Recurring concern

Unreliable assessment of patients’ mental state

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First reported 30 Apr 2014•Latest report 17 Mar 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of the mental-state assessment process, including delayed or missed assessment, failure to undertake an appropriate mental state examination, and materially inconsistent or inadequate assessment of mental state.

Not included

  • Excludes general mental health risk assessments unless the asserted deficiency specifically concerns assessment of the patient’s mental state.
  • Excludes failures of treatment, referral, admission, discharge or escalation where mental-state assessment is not itself the unsafe condition.
  • Excludes generic staffing, training, documentation or communication deficiencies unless they directly impair the mental-state assessment process.
  • Excludes assessments of physical condition or unrelated clinical states.
Reports
24

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
25

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2014–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
36

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care6
NHS England3
East London NHS Foundation Trust2
Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust2
Greater Manchester Police2
HM Prison and Probation Service2
North London NHS Foundation Trust2
Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust1
Black Country Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust1
BTCM Limited1
Care Quality Commission1
Central and North West London NHS Foundation Trust1
Cheshire and Wirral Partnership NHS Foundation Trust1
Cornwall Council1
Crown Prosecution Service1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. South Yorkshire (Eastern)

    AI-generated summary

    Delwyn PREECE · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Delwyn Preece, a 64-year-old man, died at Rotherham Hospital on 19 August 2025 from a hypoxic brain injury following deliberate self-suspension by ligature while he was an informal patient at an acute mental health hospital. The principal concerns were repeated granting of leave without documented mental state examinations or risk assessments, poor and retrospective record-keeping, and shortcomings in the patient safety investigation arising from unfamiliarity with the medical records system.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to undertake and document mental state examinations and risk assessments before granting ward leave

    Wider context from the report

    “1. There were consistent and repeated incidents (13 incidents in 6 days) where leave from the ward was granted without any documented mental state examination or risk assessment being undertaken prior to the patient being permitted to leave the ward. ”

    Source location

    Delwyn PREECE · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  2. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    Resmije Ahmetaj · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Resmije Ahmetaj, also known as Merita Brahimi, died on 30 June 2024 from a traumatic head injury after falling from a height at a multi-storey car park while suffering an exacerbation of psychosis. The report identifies concerns about subtherapeutic antipsychotic medication levels not being acted on, communication and escalation within the mental health team, incomplete record-keeping, medication prescribing confusion, and safety mitigation on the car park’s penultimate floor.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the mental health team to undertake mental state examinations

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) EPUT mental health team were relying on the clozapine clinic staff to monitor Ms Ahmetaj’s mental health, but this was not the purpose of the clinic. Staff took blood samples and vital signs with a quick chat that took about 5 minutes and were not undertaking a mental state examination. ”

    Source location

    Resmije Ahmetaj · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  3. Milton Keynes

    AI-generated summary

    Brian Thomas RINGROSE · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Brian Thomas Ringrose died on 2 February 2021 after being taken to hospital following an overdose and then subjected to prolonged prone restraint by police. The report identifies concerns about police restraint practices and welfare monitoring, communication and handover, prioritisation of transport over welfare, and the hospital and mental health teams’ assessment, communication and discharge processes.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in mental health team assessment in the Emergency Department

