Recurring concern

Unreliable recording of suicide-risk information

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First reported 9 May 2014•Latest report 12 Jan 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures in clinical or mental-health processes to record, update or maintain suicide-risk information, suicidal ideation, suicide-risk enquiries or related risk formulations in the designated risk-screening or care record.

Not included

  • Excludes generic clinical record-keeping deficiencies where suicide-risk information is not the material concern.
  • Excludes failures to assess suicide risk, escalate concerns or provide treatment when the relevant suicide-risk information was recorded adequately.
  • Excludes safeguarding, custody or police records unless the assertion specifically concerns recording suicide-risk information in a clinical or mental-health care process.
  • Excludes failures to communicate or transfer already accurate suicide-risk records where the recording process itself was reliable.
Reports
19

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
19

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2014–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
26

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

HM Prison and Probation Service3
NHS England3
Care UK2
Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust2
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust2
Pentonville Prison2
Tees, Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust2
Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust1
Central and North West London NHS Foundation Trust1
HCRG Care Services Ltd1
Herefordshire and Worcestershire Health and Care NHS Trust1
Lancashire & South Cumbria NHS Foundation Trust1
London Ambulance Service NHS Trust1
Mid and South Essex NHS Foundation Trust1
Midlands Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    STUART CHRISTOPHER JAMES BERRY · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    STUART CHRISTOPHER JAMES BERRY, who had a history of mental health issues and significant cocaine misuse, was remanded to HMP Chelmsford on 27 January 2024 after expressing an intention to end his life. He was found suspended in his cell about seven hours after arrival and died at Broomfield Hospital on 1 February 2024; the medical cause of death was hanging and the jury concluded suicide. The principal concerns included failures in mental-health care, communication and risk documentation, failure to share information about his extreme suicide risk, inadequate assessment and supervision in prison, and the accessibility of cell-window ligature points.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to document self-harm and suicide risk in clinical records

    Wider context from the report

    “In addition to failing to share crucial and obviously relevant information regarding Mr Berry’s extreme risk of suicide provided by the CPN at Court with prison staff, the jury found that the reception nurse, in the context of the clear information known to her, failed to: (a) document his risk of self-harm and suicide in the Systm One records and (b) failed to refer Mr Berry, that day, for an urgent review by the Mental Health team. CONCERN: Such comprehensive shortcomings in performance in respect of information sharing, conduct of assessments, basic documentation and escalation/referral on to relevant colleagues indicates (a) a failure in training of a very concerning kind, alongside (b) a failure in HCRG monitoring of standards, supervision and quality assurance processes to identify and address such extensive failures in performance. ”

    Source location

    STUART CHRISTOPHER JAMES BERRY · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 6 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review Prisoner Warning Notice alerts daily, record risk information in patient records, and alert relevant healthcare professionals, particularly mental health staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Safeguarding Administration and Patient Experience lead (appointed September 2025) reviews all PWN alerts on a daily basis, ensuring that the information is recorded within the patient’s records, and alerting all health care professionals, particularly Mental Health, to risk information concerning suicide and self-harm.”

    Source location

    Response from HCRG
    Page 2 · response
    Published 20 January 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce targeted SystmOne training, require basic training for new staff, and provide refresher training for existing staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Improving SystmOne Documentation and Clinical Recording Targeted SystmOne (the Clinical Computer System we use) training has been introduced to reinforce expected standards. North of England Care System Support (NECS) have been commissioned by NHS England to provide support for SystmOne and have arranged for all staff to have access to their training portal which has a suite of training packages. Our induction paperwork has been adapted to ensure that all new staff are provided with access and are required to attend SystmOne basic training. Existing members of staff have been provided with refresher training.”

    Source location

    Response from HCRG
    Page 2 · response
    Published 20 January 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide structured reception-nurse supervision, coaching, documentation audits, case-based feedback, and governance reporting to improve recording and escalation of mental-health risks.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition, the EDiC Nurse role provides structured supervision and coaching to reception nurses, including regular review of SystmOne entries, case-based feedback, and support to improve clinical reasoning and documentation. This approach provides ongoing assurance that mental health risks are clearly recorded, appropriately escalated, and visible to all relevant professionals.”

