Recurring concern

Failure to initiate 999 calls promptly when life is at risk

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First reported 15 Apr 2016•Latest report 26 May 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures in arrangements for recognising when a 999 call is required and initiating it promptly, including staff or service switchboards directing service users or other unqualified callers to make the call when the responsible service should do so.

Not included

  • Excludes ambulance call handling, dispatch, attendance and hospital handover failures after a 999 call has been initiated.
  • Excludes decisions about whether ambulance attendance is required where the failure is not the initiation of the 999 call itself.
  • Excludes non-emergency police or healthcare contact routes unless the report identifies a life-threatening situation requiring 999 initiation.
  • Excludes the broader emergency response after the call has been made.
Reports
7

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
8

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2016–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
7

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Aspray House1
Avon and Wiltshire Mental Health Partnership NHS Trust1
Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust1
Bourne Leisure Limited1
East Sussex Healthcare NHS Trust1
Hampshire and Isle of Wight Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust1
NHS England1
Office of the Chief Coroner1
Rocky Lane Medical Centre1
Sussex Partnership NHS Foundation Trust1
University Hospitals Sussex NHS Foundation Trust1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. West Sussex, Brighton and Hove

    AI-generated summary

    Kristian Edward Allen · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Kristian Edward Allen, who had complex mental health issues and a history of drug and alcohol abuse, died at Millview Hospital on 16 February 2025 after taking heroin, cocaine and alcohol. The report identifies concerns about inappropriate authorisation of leave, inadequate searches and observations, poor communication, and a delayed and ineffective response to his cardiac arrest. The concerns also include staff being insufficiently trained to manage cardiac arrests and drug overdoses in acute mental health wards.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in contacting 999 and the on-call doctor during cardiac arrests

    Wider context from the report

    “I am also concerned that staff are not properly able to deal with cardiac arrests in acute mental health wards. In Kristian’s inquest, evidence was heard that the response to Kristian’s arrest was chaotic and disorganised. Nobody appeared to be in charge, staff were unable to do CPR properly, the 999 call was of a poor standard, there were considerable delays in contacting 999 and the on call doctor and the staff did not have Naloxone training. I had the same issues in an Inquest I did nine months ago in the exact same ward, indeed in the neighbouring room. The fact that the same set of facts have repeated themselves in Kristian’s case leads me to a very real concern that future deaths will happen if action is not taken. ”

    Source location

    Kristian Edward Allen · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver regular unannounced emergency simulation training to strengthen staff confidence and response to cardiac arrest and opioid overdose.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Response to cardiac arrest I appreciate your concern in relation to staff not being properly able to deal with cardiac arrests. You will have heard how this was recognised within the Trust's PSII and the need to strengthen preparedness and response to medical emergencies, including opioid overdose, resulted in recommended action. The identified action was the need to increase staff confidence in administering Immediate Life Support (ILS). I am informed that the Inquest heard of the impact upon staff of conducting ILS and how their confidence can be impacted by the rarity of having to conduct ILS. I confirm, as you heard, that as a direct action from the PSII into Kristian's death the Trust introduced regular simulation training ie: unannounced emergency simulations to which staff then have to respond.”

    Source location

    Response from Sussex Partnership Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 22 June 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update the Resus policy to require monthly clinical and non-clinical emergency simulations across inpatient hospitals.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As you also heard in evidence the Trust's Resus policy has been updated to formalise the inclusion of simulation as standard in both clinical and non-clinical areas to enhance and embed medical emergency and cardiac arrest training, thereby ensuring staff remain competent and confident with emergency processes and procedures. The policy stipulates that simulations will be completed monthly throughout SPFT in inpatient hospitals. As ████████ informed you, the most recent simulation on Kristian's ward took place on 20th May, involving 8 staff and simulated a scenario of an opioid overdose leading to cardiac arrest. I am informed that feedback from the ILS team was that the ward-team's response was well led.”

    Source location

    Response from Sussex Partnership Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 22 June 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing Trust actions embedded in policy, training, governance and ward-level processes are considered sufficient; no further new actions are needed.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In summary, given the comprehensive range of actions already taken by the Trust there are no further new actions that I consider the Trust needs to take. That said, as I recognised above, all improvement requires sustained, committed focus. So, whilst I can already say that the actions described above are now embedded within policy, training, governance and ward-level quality improvement processes, which are subject to ongoing monitoring to ensure improvements continue, I would like to assure you that the oversight and focus on”

    Source location

    Response from Sussex Partnership Foundation Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 22 June 2026

    Open published response
  2. East London

    AI-generated summary

    Madeline Reding · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Madeline Reding, a 79-year-old nursing-home resident with advanced vascular dementia, became unwell after lunch on 17 May 2024, regurgitated food, developed an upper-airway obstruction and respiratory arrest, and died that afternoon. The inquest identified delayed and disorganised staff responses, including a failure to sound the emergency alarm or make an immediate 999 call, delayed CPR, and ineffective first aid.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to make 999 calls immediately on discovering an unresponsive person

