Recurring concern

Failure to ensure essential clinical equipment and supplies are available and serviceable

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First reported 30 Aug 2013•Latest report 8 May 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes availability, stock, checking, maintenance or servicing failures that leave essential clinical equipment or supplies unavailable or unfit for use.

Not included

  • Excludes non-clinical equipment and vehicle, environmental, or recreational-equipment checks.
  • Excludes failures concerning the operation or use of equipment during care when no equipment-readiness or serviceability check is implicated.
  • Excludes generic staffing, training, documentation, audit, or supervision deficiencies unless they are specifically tied to the reliability of daily clinical-equipment serviceability checks.
  • Excludes checks of patient condition, care processes, messages, or other non-equipment objects.
Reports
41

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
46

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
43

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

NHS England6
Department of Health and Social Care4
Care Quality Commission3
East Kent Hospitals University NHS Foundation Trust2
General Pharmaceutical Council2
Greater Manchester Health and Social Care Partnership2
Royal College of Physicians2
Association Of Anaesthetists (Great Britain & Ireland)1
Avenue House Nursing and Care Home1
Ayuntamiento de La Oliva1
Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust1
Barts Health NHS Trust1
Blackpool Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust1
Brunswick Ward at Lindridge1
Care UK1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Nottinghamshire

    AI-generated summary

    Jodie Catherine McCann · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jodie Catherine McCann, a 22-year-old woman, developed gallstone pancreatitis, suffered a cardiac arrest, and required critical care and ventilation. After her tracheostomy tube became displaced and could not be replaced, she suffered a prolonged cardiac arrest caused by lack of oxygen and died. Concerns included inadequate planning and preparation for difficult airway management and tracheostomy displacement, equipment and staffing availability, and delays in the serious incident review.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to robustly check difficult-airway trolley equipment daily and replace broken or misplaced key equipment

    Wider context from the report

    “There is limited evidence to date, for the robust daily checking of all necessary equipment on the difficult airway trolley, to ensure immediate replacement of all key equipment if it is broken or misplaced ”

    Source location

    Jodie Catherine McCann · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unavailability of equipment and skills to carry out difficult-airway plans

    Wider context from the report

    “There is limited evidence to date for the introduction and continuing use of comprehensive airway strategies, with structured planning and preparation, when a difficult airway is anticipated. There should be airway plans A, B, and C recorded, shared, and the equipment and skills to carry them out must be available ”

    Source location

    Jodie Catherine McCann · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Maintain airway trolleys with required equipment, NAP4 algorithms, and intubation checklists, supported by daily checks, restocking, and documented compliance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “This airway plan is now displayed above the patient's bed, and the airway trolley containing all vital equipment is stored in each area of the Unit with clear laminated copies of the NAP4 algorithms displayed on the airway trolley.”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals of Derby and Burton NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 27 April 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Repeat the airway study day with theory and simulation training on airway management, trolley orientation, intubation checklists, and dislodged tracheostomy management.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. To complement this, an Airway Study Day was carried out on 22 October 2022 by ████████, Consultant in ICU which contained theory and simulation training around airway management, airway trolley orientation and intubation checklist and management of a dislodged tracheostomy. This airway study day is to be repeated on 21 and 28 June 2023 (this was planned for April but was impacted by the junior doctor strikes);”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals of Derby and Burton NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 27 April 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Add airway management to the junior doctor induction programme.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “4. Airway management is to be added to the junior doctor induction training programme which covers intakes in August and February. This is being developed for the next cohort of trainees by ████████, Consultant and College Tutor;”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals of Derby and Burton NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 27 April 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide practical airway training for Band 6 and 7 nursing teams and display airway education materials within the unit.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3. A local practical session was carried out on 27 April 2023 for all the Band 6 and 7 nursing teams performed by ████████, Consultant in ICU;”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals of Derby and Burton NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 27 April 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Purchase a new intubating bronchoscope and order an additional machine to provide two bronchoscope options in intensive care.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Since the death of Ms McCann, the ICU at QHB has purchased a new intubating bronchoscope to replace the broken screen and has an order an additional machine so that there are two options for clinicians in terms of use of bronchoscopes. The unit also has a stock of scopes which can be used in conjunction with the screen units and will be compatible with the additional unit that is on order.”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals of Derby and Burton NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 5 · response
    Published 27 April 2023