    Source location

    Response from HCRG
    Page 3 · response
    Published 20 January 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review the need for an interim documentation and workflow support post before NOVA implementation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To further support sustainable improvements in documentation quality and workflow, EPUT is reviewing the need for an interim post dedicated to assisting with documentation and workflow management ahead of the planned implementation of NOVA, the Trust’s new electronic patient record (EPR) system.”

    Source location

    2026-0015 - Response from Essex Partnership University Foundation Trust
    Page 6 · response
    Published 20 January 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review existing EPR capability for consolidated personalised-care and safety-planning records and update standard operating procedures.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Until NOVA is fully operational, EPUT continues to maintain robust interim monitoring arrangements to support safe and timely documentation. Alongside this, the Trust is currently reviewing the requirements for personalised care planning and safety planning documentation, with the aim of determining whether the existing EPR can accommodate a single, consolidated place for recording and update associated standard operating procedures. This work is intended to reduce the burden associated with navigating multiple tabs and scattered documentation fields, making it easier for clinicians to record care consistently and for teams to access essential information quickly.”

    Source location

    2026-0015 - Response from Essex Partnership University Foundation Trust
    Page 6 · response
    Published 20 January 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Monitor clinical-documentation timeliness and quality through supervision, monthly performance reporting, and targeted follow-up.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As set out in our earlier response to the Prevention of Future Deaths report, we continue to monitor adherence to the 95% target for clinical documentation to be completed within 24–48 hours of patient contact. This is overseen through a combination of:”

    Source location

    2026-0015 - Response from Essex Partnership University Foundation Trust
    Page 7 · response
    Published 20 January 2026

    Open published response
  2. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    DAVID WAYNE BENNETT · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    David Wayne Bennett died by hanging on 13 June 2023 after being found suspended by a ligature, with cocaine and alcohol ingestion. He had a history of drug-induced psychosis and had sought help for deteriorating mental health, psychosis and lack of sleep before his death. Concerns included inadequate sharing and recording of mental-health and primary-care information, unclear urgent-care pathways, failures to escalate requests for urgent medication review, and insufficient mental-health assessment and liaison at hospital.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to accurately record contact and suicidal ideation in mental health records

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) Recent contact with the primary care mental health records did not appear to be accurately recorded in the System One Records with suicidal ideation not recorded. ”

    Source location

    DAVID WAYNE BENNETT · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver focused SystmOne training on recording suicidal ideation and review template completion fields with Mental Health Practitioners.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Response: SystmOne has a template to complete to record the Mental Health Assessment and also a template for risk assessment for the primary care nurse to complete. On the risk assessment there are boxes to check for suicidal thought and self-harm. If these are checked a dialogue box opens up for further information to be added. If the patient is not suicidal there will not be any information recorded. Although SystmOne training is mandatory for it to be used, the Trust will now arrange ensuring training on how to use the system for recording suicidal ideation specifically as a focus. We can confirm that a training session for Basildon and Brentwood Mental Health Practitioners planned for the 29 April 2025, where fields for completion in the templates used on SystmOne will be reviewed to ensure all MHPs are proficient in using SystmOne.”

    Source location

    Response from Essex Partnership University NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 18 February 2025

    Open published response
  3. Worcestershire

    AI-generated summary

    Oliver Davies · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Oliver Davies died by suicide by hanging in his cell at HMP Hewell on 31 December 2022. The concerns included delayed and incomplete mental health assessment, failures to share relevant information about his self-harm and suicide risk, inadequate prioritisation and follow-up by the mental health care coordinator, and failures to keep him informed about healthcare and appointments.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to highlight recent mental-health and self-harm risk information in medical records for clinical assessment

