Recurring concern

Unsafe interoperability between prison custody and healthcare procedures

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First reported 13 Jan 2014•Latest report 20 May 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of the dedicated prison custody–healthcare interface, including incompatible or poorly understood procedures, unclear responsibilities, inadequate appreciation of each function's limitations, and failures to share safety-relevant information needed for coordinated prisoner care.

Not included

  • Excludes generic inter-agency cooperation or communication failures with no explicit prison custody and healthcare interface.
  • Excludes failures confined to a single healthcare process, such as clinical assessment or treatment, where cross-function interoperability is not the unsafe condition.
  • Excludes ordinary prison staffing, training or facility deficiencies unless they directly prevent custody and healthcare procedures from operating safely together.
  • Excludes custody-transition medical-information failures where the concern is limited to transferring or reviewing records rather than wider interoperability of procedures and responsibilities.
Reports
35

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
40

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2014–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
88

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

HM Prison and Probation Service17
Ministry of Justice10
Department of Health and Social Care4
Oxleas NHS Foundation Trust4
Care UK3
NHS England3
Northamptonshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust3
Pentonville Prison3
Prisons and Probation Ombudsman3
Government Legal Department2
Herefordshire and Worcestershire Health and Care NHS Trust2
HM Inspectorate of Prisons2
Lowdham Grange Prison2
Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust2
Practice Plus Group2

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Inner West London

    AI-generated summary

    Robert John Richards · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Robert John Richards died by suicide after being found hanging by a sheet in his cell at HMP Wandsworth on 29 July 2014. The report identified concerns about bullying, extortion, inadequate risk management and communication, unsuitable cell allocation, staffing and training, and failings in resuscitation equipment and procedures.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequate communication between healthcare, psychological, psychiatric and prison staff

    Wider context from the report

    “7. That the communications interface between the medical staff, those supplying psychological support and psychiatric services needs to be improved, as does the communication of these staff with prison officers, such that risks of self harm and bullying are appropriately communicated and acted upon. ”

    Source location

    Robert John Richards · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
  2. Cambridgeshire and Peterborough

    AI-generated summary

    Peter Lawrence · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Peter Lawrence was remanded into custody at HMP Peterborough and, on 02.02.15, was found in a prison workshop toilet cubicle having stabbed himself with a chisel; he was taken to hospital where death was confirmed. The concerns related to identifying and recording suicide or self-harm risks during the initial screening of first-time prisoners, and to the absence of meaningful interaction with a custodial officer who could help identify and manage such risks.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to communicate less obvious suicide and self-harm risk factors

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The inquest heard a great deal of evidence relating to the process for identifying, managing and recording risk at the first point of contact between new prisoners and prison/healthcare staff. Mr Lawrence had not been in prison before and there was very little background information available to enable staff to identify less obvious risk factors, particularly in relation to the nature of the alleged offences. It was accepted in evidence that it was of particular importance at the initial screening to identify risk by other means and to record any observations in a comprehensive manner for future reference. HMP Peterborough has put in place a number of measures in recognition of the concern that suicide/self harm risk is identified at the earliest stage, even if no ACCT document is opened. The concern that risk factors may be missed or inadequately recorded has been addressed locally but there may be scope to expand awareness that individuals entering prison for the first time may be accompanied by only limited information. The situation is worsened where there is limited information available about the nature of the alleged offending. The identification and communication of less obvious risk factors is crucial; ”

    Source location

    Peter Lawrence · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  3. Leicester City and South Leicestershire

    AI-generated summary

    Ahmedreza Fathi · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Ahmedreza Fathi was a serving prisoner at HMP Gartree who died by suicide in May 2015 through a combination of plastic bag asphyxia and multi-drug toxicity. The report identified concerns about inadequate case planning, fragmented communication and information-sharing, inappropriate observation levels, and insufficient response to an earlier overdose.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of ready access to relevant risk-assessment and case-management information across healthcare and prison records

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Healthcare complex case planning was not robust or effective, and was not reviewed or updated in response to subsequent events. Multi-disciplinary team meetings, if they took place, were not formalised and there was no ready access to all relevant information relating to risk assessment and case management through either System1 (the medical record storage and case management system) held by healthcare, or the ACCT document held by the prison. ”

    Source location

    Ahmedreza Fathi · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 5 · concerns

