Recurring concern

Ineffective controls preventing access to railway tracks

First to latest report 27 May 2015 — 4 Mar 2024

Reports that mention this concern
24
Times this concern has been raised
31
Stated actions linked to this concern
60

What this concern includes

Includes failures of controls specifically dedicated to preventing or restricting access to railway tracks, including physical barriers or mitigation measures and responses to identified railway-access risks or recommended remedial actions.

What is not included
  • Excludes generic failures in investigation, documentation, training, staffing or governance unless they are directly tied to a dedicated railway-track-access control.
  • Excludes railway hazards unrelated to preventing access to the tracks.
  • Excludes general infrastructure or highway safety deficiencies that do not concern access to railway tracks.

Reports and published responses 24 reports

See individual reports that have raised this concern, and the actions taken in response

  1. Hertfordshire

    AI-generated summary

    Kevin Phillip SHERWOOD · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    On 20 February 2018, Kevin Phillip Sherwood was struck and killed by a passenger train while standing on the railway line near Hitchin Station. The report raised concern that the railway boundary in the area had only post and wire fencing, and that nearby areas were used by dog walkers and others.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Insufficient railway boundary fencing in areas used by dog walkers and others

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Only post and wire fencing at the railway boundary in this area. The areas on both sides off the Ickneild Way, particularly to the west of the railway, are used by dog walkers and others. ”

    Source location

    Kevin Phillip SHERWOOD · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Reassess the Icknield Way boundary risk using the fencing standard after the incident.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “At the time of the incident the boundary measure in the Icknield Way, Hitchin area had been assessed as 3 (Likelihood) x 3 (Consequence) + 0 (Condition) = 9 and, as such, deemed medium risk. The class 3 (1.4m high) boundary measure on both sides of the track was installed twelve years ago. The inspection prior to the incident on 15th February 2018 recorded the fence as ‘good condition’ and regarded as compliant to the Fencing Standard.”

    Source location

    2018-0289-Response-by-Network-Rail
    Page 2 · response
    Published 18 January 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Carry out three-monthly inspections of the Icknield Way fencing to manage its increased risk rating.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As a result of this incident, the site was re-assessed (in line with the Fencing Standard) and the likelihood score increased from 3 to 4 as there was now “recorded evidence of trespass or vandalism within the last twelve months”. The consequence score was also increased from 3 to 4 as a result of the increase in numbers of trains through this section of railway. The revised score, therefore, became 4 (Likelihood) x 4 (Consequence) + 0 (Condition) = 16.”

    Source location

    2018-0289-Response-by-Network-Rail
    Page 2 · response
    Published 18 January 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Renew the Icknield Way fencing with a scheduled replacement in 2019/2020.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The mitigation for the increased risk score is a requirement to increase the frequency of inspection from annual to three monthly. The standard also requires that, at the point where the current fence becomes life expired, it will be replaced by a class 1 (1.8m high) fence. A fence line may be renewed prior to life expiry in some circumstances due to operational requirements or route enhancement projects (subject to funding).”

    Source location

    2018-0289-Response-by-Network-Rail
    Page 2 · response
    Published 18 January 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing compliant fencing, three-monthly inspections and scheduled renewal are considered sufficient pending replacement.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The mitigation for the increased risk score is a requirement to increase the frequency of inspection from annual to three monthly. The standard also requires that, at the point where the current fence becomes life expired, it will be replaced by a class 1 (1.8m high) fence. A fence line may be renewed prior to life expiry in some circumstances due to operational requirements or route enhancement projects (subject to funding).”