    Wider context from the report

    “1) Oliver had been at HMP Hewell since 20.10.22. He was a man with long-standing mental health issues, for whom this was a first experience of custody. After a steady deterioration in his mental state, a mental health referral on 17.11.22 led to a belated mental health examination conducted by a registered learning disability nurse on 6.12.22. In the week leading up to the nurse’s assessment: (a) A prison officer had made an urgent TAG mental health referral on 30.11.22, citing concerns that Oliver was experiencing active thoughts of self-harm or suicide, and that he (the officer) had “mild concerns” about intentional self-harm, and there were “definite indicators” of unintentional self-harm; and (b) Oliver himself had submitted a healthcare application form asking to see a doctor, saying that he was “extremely depressed”, his anxiety was “really high” and he was “not coping at all, please help”; These important events were not highlighted on Oliver’s SystmOne medical record, and so the nurse conducting the assessment 6.12.22 was not aware of either of these important recent events, and did not take them into account when assessing Oliver; ”

    Source location

    Oliver Davies · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Ensure TAG referrals and healthcare applications are added to and visible in SystmOne.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “There is also now, a clear process for the management of TAG referrals and Healthcare applications ensuring that they are added to and visible in SystmOne.”

    Source location

    Response from Midlands Partnership NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 October 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Reinforce reviewing recent electronic patient-record activity before assessment or intervention through incident-meeting messages, governance dissemination, management reminders and supervision.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The importance of staff familiarising themselves with recent clinical activity from the electronic patient record has been highlighted to all Inclusion staff as part of the key messages that arise from our monthly Health in Justice Serious Incident Meeting.”

    Source location

    Response from Midlands Partnership NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 October 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Document patient concerns in SystmOne so subsequent staff can identify raised concerns and plan care and treatment to mitigate risk.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Following Mr Davies death, all MPFT colleagues at HMP Hewell have participated in specific clinical supervision focused on the importance of listening to and responding to prisoner concerns. To further support this, the team holds daily team meetings, monthly business meetings, weekly healthcare huddles, and weekly Safety Intervention Meetings (SIM) meetings; all of which have recorded minutes where prisoners' concerns are addressed. Information from the SIM meetings is disseminated to care coordinators via email, ensuring that tasks arising from these discussions can be actioned promptly. All patient concerns are documented on SystmOne by the person who is notified of the concern so that anyone looking at the”

    Source location

    Response from Midlands Partnership NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 October 2024

    Open published response
  4. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Kieran Lavin · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Kieran Lavin, who had experienced worsening depression and suicidal thoughts, died after leaving a mental health unit with his wife for transport to another facility. Shortly afterwards, on the M5 motorway, he exited the vehicle and was struck by vehicles. The principal concerns were that critical suicide-risk information was not recorded or recorded promptly, and that the transport risk assessment and guidance for family transport were inadequate.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to record critical suicide risk information completely and promptly

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Critical suicide risk information was not recorded at all or not recorded in a timely manner. On 10/12/23, the experienced nurse did not record at all in the 'suicide' box on the 'level 1 – risk screening' the first report of suicidal ideation via road traffic collision. She described this omission as an error and the likely explanation was that she was the only nurse working on a very busy shift. On 11/12/23, the experienced nurse did not in a timely manner record in the ‘suicide’ box on the ‘level 1 – risk screening’ the second report of suicidal ideation via road traffic collision received by 11am. She said the likely explanation for not updating the ‘suicide’ box until 8:51pm (and after the nurse-in-charge made his transport risk formulation) was that she was the only nurse working on a very busy shift. The experienced Nurse-in-Charge did not record at all the transport risk formulation saying that was not his usual practice. The Patient Safety Manager said long standing trust policy required clinicians to record key information as soon as possible. I am not persuaded this long standing policy is sufficient by itself to remove the risk in the future of critical suicide risk information not being recorded at all or in a timely manner given three experienced nurses within 24 hours failed to follow the policy. ”

    Source location

    Kieran Lavin · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review and revise Psychiatric Decisions Unit handover standards to require urgent information to be documented and communicated before transport, discharge and other significant decisions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The quality and standards of the handover process in the PDU will be reviewed, with particular attention to ensuring that critical information is documented and communicated before key decisions, such as patient transport, are made. The handover process will also be revised to establish clear standards that require the documentation and communication of urgent information prior to any significant decisions, including patient discharge.”