    Wider context from the report

    “Thames Valley Police Inadequate application of police restraint training The evidence demonstrated that the officers who initially restrained Mr. Ringrose failed to follow their training in multiple critical respects: a) Officers maintained Mr. Ringrose in a prone position for a prolonged period (over 20 minutes with only a brief interruption) despite training that warns of the dangers of positional asphyxia in a restrained prone position. b) Officers positioned Mr. Ringrose's arms in extreme and abnormal positions (between 90-180 degrees) while handcuffed behind his back, causing severe shoulder injuries including torn ligaments, muscles, and deep internal bruising. c) Officers failed to place Mr. Ringrose on his side as soon as practicable after handcuffing and applying leg restraints, contrary to their training. There were opportunities when this could have been done. d) One officer inappropriately dragged Mr. Ringrose by his arms across the floor without informing the other officer or Mr. Ringrose he was about to do so despite being within a few feet only of both, causing significant pain to Brian. Failure to apply the National Decision Model Officers failed to apply the National Decision Model to reassess their actions during the restraint, particularly: a) When Mr. Ringrose was briefly on his side or back at around 15:31 and had become calmer, officers returned him to the prone position without reasonable justification. b) When hospital security staff arrived at approximately 15:35, providing an opportunity to reassess the situation, appoint a safety officer, and move Mr. Ringrose to his side, the officers failed to do so. Ineffective welfare monitoring The officers failed to adequately monitor Mr. Ringrose's welfare during restraint: a) Officers did not appropriately listen to, interpret, or react to Mr. Ringrose's breathing despite their close proximity, instead attributing his deteriorating condition to purposeful actions. b) Officers failed to check that Mr. Ringrose's airways were clear or monitor his breathing rate, despite their training to monitor the welfare of anyone in police custody without relying on medical professionals. c) Officers failed to voice concerns about Mr. Ringrose's changing pallor, which progressed from extremely pale to blue, red, and even purple. Failure of officers to "speak up and speak out" The officers failed to challenge inappropriate restraint techniques: a) None of the officers present, including those who arrived later, questioned the circumstances, duration, or manner of the restraint, despite police training requiring officers to "speak up and speak out." b) No officer raised concerns about the extreme position of Mr. Ringrose's arms or the prolonged prone restraint, despite this clearly contravening their training on positional asphyxia risks. c) No officer sought advice on Mr Ringrose’s clinical condition from the many clinical staff who were stood around watching the event. Inadequate communication and handover There were significant failures in communication between officers: a) When additional officers arrived to transport Mr. Ringrose, the initial restraining officers did not inform them of how long Mr. Ringrose had been restrained in the prone position or that his arms had been elevated and the arriving officers were passive in not making any enquiry as to that. b) Officers relied on the passive inaction of hospital staff who were stood about watching, rather than actively requesting them to assess Mr. Ringrose's condition. Inappropriate prioritisation of transport over welfare After the arrival of additional officers at approximately 15:45: a) All officers became primarily focused on applying the Flexible Lift and Carry System (FLACS) and transporting Mr. Ringrose to police custody rather than monitoring his welfare. b) During the ongoing restraint and application of the FLACS, none of the officers monitored Mr. Ringrose's welfare instead focussing on how to apply a device none had adequate experience of. Central and Northwest London NHS Foundation Trust a) Delay in Assessment: There was a significant delay in the mental health team attending to Brian in the Emergency Department (ED), despite the urgency of his condition. b) Inadequate Assessment: When the mental health team did attend, they felt unable to assess Brian due to his unresponsiveness but did not escalate their concerns or communicate effectively with medical staff or police. They did not plan to return to follow up on Brian Ringrose. c) Failure to Escalate Concerns: A member of the mental health team believed Brian was not medically fit for discharge but failed to voice this to medical staff or police. d) Unsafe Communication Practices: Reliance on verbal communication and delayed written notes (within a maximum 24 hours) is inherently risky in emergency settings, as contemporaneous notes are essential for critical information to be promptly shared with other clinical and nursing staff dealing with patients. e) Inappropriate Discharge Recommendation: The mental health team suggested reassessment in police custody, despite Brian’s ongoing medical instability. In my view this represented a very high risk to Brian’s safety. Milton Keynes University Hospital NHS Foundation Trust a) Non-existent Documentation Referenced in Policy: The hospital policy makes reference to a "discharge for police custody form" that does not actually exist. This suggests the policy was hastily created, possibly for the purposes of satisfying the inquest requirements, without appropriate consideration of its content or implementation. b) Misleading Discharge Documentation: The discharge form generated by hospital staff was interpreted by police officers as a formal discharge notice, as the jury found. The current system allows for the generation of forms that may be misinterpreted by third parties as official discharge documents when they may not be. c) Unsafe Form Design: The process of generating discharge forms and additional notes requires staff to advance through a structure that may include boxes not meant to be ticked but none the less resulting in production of a document purporting to be a “Discharge Notice” which the police then understandably but erroneously rely on. This poses a risk to patient safety through potential misunderstanding of care requirements. d) Inadequate Discharge Review Process: The decision on whether patients should have a final review by doctors before formal medical discharge is reportedly scheduled to be made by a committee by June 2025. Given that four years had already passed since Brian's death at the time of Inquest, this timeline for implementing such a critical safety measure is unreasonably prolonged, and, in my view, cannot be supported. An immediate decision by the clinical director should have been made to institute final medical reviews before discharge. e) Ambiguous discharge process: The ED doctor’s plan for discharge was vague (“more awake”), not aligned with ToxBase guidance, and not clearly documented and not clearly communicated. The ED doctor told the jury that he did not assess or intend that Brian was fit for discharge at the time he was removed from the ED. I note however that when Brian was being removed he did not intervene or seek to prevent it. f) Unsafe supervision: There were a number of senior clinicians and nursing staff present and seen to be watching the restraint of Brian. None of those senior individuals asserted their authority and made enquiry or intervened. g) Premature Discharge: Brian was not medically fit for discharge (still symptomatic, GCS still not recovered, ECG not done as required, Toxbase recommendations not followed) ”