    Open published response
  2. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    John Fallon · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    John Fallon, who had dementia and was resident at Downshaw Lodge Care Home, choked on partially chewed meat while eating lunch without his dentures on 13 March 2022. The concerns included the lack of routine SALT assessments and diet changes when residents eat without dentures, delays in replacing or updating dentures due to limited dental services, and the absence of routinely available suction machines in care homes.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unavailability of suction machines in care homes for staff management of choking

    Wider context from the report

    “3. NWAS used a suction machine to clear the airway on their arrival. The inquest heard evidence that these are not routinely in place at care homes and so if a resident is choking food cannot be suctioned out by staff. ”

    Source location

    John Fallon · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  3. Norfolk

    AI-generated summary

    Tracy Dawn WOOD · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Tracy Wood was admitted to Hellesdon Hospital with a history of self-harm and suicidal ideation and died on 3 June 2021 after being found unresponsive in her room following an earlier incident involving a prohibited item. The principal concerns included insufficient staffing and one-to-one support, failures in clinical assessment and risk management, inadequate record keeping, delayed emergency response, and shortcomings in the investigation and incident report.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delayed availability of emergency life-saving equipment at the patient’s room

    Wider context from the report

    “9. On Tracy being found on the 2 June 2021 with a ████████ around her neck, emergency life-saving equipment was not brought immediately to Tracy’s room. Monitoring equipment was obtained by a member of staff who gave evidence they were unaware Tracy was not breathing. On return to Tracy’s room the emergency “crash bag” was then requested and obtained. ”

    Source location

    Tracy Dawn WOOD · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  4. North East Kent

    AI-generated summary

    Mr Osland · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr Osland was admitted to hospital after an ischaemic stroke and later suffered hypoxia, cardiorespiratory arrest and catastrophic ischaemic brain injury. He did not regain consciousness and died after the withdrawal of clinical support. The principal concerns were reduced room-monitor alarm volume, disconnection between the room and central monitors, inadequate responses to the persistent “OFF COMS” notification, and unclear procedures for nursing staff.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to include room alarm audibility in handover equipment checks

    Wider context from the report

    “1) Nursing staff are unaware that the room monitor volume could be reduced to the point where it was not audible outside the room – as a result, the volume of the room alarm was not part of hand over equipment checks. ”

    Source location

    Mr Osland · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Default ICU monitor alarm volumes to levels 8–10 and restrict volume changes to EME staff on request.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The volumes on the monitors have now been defaulted to 8-10 (which is the highest volume on the machine) and cannot be reduced by the ICU (Intensive Care Unit) staff. ICU staff are now not able to reduce and set the alarms on these machines themselves and this can only be carried out by the Trust’s Electrical and Mechanical Engineering Department (EME) on request. As a result of this change, volumes of the alarms will not routinely be required to be discussed at handover.”

    Source location

    2022-0060-Response-from-Kent-Canterbury-Hospital_Published
    Page 1 · response
    Published 28 February 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review alarm levels during configuration of current ICU monitors and agree settings through the configuration working group.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “However, if EME have been requested to change the volumes, this will be documented along with an individualised risk assessment in the patient record. In future, a review of alarm levels will take place as part of our configuration of current ICU monitors but I can assure you that volumes will be set at a level which will be agreed by the configuration working group which comprises of critical care, medical devices, EME and GE Healthcare (manufacturer of the monitors).”