    Open source report
  4. Worcestershire

    AI-generated summary

    Matthew Colin SARGENT · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Matthew Colin SARGENT was a serving prisoner who died in his cell at some time between 25 and 26 September 2014. The jury concluded that he committed suicide and raised concerns about the systematic, accurate and clear sharing of historical and current information between prison and healthcare departments.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to inform Healthcare staff when prisoners arrive with an ACCT history

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) There was a concern that Healthcare staff were not made aware of prisoners who arrive with an ACCT history and it was suggested that Healthcare should be informed in all cases where a prisoner arrives at reception with an ACCT history so that there is a continued sharing of pertinent information. ”

    Source location

    Matthew Colin SARGENT · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to supply Prisoner Escort Records to Healthcare staff at reception

    Wider context from the report

    “(4) There was a concern that the Prisoner Escort Record (highlighting concerns and risks) was not supplied to the Healthcare Department and nurses at reception. It was suggested that this should be an imperative requirement for the further sharing of relevant information. ”

    Source location

    Matthew Colin SARGENT · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review the reception screening process to develop a standard first-reception screening template across prison healthcare settings.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As stated above, Care UK was not the healthcare provider at HMP Long Lartin at the time of Mr Sargent’s death. Going forward, the Care UK suicide prevention strategy will be shared and rolled out across all sites. In addition, since taking over healthcare responsibility on 1 April 2016, Care UK plans to review the reception screening process to introduce a standard template for first reception screening across its prison healthcare settings. We are also looking at the process of information gathering on reception and the culture around this. We will expect staff to ask ‘Where is the information for this patient?’ and the SystemOne template will reflect this, ensuring that staff cannot proceed without seeking out the information and recording reasons why, in instances where the information is not available.”

    Source location

    Matthew-Sargent-Response
    Page 2 · response
    Published 7 April 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update the SystemOne reception template to require staff to seek available information and record reasons when it is unavailable.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As stated above, Care UK was not the healthcare provider at HMP Long Lartin at the time of Mr Sargent’s death. Going forward, the Care UK suicide prevention strategy will be shared and rolled out across all sites. In addition, since taking over healthcare responsibility on 1 April 2016, Care UK plans to review the reception screening process to introduce a standard template for first reception screening across its prison healthcare settings. We are also looking at the process of information gathering on reception and the culture around this. We will expect staff to ask ‘Where is the information for this patient?’ and the SystemOne template will reflect this, ensuring that staff cannot proceed without seeking out the information and recording reasons why, in instances where the information is not available.”

    Source location

    Matthew-Sargent-Response
    Page 2 · response
    Published 7 April 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Ensure reception information-gathering processes are clear and effective.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We will ensure our processes for obtaining information on reception are clear and effective and build relationships with local community providers to improve information flow. Furthermore, we will record lack of information at reception on our incident system so that we understand the extent of the issues and can monitor trends and share good practice. We recognise that we cannot rely solely on the first night reception and that on-going assessment over several days is essential in order to ensure we are aware of any changing clinical picture and to take account of any new information that arrives.”

    Source location

    Matthew-Sargent-Response
    Page 2 · response
    Published 7 April 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Remind prison and healthcare staff to check the PER every time and escalate unavailable records through a Datix incident report.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In order to ensure robust communication and partnership working going forward we will continue to work closely with our prison partners on this and in particular, the Head of Healthcare is working to address the concern with the Safer Custody Governor. In addition, all (prison and healthcare) staff have been reminded that they must see the PER on every occasion and that non-access should be escalated within the prison via a datix incident report. If the staff member does not have access, an incident form should be completed as soon as it is apparent that a PER isn’t available.”

    Source location

    Matthew-Sargent-Response
    Page 3 · response
    Published 7 April 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Prison Service staff are responsible for examining and sharing PER and ACCT information with healthcare staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “These two points raise similar issues and can be answered together. It is the responsibility of prison service staff to share information with other departments and agencies both internal and external. PSI 74/2011 (First Days in Custody) sets out the requirement for the Person Escort Record (PER) form to be examined in Reception by prison staff to identify any immediate needs and risks and for this information to be forwarded to other staff and agencies as necessary, including healthcare. PSI 74/2011 sets out the mandatory requirements for prison staff and healthcare in respect of a prisoner’s ACCT status, ACCT alerts and risk assessments. Care UK thus expects PSI 74/2011 to be followed and that prison personnel will record a prisoner’s ACCT status on their record and share this and any concerns with Healthcare.”