    Source location

    2018-0289-Response-by-Network-Rail
    Page 2 · response
    Published 18 January 2019

    Open published response

  2. North East Kent

    AI-generated summary

    Taiyah-Grace Sharon Peebles · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Taiyah-Grace Sharon Peebles, who was intoxicated, dismounted from a train in the wrong direction at Herne Bay Station, stumbled down an un-barriered platform slope and made contact with a live rail, resulting in her death. The principal concerns were the absence of an end-of-platform barrier and the accessibility of a ground-level live rail, with similar barriers absent on other platforms in the area.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to prevent public access to live rails at ground level

    Wider context from the report

    “The absence of an end of platform barrier and the existence of a live rail at ground level that might be accessible to members of the public may in my opinion create a risk that future deaths will occur unless action is taken. The Assistant Coroner understands that a barrier has since been constructed at Herne Bay Station to help prevent deaths in similar circumstances but that other platforms in the area have no such barrier. His further understanding is that in other parts of the country trains are powered by electric current supplied by way of overhead cables rather than live rails at ground level thereby making contact with the power supply less likely ”

    Source location

    Taiyah-Grace Sharon Peebles · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue developing reasonably practicable safety solutions for the ground-level conductor rail system.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The ground level conductor rail system on the South East route was installed in the 1950s and, although Network Rail has no future plans to install new conductor rail systems, it is not reasonably practicable to convert the system to an overhead contact line due to the complexity and cost to the railway industry. Whilst the ground level conductor rail cannot be replaced, Network Rail is committed to continue to develop reasonably practical solutions to improve the safety of the system wherever possible.”

    Source location

    2018-0239-Response-by-Natwork-Rail
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 September 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Install platform-end gates and anti-trespass measures at more than 50 South East route stations, with works already completed at 30 locations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “With regards to platform-end fencing, historically the fencing has not been installed as standard practice. The risks involved in intentional and unintentional accessing of the rail network were controlled via warning notices at the platform-end. The platform-end fencing and anti-trespass panels that have been installed at Herne Bay are part of a wider program of mitigations that are being applied to locations across the South East route to address the risks associated with members of the public either intentionally or unintentionally accessing the rail network. There are currently two programmes of activity which will see platform-end gates installed at over 50 stations on the South East route. We have already completed works on 30 locations over the Kent and Sussex areas. We expect the majority of works to be completed by the end of 2018 with some being finished in early 2019.”

    Source location

    2018-0239-Response-by-Natwork-Rail
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 September 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Improve fencing at higher-risk locations through a programme including £800,000 of work due for completion by April 2019.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “There are also programmes to improve our fencing at areas we consider to be at higher risk of intentional or unintentional public access and this includes £800,000 of work which is due to be completed by April 2019.”

    Source location

    2018-0239-Response-by-Natwork-Rail
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 September 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Converting or replacing the ground-level conductor rail is not reasonably practicable because of the railway system’s complexity and cost.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The ground level conductor rail system on the South East route was installed in the 1950s and, although Network Rail has no future plans to install new conductor rail systems, it is not reasonably practicable to convert the system to an overhead contact line due to the complexity and cost to the railway industry. Whilst the ground level conductor rail cannot be replaced, Network Rail is committed to continue to develop reasonably practical solutions to improve the safety of the system wherever possible.”

    Source location

    2018-0239-Response-by-Natwork-Rail
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 September 2018

    Open published response

  3. Dorset

    AI-generated summary

    Bartholomew Patrick Coleman · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Bartholomew Patrick Coleman accessed a railway track near his home, lay on the track as a train approached, and died after being struck. Concerns included that the track was easily accessible from a bridge used by schoolchildren and that there appeared to be no warning about the dangers of accessing the area.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Easy public access to the railway track from the bridge

    Wider context from the report

    “i. I understand children of school age cross the bridge to and from school. There is evidence to suggest that the area has been used by either groups or individuals to consume alcohol: there are discarded drinks containers in the area beyond the bridge and close to the train track. I am concerned that the railway track is easily accessible to members of the public from this bridge. In addition, there appears to be no warning as to the dangers presented by accessing this area. ”

    Source location

    Bartholomew Patrick Coleman · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of warnings about the dangers of accessing the railway track

    Wider context from the report

    “i. I understand children of school age cross the bridge to and from school. There is evidence to suggest that the area has been used by either groups or individuals to consume alcohol: there are discarded drinks containers in the area beyond the bridge and close to the train track. I am concerned that the railway track is easily accessible to members of the public from this bridge. In addition, there appears to be no warning as to the dangers presented by accessing this area. ”

