Recurring concern

Unreliable electronic medication-system controls for safe prescribing and administration

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First reported 26 Oct 2021•Latest report 7 Apr 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of electronic medication systems or their dedicated medication workflows that affect medication units, concentrations, strengths, conversions, pre-populated values, selectable prescribing choices or other system controls directly governing safe prescribing or administration.

Not included

  • Excludes generic electronic-record failures where the concern is access to or communication of clinical information rather than a medication-system control.
  • Excludes medication prescribing, dispensing or administration errors where no electronic medication-system deficiency is identified.
  • Excludes generic software usability or configuration problems unrelated to medication safety.
  • Excludes failures limited to reviewing, communicating or acting on medication information after the electronic medication system has operated as intended.
Reports
6

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
7

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2021–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
5

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Lewisham and Greenwich NHS Trust2
NHS England2
Bedfordshire Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust1
HM Prison and Probation Service1
Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency1
Oracle Corporation UK Limited1
Practice Plus Group1
Riverview Surgery1
Royal College of General Practitioners1
Royal College of Physicians1
Royal Pharmaceutical Society1
Thameside Prison1
University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Inner South London

    AI-generated summary

    Mark Robert Smith · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mark Robert Smith, who was detained at HMP Thameside, died after an epileptic seizure led to cardiac arrest. The report describes concerns about medication prescribing and administration, hospital-to-prison discharge and communication, access to his cell, observation arrangements and records, staffing, and the lack of equipment for resuscitation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure safe and clearly understood medication-system operation

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The wrong dose of medication could be prescribed and/or administered with life threatening consequences. Albeit I have seen evidence of significant improvements in prescribing practice at HMP Thameside since 2019 (e.g HMIP report February 2026); as recently as 2024 to 2025 HMIP and IMB reports noted “significant risks with management of medicines” and “prescribing errors.” Whilst recent internal audits in 2025 show significant improvements, medication incidents (datix) are recorded in late 2025 and the principal pharmacist notes a very busy site with multiple prescriptions screened daily. Further, during the inquest it proved difficult to establish how Systm 1 (the medical note system) operated and whether there were risks inherent in the system itself. For example, it was suggested the system would convert mg into ml or pre-populate entries such as 100ml, in contradiction to the subsequent PFD evidence provided. (Practice Plus Group) ”

    Source location

    Mark Robert Smith · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report
  2. Sunderland

    AI-generated summary

    Avery Jake Hall · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Avery Jake Hall died at Sunderland Royal Hospital on 13 November 2024, aged four days, after developing global hypoxia and diffuse alveolar damage following his birth. The report was concerned that his mother continued taking Candesartan during pregnancy because she was not given clear and definitive advice to stop it, and that the medication remained available on repeat prescription without warnings identifying her pregnancy.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of system warnings identifying pregnancy during repeat prescribing

    Wider context from the report

    “I am concerned that despite advice from the GP that it was best to stop all medication during pregnancy, Candesartan remained as a repeat prescription and, in addition to that, there were no warnings placed on the system which would have alerted the clinician approving the request for the repeat prescription that the patient was pregnant thus necessitating a review. ”

    Source location

    Avery Jake Hall · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Add pregnancy-stop warnings to electronic prescribing instructions so they appear on pharmacy-printed medication labels.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3. As set out in the SEA, a review of all female patients of child bearing age who are prescribed ARB medication was to be undertaken every 6 months and an alert added to their prescription to stop taking this medication if they become pregnant and to speak to their GP. The frequency of this review has now been increased to 3-monthly in light of the risks of this medication in later pregnancy. In addition, as most prescriptions are now electronic rather than paper copies, the alert will be added to the prescribing instructions section so that it is clearly shown on the label printed for the patient’s medication by the pharmacy when they collect their medication.”

    Source location

    Response from Riverview Surgery
    Page 2 · response
    Published 2 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review all women of childbearing age taking ARB medicines and add prescription alerts advising immediate cessation and GP consultation if pregnancy occurs.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1. I reviewed all women of childbearing age taking Candesartan and indeed taking any ARB medication.”

    Source location

    Response from Riverview Surgery
    Page 5 · response
    Published 2 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Manually reviewing every repeat medication request and creating linked pregnancy alerts is impractical due to workload and lack of technical IT skills.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I have also considered further whether it is possible to identify or flag a pregnant patient when they request repeat medication. This would be an important safeguard for doctors reviewing the two hundred or so repeat medication requests received on a daily basis. Due to their volume and the other priorities for clinicians’ time, it is not practical for the doctor to review each patient’s records when authorising every request. We do not have the technical IT skills at the practice to make changes to the computerised records system and I have therefore contacted our system provider EMIS to ask for their advice and input on whether it is possible, and if so how, to introduce a flag which would identify the pregnancy coding on the patient’s record and link it to the repeat prescriptions for the patient (and ideally include the BNF advice for that medication as well).”