    Source location

    Matthew-Sargent-Response
    Page 3 · response
    Published 7 April 2016

    Open published response
  5. County Durham and Darlington

    AI-generated summary

    Derek Thomas · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Derek Thomas died by suicide while in HMP Durham after arriving on remand and undergoing reception and first-night induction. Information suggesting suicidal intent was not adequately communicated or identified because of failures involving the SASH and PER forms across escort, prison reception and healthcare staff. The report raised concerns about procedures failing under demanding but foreseeable conditions, unclear inter-agency responsibilities, inadequate tracking of information, and poor interoperability between agencies.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of GEOAmey, prison and healthcare procedures to inter-operate safely

    Wider context from the report

    “(5) That the above concerns go to the issue of the inter-operability of GEOAmey and prison and healthcare procedures, which is not yet addressed by any of the agencies. I note that the pilot scheme is designed to improve “information sharing” between agencies. I am concerned that this case provides a paradigm example of not just a failure in communication between agencies but a deeper failure in properly appreciating each other's procedures and potential weaknesses where they are supposed to inter-connect. Looked at holistically, the system is demonstrated to be dysfunctional in this case. ”

    Source location

    Derek Thomas · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require reception staff to verbally hand over self-harm warnings and relevant court-return information to First Night Centre and healthcare staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As well as the above procedures, reception staff must verbally hand over any self-harm warnings to the officer from the First Night Centre. Should a prisoner be returning from a court appearance the reception staff must verbally hand over this information directly to the health care staff. The verbal hand over is in addition to the Health Care staff receiving all of the documentation received on each prisoner.”

    Source location

    2015-0502-Response-by-NOMS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 December 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Hold monthly meetings between prison operations and the escort contractor to communicate procedural changes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Communications between agencies – The Head of Operations at HMP Durham meets with the escort contractor on a monthly basis. Any changes in procedures are communicated at this meeting. The entire contract is managed by a NOMS monitor. Escort contractor managers make on-site visits to observe the process. There are seven individual providers that make up the healthcare function. A monthly prison operational and clinical governance meeting is held and any issues between the prison and healthcare can be discussed at this meeting.”

    Source location

    2015-0502-Response-by-NOMS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 December 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Hold monthly prison operational and clinical governance meetings to discuss issues between prison and healthcare services.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Communications between agencies – The Head of Operations at HMP Durham meets with the escort contractor on a monthly basis. Any changes in procedures are communicated at this meeting. The entire contract is managed by a NOMS monitor. Escort contractor managers make on-site visits to observe the process. There are seven individual providers that make up the healthcare function. A monthly prison operational and clinical governance meeting is held and any issues between the prison and healthcare can be discussed at this meeting.”

    Source location

    2015-0502-Response-by-NOMS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 December 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Engage with other agencies to develop and share best-practice procedures and documentation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We appreciate other agencies’ procedures and have devised and revised our SOPs to comply with the HM Prison Service’s requirements set out in the PSOs and PSIs. We engage in dialogue with other agencies (where possible) to develop best practice, procedures and documentation to be shared between the agencies.”

    Source location

    2015-0502-Response-by-GEOAMEY
    Page 3 · response
    Published 15 December 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unable to address individual staff and local HMP Durham issues because it no longer provides healthcare there.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As you are aware Care UK Clinical Services Limited (“Care UK”) ceased to be the providers of primary healthcare services at HMP Durham and for the North East cluster of prisons on 31st March 2015 and as of 1st April the providers appointed was G4S Medical Services who I note are also copied into your letter.”

    Source location

    2015-0502-Response-by-Care-UK
    Page 1 · response
    Published 15 December 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Ministry of Justice has final responsibility for policy, procedures and documentation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The final say on policy, procedures and documentation is with the MOJ to whom we are contracted.”

    Source location

    2015-0502-Response-by-GEOAMEY
    Page 3 · response
    Published 15 December 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The contractor has no contract, contact or input regarding prison healthcare provision, policies or procedures.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We do not have any contract, dialogue or contact with the Healthcare provider at HMP Durham nor with any Healthcare provider at any prison across the UK. The contract for the provision of Healthcare facilities and the policies and procedures in place is between the MOJ and the Healthcare provider. We have no input into this.”

    Source location

    2015-0502-Response-by-GEOAMEY
    Page 3 · response
    Published 15 December 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The system is not dysfunctional; correct PER completion and document reading by prison and healthcare staff address interoperability concerns.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is unclear what further inter-operability could be put in place other than the correct completion of the PER by our officers (and/or others) and the reading of PER and SASH Forms by the prison and the Healthcare provider. Accordingly, we are of the view that the system is not “dysfunctional”.”

