Recurring concern

Unsafe close-range firearms operations

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First reported 2 Feb 2017•Latest report 8 Jul 2025

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures in close-range firearms operations by firearms officers, including shot accuracy, positioning near entrances or subjects, reactionary-gap controls, training, guidance and use-of-force safeguards where these directly control the safety of close-range armed operations.

Not included

  • Excludes general firearms licensing, medical-fitness assessment, weapon security and ammunition-control concerns that are not part of close-range operational firearms use.
  • Excludes shooting-range operations, recreational shooting and range-specific supervision unless the assertion concerns comparable close-range firearms operations by firearms officers.
  • Excludes generic police staffing, communication or incident-response deficiencies unless they directly impair the safety of close-range firearms operations.
  • Excludes the legality or justification of an individual use-of-force decision where no continuing deficiency in the close-range firearms control is identified.
Reports
2

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
3

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2017–2025

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
4

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

College of Policing1
Metropolitan Police Service1
West Midlands Police1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Coventry and Warwickshire

    AI-generated summary

    SEAN FITZGERALD · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    On 4 January 2019 in Coventry, Sean Fitzgerald emerged from the rear door of a house during a West Midlands Police firearms operation and was shot in the chest by a police firearms officer. He died at 6.55pm despite first aid and medical treatment. The report identifies concerns about inconsistent guidance and training on when to announce “armed police” and how firearms officers should position themselves near property entrances, including the risks associated with close proximity.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide specific briefing discussion or direction on when to announce “armed police”

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Training and practice in relation to timing of any announcement of “armed police” in police firearms operations involving containment of properties In the police operation in which Mr Fitzgerald was killed, the officers employed the tactic of “contain and call out with limited entry.” This involves firearms officers “containing” a property by surrounding it and providing firearms cover with their weapons; creating a breach by forcing entry; and “calling out” the subjects inside (directing them to leave through the point of breach), without the officers themselves entering. In evidence, it was explained that this is a very common tactic, which is used in a range of scenarios. ████████ a former senior firearms officer and armed policing lead within the College of Policing, gave evidence in the inquest. He explained that an integral part of the tactic is for officers to announce their presence by loud shouts of “armed police.” This warns those inside the property that it is the police forcing entry and informs them that the officers are armed. It was explained that this warning helps to avoid confusion and encourage compliance, thereby reducing the risk of harm to officers and occupants. The timing of the announcement is plainly important, and any potential for confusion or for making the announcement at the wrong time risks fatal consequences. ████████ said that the timing of any such announcement is not prescribed by national training or guidance, and that there is no “template” for when it should be done, although he understood that it would usually be made after achieving a breach (e.g. breaking down a door). The procedural and training documents (both national and from WMP) which were put in evidence in the inquest gave no detailed guidance on the subject. The Chief Firearms Instructor at WMP, ████████, gave evidence that WMP trains its officers to make the announcement after achieving a breach. The evidence of the officers involved in the operation as to the recommended or standard practice was inconsistent. The Strategic Firearms Commander said that he expected officers to announce themselves as armed police as soon as they were in position. The Operational Firearms Commander said that the shout should first be made as soon as the chainsaw was being applied to the door and again as the breach was made. One further member of the team said that he thought best practice was to give the shout as the chainsaw was being applied, but acknowledged that he had not done so on this occasion. Several other members of the team thought that proper practice was only to make the announcement after the door had been breached. The firearms briefing told the officers that method of entry would be conducted and “[o]nce breached, challenges will be made at the threshold and suspects will be handcuffed”. There was no further discussion or direction about when the officers should first announce their presence. In the event, the officers at the front of the property did not shout “armed police” before breaking down the two doors at the front of the property. Before any announcement was made, Mr Fitzgerald left through the rear door of the premises and was shot by Officer K, who was providing rear containment. In these circumstances, I am concerned that the guidance and training given to firearms officers on tactics of containing and entering properties (and specifically in relation to the containment and call out with limited entry tactic) does not ensure a clear and consistent understanding of when they should announce their presence, or what factors to consider in deciding when to make the announcement. I am also concerned that the topic was not the subject of more specific discussion or direction in the briefing. It is important that officers conducting these kinds of highly challenging firearms operation should have proper guidance on this subject. If the approach of different officers is inconsistent, there is the clear potential for mistakes to be made and for the lives of officers and others to be put at risk. I appreciate that expert firearms training officers are best placed to produce any further guidance, and that it may not be possible to have a hard and fast rule. However, the inconsistent views of highly trained officers which were given in this inquest indicate that the subject ought to be further addressed in training and in formal guidance. ”