    Source location

    2022-0060-Response-from-Kent-Canterbury-Hospital_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 February 2022

    Open published response
  5. West Yorkshire Eastern

    AI-generated summary

    Mark Anthony Athias · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mark Anthony Athias had multiple physical and mental health issues, including recurring urinary infections and problems with a long-term catheter. After difficulties with his catheter on 2 July 2021, he was admitted to hospital, where his condition deteriorated and he died on 6 July 2021. Concerns included a lack of sterile replacement catheters, inadequate monitoring records, and a missing handover record, with risks arising from deficient record keeping.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unavailability of sterile replacement catheters in stock

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The nursing home did not have sterile replacement catheters in stock, despite being aware that Mr Athias had difficulties with his catheter, which had necessitated it being replaced twice in previous weeks. The mistakes made in ordering replacements had not been detected by the managers in the nursing home. ”

    Source location

    Mark Anthony Athias · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update the catheter policy to require sufficient stocks for planned, unplanned and emergency catheter changes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “You heard evidence from ████████, Head of Quality for Exemplar Health Care Services that following Mr Athias' death Exemplar Health Care's catheter policy was updated to reflect the importance of retaining sufficient stocks of catheters in all Exemplar Health Care homes. You were provided with a copy of the updated policy and your attention was drawn to the following paragraph:”

    Source location

    2022-0024-Response-from-Exemplar-Health-Care_Published
    Page 1 · response
    Published 31 January 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement layered catheter-stock controls, including weekly checks, resident-level supplies, minimum backup stocks, daily records and handover sign-off.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “You were provided with written evidence from Nurse ████████ that she recognised that the catheter stock was insufficient during an out of hours shift on 2 July 2021, and she requested that further catheters be ordered. Unfortunately, due to a communication error this request was not actioned. ████████ explained that, following Mr Athias' death, she personally reviewed all incidents across the Exemplar Health Care organisation and found no evidence of a similar incident occurring, either before or since. She explained that the lack of sterile catheter was therefore an unfortunate, one-off communication error. Ms ████████ also explained that, shortly after Mr Athias' death, weekly stock checks were implemented at Copperfields in order to ensure a sufficient level of stock is maintained at all times. This new system is working well.”

    Source location

    2022-0024-Response-from-Exemplar-Health-Care_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 31 January 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement EMAR stock visibility, low-stock alerts and daily or weekly dashboard monitoring with remote clinical oversight.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Following Mr Athias' death, Exemplar Health Care has also implemented an Electronic Medication System ("EMAR"). This means that stock level is visible on the EMAR system at all times and stock levels can be viewed by the nurses on EMAR laptops, and remotely by Clinical Nurse Managers, Heads of Care, the Registered Home Managers and the central support service 24 hours a day. This has resulted in far more overview of stock at all levels of seniority and removes the risk of a communication error leading to an absence of equipment such as occurred in Mr Athias' case.”

    Source location

    2022-0024-Response-from-Exemplar-Health-Care_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 31 January 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide EMAR training to staff and access to continuous EMAR support and an out-of-hours management contact system.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Copperfields delivered shared learning with the nursing staff following Mr Athias' death which highlighted the other avenues available to access catheters in the community. In addition, following the implementation of the EMAR system at Copperfields in February 2022, all staff were provided with several weeks of EMAR training and have access to 24 hours a day support from the EMAR team. The nurses and management team have been trained to review the stock”

    Source location

    2022-0024-Response-from-Exemplar-Health-Care_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 31 January 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The catheter stock failure was an isolated communication error, with no evidence of similar incidents occurring before or since.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “You were provided with written evidence from Nurse ████████ that she recognised that the catheter stock was insufficient during an out of hours shift on 2 July 2021, and she requested that further catheters be ordered. Unfortunately, due to a communication error this request was not actioned. ████████ explained that, following Mr Athias' death, she personally reviewed all incidents across the Exemplar Health Care organisation and found no evidence of a similar incident occurring, either before or since. She explained that the lack of sterile catheter was therefore an unfortunate, one-off communication error. Ms ████████ also explained that, shortly after Mr Athias' death, weekly stock checks were implemented at Copperfields in order to ensure a sufficient level of stock is maintained at all times. This new system is working well.”