    Source location

    Response from Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 9 August 2024

    Open published response
  5. Manchester North

    AI-generated summary

    Teresa Chmielek · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Teresa Chmielek took her own life at home on 17 June 2023, after a referral to mental health services concerning her suicide risk was rejected without contact or a face-to-face review. The concerns included failure to identify or recognise the reported recent suicide attempt, lack of meaningful multidisciplinary discussion and direct contact, inadequate referral arrangements and documentation, and the absence of procedures and auditing for referral decisions.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to record recent suicide attempts in screening MDT notes

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The notes made by the SPoE Nurse for use during discussion at the screening MDT meeting did not include any reference to the report of a recent suicide attempt and the Court was not satisfied that the risk of suicide had been identified or recognised by the SPoE Nurse ”

    Source location

    Teresa Chmielek · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  6. East Sussex

    AI-generated summary

    Christopher Richard ALLUM · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Christopher Richard Allum had escalating mental health issues and a history of deliberate self-harm before being admitted to the Langford Centre on 14 May 2022. He was found unresponsive in his room on the evening of 15 May 2022, and death was confirmed at 23:01; the inquest concluded that he died as a result of suicide. The concerns identified included gaps in obtaining and recording previous methods of self-harm and relevant family information at referral and admission, and difficulties accessing NHS notes in private healthcare settings.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to obtain and record previous methods of self-harm and suicide at referral and admission

    Wider context from the report

    “Initial referral - there seems to be a gap at the initial referral and admission stage in obtaining information about and recording previous methods of self-harm and suicide. There also appears to be a gap in the seeking and recording of relevant information from an individual's family at the point of referral and admission. An individual's family is often able to provide detailed and useful information about events that may not have been previously reported and/or be able to bridge the gap in communications between various health agencies involved in someone's care. Access to notes - the other concerning issue is the difficulty prevalent within the private sector in accessing of NHS notes. It appears to be the position across the private sector that access to an individual's notes is not provided as standard. This means that there may be a significant gap in the information available when someone is admitted to a premises run by a private healthcare provider, even within an NHS allocated bed. This gap in information can have an impact on an individual's risk assessment and their subsequent care plan. ”

    Source location

    Christopher Richard ALLUM · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Amend the initial referral form to require referrers to record previous suicide methods and self-harm methods, with explanations for incomplete information.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In order to address concerns relevant to The Langford Centre, we have been liaising with SPFT, and the following corrective measures have been agreed with our partners to be implemented from 1st January 2024;”

    Source location

    Response from Bramley Health
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 November 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Amend initial medical and risk assessments to capture patients’ previous suicide attempts and self-harm histories.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In order to further explore possible past suicide attempts and to ensure full capture of a patient’s self-harm history at the admission stage, both the initial medical assessment and formation of risk assessment, completed by the triaging doctor at Langford, include the same subsections.”

    Source location

    Response from Bramley Health
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 November 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Roll out company-wide training for staff handling referrals, initial assessments, ward rounds, and multidisciplinary meetings on the amended processes and requested information.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Finally, as there have been amendments to our initial processes, training updates have been rolled out company wide. This includes training to staff who triage our initial referral documents, medical doctors who conduct the initial assessments and consultants who oversee our ward rounds and MDT’s. All staff have been fully informed of the additional processes and the sensitivities surrounding the nature and detail of the information being requested.”

    Source location

    Response from Bramley Health
    Page 3 · response
    Published 14 November 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Publish guidance on information sharing and holistic assessment during admission, including key actions within 72 hours.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Christopher’s case does highlight the importance of effective information sharing to support providing the best care possible where individuals are transferred between different care settings. That is why joined up partnership working is one of the four key principles underpinning NHS England’s guidance on Acute inpatient mental health care for adults and older adults that was published in July 2023. This document provides specific advice on good practice on information sharing as well as guidance on the holistic assessment that should take place when someone enters a new facility, including identifying any safeguarding or risk issues, including risk to self and others. This includes guidance on the key actions that should take place within 72 hours of admission which include:”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 November 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Referring Trusts or bodies are responsible for completing previous suicide-method information in the initial referral form.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “a) Our initial referral form has been amended to include an additional field, entitled ‘Previous Suicide Methods’, which must be completed by the referrer. This field includes a supporting sub-section headed ‘Previous Suicide Methods Used,’ which is intended to record details of the self-harm methods.”