    Source location

    SEAN FITZGERALD · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Insufficient training and guidance on positioning firearms officers close to property entrances

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) Training and practice in relation to positioning of firearms officers in operations against properties (including consideration of the reactionary gap) As set out above, in this case, Officer K was standing between 7 and 8 feet from the rear door of the property as Mr Fitzgerald left. He discharged his firearm within just over half a second of the door beginning to open. The jury found that he had acted lawfully, meaning that he had perceived a threat and had used force commensurate with the threat he perceived. They also found that he had acted reasonably in taking up the position which he took, given the briefing he had received. Nevertheless, the evidence at the inquest gave cause for concern in relation to the training and guidance given to firearms officers on how they should position themselves in operations against properties. In the inquest, two experts in cognition and perception, ████████ and ████████, explained that close proximity to a potential source of danger can have a psychological impact, significantly elevating a person’s perception of threat and potentially increasing the likelihood that they will respond with force. The experts considered that, in this case, such proximity was likely to have heightened Officer K’s perception of threat. The inquest heard evidence about the concept of the “reactionary gap”, a distance which officers are often trained to maintain between themselves and a subject who presents a threat. In evidence, ████████ discussed this concept, explaining that distance gives officers more time to assimilate information and respond to an approaching threat. ████████ explained that maintaining a reactionary gap prevents officers from being “closed down” by subjects. He said that officers are trained on the importance of distance in the context of containment tactics. The firearms training and guidance materials considered in evidence made limited reference to positioning and the reactionary gap. The WMP training materials required students to demonstrate an appropriate reactionary gap in one training exercise and to explain its importance in another. The College of Policing’s Authorised Professional Practice on Armed Containment described the benefit of distance, but in terms of reducing stress, tension and the likelihood of a close quarter confrontation. None of the materials gave any detailed consideration to the risks presented by close proximity (including close proximity to entrances rather than subjects) in the context of armed containment of properties. None explained the potential impact of proximity on threat perception and the likelihood that an officer will respond with potentially lethal force. I am concerned that the training and guidance given to firearms officers on how to position themselves, especially in operations against properties, does not include detailed consideration of the risks of taking up position in close proximity to entrances. It does not appear to address the effects of proximity on threat perception and the use of force. As with the first matter of concern, I recognise that it should be for expert firearms training officers to decide how to deal with this subject in training and guidance, and that there will inevitably be situations where a firearms officer has to take up position very close to a doorway or other entrance when containing a property. However, there appears to be a need for further consideration of this issue in the interest of minimising the risks of mistake of fact shootings in the future. Finally, I should stress that in raising this matter of concern, I am not detracting from the jury’s conclusions that Officer K’s use of force was lawful and that his decision on where to position himself was reasonable in light of the briefing and intelligence. ”

    Source location

    SEAN FITZGERALD · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 6 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Draft additional guidance for inclusion in authorised professional practice on armed policing and post-incident procedures.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Following consultation with stakeholders, most notably the Independent Office of Police Conduct (IOPC), who were also in receipt of a letter of concern regarding the same matter, additional guidance has been drafted for inclusion within The College authorised professional practice on armed policing (APP-AP) and the authorised professional practice on post-incident procedures following death or serious injury. The amended APP will be published within the next 2-3 weeks and in the interim the guidance has been published in a National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC) national circular and circulated to all police forces in the UK for immediate implementation. The amended guidance has been included in a practical scenario that formed the basis of this year’s annual College national Post Incident Manager (PIM) training which all PIMs must receive.”