    Source location

    Response from Riverview Surgery
    Page 2 · response
    Published 2 February 2026

    Open published response
  3. Inner South London

    AI-generated summary

    Paula Doreen Hughes · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Paula Doreen Hughes was admitted to hospital after a fall and received paracetamol in excess of the recommended dose because paracetamol was prescribed alongside co-codamol. The overdose was not recognised until she had developed fulminant acute liver failure, and timely treatment was not provided. The principal concerns included preventing duplicate paracetamol prescriptions and administration, recognising and managing therapeutic excess, accurately assessing confusion, recording over-the-counter medicines, mitigating confirmation bias, and providing guidance for virtual patient reviews.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Risk of loss or dilution of prescribing safety nets during electronic system changes

    Wider context from the report

    “1. In respect of preventing concurrent prescriptions of paracetamol containing drugs and otherwise preventing prescribing errors resulting in therapeutic excess of paracetamol (NHSE, RPS, Cerner, MHRA, LGT) (1) NHSE, RPS, Cerner, MHRA I consider that the risk of concurrent prescriptions of paracetamol containing drugs is of wider national concern. The Cerner prescribing system offers a duplicate checking functionality that is not a standard feature. It is hard stop and can be overridden and was not adopted by the LGT when the system was introduced. All the healthcare professionals were aware that co-codamol contained paracetamol and should not be prescribed with paracetamol. However, the 2 prescribing doctors failed to recognise that Mrs Hughes was already prescribed a paracetamol containing drug. 2 nurses failed to recognise they were administering 2 paracetamol containing drugs. A pharmacist failed to identify the concurrent prescriptions during reconciliation. (2) LGT LGT’s response to the incident was swift and commendable. A hard stop was introduced to the electronic prescribing system which eliminated concurrent prescriptions of paracetamol containing drugs. Further refinements of the system significantly reduced therapeutic excesses of paracetamol based on weight, which had been identified as an issue when investigating Mrs Hughes’ death. However, it is my understanding that consideration is being given to changing the electronic record and prescribing system. My concern is that during any move to a new system, the safety nets introduced by the Trust will be diluted or lost. ”

    Source location

    Paula Doreen Hughes · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Liaise with NHS England about preventing prescribing systems from dispensing two concurrent medicines containing paracetamol.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have liaised with NHSE with regard to the ability of the prescribing system to dispense two concurrent medicines containing paracetamol and we understand they will incorporate learning from this incident into the commissioning of the ePRaSE tool.”

    Source location

    Response from Medicines & Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Seek assurance that Epic will implement iCare paracetamol safety features when introduced across the three Trusts.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In May 2027, the Trust will be joining Epic, an electronic records and prescribing system shared by our neighbouring Trusts, Guy’s and St Thomas’ NHS Foundation Trust (GSTT) and King’s College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust (KCH).”

    Source location

    Response from Lewisham and Greenwich NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response
  4. Bedfordshire and Luton

    AI-generated summary

    Jacqueline GREEN · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jacqueline GREEN was admitted to Bedford Hospital after a fall and was found to be very weak, frail, cachectic and dehydrated. She received paracetamol at a dose intended for patients weighing over 50 kg despite weighing 33.6 kg, subsequently developed paracetamol-induced liver injury and died from liver failure. The concerns included inadequate safeguards for prescribing paracetamol to low-weight adults, unexplained variation in the administration of doses, and incomplete implementation of relevant safety measures.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure accurate patient weights are entered before paracetamol prescribing

    Wider context from the report

    “3. Despite the PSII report referencing the 2022 HSSIB report and recommending that this should be shared with staff, relevant Safety Observations made in the HSSIB Report appear to have been insufficiently addressed: (a) Although Bedford Hospitals NHS Trust are now using the Nevercentre electronic record system which, since 28th February 2024, has included the height and weight of patients and prevents a prescribing doctor from prescribing without a patient’s weight having first been entered, staff are still able to enter a estimated weight and there do not appear to be any alerts on this system to advise of the need for weight accuracy in the prescription of oral paracetamol and consideration of the risk of liver toxicity in those weighing under 50 kg (as advised in Safety Observation 02/2022/151); (b) Whilst the PSII report states as an Action that “Patients should be weighed on admission and the information documented”, other than the provision of a ‘pat slide’, no other practical actions are planned for actually achieving this outcome, particularly in respect of those adults at risk of an unintentional paracetamol overdose, such as an alert aimed at those administering medication as well as those prescribing it (as advised in Safety Observation 02/2022/151). ”

    Source location

    Jacqueline GREEN · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Absence of electronic alerts for weight accuracy and liver-toxicity risk in oral paracetamol prescribing