    Source location

    2015-0502-Response-by-GEOAMEY
    Page 4 · response
    Published 15 December 2015

    Open published response
  6. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Dean Ronald Edmund BOLAND · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Dean Ronald Edmund Boland was found unresponsive in his cell at HMP Birmingham on 17 April 2015 and was pronounced dead shortly afterwards. Post-mortem examination confirmed multiple drugs in his system, and the inquest concluded that he died from mixed drug toxicity. The principal concerns included inadequate awareness, communication, monitoring, searching and security measures relating to drug use within the prison.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of prison, health and DART workers to share drug issue information adequately

    Wider context from the report

    “2. There is a lack of multi-disciplinary approach to drug issues within the prison. The evidence heard at the inquest confirmed that prison officers, health workers and DART workers do not adequately discuss trends and general drugs issues to ensure all staff are up to date and aware of the problems. It is accepted that patient’s confidentiality needs to be maintained but it is essential to discuss trends and significant events in a multi-disciplinary way. ”

    Source location

    Dean Ronald Edmund BOLAND · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Hold monthly drug-strategy meetings, require B-Wing officers to attend, and require detox and recovery staff to confirm they have read the minutes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Drug strategy meetings are being held monthly and the purpose of these meetings is to discuss current issues and trends around drug misuse within the prison and to agree actions and strategies going forward. These meetings are attended by a cross-functional group of interested parties including clinical staff, residential managers and DART workers. From 9 December 2015 there has been mandatory attendance at these meetings from prison officers who work on B Wing. All staff on the detox and recovery unit will be required to sign a document indicating that they have read the minutes of the meeting each month. Also included in this meeting is discussion of those prisoners receiving opiate substitution medications who have failed both mandatory and compliance based drugs tests.”

    Source location

    2015-0468-Response-by-NOMS
    Page 1 · response
    Published 25 November 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Discuss drug-misuse trends in monthly drug-strategy and security meetings and identify and implement risk-reduction actions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Issues around the misuse of illicit drugs and prescribed medication are discussed during monthly drug strategy and security meetings. During the meeting trends and issues around drug misuse of all kinds are discussed and actions to reduce the risk and likelihood of these occurrences are identified and put in place. Due consideration is given to confidentiality, but this does not prevent discussion around these issues.”

    Source location

    2015-0468-Response-by-NOMS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 25 November 2015

    Open published response
  7. Worcestershire

    AI-generated summary

    Liam SMITH · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Liam Smith was admitted to HMP Hewell on 7 August 2014 and died after taking a combination of prescribed and illicitly obtained medication in his cell. The concerns included possible failures to follow mandatory ACCT procedures, inadequate dissemination and recording of medical information, and limited healthcare interaction with high-risk drug users, potentially resulting in warning signs being missed.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to disseminate relevant medical risk information to staff involved in prisoner care

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) Evidence was given that certain medical information which arrived at the prison with Mr Smith was not disseminated to those in reception for those who had later dealings with him which meant that they were unaware of the potential risk of suicide or self harm. It was suggested by some witnesses that documentation "goes astray" and is only found much later. ”

    Source location

    Liam SMITH · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review reception procedures and establish recorded communication between reception staff and escort providers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is accepted that the reception processes in relation to communicating with escort staff were not as robust as ideally they should have been. Both the prison and healthcare provider have reviewed their procedures in respect to ensure that systems are in place that communication between reception staff and the escort provider is recorded appropriately. In Mr Smith's case it appears that the Person Escort Record (PER) was not used appropriately, in that the medical in confidence information provided by health care professionals in the court was not attached to the PER.”

    Source location

    2015-0382-Response-by-NOMS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 18 September 2015

    Open published response
  8. Manchester City

    AI-generated summary

    Craig Douglas Bell · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Craig Douglas Bell was found dead in his cell at HMP Manchester on 13 December 2012 after taking his own life by hanging using a self-constructed ligature. He had a history of self-harm and suicidal ideation and was subject to ACCT procedures. The principal concerns included inadequate sharing of risk information, insufficient senior psychiatric involvement in discharge planning, the lack of a graduated risk-management plan, and limited availability of safer or CCTV-monitored cells for prisoners at risk of suicide.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to share timely information about risk and suicidal or self-harming behaviour between clinical and HMPS staff