    Source location

    Brian Thomas RINGROSE · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Accept emergency-department referrals before medical clearance to enable earlier engagement, risk planning and support, with timely referral-response monitoring.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “a. Delay in Assessment We have revised our approach to ensure that referrals are accepted even when patients are not yet medically cleared. This enables earlier engagement, risk planning, and support. A key performance indicator for the HLT is timely response to referrals. In the past six months, over 95% of ED referrals have been responded to within one hour. This reflects not only operational improvements but a cultural shift towards proactive, parallel working with ED colleagues.”

    Source location

    Response from Central and North West London NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 4 August 2025

    Open published response
  4. Inner West London

    AI-generated summary

    Patryk Gladysz · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Patryk Gladysz, who had schizophrenia and was detained at HMP Wandsworth, was found in his cell with a ligature around his neck on 5 January 2024 and died at St George’s Hospital. The inquest concluded that he had hung himself with a ligature, with his intentions unknown. Concerns included delays and staffing pressures affecting mental health assessments, inadequate communication between prison and healthcare staff, gaps in knowledge of his history and risks, and shortcomings in prison monitoring and training.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Insufficient Mental Health in-reach team staffing for timely meaningful and quality mental health assessments

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Staffing within the Mental Health in-reach team impacting the timely undertaking of meaningful and quality mental health assessments. ”

    Source location

    Patryk Gladysz · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Fill the vacant mental health in-reach team post.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I understand your concerns about staffing shortages within the mental health in-reach team at HMP Wandsworth, and how that may have impacted the quality of mental health assessments. I understand from NHS England that, at the time of Mr Gladysz’s death, the team had a vacancy for one whole time equivalent staff member, and that this has now been filled. In addition, the internal patient safety investigation into Mr Gladysz’s death carried out by Oxleas NHS Foundation Trust, as the healthcare provider at HMP Wandsworth, highlighted wider staff concerns around a lack of supportive leadership at the time of the incident. I am assured by NHS England that these issues have since been addressed, with the appointment in late 2024 of a new operational manager to the prison’s mental health team.”

