Recurring concern

Failure to maintain and share security and offender risk intelligence

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First reported 29 May 2014•Latest report 22 Jan 2025

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures to record, maintain, access or share security and offender-risk intelligence across responsible criminal-justice or security functions.

Not included

Excludes generic communication, documentation or staffing deficiencies that are not explicitly tied to an operational intelligence picture or risk-management process.
Excludes failures concerning unrelated factual databases or intelligence systems where no shared operational risk-management concern is supported.
Excludes the specific consequential risks, harms or clinical-care deficiencies resulting from incomplete intelligence; those are outcomes or separate concerns rather than the intelligence-system failure itself.

Reports: 13
Individual concerns: 17
Date range: 2014–2025
Stated actions: 75

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Ministry of Justice7

Home Office5

HM Prison and Probation Service4

Probation Service3

Greater Manchester Police2

Lancashire Constabulary2

Metropolitan Police Service2

National Police Chiefs’ Council2

West Midlands Police2

Berkshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust1

Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust1

College of Policing1

Department for Education1

G4S1

Independent Office for Police Conduct1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

15 Apr2016
Manchester South
Concerns raised1
1. Failure to record pertinent information in individuals’ intelligence profiles
This report raised 3 other concerns. They are not shown here because they do not form part of this recurring concern.
Responses linked to these concerns
Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.
Actions described in response 1
1. Action
  Remind Public Protection Investigation Unit supervisors to quality-assure vulnerable-adult PPI logs, submit relevant intelligence and review warnings on finalisation.
  Stated by Greater Manchester PoliceStated planned
AI-generated summary

Adele Blakeman · Prevention of Future Deaths report

This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

Report summary

Adele Blakeman, who had a history of mental health difficulties and self-harming behaviour, died after taking her own life at Gateley Railway Station on 28 September 2015. The substantive concerns included failures in police information recording and access, classification and escalation of the call, timely allocation of resources, and understanding of the role of the Missing Persons Unit.

Read the report on judiciary.uk
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure to record pertinent information in individuals’ intelligence profiles
Wider context from the report
“2. There is a failure by officers to record pertinent information about an individual on the intelligence section of an individuals nominal profile. There were 5 PPI logs available to Officers no crucial pertinent information from these logs had been placed on her intelligence section, officers would have had to access each of these logs individually and read through the entire entries to elicit any information which may have been relevant. For example the fact that 4 of them involved this individual attending at railway stations or level crossings with a view to attempting to commit suicide. There was also on one mention of involving BTP should there be concerns about this individual, this partnership working was lost in the midst of one PPI Log. ”
Source location
Adele Blakeman · Prevention of Future Deaths report
Page 2 · concerns
Open source report
Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
Remind Public Protection Investigation Unit supervisors to quality-assure vulnerable-adult PPI logs, submit relevant intelligence and review warnings on finalisation.

Verbatim wording from the response
“In respect of PPI logs, it is the responsibility of the officer submitting the PPI to submit any relevant intelligence from within the report.”

Source location
2016-0145-Response-by-Greater-Manchester-Police
Page 2 · response
Published 15 April 2016
Open published response
18 Dec2014
Oxfordshire
Concerns raised1
1. Failure to accurately and widely circulate the nature and duration of threat hits on the relevant intelligence database
This report raised 1 other concern. They are not shown here because they do not form part of this recurring concern.
Responses linked to these concerns
Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.
Actions described in response 2
1. Action
  Require PISTOL hits to be reported to the Battle Captain or Duty Watch Keeper and recorded in JCHAT.
  Stated by Ministry of DefenceStated completed
2. Action
  Produce daily PISTOL-hit heat maps, analyse them through intelligence staff, and disseminate them to tactical planners and patrol personnel.
  Stated by Ministry of DefenceStated completed
AI-generated summary

Corporal William Savage and 2 others · Prevention of Future Deaths report

This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

Report summary

Corporal William Savage, Fusilier Samuel Flint and Private Robert Hetherington died on 30 April 2013 when their Mastiff armoured patrol vehicle was hit by a large improvised explosive device placed in a tunnel under Route 611 in Helmand, Afghanistan. The principal concerns were that frequent and continuous surveillance hits indicating possible digging were not accurately and widely shared, and that the route may have been marked as cleared without sufficiently detailed consideration of the threat warnings.

Read the report on judiciary.uk
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure to accurately and widely circulate the nature and duration of threat hits on the relevant intelligence database
Wider context from the report
“- The nature of the hits and the period over which they were received should have been more accurately and widely circulated on the relevant Intelligence database. The commanders of the Patrol were aware there had been PISTOL hits at the location (but not frequent and continuous hits over 3/4 days) and were led to believe that the location had been cleared the day before on the 29 April when the US route clearing team travelled along Route 611. ”
Source location
Corporal William Savage and 2 others · Prevention of Future Deaths report
Page 2 · concerns
Open source report
Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
Require PISTOL hits to be reported to the Battle Captain or Duty Watch Keeper and recorded in JCHAT.