    Source location

    Response from Bramley Health
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 November 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Langford Centre, operated by an independent provider, is the appropriate organisation to respond to concerns about information collection and recording.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Langford Centre is operated by Bramley Healthcare, an independent Mental Health Care Provider providing services within the South of England. I note that you have also addressed your Report to the Centre, and they would be the appropriate organisation to respond to the above concerns. NHS England will carefully review and consider their response to you.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 14 November 2023

    Open published response
  7. Manchester City

    AI-generated summary

    Antony Declan Schofield · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Antony Declan Schofield, who had recurrent depressive disorder and a history of suicidal thoughts and behaviour, was found dead at home on 27 August 2019 after taking an overdose. The report identified concerns about incomplete risk assessment before discharge, inadequate transfer and communication to the community team, insufficient review of escalating suicide risk, missed opportunities to assess changes in presentation, and deficiencies in records, auditing and the subsequent investigation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to maintain adequate records of suicide-risk enquiries

    Wider context from the report

    “1. a. No thorough comprehensive risk review was undertaken by a member of staff who had detailed knowledge of the deceased prior to his discharge from the inpatient unit. This was not identified before he left the ward and it was not discovered by the HBTT when they took over his care. b. The transfer and communication process from inpatient care to the HBTT appeared inadequate. b. There was no clear plan to deal with the risk of his condition deteriorating and him experiencing significantly more suicidal thoughts as well as obtaining the means by which to kill himself. It is well known that a history of suicidal thoughts and actions increases the risk when they are repeated. c. When he disclosed that he bought ████████ there was no risk review planning involving a senior HBTT clinician which was then monitored even when he indicated that he had received it. d. On several occasions before he died the deceased saw members of the HBTT but they failed to demonstrate professional curiosity and enquire about his suicidal thoughts and plans. There were either adequate or no records about this. e. There were a number of missed opportunities for the HBTT to assess changes in his presentation and risk profile. f. There was no robust audit system for checking compliance with the trust own policies and protocols in particular with regard to medical record keeping, risk assessments and reviews. g. The GMMH SUI investigation report contained several factual errors and misinterpretations. It was only discovered at the inquest hearing that one of the last members of HBTT staff to see the deceased had given an account that was not the same as given to their line manager. This meant the all the lessons for future care and planning were not learnt. There was inadequate overview of the report before it was signed off. ”

    Source location

    Antony Declan Schofield · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce a structured HBTT note format prompting documentation of visit purpose, presentation, and risk to self and others.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Following the Trust’s review into Mr Schofield’s death it was acknowledged that the documentation was not always in keeping with Trust Record Keeping Policy in respect of the notes being recorded in the clinical record and that they did not always reflect the discussions that were occurring with the patient and so had the potential to impact on communication and decision making within the team. The HBTT SOP has been updated and states that clinical risk and management are reviewed at each contact with the service user and changes responded to where necessary and escalated to the MDT if necessary. Since the review, in addition to the daily MDT meetings, HBTT have introduced a structured note format to prompt staff to review and record the purpose of the HBTT visit, how the patient was presenting and specific prompts in respect of assessing risk to self and others.”

    Source location

    2021-0324-Response-from-Greater-Manchester-Mental-Health_Published
    Page 4 · response
    Published 5 October 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Train HBTT staff in contact requirements and documentation, supported by senior colleagues to embed the process.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “All staff have undergone training in respect of what they should be addressing in an HBTT contact and how this should be recorded and have received support from senior colleagues to embed the process. Since the introduction of the structured note the Team Manager has put into place a process whereby senior undertaking supervision select notes to review prior to the staff members supervision, as per Trust Supervision Policy. There is also a quarterly audit planned to be undertaken across the team in respect of record keeping providing assurance that this structured note is being adhered to and record keeping is in line with Trust policy. The Trust Clinical risk policy and training has been updated to reflect the use of professional curiosity, this training is mandatory and all staff should attend the training every three years as a minimum.”