    Source location

    Bartholomew Patrick Coleman · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Install wire mesh panels with base-plated fence posts on the parapet walls to deter access to the track.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Noting your concerns identified in your report, and following the Network Rail staff site assessment, Network Rail is planning to apply mitigation measures (wire mesh panels with base plated fence posts fixed to the top of the parapet walls) to the parapet walls to further deter access to the track below. An order has now been placed with Network Rail’s framework contractors in respect of these works, with an anticipated completion date of the end September 2018. Network Rail will also erect a warning sign of the dangers presented and that the land belongs to Network Rail and therefore access beyond is trespass.”

    Source location

    2018-0250-Response-by-Network-Rail
    Page 2 · response
    Published 24 September 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Erect a warning sign describing the dangers, Network Rail ownership and trespass prohibition.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Noting your concerns identified in your report, and following the Network Rail staff site assessment, Network Rail is planning to apply mitigation measures (wire mesh panels with base plated fence posts fixed to the top of the parapet walls) to the parapet walls to further deter access to the track below. An order has now been placed with Network Rail’s framework contractors in respect of these works, with an anticipated completion date of the end September 2018. Network Rail will also erect a warning sign of the dangers presented and that the land belongs to Network Rail and therefore access beyond is trespass.”

    Source location

    2018-0250-Response-by-Network-Rail
    Page 2 · response
    Published 24 September 2018

    Open published response

  4. Bedfordshire and Luton

    AI-generated summary

    Andrew Thomas HANAHOE · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Andrew Thomas HANAHOE died after walking onto Lindsells Foot Crossing at Biggleswade Railway Station as a train approached on 29 December 2017. Concerns were raised about the crossing’s safety, including its exposure to high-speed trains, inadequate fencing and the absence of measures such as repeater lights or trespass deterrence; the report states that the risk of a future death remained.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequate trespass deterrence and fencing around the foot crossing

    Wider context from the report

    ““(1) The Post Incident Site Report states: “Ideally this foot crossing should be closed. It crosses railway line that have trains regularly passing over it at speeds up to 125 mph. “Biggleswade, like many towns, is growing in size and any future development in this area will bring housing closer to the crossing. “Would the crossing be installed today? “If the crossing is a recognised “foot path” then an enclosed foot bridge, to prevent items being thrown at or dropped on trains, should be installed, together with suitable fencing on both sides of the line adjacent to it, to prevent simple access to the tracks. “Currently there is just “post and wire” fencing immediately next to the adjacent railway structure... “If the crossing is to be retained, then “repeater lights” should be installed on either side of the crossing, so that users on the crossing can be made aware that a train is approaching”. “Additionally trespass deterrence “Pyramid matting” that has been approved for use by Network Rail ... or similar should be installed on either side of the crossing, to deter simple access to the railway. Additional fencing is also needed between the existing line side fencing and the trespass deterrence to prevent access to the embankment.” I understand that no decision has been made since this Report was made in January 2018, yet the risk of a future death remains. ”

    Source location

    Andrew Thomas HANAHOE · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequate physical separation between foot crossing users and the railway

    Wider context from the report

    ““(1) The Post Incident Site Report states: “Ideally this foot crossing should be closed. It crosses railway line that have trains regularly passing over it at speeds up to 125 mph. “Biggleswade, like many towns, is growing in size and any future development in this area will bring housing closer to the crossing. “Would the crossing be installed today? “If the crossing is a recognised “foot path” then an enclosed foot bridge, to prevent items being thrown at or dropped on trains, should be installed, together with suitable fencing on both sides of the line adjacent to it, to prevent simple access to the tracks. “Currently there is just “post and wire” fencing immediately next to the adjacent railway structure... “If the crossing is to be retained, then “repeater lights” should be installed on either side of the crossing, so that users on the crossing can be made aware that a train is approaching”. “Additionally trespass deterrence “Pyramid matting” that has been approved for use by Network Rail ... or similar should be installed on either side of the crossing, to deter simple access to the railway. Additional fencing is also needed between the existing line side fencing and the trespass deterrence to prevent access to the embankment.” I understand that no decision has been made since this Report was made in January 2018, yet the risk of a future death remains. ”