    Source location

    Response from Department for Health and Social Care
    Page 1 · response
    Published 23 July 2025

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Recruit vacant mental health in-reach nursing posts following the successful recruitment campaign.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The permanent fill rate of the in reach mental health nursing team between April 2023 and January 2024 was 33 % and 67% respectively. The current permanent fill rate of the mental health in reach nursing team is 67% and following a successful recruitment campaign these vacancies are currently being recruited to, and we anticipate a start date to be soon.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 July 2025

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use bank or agency staff to fill vacant mental health service posts during recruitment.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Oxleas NHS Foundation Trust are supported with a proactive temporary staffing team, and we endeavour to fill vacant posts within this service with bank or agency staff during the recruitment process.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 July 2025

    Open published response
  5. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    Julie Sheila Beasley · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Julie Sheila Beasley was found deceased at home on 16 March 2023 and died from multiple drug misuse involving a fatal amount of morphine and concomitant prescribed medications. She had deteriorating mental health, increasing suicidal thoughts and plans, and repeatedly requested mental health assessment and a medication review. The report identifies failures to complete required assessments and medication review, inadequate communication and record keeping, and insufficient exploration of information she sought to share about her risks.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to review records and identify the need for urgent mental health assessment

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) Mrs Beasley was conveyed to hospital having taken an overdose of medication and was reviewed by the Trust mental health liaison team. Review of the mental health Trust medical records would have shown that Mrs Beasley had an SBAR review rather than a V4 mental health assessment. This should have alerted staff to the fact that an urgent assessment was required when Mrs Beasley attended mental health liaison following an overdose of her medication. This did not happen. ”

    Source location

    Julie Sheila Beasley · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require full biopsychosocial mental health assessments, with documented rationale for omissions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Response: The Trust has continued to review our assessment processes to ensure that the appropriate reviews are undertaken in a timely manner and are supported through the MDT approach which then supports a joined up approach to patient assessments. Staff in the Mental Health Crisis team are required to undertake a mental health assessment for all patients, which is monitored and audited via supervision meetings and compliance reviews.”

    Source location

    Response from Essex Partnership University NHS Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 4 June 2025

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct monthly evidence-based assessment quality audits and provide feedback on findings.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Monitoring of the quality of assessments, noting the concerns above has been enhanced with monthly assessment quality audits. The audits are evidence based (NICE Guidance) and undertaken by each lead reviewing 10 cases each month. The lead will feedback to staff the themes they have found, good practice and areas for improvement, as a means of ‘spot checking’ the assessments that are being carried out. In addition to the team monthly audits, an EPUT wide audit carried out in April 2025 for urgent care, showed overall for the 5 teams, sections regarding Patient Details, Consent & Capacity, Carers, Referral Details and Assessment attained results at 91% or above regarding compliance.”

    Source location

    Response from Essex Partnership University NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 4 June 2025

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue reviewing urgent-care learning, deadlines and impact through monthly quality and safety meetings.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “This event was led by the Director of Quality and Safety and Operational Associate Director on the 19th August 2024 with a focus on assessment and family involvement. A follow up Urgent care away day took place on 1st May 2025 to review all learning, data and incident reporting across 2023- 2024 for urgent care to ensure joined up thematic learning and review. The scrutiny of deadlines and impact continues to be reviewed at the monthly Urgent care Quality and safety meetings.”

    Source location

    Response from Essex Partnership University NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 4 June 2025

    Open published response
  6. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    James Warren Agius · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    James Warren Agius was found deceased at home on 17 December 2022 after suspending himself, with the inquest concluding suicide by suspension by ligature. The concerns included significant omissions in his medical records, an incomplete risk assessment following a suicide attempt, differing views about whether he displayed hypomanic symptoms, and no evidence that new national risk-assessment training had been implemented by the Trust.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Differences of opinion in mental state assessments

    Wider context from the report

    “2. The evidence of assessments of Mr Agius’s mental state provided to the inquest indicated a difference of opinion as to whether Mr Agius was displaying hypomanic symptoms on 12 and 13 February 2022. ”

    Source location

    James Warren Agius · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require Home Treatment Team staff to use an agreed home-visit documentation template covering mental state, physical health, safeguarding, risk assessment, and follow-up planning, with fortnightly audits.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To support good record keeping practice in the Home Treatment Teams (HTT) in NELFT, all staff completing home visits to service users are expected to complete their records utilising an agreed template. This ensures that the visit and documentation of what took place will cover areas including (though not limited to), mental state examination, social situation, physical health concerns, risk assessment, safeguarding and that these lead to a clear plan to be followed by the team. Adherence to this is monitored within through a fortnightly progress note audit that is completed. The last audit that was completed for the Barking and Dagenham HTT was on 3rd November 2024, with the team scoring 100% for adherence to use of the correct template. All entries reviewed also included a full Mental State Examination and risk assessment.”