    Wider context from the report

    “3. Despite the PSII report referencing the 2022 HSSIB report and recommending that this should be shared with staff, relevant Safety Observations made in the HSSIB Report appear to have been insufficiently addressed: (a) Although Bedford Hospitals NHS Trust are now using the Nevercentre electronic record system which, since 28th February 2024, has included the height and weight of patients and prevents a prescribing doctor from prescribing without a patient’s weight having first been entered, staff are still able to enter a estimated weight and there do not appear to be any alerts on this system to advise of the need for weight accuracy in the prescription of oral paracetamol and consideration of the risk of liver toxicity in those weighing under 50 kg (as advised in Safety Observation 02/2022/151); (b) Whilst the PSII report states as an Action that “Patients should be weighed on admission and the information documented”, other than the provision of a ‘pat slide’, no other practical actions are planned for actually achieving this outcome, particularly in respect of those adults at risk of an unintentional paracetamol overdose, such as an alert aimed at those administering medication as well as those prescribing it (as advised in Safety Observation 02/2022/151). ”

    Source location

    Jacqueline GREEN · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Add EPMA prescribing prompts requiring accurate weight recording and appropriate paracetamol dosing, including liver-toxicity warnings below 50 kilograms.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “There is now a prompt when prescribing paracetamol (all routes) on EPMA that reminds prescribers of the need to ensure there is an accurate weight recorded and that the dose is appropriate.”

    Source location

    Response from Bedford Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 11 April 2025

    Open published response
  5. Inner South London

    AI-generated summary

    Juanita Boate Nti · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Juanita Boate Nti had complex congenital diseases and was receiving palliative care at home. She received twenty times the intended morphine dose after the prescription and symptom control plan failed to clearly specify the volume, and the prescription contained two different concentrations. She suffered respiratory arrest and died following an accidental morphine overdose, with concerns also identified about the EMIS prescribing system not offering the relevant morphine strength.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unavailability of an appropriate morphine strength as a prescribing choice on EMIS

    Wider context from the report

    “The hospital originally prescribed 120 micrograms of morphine sulphate 6 hourly and dispensed 100 micrograms per ml solution, but the strength and volume to be administered were not clearly recorded on the plan sent to the GP. The mother requested her GP by telephone to continue the prescription. The GP found only one strength of morphine on the EMIS prescription system, 10mg/5ml, confirmed to be the lowest strength available in the British National Formulary. He wrote this in the first line of the prescription and then confusingly further added “100 micrograms per ml solution, 120 micrograms 6hrly”. The pharmacist did not notice that the second line contained a different concentration and dispensed the higher dose without stipulating the volume to be administered. The baby received 3mg instead of the intended 150 micrograms. Whilst both GP and pharmacist made errors in clinical practice and did not contact each other, the error would not have occurred had another strength of morphine been a choice on EMIS. EMIS have been notified and placed the special prescription on its drug data base. The local commissioning group is conducting a project to identify other special prescriptions that are not on EMIS that may pose a similar risk to safety. ”

    Source location

    Juanita Boate Nti · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  6. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Christopher COLLINSON · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Christopher Collinson was admitted to Birmingham Heartlands Hospital with suspected deep vein thrombosis and pulmonary embolism, but was not seen by a doctor for several hours. He was prescribed a prophylactic rather than therapeutic dose of Enoxaparin, later suffered a cardiac arrest, and died on 15 June 2021. Concerns related to the patient-allocation system not making it clear when an allocated patient had not been seen, and the electronic prescribing system not requiring a secondary medication check.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the electronic prescribing system to require a secondary medication-selection check

    Wider context from the report

    “2. The current electronic prescribing system does not require a Doctor to perform a secondary check that they have selected the correct medication. I am concerned that it is all too easy to select the wrong medication, particularly when the department is busy and Doctors are under pressure. This could lead to fatal outcomes for patients if given incorrect medication. ”

    Source location

    Christopher COLLINSON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Additional prescribing double-checks are unlikely to improve safety and may increase risk through alert fatigue.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “There is however little evidence to suggest that introducing an additional double-check into the individual prescriber’s workflow improves patient safety. On the other hand, there is evidence of risks associated with introducing many more alerts. This is a consequence of alert fatigue discussed in more detail below.”

    Source location

    2021-0361-Response-from-Queen-Elizabeth-Hospital_Published
    Page 3 · response
    Published 2 November 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing EPMA systems and processes sufficiently minimise medication risk, so no additional prescribing double-check is introduced.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Based on the review of our systems and relevant literature, we are confident that the systems and processes that we have in place are sufficient to minimise risk to our patients. We are satisfied that our decision not to introduce an additional double-check step has been carefully considered and is consistent with the collective approach of those responsible for introducing and maintaining EPMA systems.”

    Source location

    2021-0361-Response-from-Queen-Elizabeth-Hospital_Published
    Page 4 · response
    Published 2 November 2021

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026