    Source location

    Andrew Thomas HANAHOE · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Anti-trespass matting is not considered appropriate because there is no evidence of shortcuts or trespass at the crossing.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The PISR also suggests that anti-trespass matting should be installed on either side of the crossing. Trespass deterrent measures of this nature are considered and installed if, for example, there is evidence of people using the level crossing to trespass on the railway. There is no evidence of users taking shortcuts or other such behaviour at Lindsells Level Crossing. As a result, it is not considered that this type of deterrent is appropriate at this crossing.”

    Source location

    2018-0184-Response-by-Network-Rail
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 July 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Further boundary mitigation is not required because fencing is in good condition, fit for purpose, compliant, and unrelated to the incident’s access route.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The fencing in the area of Lindsells Level Crossing is a mixture of Class 1 (1.8m high, which includes palisade fencing) and Class 3 (1.4m high), which includes post and wire boundary measures. The latest inspection recorded all fencing in the area of Lindsells Level Crossing to be in good condition, fit for purpose and compliant with the current fencing standard. We understand that there is no suggestion in this incident that access was taken to the railway as a result of failure of the boundary measures, therefore it is not considered that further boundary mitigation is required at this time.”

    Source location

    2018-0184-Response-by-Network-Rail
    Page 3 · response
    Published 8 July 2018

    Open published response

  5. Hertfordshire

    AI-generated summary

    Scott RAYNER · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    On 16 April 2017, Scott Rayner trespassed onto the railway track near Watford Junction Station and was struck and killed by a train. The investigation identified inadequate fencing beside the track, particularly near a scrap metal dealer, creating a risk of adults and children trespassing onto a line where the speed limit was 100mph.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequate fencing beside the railway track

    Wider context from the report

    “British Transport Police investigating revealed that fencing beside the railway track was inadequate especially at the rear of a scrap metal dealer located off St Albans Road and Bedford Street, leading to a risk that adults and children may trespass on the line where the speed limit is 100mph. ”

    Source location

    Scott RAYNER · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement a mandatory fencing standard requiring risk-assessed boundary management measures for Network Rail-controlled infrastructure.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In accordance with its legal obligations, Network Rail implements a mandatory fencing standard “Management of Fencing and Other Boundary Measures” which applies to the boundary of Network Rail controlled infrastructure (the Fencing Standard).”

    Source location

    2017-0345-Response-by-Network-Rail
    Page 1 · response
    Published 5 February 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Complete enhancement work at identified Watford-area access locations, including installing additional palisade fencing around St Albans Road and Bedford Street.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Although no faults were identified in the boundary fencing around St Albans Road and Bedford Street, the local operations team planned a further multi stakeholder inspection of the wider Watford area in order to investigate trespass incidents where specific locations of access were unknown. This took place on the 30 May 2017 in conjunction with the British Transport Police. A number of lineside locations in the Watford area were inspected and identified for additional enhancement work to prevent access to the railway. Work to implement this enhancement work was completed on 22 February 2018, which included installing additional palisade fencing in the St Albans Road and Bedford Street area.”

    Source location

    2017-0345-Response-by-Network-Rail
    Page 2 · response
    Published 5 February 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The boundary fencing was compliant and inspections identified no faults requiring repair in the St Albans Road and Bedford Street area.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The last annual inspection of the St Albans Road and Bedford Street area, including the area to the rear of the H&D Motors, prior to April 2017 was undertaken on 26 June 2016. This inspection identified that there was no repair work required in the area and the boundary fencing was compliant with the Fencing Standard.”