    Source location

    2021-0324-Response-from-Greater-Manchester-Mental-Health_Published
    Page 4 · response
    Published 5 October 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require senior staff to review selected clinical notes before supervision sessions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “All staff have undergone training in respect of what they should be addressing in an HBTT contact and how this should be recorded and have received support from senior colleagues to embed the process. Since the introduction of the structured note the Team Manager has put into place a process whereby senior undertaking supervision select notes to review prior to the staff members supervision, as per Trust Supervision Policy. There is also a quarterly audit planned to be undertaken across the team in respect of record keeping providing assurance that this structured note is being adhered to and record keeping is in line with Trust policy. The Trust Clinical risk policy and training has been updated to reflect the use of professional curiosity, this training is mandatory and all staff should attend the training every three years as a minimum.”

    Source location

    2021-0324-Response-from-Greater-Manchester-Mental-Health_Published
    Page 4 · response
    Published 5 October 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct quarterly team audits of record keeping and compliance with procedures and clinical risk policy.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “All staff have undergone training in respect of what they should be addressing in an HBTT contact and how this should be recorded and have received support from senior colleagues to embed the process. Since the introduction of the structured note the Team Manager has put into place a process whereby senior undertaking supervision select notes to review prior to the staff members supervision, as per Trust Supervision Policy. There is also a quarterly audit planned to be undertaken across the team in respect of record keeping providing assurance that this structured note is being adhered to and record keeping is in line with Trust policy. The Trust Clinical risk policy and training has been updated to reflect the use of professional curiosity, this training is mandatory and all staff should attend the training every three years as a minimum.”

    Source location

    2021-0324-Response-from-Greater-Manchester-Mental-Health_Published
    Page 4 · response
    Published 5 October 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Records indicate that HBTT staff explored risk and made care plans, although documentation did not always reflect discussions with the patient.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The clinical records show that HBTT staff did review Mr Schofield prior to his discharge from Safire ward including risks to self and on 20 August 2019 when the records identify risk was explored and a plan of care that included Mr Schofield being given numbers for the Crisis Line, Sanctuary and Crisis Point. During the assessment by the Clinical Psychologist on 26 August 2019 issues in respect of ████████ thoughts were explored including risk during which Mr Schofield indicated he was able to keep himself safe and denied any thoughts to ████████ himself in any way and a plan arising from that assessment was made accordingly.”

    Source location

    2021-0324-Response-from-Greater-Manchester-Mental-Health_Published
    Page 4 · response
    Published 5 October 2021

    Open published response
  8. Central Hampshire

    AI-generated summary

    Andrew Goldstraw · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Andrew Goldstraw was found hanging in a cell at HM Prison, Winchester, on 14 November 2018, having taken his own life using a ligature made from torn bed linen. The report raised concerns that relevant information about his previous suicidal ideation and self-harm attempts was difficult for healthcare staff to identify in SystmOne, that the system could hinder effective risk assessment, and that staff training may have been inadequate. The inquest jury found that an ACCT should have been opened and that its absence would have more than minimally helped to prevent his death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to maintain accurate and usable summary and active-problem risk information

    Wider context from the report

    “B. SystmOne makes it difficult for a doctor or mental health nurse to ascertain the key information needed to undertake a risk assessment and to decide whether or not to open an ACCT. Too much reliance is placed on the individual prisoners presentation and how he answers a series of pre-set questions. C. At best, SystmOne makes it difficult for a mental health nurse to ascertain the relevant information and at worst it actively misleads them. For example, a search can be made of the "journal" section but this would rely on the exact words being searched (such as "suicide" or "deliberate self-harm") and it would then be necessary to go through the various entries (in Mr Goldstraw's case spread over 111 pages) using the "Key Word Search" function. Further, the functions that would (on the face of it) serve to assist in this situation (such as the "Summary" page or "Active Problems" section) were not populated with the information relevant to an accurate assessment. It was conceded by the legal representatives acting on behalf of CNWL that the "Summary" section is "very limited in its contents" and is not routinely used by healthcare staff within the prison in order to gain an insight into a prisoner's past medical history. D. The "Active Problems" section of SystmOne is subdivided in to a number of distinct areas and it appears to be wholly inadequate in terms of identifying key areas of concern such as the risk of suicide or deliberate self-harm. The only information contained in the "Active Problems" section of SystmOne in Mr Goldstraw's case was four years out of date. None of the relevant information was contained in "Active Problems" but a great deal of irrelevant information was there! E. The "Communications" section of SystmOne contains a chronological record of correspondence with the hospital, GP surgery and psychiatric units. However, the "Key Word Search" facility does not function at all and short of going through all of the correspondence there is no way of identifying the key information needed to undertake an effective risk assessment. The "Communications" section in Mr Goldstraw's case amounted to 83 pages. Although the relevant information concerning Mr Goldstraw's mental health issues was contained within the "Communications" section of SystmOne there was no way of easily extracting it. F. Accordingly, a busy, under pressure mental health nurse or doctor is very likely to struggle to find the relevant entries using SystmOne, which may explain why (in Mr Goldstraw's case) too much reliance was placed on how he presented during interview. A prisoner who chooses not to disclose his true state of mind or suicidal ideation is unlikely to come to the notice of the healthcare staff whose job it is to identify the risk that he may pose to himself because SystmOne does not facilitate this. ”