    Source location

    Response from NELFT
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 October 2024

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require Home Treatment Team mental-state examinations to record speech abnormalities and psychotic symptoms where mood-disorder concerns arise.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “When HTT staff complete their mental state examinations, where there is a potential concern regarding a mood disorder, staff will make reference to a service user’s speech and observation of any psychotic symptoms. This is completed as abnormalities within these domains can be common features of a manic episode (International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems 10th Revision (ICD-10)).”

    Source location

    Response from NELFT
    Page 3 · response
    Published 8 October 2024

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The medical records indicate consistent staff opinions and do not support a difference of opinion about hypomanic symptoms.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Mr Agius’ medical records would suggest that there was consistency in the opinion of the two staff members that visited, in as much that they both did not see evidence of an elated mood. Had Mr Agius been under the BDHTT for a period longer than the three days he was, he would have been reviewed by the medical team, in line with the HTT Standard Operating Procedure and greater clarity regarding his diagnosis would have been achieved.”

    Source location

    Response from NELFT
    Page 3 · response
    Published 8 October 2024

    Open published response
  7. County Durham and Darlington

    AI-generated summary

    Michael Raymond SMITH · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Michael Raymond SMITH entered HMP Durham on 10 July 2020, was transferred to SACU after being found to have packages concealed internally, and was discovered self-suspended on 11 July; he died in hospital on 13 July 2020. The principal concerns included the absence of medical and mental health assessments, inadequate staffing while he was subject to three-man unlock, delays in responding to the suspension, and weaknesses in SACU record keeping and multidisciplinary oversight.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to undertake medical and mental health assessments on SACU

    Wider context from the report

    “Between his arrival in SACU at 18.37 on 10 July 2020 and his being discovered self suspended with a ligature at 17.45 on 11 July 2020 there, Michael was subject to a 3 man unlock. On the morning of 11 July, a Saturday, there were 3 officers on duty on SACU. This did permit his cell to be unlocked for a meal to be delivered and for a cursory one and a half minute conversation with a nurse that fell short, on her evidence, of an actual medical examination. On the afternoon of 11 July there were only one or (briefly) two officers on SACU duty per the staff duty log, albeit, as CCTV footage shows, more officers did attend intermittently for specific tasks. The SACU staff duty log shows only one officer on duty for the whole afternoon to 17.00. In any event medical assessments of Michael were not undertaken at any stage while he was on SACU, the reason being given that he was on three man unlock. It appears that there were never sufficient staff available for a dedicated medical assessment to be undertaken. This notwithstanding that evidence from prison officers and a nurse was that during the course of the afternoon Michael`s presentation had become “angrier” and “bizarre”. In fact, it is now known, he had been ingesting toxic amounts ████████, an unlicensed drug, he had secreted into the prison (his being detected at reception as plugged lead him to SACU). ████████ is a highly potent ████████ which effects judgement and lowers inhibitions. The jury subsequently concluded that the absence of medical, and mental health, assessments, and the use of the ████████ (which was never diagnosed), contributed to the Michael`s death. From 17.00, when patrol state commenced, there was clearly only one officer on duty and present. When she discovered Michael self suspended that officer made a perfectly defensible dynamic assessment, electing not to enter the cell unsupported. She made ready to enter for when back up arrived. In the event, partly because there was another discipline incident unfolding on a different wing, this took 2-3 minutes. There were only 16 prison officers available while on patrol state across the entire prison, and they were already at full stretch, and probably beyond it (the Tactical Resources Unit from Doncaster were en route). The evidence was that without knowing precisely when Michael self-suspended any such delay could not be held, on a balance of probabilities, to have entered the chain of causation death. However, the fact remains that there was a delay consequent to Michael being on a three man unlock but there being only a single officer available on SACU while in patrol state. It is reasonable to conjecture that this could have made the difference between life and death in this case, and the repetition of these circumstances could well do so in future. In your response dated 15 November 2021 to the Regulation 28 report of HM Assistant Coroner James Thompson of 21 September 2021 following the Inquest into the death of Charlie Brian Todd at HMP Durham, you wrote, amongst other things: “There is clear management oversight of the SACU”. This is not what the evidence in the instance case showed. Rather, what it made clear was that: 1) the SACU staff log plus CCTV further demonstrated that officers, including officers not posted to SACU, but covering for a shift, were required to allocate various task between themselves on an ad-hoc basis” was an ongoing problem, and this appears to be still ongoing; 2) NOMIS record keeping was unhelpfully sparse (“you would expect more” was the evidence of SACU manager); 3) the daily log was under-utilised as a multi-disciplinary tool, and this appears to be ongoing. You also stated: “I am confident that the staffing levels and supervisory arrangements in place are sufficient to deliver all of the SACU`s regime”. This, too, is clearly not the case. Staffing levels remain the same. Safeguarding of prisoners is comprised as a consequence. With a three man unlock imposed, there should be three officers available at all times to ensure safety. Staffing levels at HMP Durham should be increased. ”