    Wider context from the report

    “2. I am concerned that the appropriate sharing of information relating to risk and suicidal or self harming behaviour did not take place between the clinical team and HMPS staff. For example, the direct threat of suicide made at the review on the 27 November 2012 was not disclosed to HMPS staff. Appropriate, timely mutual information exchange had not taken place and there is a concern that this may be vital but may be overlooked if steps are not taken to make this a matter of routine. It means that clinical staff have to be able to review the clinical record appropriately and share information with their HMPS colleagues. ”

    Source location

    Craig Douglas Bell · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 5 · concerns

    Open source report
  9. Mid Kent and Medway

    AI-generated summary

    Alex Kelly · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Alex Kelly, a vulnerable 15-year-old looked-after child, died in hospital after suspending himself from a ligature made from his shoelaces while detained at Cookham Wood Young Offenders Institution. The report identified concerns about the lack of a forensic psychiatric assessment, failures in communication and information sharing, weaknesses in the ACCT safeguarding process, conflicts between disciplinary procedures and suicide prevention, and inadequate management of his medication and welfare.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to flag medication non-compliance for clinical and custodial action

    Wider context from the report

    “Re: Secretary of State for Justice Alex Kelly a vulnerable looked after child of 15 years with complex unresolved emotional issues and unmanaged mental health issues was sentenced to a Detention and Training Order to be served at a Young Offender’s Institution without the benefit of a forensic psychiatric assessment. Whilst I heard evidence from a psychiatrist associate of Cookham Wood YOI that the mental health in-reach team were able to address Alex’s mental health needs whilst in custody, I am aware of the deaths of a number of other children in custody who similarly had not had forensic psychiatric assessments and it is for this reason I am reporting the concern. Whilst hearing evidence in relation to lessons learned I heard from the Service Manager of Medway Youth Offending Team that they have now secured the services of a psychiatric mental health nurse to assist them in the effective management of the young people for whom they have responsibilities which I was told was proving effective and is to be continued. Alex Kelly was under an ACCT between the 23rd December 2011 and 3rd January 2012 and 6th January 2012 until his death. During the operation of the ACCT there was a continued conflict between the ACCT process and disciplinary procedures; outside agencies and carers were not asked to contribute; specific acts by Alex were seen as obstructive/challenging behaviour rather than signs of distress or a means of communicating that he needed help (his foster carers who had not been asked to contribute had some experience of Alex using non-verbal methods of communication); the ACCT reviews tended to focus on addressing specific or recent behaviours rather than the reason for the behaviour; although Alex was frequently mentioned at weekly safer regimes multidisciplinary meetings, a holistic approach was never adopted as to how he could best be supported or whether the YOI could support his needs. Re: Tower Hamlets 1. Allocation a) Alex Kelly was without a named social worker for a period of two months at a time when he was in danger of being sent to custody and after he was sent to custody. Difficulties in allocation were not escalated to senior management 2. IT a) Social workers did not transfer documentation including emails onto Framework in a timely manner or at all b) There was no system in place for ensuring that urgent electronic communications were flagged/diverted when the recipient was absent from work 3. Custody a) Social workers did not all appear to appreciate that their responsibilities as Corporate Parent included a role in a looked after child’s welfare whilst in custody Re: Medway Youth Offending Team 1. Involvement with other agencies a) Shortcomings in other agencies which affected the ability of the YOT to manage the young person were not brought to the attention of management 2. Placement within the Secure Estate a) There were inconsistencies in recommendations as to placement in a STC/YOI which were not reconciled b) Youth Offending Team keyworkers did not all appear to appreciate that their responsibilities included a role in the young person’s welfare whilst in custody c) Members of the Youth Offending Team did not all appear to appreciate that the Youth Offending Team could initiate a transfer within the secure estate 3. Caseworker based at Cookham Wood YOI a) Outside agencies sharing responsibility of the welfare of a young person in custody and foster carers were not kept informed of significant events, asked to participate in ACCT reviews or asked for input into the management of the young person b) Although involved in the ACCT reviews the caseworker was unaware of the range of options available to safely manage the young person including requests to transfer to a different type of secure accommodation and the use of enhanced reviews c) Paperwork was not submitted for early release on the basis of non-compliance with the regime and concerns about absence of a placement without consultation with any person responsible for making decisions in relation to early release Re: Cookham Wood YOI 1. Communication with outside agencies a) Outside agencies sharing responsibility of the welfare of a young person in custody and foster carers were not kept informed of significant events, asked to participate in ACCT reviews or asked for input into the management of the young person 2. ACCT a) Officers were inconsistent in the recording of significant events; entries being made in either the wing observation log, ACCT ongoing record or not at all b) At least one officer did not appear to appreciate the importance of significant incidents/disclosures or report them c) Significant events in a lengthy ongoing record were not highlighted and therefore not obvious to officers reviewing safeguarding provisions d) Officers were unaware of the need to involve outside agencies in the ACCT review process, the range of options available to them to safely manage the young person including requests to transfer to a different type of secure accommodation and the use of enhanced reviews e) The safer regimes meetings were not provided with all relevant information and were not used to their full effect. The minutes of the meetings were not fully recorded f) A holistic approach was not taken to the safe management of the young person during ACCT reviews or Safer Regimes meetings when it was apparent that he was struggling with the regime and that interventions were not working 3. Conflict between Regimes a) Officers did not always seek advice before placing the young person on report for tattooing when there was an indication in the ACCT documentation that adjudication awards would lead to a heighted risk of self-harm b) There was a conflict between the use of a behaviour improvement plan and adjudications which was not recognised at the time 4. Early Release a) Paperwork was not submitted for early release on the basis of non-compliance with the regime and concerns about absence of a placement without consultation with any person responsible for making decisions in relation to early release 5.Cell entry a) There appeared to be an inflexible approach to cell entry requiring the presence of three prison officers even though YOI was in patrol state and concerns were sufficient to require entry Re: Healthcare at Cookham Wood NB: the service provider has changed since the death of Alex Kelly. The new provider is in the process of determining the systems and procedures being put in place at Cookham Wood 1. Sharing of Information a) Officers concerned with the management of the young person were not informed in terms of his non-compliance with medication and the potential effect of the failure to take the medication 2. Medication management a) a)Medication was found stockpiled in the young person’s cell; staff dispensing medication had not ensured it had been taken when it was probably recorded as having been taken b) b)Any failure to take medication was not sufficiently flagged for healthcare/prison staff to deal with the issue 3.Recording of information a) Not all occasions when the young person was seen by the in-reach team were recorded on System One ”