Verbatim wording from the response
“Immediately following this incident an in-depth analysis of the circumstances was conducted to ensure we identified and implemented all relevant lessons. The failure of effective communication of PISTOL information was highlighted and on 11 May 2013 a new Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) was issued and briefed to those operating PISTOL and to those using the information that PISTOL produced. This new SOP focussed on the passage of information and implemented the following changes:”

Source location
MOD-Response
Page 1 · response
Published 18 December 2014
Open published response
Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
Produce daily PISTOL-hit heat maps, analyse them through intelligence staff, and disseminate them to tactical planners and patrol personnel.

Verbatim wording from the response
“• On a daily basis all PISTOL hits should be converted into a ‘heat map’ which should be analysed by intelligence staff and promulgated to all those conducting tactical level planning and patrol activity.”

Source location
MOD-Response
Page 2 · response
Published 18 December 2014
Open published response
29 May2014
London (North)
Concerns raised1
1. Failure to develop and share operational intelligence between the MPS and SOCA
This report raised 9 other concerns. They are not shown here because they do not form part of this recurring concern.
Responses linked to these concerns
Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.
Actions described in response 4
1. Action
  Complete an internal review of procedures for gathering, developing and disseminating intelligence.
  Stated by National Crime AgencyStated completed
2. Action
  Adopt intelligence processes and develop training ensuring Senior Investigating Officers receive all relevant intelligence and dynamic strategy changes.
  Stated by Metropolitan Police ServiceStated in progress
3. Action
  Assign Covert Intelligence Managers responsibility for oversight of covert intelligence processes and Senior Investigating Officer awareness.
  Stated by Metropolitan Police ServiceStated planned
1. Action
  Review Intelligence Officer training to strengthen their role in ensuring Senior Investigating Officers receive relevant intelligence.
  Stated by Metropolitan Police ServiceStated planned
Respondent positions 3
1. Position
  After reviewing intelligence-gathering, development and dissemination procedures, no further action could realistically have been taken to avoid the incident.
  Stated by National Crime AgencyNo action considered necessary
1. Position
  Weapons-seizure procedures fall to wider operational policing, the senior investigating officer and the operational commander.
  Stated by National Police Chiefs’ CouncilRedirects responsibility
2. Position
  Existing joint MPS and NCA intelligence processes were considered robust, risk managed and accountable, with clear governance for developing intelligence opportunities.
  Stated by Metropolitan Police ServiceExisting arrangements considered sufficient
AI-generated summary

Mark Duggan · Prevention of Future Deaths report

This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

Report summary

On 4 August 2011, Mark Duggan was shot by an armed police officer during an enforced vehicle stop in London and was pronounced dead at the scene. The report raises concerns about intelligence sharing and operational decisions before the shooting, the investigation and preservation of evidence at the scene, the recording of the operation, and the coordination and access to intelligence during the investigation and inquest.

Read the report on judiciary.uk
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure to develop and share operational intelligence between the MPS and SOCA
Wider context from the report
“Concern 1: The MPS and SOCA could have reacted better to developing events and used their joint intelligence resources better. I am therefore concerned that there may have been the opportunity for better liaison between the MPS and SOCA, and for more focus on intelligence about Mr Hutchinson-Foster, with a view to locating the guns prior to Mr Duggan collecting one. I am left with the clear concern that SOCA did no more than pass on the intelligence it received and did not develop it or suggest ways in which the MPS could do so, in order to get guns from the girlfriend’s address in Burchell Road. The MPS did not react to the unfolding situation so as to review their strategy of waiting for Mark Duggan to obtain a gun before stopping him. The MPS and SOCA did not devise a strategy which focussed on Mr Hutchinson-Foster and the guns and which was capable of leading to them being seized before one was collected by Mark Duggan. This concern is directed to the MPS and NCA. ”
Source location
Mark Duggan · Prevention of Future Deaths report
Page 20 · concerns
Open source report
Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
Complete an internal review of procedures for gathering, developing and disseminating intelligence.

Verbatim wording from the response
“The National Crime Agency has undertaken a thorough internal review of its operating procedures in relation to how intelligence is gathered, how it is developed and subsequently disseminated. In the light of this review, the Agency does not consider that any more could realistically have been done to avoid this tragic incident.”

Source location
2014-0182-Response-by-National-Crime-Agency
Page 1 · response
Published 29 May 2014
Open published response
Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
Adopt intelligence processes and develop training ensuring Senior Investigating Officers receive all relevant intelligence and dynamic strategy changes.