    Source location

    Michael Raymond SMITH · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct a SACU pilot evaluating operational processes and health support to inform a safe, integrated workforce model.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It may also be helpful for me to explain that where prisoners are subject to a three person unlock and staff are not readily available to facilitate this, then additional staff can be drawn from across the prison to assist. I acknowledge that at the time did not happen when Mr Smith required a medical assessment and accept staff did not take the necessary actions to ensure Mr Smith could be seen by a medical practitioner. However, the Governor is confident that where this situation arises in the future the resources are in place to respond effectively. A SACU pilot, which is looking at both operational processes within the SACU and the health support provided, is due to conclude in June 2023. This will assist in developing a new workforce model to support the delivery of a safe, integrated holistic approach to the care and management of those residing and working in segregation units.”

    Source location

    Response from HM Prison and Probation Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 4 January 2023

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Base a full-time nurse within the SACU to provide flexible healthcare input, including medical assessments.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As result of some early evaluations, a full time nurse is now based within the SACU, which has meant there can be a more flexible approach regarding healthcare input, including the arrangements for medical assessments.”

    Source location

    Response from HM Prison and Probation Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 4 January 2023

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing arrangements allow additional prison staff to assist with three-person unlocks, and resources are considered sufficient to respond effectively in future.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It may also be helpful for me to explain that where prisoners are subject to a three person unlock and staff are not readily available to facilitate this, then additional staff can be drawn from across the prison to assist. I acknowledge that at the time did not happen when Mr Smith required a medical assessment and accept staff did not take the necessary actions to ensure Mr Smith could be seen by a medical practitioner. However, the Governor is confident that where this situation arises in the future the resources are in place to respond effectively. A SACU pilot, which is looking at both operational processes within the SACU and the health support provided, is due to conclude in June 2023. This will assist in developing a new workforce model to support the delivery of a safe, integrated holistic approach to the care and management of those residing and working in segregation units.”