    Source location

    Andrew Goldstraw · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Distribute guidance and a standard process for reviewing, entering and linking diagnoses and problems in SystmOne.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The usefulness of the “Problem section” is reliant on the information added to it by whichever establishment the patient is in. However, CNWL offender care have sent out a memo to all staff to inform them how to review problems which are on the SystmOne record. In addition, since this inquest, CNWL Offender Care have sent out the SystmOne guidance section in how to input diagnosis data and link it to consultations in a standard way across the service. This is referred to as “creating a problem”. To ensure this memo is acted upon, Offender Care will undertake a review of the use of problem section in conjunction with their annual medical records audit. This audit generates site specific action plans highlighting areas for improvement.”

    Source location

    2020-0041-Response-from-Central-and-North-West-London-Foundation-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 9 March 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review use of SystmOne’s problem section through the annual medical-records audit and assign improvement actions where required.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The usefulness of the “Problem section” is reliant on the information added to it by whichever establishment the patient is in. However, CNWL offender care have sent out a memo to all staff to inform them how to review problems which are on the SystmOne record. In addition, since this inquest, CNWL Offender Care have sent out the SystmOne guidance section in how to input diagnosis data and link it to consultations in a standard way across the service. This is referred to as “creating a problem”. To ensure this memo is acted upon, Offender Care will undertake a review of the use of problem section in conjunction with their annual medical records audit. This audit generates site specific action plans highlighting areas for improvement.”

    Source location

    2020-0041-Response-from-Central-and-North-West-London-Foundation-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 9 March 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Train all staff during induction to use SystmOne’s problem functionality and audit its use through quarterly care-quality meetings.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “This functionality has the potential to be very helpful if used appropriately as, for instance, every episode of self-harm could be linked to a problem “Self-harm” meaning all episodes are collated in one place. CNWL has sent out guidance to all staff on how to manage problems on SystmOne. Training will be provided on “problems” for every member of staff during their induction. The use of problems on SystmOne will be audited through the Offender Care, Care Quality Meetings initially on a quarterly basis to review progress of this function.”

    Source location

    2020-0041-Response-from-Central-and-North-West-London-Foundation-Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 9 March 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The accuracy of SystmOne’s problem list depends on all providers updating records, not solely on CNWL.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Problem list is populated by staff who use SystmOne. CNWL are not the only provider who use SystmOne and therefore an accurate Problem list is dependent on”

    Source location

    2020-0041-Response-from-Central-and-North-West-London-Foundation-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 9 March 2020

    Open published response
  9. West London

    AI-generated summary

    Henry Curtis-Williams · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Henry Curtis-Williams died from hanging at Acton Cemetery on 17 May 2018; the inquest conclusion was hanging and suicide. Concerns included inadequate contemporaneous recording, discharge by junior doctors without prior senior review, and informal communication without records of important messages.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to record contemporaneous clinical notes, including presence or absence of suicidal ideation

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) That following admission to Southgate Ward Henry Curtis-Williams was seen by a number of different staff members. It became evident that there was a culture of not recording contemporaneous notes. This was very obvious with reference to recording presence or absence of suicidal ideation. ”