    Source location

    Response from College of Policing
    Page 1 · response
    Published 15 July 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Publish the amended authorised professional practice guidance within the stated two-to-three-week timeframe.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Following consultation with stakeholders, most notably the Independent Office of Police Conduct (IOPC), who were also in receipt of a letter of concern regarding the same matter, additional guidance has been drafted for inclusion within The College authorised professional practice on armed policing (APP-AP) and the authorised professional practice on post-incident procedures following death or serious injury. The amended APP will be published within the next 2-3 weeks and in the interim the guidance has been published in a National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC) national circular and circulated to all police forces in the UK for immediate implementation. The amended guidance has been included in a practical scenario that formed the basis of this year’s annual College national Post Incident Manager (PIM) training which all PIMs must receive.”

    Source location

    Response from College of Policing
    Page 1 · response
    Published 15 July 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Publish the interim guidance in an NPCC national circular and circulate it to all UK police forces for immediate implementation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Following consultation with stakeholders, most notably the Independent Office of Police Conduct (IOPC), who were also in receipt of a letter of concern regarding the same matter, additional guidance has been drafted for inclusion within The College authorised professional practice on armed policing (APP-AP) and the authorised professional practice on post-incident procedures following death or serious injury. The amended APP will be published within the next 2-3 weeks and in the interim the guidance has been published in a National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC) national circular and circulated to all police forces in the UK for immediate implementation. The amended guidance has been included in a practical scenario that formed the basis of this year’s annual College national Post Incident Manager (PIM) training which all PIMs must receive.”

    Source location

    Response from College of Policing
    Page 1 · response
    Published 15 July 2025

    Open published response

  2. North London

    AI-generated summary

    James Kerry Fox · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    James Kerry Fox, who had been suffering from depression and anxiety, was shot by police officers after opening the door of his flat while holding an air weapon pointed in the officers’ direction. The inquest concluded that the death was lawful killing. The principal concerns included the accuracy of close-range shots, the lack of detailed contingency planning, the availability of less-lethal firearms and enhanced ballistic protection, firearms response tactics, and inconsistencies and lack of national standardisation in police firearms training.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inaccuracy of shots fired at close range

    Wider context from the report

    “1, The accuracy of shots fired at close range. A number of shots were fired at close range, (about 1 meter), resulting in a range if injuries spread over a large area including a gunshot wound to the head. ”

    Source location

    James Kerry Fox · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Maintain national armed-officer weapon-handling and shooting-accuracy standards, with regular reviews of training sufficiency.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “11. The MPS continues to maintain national standards in respect of armed officers weapon handling and shooting accuracy, and additionally reviews these standards regularly to ensure officers are trained sufficiently to meet the operational requirement based on threats encountered.”

    Source location

    2017-0014-Response-by-Metropolitan-Police
    Page 4 · response
    Published 2 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The available evidence does not establish that officers’ shooting accuracy was poor or that the head wound resulted from deliberately aiming at the head.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “9. It is possible one or both officers’ aim was adversely affected by the requirement to act quickly and instinctively. However, based upon the evidence available, no definite conclusion can be arrived at which would suggest either of the officer’s aim was poor. It is possible and plausible that the movement of James Fox’s body as he was hit may account for the location of the wounds. For example, the wound to head may have been the final shot fired which was directed into the torso but actually hit the head as James Fox fell backwards. Without any detailed and evidentially reliable reconstruction providing a basis for further examination, it would not be a fair conclusion that the officer’s accuracy was poor.”

    Source location

    2017-0014-Response-by-Metropolitan-Police
    Page 3 · response
    Published 2 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    National standards and regular review of armed-officer weapons handling and shooting accuracy are considered sufficient to meet operational requirements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “11. The MPS continues to maintain national standards in respect of armed officers weapon handling and shooting accuracy, and additionally reviews these standards regularly to ensure officers are trained sufficiently to meet the operational requirement based on threats encountered.”

    Source location

    2017-0014-Response-by-Metropolitan-Police
    Page 4 · response
    Published 2 February 2017

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026