    Source location

    2022-0024-Response-from-Exemplar-Health-Care_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 31 January 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing electronic, visual and dashboard stock controls remove the risk of communication errors causing catheter shortages.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Following Mr Athias' death, Exemplar Health Care has also implemented an Electronic Medication System ("EMAR"). This means that stock level is visible on the EMAR system at all times and stock levels can be viewed by the nurses on EMAR laptops, and remotely by Clinical Nurse Managers, Heads of Care, the Registered Home Managers and the central support service 24 hours a day. This has resulted in far more overview of stock at all levels of seniority and removes the risk of a communication error leading to an absence of equipment such as occurred in Mr Athias' case.”

    Source location

    2022-0024-Response-from-Exemplar-Health-Care_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 31 January 2022

    Open published response
  6. Mid Kent and Medway

    AI-generated summary

    Derek Albert RUSSELL · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Derek Albert Russell, who had a history of falls, was admitted to hospital after an unwitnessed fall and was assessed as being at high risk of further falls. Despite repeated requests, falls alarm equipment was unavailable, and he later suffered another unwitnessed fall and brain haemorrhages before developing COVID-19 and dying. The principal concern was the chronic shortage of falls alarm equipment at Medway Maritime Hospital, which increased patients’ risk of falls and serious injury and compromised clinical staff’s ability to monitor and reduce that risk.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Chronic shortages of falls alarm equipment for patients assessed as requiring it

    Wider context from the report

    “I am concerned that: (a) Patients who are assessed as requiring falls alarm equipment in future will not receive it due to chronic shortages of that equipment in the Medway Maritime Hospital. (b) By failing to provide adequate falls alarm equipment, patients are at increased risk of falling and sustaining fatal injuries (or injuries such as fractures and brain injury that can lead to immobility, susceptibility to infection and death). (c) The ability of clinical staff to monitor and reduce the risk of patients falling and sustaining fatal injuries is seriously compromised by the lack of this basic safety equipment and is putting lives at risk. ”

    Source location

    Derek Albert RUSSELL · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Purchase additional falls alarms, bed sensor pads and chair sensor pads to increase available equipment.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Since 2015 Medway NHS Foundation Trust has purchased 236 falls alarms, the last purchase being 100 alarms available for use February 2020 with each ward being allocated two dedicated falls alarms. Our Frailty Assessment Unit has also purchased nine additional alarms, and in response to the concerns raised by HM Coroner the Trust is in the process of increasing stock by purchasing a further 75 falls alarms, 75 bed sensor pads, and 10 chair sensor pads.”

    Source location

    2021-0119-Response-from-Medway-NHS-Foundation-Trust-Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 April 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement ward-level stocktaking, local stock monitoring and daily checks alongside the centrally held falls-equipment reserve.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Our comprehensive investigation following this Regulation 28 report identified that the tracking of stock throughout the hospital was not as robust as it could be, and as such changes are being implemented to stocktake current provisions and equip wards with the ability to monitor and maintain their own stock in addition to the centrally held reserve; falls equipment levels and availability will be added to the daily checks each ward completes. Budget will be identified and Clinical Engineering, who maintains the equipment stores, will be establishing a robust process for the RFID tagging, logging and tracking of falls equipment as they do with other critical equipment. We have also contacted other local Trusts to learn from any helpful processes they have in place.”

    Source location

    2021-0119-Response-from-Medway-NHS-Foundation-Trust-Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 April 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Identify budget and establish RFID tagging, logging and tracking for falls equipment.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Our comprehensive investigation following this Regulation 28 report identified that the tracking of stock throughout the hospital was not as robust as it could be, and as such changes are being implemented to stocktake current provisions and equip wards with the ability to monitor and maintain their own stock in addition to the centrally held reserve; falls equipment levels and availability will be added to the daily checks each ward completes. Budget will be identified and Clinical Engineering, who maintains the equipment stores, will be establishing a robust process for the RFID tagging, logging and tracking of falls equipment as they do with other critical equipment. We have also contacted other local Trusts to learn from any helpful processes they have in place.”