    Source location

    Alex Kelly · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Record medication refusal, non-attendance, diversion or failed ingestion and notify relevant healthcare and custodial staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Healthcare staff are aware of the need to inform all those involved in the management of a young person about their compliance with medication and to record such issues within the medical record and other prison documentation – ACCT, NOMIS and wing observation book. All healthcare staff complete mandatory trust and HMPS Information Governance training, which also includes information sharing guidelines. The process is embedded in established clinical and safer custody forums.”

    Source location

    2014-0555-Response-by-Oxleas-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 December 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Share medication non-compliance concerns through cross-agency handovers, electronic tasks, prison communication records, and relevant safeguarding processes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Our healthcare staff are acutely aware that non-compliance with certain prescribed medications may indicate that a young person’s mental state has deteriorated, or that it may deteriorate in future. This can result in planned or impulsive self-harm or suicidal acts. Healthcare staff are therefore required to share this knowledge with other partners for patients receiving psychotropic and other potentially harmful medications.”

    Source location

    2014-0555-Response-by-Central-North-West-London-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 December 2014

    Open published response
  10. Portsmouth and South East Hampshire

    AI-generated summary

    GARRY GILBEY · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Garry Gilbey developed worsening arm, chest and breathing symptoms while imprisoned and was later diagnosed with inoperable lung cancer after being admitted to hospital on 25 June 2012. He died on 3 July 2012. The substantive concerns included unclear ambulance-call procedures and emergency thresholds for prison officers, inadequate communication of healthcare events to night staff, and failures to ensure that specialist investigations were arranged, completed and properly checked.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to consistently record and flag key healthcare events between daytime and night-time staff

    Wider context from the report

    “3. There was no clear or consistent system to flag key healthcare events during the day and there seemed to be a variable practice/policy in place that not all healthcare staff seemed to be familiar with or followed so that less relevant information was recorded such as an additional pillown being supplied yet important information such as nebuliser treatment or having a low threshold for medical review if symptoms reoccur or worsen was not consistently recorded in a way that would enable daytime medical staff to flag prisoner healthcare concerns to night-time prison staff. ”

    Source location

    GARRY GILBEY · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing professional guidance requires accurate clinical records and sharing relevant information with colleagues, addressing handover and communication concerns.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The bodies regulating medical professionals have published comprehensive guidance for clinicians within the prison service, including communicating with non-clinical prison staff.”

    Source location

    2014-0533-Response-by-Department-of-Health
    Page 2 · response
    Published 10 December 2014

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026