    Source location

    Response from HM Prison and Probation Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 4 January 2023

    Open published response
  8. Surrey

    AI-generated summary

    Matthew John Evans · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Matthew John Evans was a 47-year-old man who developed insomnia, anxiety and depression during the third COVID-19 lockdown and died on 16 June 2021 after ending his life. The principal concerns related to the GP’s lack of mental-health assessment, suicide-risk assessment, follow-up and consideration of referral; the general practice’s prescribing, communication and clinical-governance arrangements; and TalkPlus’s lack of clear guidance on referral to secondary mental-health services.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to undertake mental health assessment and identify need for further or secondary mental health support

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The actions of the General Practitioner The GP was not sufficiently proactive with multiple lost opportunities to provide better care and support for Matthew. The GP did not undertake a mental health assessment to assess the severity of Matthew’s difficulties and to ascertain whether further support or referral to secondary mental health care were indicated in any of the four telephone consultations. He did not ask or document at any time if Matthew had any suicidal ideation or acts of self-harm. The GP did not offer a face-to-face consultation or arrange a follow up appointment. The GP declined to prescribe Zopiclone and whilst he referred Matthew to the benefits of Melatonin he did not offer a prescription. He prescribed Mirtazepine having not done so before for someone in Matthew’s position on a background of having no post graduate qualifications in mental health. Furthermore, he did not document any warning of the possible side-effects of this drug including the possible increased risk of suicidal ideation with commencing the drug. It is unclear whether the GP had read the letters from TalkPlus. He did not ask permission as to whether it was possible to inform or involve Matthew’s partner and family in his on-going care. ”

    Source location

    Matthew John Evans · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Share suicide and self-harm documentation and assessment learning with all Frimley GP practices through bulletins, meetings, clinical leads and prescribing updates.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The NHS Frimley ICB will be carrying out a number of actions following the inquest. These include sharing the concerns raised with all GP practices in the Frimley area. The learning will focus particularly on the importance of good documentation in recording risk of suicide or self-harm following a consultation when someone has been assessed as having suicidal ideation or is at risk of acts of self-harm.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS Firmley
    Page 1 · response
    Published 19 May 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver a recorded virtual training session on mental health assessment and documentation, then distribute the recording to all practices.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The practices across the ICS will also be reminded of the importance of a good mental health assessment using recognised mental health tools. There are already templates for PHQ9 and GAD on the GP systems for them to use. The learning will be shared with practices in July 2022 in the GP bulletin. In September 2022, there will be a virtual training session, which will be recorded, on mental health assessment, which will also include documentation. The recording will be sent to all practices following the event.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS Firmley
    Page 1 · response
    Published 19 May 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Send PHQ9 and GAD7 questionnaires before consultations and record their scores directly in EMIS Web.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “18. PHQ9/GAD7 questionnaire will now be sent to patients to complete ahead of their consultations. Scores will be written directly into EMIS Web so available during the consultation with the patient.”

    Source location

    Response from Farnham Practice
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 May 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Create and circulate an Accurix template directing clinicians to GAD and PHQ9 resources for detecting anxiety and symptoms.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “20. Accurix Template created and circulated to all clinicians on where to find GAD & PHQ-9 to detect patient’s anxiety and symptoms.”

    Source location

    Response from Farnham Practice
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 May 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The circumstances were a specific case, not widespread poor care, and the care provided was not unsafe.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We are satisfied, at this point, that the circumstances surrounding Mr Evans’ death were a specific case and not indicative of widespread poor care on the part of the provider. Whilst we have concluded that improvements could have been made in the care and treatment provided to Mr Evans, this was not unsafe. We are pleased to see the provider has identified areas of improvement in its care and treatment, and we are assured that the actions taken will protect others using the service from harm. At this stage we have decided not to instigate any further action. However, we will continue to regularly monitor the provider and, where”

    Source location

    Response from Care Quality Commisson
    Page 1 · response
    Published 19 May 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    No further action is currently considered necessary because the provider’s actions are expected to protect service users from harm.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We are satisfied, at this point, that the circumstances surrounding Mr Evans’ death were a specific case and not indicative of widespread poor care on the part of the provider. Whilst we have concluded that improvements could have been made in the care and treatment provided to Mr Evans, this was not unsafe. We are pleased to see the provider has identified areas of improvement in its care and treatment, and we are assured that the actions taken will protect others using the service from harm. At this stage we have decided not to instigate any further action. However, we will continue to regularly monitor the provider and, where”

    Source location

    Response from Care Quality Commisson
    Page 1 · response
    Published 19 May 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Regulatory action can target registered managers or providers, but not failings attributed solely to individuals.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As you may be aware, CQC can only take regulatory action against a registered manager or a registered provider, but not when failings of an individual have been identified.”

