Recurring concern

Inadequate physical barriers preventing access to dangerous drops or areas

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First reported 21 Nov 2013•Latest report 6 Mar 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes barrier height, climbability, coverage, replacement and measurement failures where guarding is intended to prevent access to a dangerous drop or area.

Not included

  • Clinical bed or chair fall-prevention controls
  • Vehicle collision barriers
  • Security controls with no physical-injury hazard
Reports
46

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
57

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
90

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Network Rail14
Cornwall Council3
Durham County Council3
National Highways3
Canal & River Trust2
Hammerson PLC2
Isle of Wight Council2
Recipient name withheld2
The National Trust For Places Of Historic Interest Or Natural Beauty2
Alexandra Park and Palace Charitable Trust1
Arriva Rail North Limited1
Bedford Borough Council1
British Transport Police1
Calderdale Borough Council1
Chesterfield Borough Council1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. North Northumberland

    AI-generated summary

    Daniel Campbell · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Daniel Campbell, aged 25, died instantly on 24 November 2015 after stepping into the path of a high-speed train between Spittal and Scremerston, Northumberland. The principal concern was that broken, missing or poorly maintained fencing and walls between a public footpath and the railway line created an easy opportunity for impulsive acts of suicide.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to maintain fencing and walls separating the public footpath from the railway line

    Wider context from the report

    “Disrepair of walls, fences or other barriers:- Photographs of the location where the death occurred, provided by British Transport Police show that various sections of fencing and walls separating the public footpath from the railway line were broken, missing or in disrepair. While more substantial fencing is unlikely to prevent the trespass and death of a person who is determined to take his own life, insubstantial fencing or barriers create an easy opportunity for persons who might not otherwise act impulsively on fleeting suicidal thoughts after they have passed. ”

    Source location

    Daniel Campbell · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review active fencing upgrade proposals for both sides of the incident section.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I can confirm that Network Rail has reviewed the active fencing proposals for upgrade on both sides of the track in the section where the incident occurred and have included these in our 2018 renewals plan. Stone walls are a specialist entity, which require specialist contractors. We will aim to repair/restore the smaller sections where possible, but large sections which have failed will be plugged with appropriate lineside fencing to maintain integrity.”

    Source location

    2017-0122-Response-by-National-Rail_Redacted
    Page 1 · response
    Published 2 June 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver planned fencing and boundary repairs in the incident section, restoring smaller stone-wall sections and replacing failed larger sections with lineside fencing.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I can confirm that Network Rail has reviewed the active fencing proposals for upgrade on both sides of the track in the section where the incident occurred and have included these in our 2018 renewals plan. Stone walls are a specialist entity, which require specialist contractors. We will aim to repair/restore the smaller sections where possible, but large sections which have failed will be plugged with appropriate lineside fencing to maintain integrity.”

    Source location

    2017-0122-Response-by-National-Rail_Redacted
    Page 1 · response
    Published 2 June 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Complete an extensive lineside fencing upgrade north of the location between Spittal and Berwick.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Network Rail has completed an extensive upgrade of our lineside fencing to the north of this location in conjunction with significant trespass and another suicide incident between Spittal and Berwick.”

    Source location

    2017-0122-Response-by-National-Rail_Redacted
    Page 1 · response
    Published 2 June 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct a site walk-through between Scremerston and Spittal to assess boundary robustness.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In May, my team walked through the section between Scremerston and Spittal, whilst the fencing already meets Network Rail standards further works will be planned to improve the robustness of this boundary.”

    Source location

    2017-0122-Response-by-National-Rail_Redacted
    Page 1 · response
    Published 2 June 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Plan further works to improve boundary robustness between Scremerston and Spittal.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In May, my team walked through the section between Scremerston and Spittal, whilst the fencing already meets Network Rail standards further works will be planned to improve the robustness of this boundary.”

    Source location

    2017-0122-Response-by-National-Rail_Redacted
    Page 1 · response
    Published 2 June 2017

    Open published response
  2. Cheshire

    AI-generated summary

    Thomas Coyne · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Thomas Coyne consumed alcohol at a stag party, inadvertently entered Earlestown Railway station, accessed the railway lines and was struck by a passing train on 21 May 2016. Concerns were raised that station CCTV did not cover all platform areas and that there was no physical barrier at the end of platform three, allowing access to the tracks.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a physical barrier at the end of platform three

    Wider context from the report

    “2. There is apparently absolutely no physical barrier of any kind at the end of platform three, thus allowing unfettered access to the tracks at that point. ”

    Source location

    Thomas Coyne · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Responsibility for barriers and fencing preventing track access lies with Network Rail as part of the station infrastructure.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “At the outset, it may assist if we clarify responsibility relating to the station. Arriva Rail North Limited manage the station as part of a network of approximately 500 stations. Network Rail are responsible for the infrastructure of the stations themselves.”