    Source location

    Henry Curtis-Williams · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  10. Blackpool and the Fylde

    AI-generated summary

    Adam James Carter · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Adam James Carter died on 10 September 2017 after absconding from The Harbour mental health facility during escorted leave and falling from the fifth floor of a car park. The principal concern was inadequate record keeping about Adam’s risks, leave arrangements, leave authorisation and assessment before leave, which could affect staff decisions about patient safety.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to document and clearly formulate patient risks in the medical records

    Wider context from the report

    “The concern relates to record keeping. During his independent review of this matter, a Consultant Psychiatrist identified some discrepancies within the medical records including the following: • Although he felt that the therapeutic team had an understanding of the extent to which Adam posed a risk of: - aggression and violence; - self harm; - suicidal behaviour; - absconding; He did not feel that these risks were documented or clearly formulated in the medical notes. • He stated that there was very little detail in the documentation as regards Adam’s use of leave nor of care planning of his leave. The rationale for leave having been granted was not recorded nor were the benefits and risks associated with leave. • He was unable to find a record of an assessment of Adam’s clinical state by nursing staff immediately before the period of escorted ground leave on 10th September 2017 as required by trust policy (although he did not feel that this would have any bearing on the decision to afford Adam leave on this occasion). • He could not find a copy of the Leave Authorisation that granted Adam leave and felt that documentation of leave fell short of the guidance laid out in the Trust policy for the authorisation of section 17 leave of absence. Clearly the quality of record keeping is important in the context of a detained mental health patient. Adam had spent some time in a Psychiatric Intensive Care Unit and then a number of days on an acute inpatient ward prior to the events of 10th September 2017. The level of risk such a patient poses as regards issues such as the risk of self harm and absconding are fundamental to the care provided. Plans were being made for Adam to be discharged and into the community rather than back to his parents’ home and he was being afforded the opportunity to build towards that discharge by granting him leave which was an important step in progressing towards that goal. However, such decisions need to be made appropriately and informed by how the risk a patient poses is viewed at that time. It is vital that the basis for such decisions is clear from the records. If this does not happen then I have a concern that future deaths may result – inevitably patients such as Adam are cared for by a team consisting of different staff performing different shifts. Staff taking over the care of a patient such as Adam ought not to have to rely on the verbal information provided to them and handover of that patient’s care but need to have the opportunity to read the records and to remind themselves how the risk their patient poses is viewed by for example the relevant Consultant Psychiatrist, and why he or she has been granted leave. The court heard that escorted grounds leave was granted to Adam but that nursing staff had discretion as regards whether that leave went ahead and they may exercise such discretion subject to how Adam presented, his behaviour on the ward etc. If they cannot access accurate and informative records, such staff may make decisions that are not in the interests of their patients. Leave may proceed on a basis not felt to be safe. Leave may be declined because the staff member – unable to access the relevant information – decides to err on the side of caution and declines leave to the detriment of that patient’s progress and the condition of his / her mental health. It seems to me that if an independent consultant psychiatrist has conducted a review and identified these issues in relation to records it should inevitably prompt a concern on my part that unless I write a report such as this one future deaths may result. I therefore raise the concern. I cannot be prescriptive about what action should be taken and I make no recommendations but simply raise the issue. At the conclusion of the inquest, I indicated to the Properly Interested Persons that I proposed to write to the Department of Health by way of a report in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 7 of Schedule 5 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. ”

    Source location

    Adam James Carter · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Prompt nursing teams to reassess patients’ risks and mental state immediately before leave and document the decision in clinical records.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Once leave has been agreed by the Multi Disciplinary Team, the nursing team on each ward will be prompted to fully consider the patients risks and state of mind immediately prior to the patient taking this leave, and reminded to document their up to date decision in the clinical record.”

    Source location

    2018-0226-Response-by-Lancashire-Care-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 23 September 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Include the actions’ impact in a clinical audit, then review findings and provide feedback through team clinical supervision.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The impact of the above actions will be included in a clinical audit in January 2019. Matrons and ward managers will then review the findings from these audits and feed the results back during clinical supervision with their teams.”

    Source location

    2018-0226-Response-by-Lancashire-Care-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 September 2018

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026