    Source location

    2021-0119-Response-from-Medway-NHS-Foundation-Trust-Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 April 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Disseminate and require compliance with the falls-equipment procurement and non-availability escalation procedure.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “All staff have been reminded of the importance of maintaining good stock management processes as well as prompt identification and escalation of any supply issues. The attached standard operating procedure for procuring falls equipment for patients will be disseminated and must be followed, and the outlined escalation process actioned in the event of non-availability. In addition, Clinical Engineering will now contact the dedicated falls team if there is any shortage of falls equipment in their stores, with a twice yearly report of stock levels and stock integrity/expiry, and a full yearly stocktake occurring. There will be 10 dedicated and tracked falls alarms held within the Emergency Cupboard at all times.”

    Source location

    2021-0119-Response-from-Medway-NHS-Foundation-Trust-Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 April 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Maintain up-to-date falls-equipment training for staff working predominantly nights.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Since January 2019 there have been 9 reports of inability to obtain a falls alarm, with all incidents occurring overnight. Escalation of these incidents to the dedicated falls team did not always happen, but where they were alerted additional alarms were purchased in response. The occurrence of the majority of these incidents being overnight has led to the Trust ensuring training is up”

    Source location

    2021-0119-Response-from-Medway-NHS-Foundation-Trust-Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 April 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Remind appropriate staff to report and escalate falls-equipment shortages promptly.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “All staff have been reminded of the importance of maintaining good stock management processes as well as prompt identification and escalation of any supply issues. The attached standard operating procedure for procuring falls equipment for patients will be disseminated and must be followed, and the outlined escalation process actioned in the event of non-availability. In addition, Clinical Engineering will now contact the dedicated falls team if there is any shortage of falls equipment in their stores, with a twice yearly report of stock levels and stock integrity/expiry, and a full yearly stocktake occurring. There will be 10 dedicated and tracked falls alarms held within the Emergency Cupboard at all times.”

    Source location

    2021-0119-Response-from-Medway-NHS-Foundation-Trust-Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 April 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require Clinical Engineering to notify the dedicated falls team of shortages and provide twice-yearly stock reports and annual stocktakes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “All staff have been reminded of the importance of maintaining good stock management processes as well as prompt identification and escalation of any supply issues. The attached standard operating procedure for procuring falls equipment for patients will be disseminated and must be followed, and the outlined escalation process actioned in the event of non-availability. In addition, Clinical Engineering will now contact the dedicated falls team if there is any shortage of falls equipment in their stores, with a twice yearly report of stock levels and stock integrity/expiry, and a full yearly stocktake occurring. There will be 10 dedicated and tracked falls alarms held within the Emergency Cupboard at all times.”

    Source location

    2021-0119-Response-from-Medway-NHS-Foundation-Trust-Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 April 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Maintain 10 dedicated, tracked falls alarms in the Emergency Cupboard at all times.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “All staff have been reminded of the importance of maintaining good stock management processes as well as prompt identification and escalation of any supply issues. The attached standard operating procedure for procuring falls equipment for patients will be disseminated and must be followed, and the outlined escalation process actioned in the event of non-availability. In addition, Clinical Engineering will now contact the dedicated falls team if there is any shortage of falls equipment in their stores, with a twice yearly report of stock levels and stock integrity/expiry, and a full yearly stocktake occurring. There will be 10 dedicated and tracked falls alarms held within the Emergency Cupboard at all times.”