    Source location

    Response from Care Quality Commisson
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 May 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing clinical guidance, professional standards, revalidation and training arrangements are considered sufficient to support appropriate prescribing and diagnosis.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As noted by NHS England, there are several educational resources and guidance documents relating to the assessment and treatment of depression that are regularly reviewed and accessible to clinicians. These include National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) guidance, which details possible adverse effects of prescribing mirtazapine, Clinical Knowledge Summaries and the British National Formulary.”

    Source location

    Response from Department of Health and Social Care
    Page 1 · response
    Published 19 May 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The concerns do not indicate that the doctor poses a patient risk or undermines public confidence in doctors.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The AR is assured that the matters contained in your complaint do not raise concerns that ████████ poses either a risk to patients or undermines the public’s confidence in doctors. Although we do not need to investigate further, we will share your concerns with the doctor’s responsible officer and ask the doctor to discuss it with their appraiser as part of their revalidation.”

    Source location

    Response from General Medical Council(2)
    Page 1 · response
    Published 19 May 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    No further investigation is considered necessary, although the concerns will be shared for discussion during revalidation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The AR is assured that the matters contained in your complaint do not raise concerns that ████████ poses either a risk to patients or undermines the public’s confidence in doctors. Although we do not need to investigate further, we will share your concerns with the doctor’s responsible officer and ask the doctor to discuss it with their appraiser as part of their revalidation.”

    Source location

    Response from General Medical Council(2)
    Page 1 · response
    Published 19 May 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The response disputes that secondary mental health referral was indicated, stating that the patient did not meet referral criteria and remained low risk.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “10. The Deceased did not come close to a referral to the urgent assessment unit.”

    Source location

    Response from Farnham Practice
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 May 2022

    Open published response
  9. Manchester City

    AI-generated summary

    Name not published · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    The deceased had mental illness, illicit and prescribed drug misuse, homelessness and a history of contact with mental health services. She was discharged from hospital to community treatment on 13 January 2021 despite concerns about her readiness, inadequate records, risk assessments and mental state examinations, and lack of fixed accommodation. She was found in cardiac arrest on 30 January 2021 and died in hospital on 31 January 2021; the cause of the cardiac arrest could not be determined. The principal concerns included the discharge decision, incomplete clinical documentation, inadequate risk assessment, and failure to consider safeguarding.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequate and incomplete risk assessments and mental state examinations

    Wider context from the report

    “4. Inadequate and incomplete risk assessments and mental state examinations. ”

    Source location

    Name not published · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
  10. East London

    AI-generated summary

    Mr Jason Lennon · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jason Lennon, a 37-year-old man living in supported accommodation, died on 31 July 2019 after being found unresponsive while restrained in a prone position by security officers at the Excel Centre; resuscitation efforts later ceased in hospital. The concerns included failures in community mental health care, including inadequate monitoring, assessment, communication and documentation, and the extent and manner of the restraint used by security officers. The report also identified deficiencies in the Trust’s serious incident action plan and uncertainty about whether regulatory referral had been considered.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to assess mental state, relapse and risk of harm

    Wider context from the report

    “2. The CRT undertook a flawed review of Mr Lennon’s mental state on 29/7/19 which failed to assess that, Jason was in relapse and was a risk of harm to himself and others. Factors which contributed to this failure included; a. CRT staff did not effectively review medical records prior to assessing Jason, b. The CRT did not communicate important clinical information between themselves and external stakeholders. c. The CRT did not adequately document important information arising from the assessment. ”

    Source location

    Mr Jason Lennon · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
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Data last updated 7 September 2026