    Wider context from the report

    “3. A 999 call was not made immediately on discovering Mrs Reding was unresponsive. ”

    Source location

    Madeline Reding · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver lessons-learned, anti-choking, first-aid and competency training to permanent, agency, care and non-care staff, including refresher training.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Immediately following the incident, an urgent flash Lessons Learnt training session was held with all nursing staff (including the management nurses present at the incident) on 23 May 2025 to reinforce the existing Swallowing Difficulties policy and Basic Life support, Resuscitation and DNARCPR policies and the procedures to be followed in the event of a choking incident. Both policies were subsequently reviewed on 31 July 2024 and noted to be compliant with Resuscitation Council, Royal College of Nursing and CQC guidance.”

    Source location

    2025-0368 Response from Aspray House Nursing Home
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 July 2025

    Open published response
  3. Hampshire, Portsmouth and Southampton

    AI-generated summary

    Dean John Mark Anthony BRAY · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Dean Bray died of acute heart failure on 29 December 2021 while in the seclusion room on Hamtun Ward. The report identified failures to adequately monitor and escalate his high respiratory rate, and concerns about the ability to make emergency calls from the observation room and delays accessing the seclusion area.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of an outside line on the seclusion-room observation handset for direct 999 emergency calls

    Wider context from the report

    “Firstly, Staff conducting 121 observations upon a patient within the seclusion room were unable to make a direct 999 emergency call from the observation room as no outside line was available from this handset to respond to a medical emergency. Secondly, I heard evidence from Paramedics of a delay, and difficulty with accessing the patient who was being cared for in seclusion. The most immediate access route to the ward used by secure transport services being unknown by South Central Ambulance Service and not shared with them to assist responding to a medical emergency at Antelope House. ”

    Source location

    Dean John Mark Anthony BRAY · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Adjust the Antelope House observation-room telephone line to enable external emergency calls.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Immediately following the conclusion of the inquest, an adjustment was made to the internal phone line in the observation room in question at Antelope House, allowing external calls. In order to provide further assurance, we have also checked our other inpatient Mental Health units (where there are seclusion rooms) to ensure that they are unimpaired in being able to dial 999 in an emergency situation.”

    Source location

    Hampshire and IOW Healthcare NHS
    Page 1 · response
    Published 28 November 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Check seclusion-room telephones across inpatient mental-health units to confirm they can dial 999.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Immediately following the conclusion of the inquest, an adjustment was made to the internal phone line in the observation room in question at Antelope House, allowing external calls. In order to provide further assurance, we have also checked our other inpatient Mental Health units (where there are seclusion rooms) to ensure that they are unimpaired in being able to dial 999 in an emergency situation.”

    Source location

    Hampshire and IOW Healthcare NHS
    Page 1 · response
    Published 28 November 2024

    Open published response
  4. Sefton, St Helens and Knowsley

    AI-generated summary

    Wayne MILNE · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Wayne Milne attended hospital with chest pain on 28 February 2022 but was discharged without required chest-pain assessments and senior review. On 2 March 2022, after reporting further symptoms to his GP practice, he was advised to attend the emergency department, but the nurse did not call 999, escalate to a doctor, or check whether he had obtained urgent care; Wayne was later found deceased at home from haemopericardium due to a dissecting aortic aneurysm. The report identifies concerns about inconsistent procedures for summoning emergency assistance, escalation and follow-up, and awareness of dissecting aortic aneurysm within the practice.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to summon emergency medical assistance when required

    Wider context from the report

    “2. The nurse at the practice told the Inquest, the procedure for practice staff calling 999 (not leaving it to the patient) in the event of a patient with chest pain and other life threatening conditions applied only to reception staff and not to nursing staff. This led to inconsistency and in this case an avoidable delay in summoning urgent medical assistance and needs reviewing/all staff working in/working on behalf of the practice need to be aware of the procedure to be followed, consideration must be given as to whether it is appropriate to have different standards for qualified nursing and administrative/non qualified nursing staff. The awareness of Dissecting Aortic Aneurysm and the rapidity at which the condition can become catastrophic/fatal also needs raising within the practice. The nurse within the practice who spoke with Wayne on the date of his death on behalf of the practice , did not escalate to a doctor, did not call 999, she did not inform the NOK of her concerns, she did not call back to see if Wayne had called for an ambulance/attended hospital and she did not alert the hospital of her suspicions i.e. differential diagnoses including; PE, cardiac related problem or aortic aneurysm. The GP to whom this regulation 28 (Prevention of Future death) report is addressed informed the court (in a witness statement) no action had been taken within the practice since these events. ”

    Source location

    Wayne MILNE · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to apply the emergency-calling procedure consistently across practice staff