    Source location

    2017-0345-Response-by-Network-Rail
    Page 2 · response
    Published 5 February 2018

    Open published response

  6. Central and South East Kent

    AI-generated summary

    Robert John MULLIS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Robert Mullis, who had Parkinsons, Vascular Dementia and was partially sighted, disembarked a train at Ashford railway station and walked onto the tracks, where he was struck by two trains and died from his injuries. The report raises a concern about track access from railway platforms, with Network Rail and South Eastern addressing this issue nationally.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unsafe track access from platforms

    Wider context from the report

    “I make this report with the knowledge that Network Rail and South Eastern are addressing the issue of track access from platforms nationally with Ashford being addressed in Autumn 2017 ”

    Source location

    Robert John MULLIS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Install platform-end fencing and anti-trespass panels at both ends of platforms 2, 5 and 6 and the London end of platform 1.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I confirm that Network Rail is planning to install platform-end fencing and anti-trespass panels (commonly referred to as ‘witches’ hats) on platform 1, 2, 5 and 6 (the domestic platforms) at Ashford International Station and that these works are due to be completed by the 31st July 2017. More specifically, we have now installed platform-end fencing (in the form shown in Annex 1 below and witches’ hats in the form shown in Annex 2 at both ends of platforms 2, 5 and 6 and the London end of platform 1 at Ashford International Station. We will install equivalent fencing and witches’ hats at the country end of platform 1 by the end of July 2017.”

    Source location

    Robert-Mullis-Response
    Page 2 · response
    Published 31 August 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Install equivalent platform-end fencing and anti-trespass panels at the country end of platform 1 by the end of July 2017.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I confirm that Network Rail is planning to install platform-end fencing and anti-trespass panels (commonly referred to as ‘witches’ hats) on platform 1, 2, 5 and 6 (the domestic platforms) at Ashford International Station and that these works are due to be completed by the 31st July 2017. More specifically, we have now installed platform-end fencing (in the form shown in Annex 1 below and witches’ hats in the form shown in Annex 2 at both ends of platforms 2, 5 and 6 and the London end of platform 1 at Ashford International Station. We will install equivalent fencing and witches’ hats at the country end of platform 1 by the end of July 2017.”

    Source location

    Robert-Mullis-Response
    Page 2 · response
    Published 31 August 2017

    Open published response

  7. North Northumberland

    AI-generated summary

    Daniel Campbell · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Daniel Campbell, aged 25, died instantly on 24 November 2015 after stepping into the path of a high-speed train between Spittal and Scremerston, Northumberland. The principal concern was that broken, missing or poorly maintained fencing and walls between a public footpath and the railway line created an easy opportunity for impulsive acts of suicide.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to maintain fencing and walls separating the public footpath from the railway line

    Wider context from the report

    “Disrepair of walls, fences or other barriers:- Photographs of the location where the death occurred, provided by British Transport Police show that various sections of fencing and walls separating the public footpath from the railway line were broken, missing or in disrepair. While more substantial fencing is unlikely to prevent the trespass and death of a person who is determined to take his own life, insubstantial fencing or barriers create an easy opportunity for persons who might not otherwise act impulsively on fleeting suicidal thoughts after they have passed. ”

    Source location

    Daniel Campbell · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review active fencing upgrade proposals for both sides of the incident section.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I can confirm that Network Rail has reviewed the active fencing proposals for upgrade on both sides of the track in the section where the incident occurred and have included these in our 2018 renewals plan. Stone walls are a specialist entity, which require specialist contractors. We will aim to repair/restore the smaller sections where possible, but large sections which have failed will be plugged with appropriate lineside fencing to maintain integrity.”

    Source location

    2017-0122-Response-by-National-Rail_Redacted
    Page 1 · response
    Published 2 June 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver planned fencing and boundary repairs in the incident section, restoring smaller stone-wall sections and replacing failed larger sections with lineside fencing.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I can confirm that Network Rail has reviewed the active fencing proposals for upgrade on both sides of the track in the section where the incident occurred and have included these in our 2018 renewals plan. Stone walls are a specialist entity, which require specialist contractors. We will aim to repair/restore the smaller sections where possible, but large sections which have failed will be plugged with appropriate lineside fencing to maintain integrity.”