    Source location

    2017-0207-Arriva-Rail-North-Limited
    Page 1 · response
    Published 28 July 2017

    Open published response
  3. Cornwall and Isles of Scilly

    AI-generated summary

    SIMON DENNIS CHARLES · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Simon Charles was found dead in the sea at Hells Mouth on 3 July 2016 after a concern for welfare search. He had been suffering from depression and had previously made a serious attempt to take his own life. Concerns were raised about the lack of additional preventive measures at Hells Mouth, including suicide-support signage and natural barriers.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of natural barriers at the edge of the cliff at Hells Mouth

    Wider context from the report

    “The Family and others at inquest raised concerns that there are not more preventive measures (apart from a fence) to those contemplating suicide (or undertaking risky behaviour) at Hells Mouth, which is a renowned suicide location in Cornwall. They provided examples of the type of measures which they felt could additionally be put in place such as: • Providing the telephone number of suicide support agencies such as the Samaritans in the same way as at Beachy Head, East Sussex • Using natural barriers at the edge of the cliff such as encouraging or planting gorse or other such plants as in Devon along the coast line especially where falls have been known to have occurred The coastline around Cornwall and in particular, the area around Hells Mouth are owned by the National Trust. It would require the consent of the National Trust to put up such signs or other preventative measures and this is the reason for raising the concerns with you and your organisation. ”

    Source location

    SIMON DENNIS CHARLES · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Vegetation cannot feasibly prevent cliff-edge access and could encourage visitors into more dangerous positions, increasing accidental trip and fall risks.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “With regards to the suggestion that vegetation could be planted to prevent access to the cliff edge, we believe this would be difficult to achieve and counterproductive. The exposed nature of the cliff top in this area limits the natural growth of shrubs and we feel it would not be possible to establish sufficient growth to prevent physical access to the cliff. The impact on the views that screening by vegetation would produce would, in our view, encourage visitors to circumvent such a barrier and put themselves in a potentially much more dangerous position, leading to a greater chance of accidental trips and falls.”

    Source location

    2016-0465-Response-by-National-Trust.pdf
    Page 1 · response
    Published 28 December 2016

    Open published response
  4. Plymouth, Torbay and South Devon

    AI-generated summary

    Charles Edward Pitcher · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    On 5 July 2016, Charles Edward Pitcher jumped over the walkway barrier of the Tamar Bridge and landed in Wolseley Road, Plymouth, suffering fatal injuries. The report raised concerns that the barrier was too easy to cross, that people in Wolseley Road were at risk, and that further procedures and measures should be reviewed to reduce the likelihood of suicide from the bridge.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to prevent people from easily crossing the walkway barrier

    Wider context from the report

    “At the Inquest I received information from Detective Constable ████████ who informed me there have been 11 persons who had jumped from the bridge in the last 10 years. He formed the view that it was all too easy to jump the barrier. He also made the observation there was a risk to persons in Wolseley Road arising from people crossing the walkway barrier at that point. He made the observation that on other significant bridges and he gave as an example the Humber Bridge, the operators have established precautions and set up appropriate notices. ”

    Source location

    Charles Edward Pitcher · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  5. Bedfordshire and Luton

    AI-generated summary

    Susan Elizabeth HAMLETT · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    On 8 March 2016, Susan Elizabeth HAMLETT walked onto a railway line and lay across the tracks, where she was killed instantly by a train. The investigation identified that an access gate provided little deterrence to railway access and that a more substantial fence had not been installed.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequate physical barriers at the railway access gate

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The British Transport investigation revealed that the deceased gained access to the railway line through an access gate at Lower Farm Road, Bromham, Bedfordshire. The gate is of wooden construction and provides little deterrence or hindrance to someone wanting to gain access to the railway. The gate has a wooden fence around it of a similar height. (2) The investigation identified that the area around the wooded track access gate, at the western side of the bridge, should be removed and replaced with a more significant fence as a matter of urgency. It is understood that this has not been undertaken. ”

    Source location

    Susan Elizabeth HAMLETT · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  6. Suffolk

    AI-generated summary

    James Hall · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    James Hall, a Lincoln University student, returned to Ipswich and later left in the family car before being found beneath Orwell Bridge; efforts to resuscitate him were unsuccessful, and he was pronounced dead on 24 November 2015. The report raised concerns about the bridge’s easy access, low concrete walls, lack of deterrents to climbing, and absence of handholds or footholds to prevent or recover from a fall.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide a barrier that prevents or deters climbing onto the bridge wall

