Recurring concern

Unreliable railway-station detection and alerting for persons on the line

First to latest report 15 Nov 2013 — 29 May 2020

Reports that mention this concern: 3
Times this concern has been raised: 5
Stated actions linked to this concern: 6

What this concern includes

Includes failures of railway-station systems specifically intended to detect persons on or near the line and raise or transmit an immediate alert, including platform or trackside alarms, monitored CCTV, alternative detection systems, coverage, integration and arrangements for triggering an appropriate response.

What is not included

Excludes general supervision of members of the public on station premises where no person-on-line detection or alerting function is identified.
Excludes physical controls preventing railway-track access, including fencing, barriers and access restrictions, unless the assertion also concerns detection or alerting of a person on or near the line.
Excludes generic emergency communication, staffing or response failures where the railway-station detection or alerting control is not deficient.
Excludes suicide-prevention signage, lighting or mental-health support measures unless they are specifically part of detecting a person on or near the railway line and triggering a response.

Trends

Reports over time

Reports mentioning this concern, over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Arriva Rail North Limited1

Docklands Light Railway Limited1

London Underground Limited1

Office of Rail and Road1

Transport for London1

Reports and published responses 3 reports

See individual reports that have raised this concern, and the actions taken in response

29 May2020
Inner North London
Concerns raised2
1. Inability of the central CCTV monitoring system to watch all stations simultaneously
2. Dependence on members of the public to notice hazards and activate alarms
This report raised 2 other concerns. They are not shown here because they do not form part of this recurring concern.
Linked responses

Keolis Amey Docklands (KAD
Office of Rail and Road
Transport for London
Stated actions 3
1. Keolis Amey Docklands (KAD and Transport for London
  Develop and roll out enhanced platform-alarm signage to improve passengers’ ability to locate alarms.
2. Keolis Amey Docklands (KAD and Transport for London
  Research and collaborate on CCTV and train-based hazard-detection technologies, including assessing potential options for a DLR trial.
3. Office of Rail and Road
  Discuss with DLR the reasonable practicability of technological solutions to detect people on the track and stop approaching vehicles.
Respondent positions 4
1. Keolis Amey Docklands (KAD and Transport for London
  On-train and CCTV obstacle-detection technology is considered insufficiently mature for reliable operation on the DLR network.
  Unable to act
1. Office of Rail and Road
  Existing risk controls were considered appropriate and reasonably practicable, so additional platform screen doors were not required.
  Existing arrangements considered sufficient
2. Office of Rail and Road
  DLR, KAD and TfL held responsibility and power to investigate and implement additional technological or operational safety solutions.
  Redirects responsibility
3. Office of Rail and Road
  Reliable commercial technologies for detecting people on tracks and stopping trains were not yet available off the shelf.
  Unable to act
AI-generated summary

Flora Shen · Prevention of Future Deaths report

This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

Report summary

Flora Shen died on 6 January 2020 at Lime House station after falling from the platform and being struck by a train. The report raised concerns about the reliance on members of the public to notice hazards and activate alarms, and about limited CCTV coverage and the response process on the driverless DLR system.

Read the report on judiciary.uk
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Inability of the central CCTV monitoring system to watch all stations simultaneously
Wider context from the report
“(3) The central DLR CCTV monitoring system cannot watch all stations at the same time and the safety of persons slipping, falling or collapsing on to a line on the DLR system seems to rely on ability of members of the public to notice the hazard and activate the alarm on either the platform or the train. ”
Source location
Flora Shen · Prevention of Future Deaths report
Page 1 · concerns
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Dependence on members of the public to notice hazards and activate alarms
Wider context from the report
“(3) The central DLR CCTV monitoring system cannot watch all stations at the same time and the safety of persons slipping, falling or collapsing on to a line on the DLR system seems to rely on ability of members of the public to notice the hazard and activate the alarm on either the platform or the train. ”
Source location
Flora Shen · Prevention of Future Deaths report
Page 1 · concerns
Open source report
Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
Develop and roll out enhanced platform-alarm signage to improve passengers’ ability to locate alarms.

Verbatim wording from the response
“1. Enhancing the signage on the platform alarms – the intention of this work is to give passengers a greater chance of locating the alarms on the platforms should they notify a hazard on the track. The timescale for completion is July 2021; the programme is now being developed and would be rolled out on a risk-basis.”

Source location
2020-0115-Response-from-TFL_Redacted.pdf
Page 6 · response
Published 11 June 2020
Open published response
Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
Research and collaborate on CCTV and train-based hazard-detection technologies, including assessing potential options for a DLR trial.

Verbatim wording from the response
“2. We will continue to research and collaborate with suppliers to identify potential solutions and improvements in the area of hazard/obstacle detection. We are currently exploring an emerging CCTV product that can detect persons and/or objects on the track, and have held preliminary discussions with its developer to assess its potential for testing on the DLR. We should know by December 2020 if a trial can be taken forward. However, this is partly dependent on the existing CCTV network being capable of supporting such a trial.”

