar BUTT · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Nadim Muzzfar BUTT died on 5 September 2014 after complications following laparoscopic gastric bypass surgery, including small bowel obstruction, systemic inflammatory response syndrome and multi-organ failure. The report raised concerns that the hospital review was not escalated to a serious untoward incident or root cause analysis, and that no consultant-led out-of-hours on-call rota was in place for postoperative patients.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to escalate matters for comprehensive serious incident or root cause review

    Wider context from the report

    “1, Whilst the hospital sought a review of procedures and protocols the matter was not elevated to a serious untoward incident or root cause analysis where all matters including clinical and nursing decisions were reviewed and subjected to critical examination. ”

    Source location

    Nadim Muzzfar BUTT · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  4. Exeter and Greater Devon

    AI-generated summary

    Judith Anne SAVILLE · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Judith Anne Saville, who had a long history of agitated depression and previous psychiatric admissions and ECT treatment, was found deceased at home on 28 January 2014. The inquest concluded that she died from a Zopiclone and Paracetamol overdose and that she had taken her own life. Concerns included the quantity of medication prescribed, the need for warnings about a history of overdose in the practice’s computer system, and implementation and auditing of an action plan.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to implement the action plan arising from the Root Cause Analysis

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) For the attention of Melanie Walker The Inquest heard evidence from ████████████████████ who had conducted a Root Cause Analysis into the circumstances of Mrs Saville’s death. A copy of that Report is attached. ████████ gave evidence that there were a number of lessons to be learned and that an action plan had been drafted. At Inquest I expressed my concern that the action plan was implemented and its effectiveness subsequently audited. ”

    Source location

    Judith Anne SAVILLE · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide comprehensive assessments and formulate recovery, care and risk plans for people using CRHT services.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Action 1 Recommendation: That Crisis Teams should provide a comprehensive assessment (including a full mental state assessment) for all people using the service, required for the recovery plan. From this a recovery / care plan and risk assessment (including information of known risks) should be formulated to meet and manage identified needs and risks.”

    Source location

    2015-0011-Response-by-Devon-Partnership-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 January 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Reassess CRHT patients before discharge when increased risks have been identified.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Action 2 Recommendation: That the CRHT team reassess individuals prior to discharge where increased risks have been highlighted.”

    Source location

    2015-0011-Response-by-Devon-Partnership-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 January 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Record all telephone calls received by CRHT teams in clinical records.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Action 3 Recommendation: That all phone calls received by CRHT teams are recorded in the clinical record.”

    Source location

    2015-0011-Response-by-Devon-Partnership-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 January 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Document discharge awareness and routinely consult and inform people and carers about CRHT discharge decisions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Action 4 Recommendation: That RiO notes and recovery plans regarding the discharge of people from the CRHT team clearly state whether the person involved and their carers are aware of the discharge.”

    Source location

    2015-0011-Response-by-Devon-Partnership-NHS-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 15 January 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Register both CRHT teams for the Triangle of Care initiative.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Action to address recommendation: That the CRHT team CTL communicates the importance of the clinical record indicating that people using the service and their carers are aware of discharge. That carers are being informed about discharge by both CRHT being signed up to the Triangle of Care initiative and is also monitored by CRSM/random audits.”

    Source location

    2015-0011-Response-by-Devon-Partnership-NHS-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 15 January 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Contact people on the day they are discharged from CRHT, using face-to-face or telephone contact according to risk.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Action 5 Recommendation: That, unless clinically indicated otherwise, the CRHT team always contact people (face to face or telephone) on the day that they are discharged from the team.”

    Source location

    2015-0011-Response-by-Devon-Partnership-NHS-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 15 January 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Increase OPMH consultant input and provide CRHT teams with direct access to OPMH consultants or named backup.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Action 6 Recommendation: That the OPMH team and the CRHT team carry out a review of how to improve communication between teams with recommendations and actions reported into the CRHT team and OPMH team.”

    Source location

    2015-0011-Response-by-Devon-Partnership-NHS-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 15 January 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Have CRHT staff attend weekly Rougemont discharge-planning meetings to improve Adult/OPMH communication.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Action 6 Recommendation: That the OPMH team and the CRHT team carry out a review of how to improve communication between teams with recommendations and actions reported into the CRHT team and OPMH team.”

    Source location

    2015-0011-Response-by-Devon-Partnership-NHS-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 15 January 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop recovery plans face to face with people using CRHT services whenever safe and practicable.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Action 7 Recommendation: That all cases open to the CRHT team have a recovery plan that is developed face to face with the individual.”

    Source location

    2015-0011-Response-by-Devon-Partnership-NHS-Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 15 January 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Consider the wishes and opinions of people receiving services in clinical decision making.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Action 8 Recommendation: That the wishes and opinions of people receiving services are always considered in the clinical decision-making process.”

    Source location

    2015-0011-Response-by-Devon-Partnership-NHS-Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 15 January 2015

    Open published response
  5. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    Frances Margaret Ann Bell · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Frances Margaret Ann Bell presented at Southend Hospital with abdominal pain on 30 March 2012, was discharged shortly after midnight, readmitted the next day, underwent abdominal surgery on 1 April, and died on 13 April 2012. The report identified very serious failings in her care, including no senior clinical input at presentation and an unacceptable delay before surgery, and noted that no Root Causes Analysis Investigation was carried out.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to conduct root cause analysis and develop lessons learned and an action plan

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) There was no Root Causes Analysis Investigation carried out which would have identified lessons learned and an action plan ”

    Source location

    Frances Margaret Ann Bell · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  6. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Agostino COSTA · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Agostino Costa died after an accidental fall in hospital on 12 May 2013, which hastened death from terminal disease. The principal concerns were staff confusion about falls-risk classification and management, inadequate training for a junior doctor, limited sharing of the hospital root cause analysis, and non-mandatory attendance at falls-prevention seminars.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to share root cause analysis learning with relevant staff

    Wider context from the report

    “4. The junior doctor present did not know how to deal with a patient post fall on the ward, though he had dealt with patients in the emergency unit who had fallen in the community. He had not attended the hospital training seminar on falls. 5. The hospital root cause analysis was not shared with all relevant members of staff, though it was signed off at the beginning of August. Thus learning points from it were completely lost to some. I heard that a great deal of work is being done in your trust to attempt to prevent falls and appropriately to treat patients when falls have occurred, but attendance at one of the monthly seminars run by the lead doctor for falls is not mandatory for all staff. ”

    Source location

    Agostino COSTA · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
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Data last updated 7 September 2026