    Source location

    2017-0122-Response-by-National-Rail_Redacted
    Page 1 · response
    Published 2 June 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Complete an extensive lineside fencing upgrade north of the location between Spittal and Berwick.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Network Rail has completed an extensive upgrade of our lineside fencing to the north of this location in conjunction with significant trespass and another suicide incident between Spittal and Berwick.”

    Source location

    2017-0122-Response-by-National-Rail_Redacted
    Page 1 · response
    Published 2 June 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct a site walk-through between Scremerston and Spittal to assess boundary robustness.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In May, my team walked through the section between Scremerston and Spittal, whilst the fencing already meets Network Rail standards further works will be planned to improve the robustness of this boundary.”

    Source location

    2017-0122-Response-by-National-Rail_Redacted
    Page 1 · response
    Published 2 June 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Plan further works to improve boundary robustness between Scremerston and Spittal.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In May, my team walked through the section between Scremerston and Spittal, whilst the fencing already meets Network Rail standards further works will be planned to improve the robustness of this boundary.”

    Source location

    2017-0122-Response-by-National-Rail_Redacted
    Page 1 · response
    Published 2 June 2017

    Open published response

  8. North London

    AI-generated summary

    George Henry Dicker · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    George Henry Dicker entered the railway tracks and electrical lines at Woodside Park Underground Station on 9 May 2016, where he likely died after contact with the live rail and being struck by a train. The substantive concern was that there was no alarm or warning to the signaller when a person passed through the gate onto the tracks.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of an alarm or warning to the signaller when a person passes through the gate to the tracks at the end of the platform

    Wider context from the report

    “That there is no alarm or warning to the signaller that a person has passed through the gate to the tracks at the end of the platform. ”

    Source location

    George Henry Dicker · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

  9. Cheshire

    AI-generated summary

    Thomas Coyne · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Thomas Coyne consumed alcohol at a stag party, inadvertently entered Earlestown Railway station, accessed the railway lines and was struck by a passing train on 21 May 2016. Concerns were raised that station CCTV did not cover all platform areas and that there was no physical barrier at the end of platform three, allowing access to the tracks.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a physical barrier at the end of platform three

    Wider context from the report

    “2. There is apparently absolutely no physical barrier of any kind at the end of platform three, thus allowing unfettered access to the tracks at that point. ”

    Source location

    Thomas Coyne · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Responsibility for barriers and fencing preventing track access lies with Network Rail as part of the station infrastructure.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “At the outset, it may assist if we clarify responsibility relating to the station. Arriva Rail North Limited manage the station as part of a network of approximately 500 stations. Network Rail are responsible for the infrastructure of the stations themselves.”

    Source location

    2017-0207-Arriva-Rail-North-Limited
    Page 1 · response
    Published 28 July 2017

    Open published response

  10. Bedfordshire and Luton

    AI-generated summary

    Stephen Sean CAHILL · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Stephen Sean CAHILL died after being struck by a train while lying across the track near Sandy Railway Station on 29 March 2016. The principal concern was that the access gate and fencing provided little deterrence or hindrance to people seeking to access the railway line, and a recommended review had not been undertaken.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequate deterrence and hindrance provided by railway access gates and fencing

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The British Transport investigation revealed that the deceased gained access to the railway line through an access gate. Both the gate and fence provide little deterrence or hindrance to someone wanting to gain access to the railway. (2) The Investigation recommended a review of the fencing and access gates be undertaken at the location as it is relatively easy to access the track from both sides of the line. It is understood that this has not been undertaken. ”

    Source location

    Stephen Sean CAHILL · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver over 600 metres of fencing and upgrade nearby gates to deter unauthorised railway access.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• We have commissioned works to enhance the fencing and gates in this area. These works will be delivered by 15th January 2017 and will be to install over 600m of fencing and upgrade the gate height and construction to deter unauthorised access to the railway in the area.”

    Source location

    2016-0304-Response-by-Network-Rail
    Page 1 · response
    Published 23 August 2016

    Open published response

Actions and positions describe what organisations say in published responses. Implementation is not independently verified.

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Data last updated 7 September 2026