Source location
2020-0115-Response-from-TFL_Redacted.pdf
Page 6 · response
Published 11 June 2020
Open published response
Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
Discuss with DLR the reasonable practicability of technological solutions to detect people on the track and stop approaching vehicles.

Verbatim wording from the response
“ORR has discussed with DLR the reasonable practicability of providing further technological solutions that could detect persons on the track and take action to stop approaching vehicles. DLR have advised us that they have investigated the availability of such technologies and are currently seeking a partner to conduct a study into potential on-train obstacle detection systems. It is clear that DLR is keeping this topic under review and actively seeking solutions.”

Source location
2020-0115-Response-from-Office-of-Rail-and-Road_Redacted.pdf
Page 3 · response
Published 11 June 2020
Open published response
Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
On-train and CCTV obstacle-detection technology is considered insufficiently mature for reliable operation on the DLR network.

Verbatim wording from the response
“2. We will continue to research and collaborate with suppliers to identify potential solutions and improvements in the area of hazard/obstacle detection. We are currently exploring an emerging CCTV product that can detect persons and/or objects on the track, and have held preliminary discussions with its developer to assess its potential for testing on the DLR. We should know by December 2020 if a trial can be taken forward. However, this is partly dependent on the existing CCTV network being capable of supporting such a trial.”

Source location
2020-0115-Response-from-TFL_Redacted.pdf
Page 6 · response
Published 11 June 2020
Open published response
Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
Existing risk controls were considered appropriate and reasonably practicable, so additional platform screen doors were not required.

Verbatim wording from the response
“ORR has confirmed that the risk assessments jointly undertaken by DLR and KAD include for the events of a person falling or jumping onto the track and the consequent potential events. This assessment identifies a range of control and mitigation measures for these events. These include, amongst other things, the alarm points on stations and random CCTV monitoring, and station signage, platform markings and surface finish. Measures also include wider initiatives such as proactive liaison with local police and mental health services.”

Source location
2020-0115-Response-from-Office-of-Rail-and-Road_Redacted.pdf
Page 2 · response
Published 11 June 2020
Open published response
Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
DLR, KAD and TfL held responsibility and power to investigate and implement additional technological or operational safety solutions.

Verbatim wording from the response
“It is for these reasons that ORR considers that the concerns in the Coroner’s report would be better directed to DLR, KAD and TfL. These organisations hold the responsibility for health and safety and have the power to investigate and implement additional or alternative new technological and operational solutions that could reduce further the risks to persons on the track.”

Source location
2020-0115-Response-from-Office-of-Rail-and-Road_Redacted.pdf
Page 3 · response
Published 11 June 2020
Open published response
Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
Reliable commercial technologies for detecting people on tracks and stopping trains were not yet available off the shelf.

Verbatim wording from the response
“ORR has discussed with DLR the reasonable practicability of providing further technological solutions that could detect persons on the track and take action to stop approaching vehicles. DLR have advised us that they have investigated the availability of such technologies and are currently seeking a partner to conduct a study into potential on-train obstacle detection systems. It is clear that DLR is keeping this topic under review and actively seeking solutions.”

Source location
2020-0115-Response-from-Office-of-Rail-and-Road_Redacted.pdf
Page 3 · response
Published 11 June 2020
Open published response
10 Dec2018
County Durham and Darlington
Concerns raised2
1. Absence of alternative means of detecting persons on the line and triggering appropriate response at railway stations
2. Absence of means to raise an immediate and effective alert regarding persons on the line at railway stations
Linked response

Arriva Rail North (ARN
Stated actions 3
1. Arriva Rail North (ARN
  Hold multidisciplinary post-incident meetings, distribute anniversary safety briefings, and deploy Travel Safe Officers at relevant locations.
2. Arriva Rail North (ARN
  Use data to identify hotspot locations and assess additional measures such as CCTV coverage.
3. Arriva Rail North (ARN
  Bring forward the planned CCTV installation at Chester-le-Street station.
Respondent positions 2
1. Arriva Rail North (ARN
  No technology is available to detect people on the railway line.
  Unable to act
1. Arriva Rail North (ARN
  Responsibility for the station help point rests with Durham County Council.
  Redirects responsibility
AI-generated summary

Christopher Lewis McGUFFIE · Prevention of Future Deaths report

This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

Report summary

Christopher Lewis McGUFFIE stood on the rails at Chester-le-Street station and was struck by a London to Edinburgh service. The report raised concerns about the lack of immediate and effective means to alert railway staff to people on the line, and the lack of alternative detection and response systems.