    Source location

    2021-0119-Response-from-Medway-NHS-Foundation-Trust-Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 April 2021

    Open published response
  7. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    Frederick Joseph Terry · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Baby Frederick Joseph Terry was delivered by caesarean section after a failed forceps attempt on 16 November 2019, and death was confirmed after 40 minutes of resuscitation attempts. The stated cause of death was hypovolaemic shock due to skull fracture, scalp laceration and haemorrhage arising from birth trauma. Concerns included risk assessment and forceps delivery, excessive force and traction, staff training and levels, communication, record keeping, resuscitation equipment and procedures, and neonatal unit support.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unavailability or unsuitability of resuscitation equipment on the maternity ward

    Wider context from the report

    “Availability and suitability of resuscitation equipment and procedures on the maternity ward. The Trust’s Neonatal Resuscitation Policy may need to be revisited ”

    Source location

    Frederick Joseph Terry · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  8. Black Country

    AI-generated summary

    Zachary James Johnson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Zachary James Johnson was born in a birthing pool on 15 October 2016 after his foetal heart rate could not be auscultated for approximately 38 minutes because no working waterproof sonicaid was available. He was born floppy and unresponsive, and problems occurred during resuscitation, including incorrect ventilation-to-compression ratios, a period without chest compressions, and an interruption in airway management during transfer to hospital. The concerns included the availability of appropriate monitoring equipment and insufficiently frequent mandatory refresher training in newborn life support skills.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of waterproof equipment for foetal heart rate auscultation during birthing pool births

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) During the course of the inquest, I heard evidence that Zachary’s mother was permitted to enter a birthing pool to give birth in the known absence of a waterproof sonicaid. The lack of such equipment prevented the auscultation of the foetal heart rate. This was a matter I found causative of Zachary’s death. ”

    Source location

    Zachary James Johnson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  9. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Maureen Waterfall · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Maureen Waterfall fell at home on 12 July 2019 while taking the anticoagulant Edoxaban and sustained a head injury that led to a subdural haematoma. She died at Willow Wood Hospice on 26 July 2019. Concerns included the lack of a licensed specific antidote for Edoxaban, uncertainty about treatment effectiveness and timing, the absence of national guidance, and the storage of antidote supplies away from the resuscitation unit.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unavailability of anticoagulant antidote supplies at the resuscitation unit

    Wider context from the report

    “3. I heard that there is no national standard guidance about the storage of supplies of anticoagulant antidote drugs. As a result, as in this case at Tameside General Hospital Accident and Emergency Department they were not kept at the resuscitation unit, but rather they were kept in the haematology department ”

    Source location

    Maureen Waterfall · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  10. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Arnold Fletcher Ward · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Arnold Fletcher Ward was a resident at Fernlea Nursing Home who developed a deteriorating grade 4 sacral pressure ulcer, later associated with osteomyelitis, and died in hospital on 21 January 2019 from a myocardial infarction. Concerns included inadequate monitoring and escalation of the pressure ulcer, failure to follow up a referral to the Tissue Viability Nursing Team, and the resulting lack of appropriate wound dressing.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unavailability or non-use of required wound dressings

    Wider context from the report

    “The inquest heard that within the home the forms used did not capture the deterioration of the pressure ulcer or require detailed monitoring/use of photographs to track its progress. This meant that the significant and steep deterioration was not recognised and escalated at an early opportunity to the Tissue Viability Nursing team for expert wound management input. As a result the type of wound dressing he required were not utilised/available. It had been captured in the notes that there had been a referral to the Tissue Viability Nursing team in October. There was no system in the home to chase up the team after a number of weeks had elapsed and there had been no response. The inquest heard that even in non-urgent cases the Tissue Viability Nursing team would contact a home requesting support in at least 10 days and more quickly in an urgent case. ”

    Source location

    Arnold Fletcher Ward · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Complete the extended comprehensive inspection of Fernlea Care Home, examining pressure-ulcer management and management oversight.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The matters of concerns which arose from the preventing future deaths report were reviewed by CQC and a decision was made to undertake an unannounced, focused inspection of the Fernlea Care Home. This was because the concerns indicated that the registered provider may have been/may still be in breach of the following fundamental standards:”

    Source location

    2019-0433-Response-from-the-Care-Quality-Commission-Redacted
    Page 3 · response
    Published 31 December 2019

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026