    Wider context from the report

    “2. The nurse at the practice told the Inquest, the procedure for practice staff calling 999 (not leaving it to the patient) in the event of a patient with chest pain and other life threatening conditions applied only to reception staff and not to nursing staff. This led to inconsistency and in this case an avoidable delay in summoning urgent medical assistance and needs reviewing/all staff working in/working on behalf of the practice need to be aware of the procedure to be followed, consideration must be given as to whether it is appropriate to have different standards for qualified nursing and administrative/non qualified nursing staff. The awareness of Dissecting Aortic Aneurysm and the rapidity at which the condition can become catastrophic/fatal also needs raising within the practice. The nurse within the practice who spoke with Wayne on the date of his death on behalf of the practice , did not escalate to a doctor, did not call 999, she did not inform the NOK of her concerns, she did not call back to see if Wayne had called for an ambulance/attended hospital and she did not alert the hospital of her suspicions i.e. differential diagnoses including; PE, cardiac related problem or aortic aneurysm. The GP to whom this regulation 28 (Prevention of Future death) report is addressed informed the court (in a witness statement) no action had been taken within the practice since these events. ”

    Source location

    Wayne MILNE · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  5. West Sussex

    AI-generated summary

    James Joseph MANNING · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    James Joseph Manning, aged two, choked on a piece of sausage at Butlins, Bognor Regis, on 6 June 2018, suffered a cardiac arrest and hypoxic ischaemic brain injury, and died in hospital on 20 June 2018. The concerns included delays and weaknesses in healthcare referral, follow-up and information-sharing systems, and shortcomings in the management of health and safety, incident reporting, first-aid provision and emergency procedures at Bourne Leisure sites.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a written procedure for making a 999 emergency call

    Wider context from the report

    “e) Witnesses confirmed that there was no written standard operating procedure setting out how staff can get first aid help quickly as well as when and how to make a 999-emergency call especially if a trained first aider is not immediately available. ”

    Source location

    James Joseph MANNING · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
  6. Avon

    AI-generated summary

    Christopher Michael SEAL · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Christopher Michael Seal died by suicide on 30 November 2017 at playing fields at Bath Spa University, having been found suspended from rugby posts. In the five days before his death, he was assessed as high risk by mental health services, but concerns included underestimation of his condition, failures to escalate after missed contact and a police welfare check, inadequate information sharing with his family, and weaknesses in records, policies and staff processes.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Intensive service switchboard inability to call 999 when life protection is required

    Wider context from the report

    “8. The intensive service switchboard – is there an issue in relation to the training of staff and their ability to react to protecting life? I was told they do not have ability to call 999 but that they advise the service user to make the call, is that appropriate? ”

    Source location

    Christopher Michael SEAL · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The switchboard can call 999 when an emergency requires it, contrary to evidence that it lacked this ability.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The intensive service switchboard and their ability to react to protecting life”

    Source location

    2019-0013-Response-by-Avon-and-Wiltshire-Mental-Health-NHS-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 24 May 2019

    Open published response
  7. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Luke Christie AYRES · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Luke Christie AYRES, aged 24, died on 27 September 2015 while serving a custodial sentence as an inpatient at Raeside Clinic. He was found hanging by a ligature in his bedroom and could not be resuscitated. Concerns included delays and communication risks in contacting the ambulance service, and the absence of staff to escort paramedics from reception to the ward.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of ward staff to call 999 directly

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The 999 call to the ambulance service made by Raeside reception after the issuing of a 2222 medical emergency call was cut off when they attempted to transfer the Ambulance Service to Ward Severn. The ambulance Service therefore had to get the number from the operator and called back a minute later. When they were put through to the Ward the person they were speaking with was not at Luke’s side and did not know his current status because she was in an office some distance away from him and the staff with him. There is no evidence that this actually had an impact on Luke’s death but there are risks for the future arising from the fact that: a) the Ward staff do not call 999 themselves necessitating a delay and a risk of the call being cut off when the call is transferred to the Ward; and b) the person providing information to the Ambulance Service may not know the patient’s current status and could therefore give incorrect information. ”

    Source location

    Luke Christie AYRES · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Replace Reaside Clinic’s telephony system with the Trust’s standard system.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “During the inquest, evidence gave rise to concern about the procedures associated with the handling of medical emergency calls at Reaside Clinic, together with a lack of assurance that Paramedics would always be greeted in reception by a member of ward staff who could immediately escort them to the scene of the incident.”

    Source location

    2016-0148-Response-by-Birmingham-and-Solihull-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 April 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Extend ward medical-emergency simulations to test ambulance-call connection and availability of patient information and observations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have therefore decided to extend the simulation of medical emergencies on our wards at Reaside to include the connection of the call to the ambulance service and to also ensure that the individual nominated to make the call has all of the relevant medical information and observations of the patient to hand. We currently deliver quarterly medical emergency simulation exercises at Reaside Clinic (the most recent being just 2 weeks ago) and will explore the possibility of increasing the frequency.”

    Source location

    2016-0148-Response-by-Birmingham-and-Solihull-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 April 2016

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026