Read the report on judiciary.uk
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Absence of alternative means of detecting persons on the line and triggering appropriate response at railway stations
Wider context from the report
“The absence, at railway stations, of:- (1) the means to raise an immediate and effective alert regarding persons on the line; AND (2) Alternative means of detecting persons on the line and triggering appropriate response. ”
Source location
Christopher Lewis McGUFFIE · Prevention of Future Deaths report
Page 1 · concerns
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Absence of means to raise an immediate and effective alert regarding persons on the line at railway stations
Wider context from the report
“The absence, at railway stations, of:- (1) the means to raise an immediate and effective alert regarding persons on the line; AND (2) Alternative means of detecting persons on the line and triggering appropriate response. ”
Source location
Christopher Lewis McGUFFIE · Prevention of Future Deaths report
Page 1 · concerns
Open source report
Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
Hold multidisciplinary post-incident meetings, distribute anniversary safety briefings, and deploy Travel Safe Officers at relevant locations.

Verbatim wording from the response
“Following a suicide or attempted trespass multi-disciplinary meetings involving NwR, BTP, ARNs station manager and the Samaritans take place to identify any local actions that need to take place. Suicide awareness briefs from NwR are distributed to station managers on the anniversary of an event. TSOs are also actively deployed to these locations at this time to assist the station managers. We actively work with NwR to implement any BTP recommended measures following an incident such as signage, platform end protection.”

Source location
2018-0386-Response-by-Arriva-1
Page 2 · response
Published 13 May 2019
Open published response
Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
Use data to identify hotspot locations and assess additional measures such as CCTV coverage.

Verbatim wording from the response
“• Using data to identify hotspot locations and identify additional measures such as CCTV coverage. In the longer term we want to upgrade our CCTV network such that a live feed could be seen in a central control room offering greater potential for proactive intervention.”

Source location
2018-0386-Response-by-Arriva-1
Page 2 · response
Published 13 May 2019
Open published response
Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
Bring forward the planned CCTV installation at Chester-le-Street station.

Verbatim wording from the response
“We are looking to bring forward out planned installation of CCTV on the station and will continue to work with industry groups to develop solutions to reducing suicide on the railway.”

Source location
2018-0386-Response-by-Arriva-1
Page 3 · response
Published 13 May 2019
Open published response
Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
No technology is available to detect people on the railway line.

Verbatim wording from the response
“4. Unfortunately there is no technology that could detect persons on the line.”

Source location
2018-0386-Response-by-Arriva-1
Page 3 · response
Published 13 May 2019
Open published response
Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
Responsibility for the station help point rests with Durham County Council.

Verbatim wording from the response
“2. There is a help point at the station this is the responsibility of Durham County Council. We understand that this is currently not working. We are installing Ticket Vending Machines across our network and phase 2 of the software installation includes a help point. The software is currently being trialled.”

Source location
2018-0386-Response-by-Arriva-1
Page 3 · response
Published 13 May 2019
Open published response
15 Nov2013
Inner North London
Concerns raised1
1. Failure to alert the driver by the most direct and effective method about a person’s presence on the track
This report raised 1 other concern. They are not shown here because they do not form part of this recurring concern.
No linked response statements
No respondent-stated action or position is linked to these concerns in the published data.
AI-generated summary

Andrew PHRYDAS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

Report summary

Andrew Phrydas died after being struck by a London Underground train near Finsbury Park Station after entering the tunnel and crossing between the Victoria and Piccadilly lines. The report identified concerns about London Underground’s lack of a process to shut down both lines simultaneously and its failure to alert the driver about Andrew’s presence on the track by the most direct and effective method.

Read the report on judiciary.uk
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure to alert the driver by the most direct and effective method about a person’s presence on the track
Wider context from the report
“Although a person in the tunnel was an unprecedented event, there was a failure by London Underground to have a process in place to shut down both lines simultaneously at a station where two lines intersect. There was also a failure by London Underground to alert the driver in the most direct and effective method about Andrew’s presence on the track. ”
Source location
Andrew PHRYDAS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
Page 2 · concerns
Open source report

Actions and positions describe what organisations say in published responses. Implementation is not independently verified.

Data last updated 7 September 2026

What this concern includes

Trends

Reports mentioning this concern, over time

Concerns raised2

Inability of the central CCTV monitoring system to watch all stations simultaneously

Dependence on members of the public to notice hazards and activate alarms

Linked responses

Stated actions An action is something a respondent says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to the concern raised.3

Respondent positions A position is what a respondent says about the concern when they do not describe a specific action.4

Concerns raised2

Absence of alternative means of detecting persons on the line and triggering appropriate response at railway stations

Absence of means to raise an immediate and effective alert regarding persons on the line at railway stations

Linked response

Stated actions An action is something a respondent says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to the concern raised.3

Respondent positions A position is what a respondent says about the concern when they do not describe a specific action.2

Concerns raised1

Failure to alert the driver by the most direct and effective method about a person’s presence on the track

Stated actions 3

Respondent positions 4

Stated actions 3

Respondent positions 2