Verbatim wording from the response
“The MPS is adopting processes and developing training specifically designed to ensure the relevant Senior Investigating Officer [‘SIO’] is fully sighted on all available intelligence. Covert Intelligence Managers will have a specific responsibility to maintain oversight of covert intelligence processes in order to ensure that the SIO is aware of intelligence relevant to achieving his or her strategy. Emphasis will be laid on ensuring that the oversight must include dynamic responses to changes in the SIO’s strategy in light of all available intelligence. Training for MPS Intelligence Officers will be reviewed to guarantee that there is sufficient emphasis on their role in ensuring the Senior Investigating Officer is aware of intelligence relevant to achieving his or her strategy in each case.”

Source location
2014-0182-Response-by-Metropolitan-Police-Service
Page 3 · response
Published 29 May 2014
Open published response
Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
Assign Covert Intelligence Managers responsibility for oversight of covert intelligence processes and Senior Investigating Officer awareness.

Verbatim wording from the response
“The MPS is adopting processes and developing training specifically designed to ensure the relevant Senior Investigating Officer [‘SIO’] is fully sighted on all available intelligence. Covert Intelligence Managers will have a specific responsibility to maintain oversight of covert intelligence processes in order to ensure that the SIO is aware of intelligence relevant to achieving his or her strategy. Emphasis will be laid on ensuring that the oversight must include dynamic responses to changes in the SIO’s strategy in light of all available intelligence. Training for MPS Intelligence Officers will be reviewed to guarantee that there is sufficient emphasis on their role in ensuring the Senior Investigating Officer is aware of intelligence relevant to achieving his or her strategy in each case.”

Source location
2014-0182-Response-by-Metropolitan-Police-Service
Page 3 · response
Published 29 May 2014
Open published response
Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
Review Intelligence Officer training to strengthen their role in ensuring Senior Investigating Officers receive relevant intelligence.

Verbatim wording from the response
“The MPS is adopting processes and developing training specifically designed to ensure the relevant Senior Investigating Officer [‘SIO’] is fully sighted on all available intelligence. Covert Intelligence Managers will have a specific responsibility to maintain oversight of covert intelligence processes in order to ensure that the SIO is aware of intelligence relevant to achieving his or her strategy. Emphasis will be laid on ensuring that the oversight must include dynamic responses to changes in the SIO’s strategy in light of all available intelligence. Training for MPS Intelligence Officers will be reviewed to guarantee that there is sufficient emphasis on their role in ensuring the Senior Investigating Officer is aware of intelligence relevant to achieving his or her strategy in each case.”

Source location
2014-0182-Response-by-Metropolitan-Police-Service
Page 3 · response
Published 29 May 2014
Open published response
Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
After reviewing intelligence-gathering, development and dissemination procedures, no further action could realistically have been taken to avoid the incident.

Verbatim wording from the response
“The National Crime Agency has undertaken a thorough internal review of its operating procedures in relation to how intelligence is gathered, how it is developed and subsequently disseminated. In the light of this review, the Agency does not consider that any more could realistically have been done to avoid this tragic incident.”

Source location
2014-0182-Response-by-National-Crime-Agency
Page 1 · response
Published 29 May 2014
Open published response
Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
Weapons-seizure procedures fall to wider operational policing, the senior investigating officer and the operational commander.

Verbatim wording from the response
“The issue you set out in paragraphs 84 to 86 is one for wider operational policing and for senior investigating officer and operational commander and the National Policing portfolios will ensure liaison with the College of Policing to incorporate, reiterate and reflect in its operational training.”

Source location
2014-0182-Response-by-ACPO
Page 12 · response
Published 29 May 2014
Open published response
Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
Existing joint MPS and NCA intelligence processes were considered robust, risk managed and accountable, with clear governance for developing intelligence opportunities.

Verbatim wording from the response
“Following a comprehensive review of intelligence procedures and liaison conducted in response to your PFD report, the MPS has concluded that there were, and continue to be, robust, risk managed and accountable joint MPS/NCA (and previously SOCA) processes to request, refuse and allow intelligence opportunities to be developed with clear lines of governance. The MPS have collaborated with the NCA on all aspects of review and learning undertaken as a result of the tragic death of Mark Duggan. These include (a) professional development training courses for staff and managers in specialist skills and (b) reviews into safe-guarding and critical incident procedures.”

Source location
2014-0182-Response-by-Metropolitan-Police-Service
Page 3 · response
Published 29 May 2014
Open published response

Data last updated 7 September 2026

What this concern includes

Not included

Reports over time

Concerns raised1

Failure to record pertinent information in individuals’ intelligence profiles

Actions described in response An action is something a respondent says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to the concern raised.1

Concerns raised1

Failure to accurately and widely circulate the nature and duration of threat hits on the relevant intelligence database

Actions described in response An action is something a respondent says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to the concern raised.2

Concerns raised1

Failure to develop and share operational intelligence between the MPS and SOCA

Actions described in response An action is something a respondent says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to the concern raised.4

Respondent positions A position is what a respondent says about the concern when they do not describe a specific action.3

Actions described in response 1

Actions described in response 2

Actions described in response 4

Respondent positions 3