    Wider context from the report

    “The Orwell Bridge is a well known very high structure in Suffolk that can be easily accessed on foot. There are a number of locations that provide parking within close walking distance. Once on the bridge there is a pedestrian walkway on both sides which allows full access to its entire length. A concrete wall runs the length of the bridge on the river side of each walk way. A vehicle crash barrier separates each walkway from the carriageway. The bridge wall is between waist and low chest height for an adult and is approximately 30-40 cm in width. As such it is easy to straddle for the majority of reasonable fit adults or young persons. This relatively low concrete wall is the only barrier preventing a fall from the bridge. There is nothing in place that would make it either physically difficult or provide a deterrent against climbing onto the bridge wall. Further, the river side of the bridge walls are bare vertical concrete. As such should someone who had straddled the wall subsequently slip, there is nothing on the structure that would provide a hand or foothold allowing them the opportunity to climb back onto the bridge. This is by no means an isolated incident and I am aware that further inquests are to be held shortly in relation to other deaths resulting from falls from Orwell Bridge. ”

    Source location

    James Hall · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Commission and complete a stakeholder-informed review of preventative measures for Orwell Bridge.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Orwell Bridge opened to traffic in 1982. Recent years have seen a number of suicides and attempted suicides at the location. This prompted Highways England to commission a review possible measures that could be considered to reduce the likelihood of such tragic events in future. The review completed in March 2015 was carried out in consultation with a range of stakeholders. It identified a range of preventative measures taken in and around similar structures and assessed their likely effectiveness on the Orwell Bridge. The report also considered the psychological, socio and economic aspects of incidents.”

    Source location

    Response from Highways England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 12 May 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Additional solid parapets or panels will not be installed because their weight and wind effects could significantly compromise bridge stability.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The 2015 review identified that the installation of physical barriers were likely to be one of the most effective means to deter suicides. The parapets fully comply with height requirements designed to prevent pedestrians accidentally falling from the structure. In relation to Orwell Bridge, the review concluded that the use of additional barriers such as solid parapets or panels would add considerable weight to such a long span structure. The addition of such weight when combined with effects of high winds would have a significant impact on the stability of the structure.”

    Source location

    Response from Highways England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 May 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Toe holds will not be installed because they could encourage climbing, create workforce safety risks, and have unproven effectiveness.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The installation of toe holds on the outer face of the bridge would create an extended climbing face that could encourage unauthorised access. Their installation would also present a significant health and safety risk to the workforce. We are not aware of the use of such toe holds on the outward facing side of similar structures and therefore their effectiveness in preventing such incidents is unproven. In light of this and the other factors outlined above, we are not intending to take further action in this respect.”

    Source location

    Response from Highways England
    Page 3 · response
    Published 12 May 2016

    Open published response
  7. South Yorkshire (Western)

    AI-generated summary

    Adam Ben Miles · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Adam Ben Miles attended a Christmas party at the Hilton Hotel in Sheffield on 12 December 2015 and drowned after falling into the canal basin. The concerns included smoking being permitted near the canal, the lack of effective barriers separating people from the canal, and the absence of means of escape for anyone who fell in.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of rails or other effective barriers segregating drinkers from the canal

    Wider context from the report

    “[BRIEF SUMMARY OF MATTERS OF CONCERN] (1) That smokers were allowed to smoke outside the hotel near the canal. (2) That there wasn't any rails or other effective barriers to segregate drinkers from the dangers of the canal (3) That the canal didn't have any means of escape for anyone who fell in. ”

    Source location

    Adam Ben Miles · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Complete a site safety review and risk assessment covering segregation, rescue equipment, self-rescue, lighting and signage at Victoria Quays.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “On the 3rd May 2016 one of the Trust’s safety advisors visited Victoria Quays and it’s immediate surroundings. Together, he and I have reviewed the matters of concern outlined above and conducted a risk assessment. During the risk assessment we applied the Trust’s guidance on the appropriateness of segregation of the public from the canal basin, rescue equipment (such as a life rings and escape ladders), and the ability of a person to ‘self-rescue’. We came to the following conclusions:”

    Source location

    2016-0132-Response-by-Canal-and-River-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 29 March 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing barriers adequately exclude people from the waterway edge, and the basin’s lighting is considered sufficient for its intended operational use.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Effectiveness of barriers. The level of segregation at Victoria Quays necessarily varies because this is dependant on the activity in the different sections of the canal basin and the land immediately adjacent to the canal. We have reviewed this situation and believe it is appropriate for the intended use of the basin and its surroundings, which remains very much an operational waterway. The chains and barriers have difference purposes: the chains are for demarcation only (and primarily for vehicles at that), and they are not intended to exclude people from accessing the waterway because e.g. boaters are allowed to moor in this area; the barriers are intended to exclude people from the edge of the waterway and appear to do so adequately. We also believe lighting in the canal basin is sufficient and we note it is augmented by the lighting on adjacent land.”

    Source location

    2016-0132-Response-by-Canal-and-River-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 March 2016

    Open published response
  8. Manchester West

    AI-generated summary

    Adam Lee Connelly · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Adam Lee Connelly was found deceased beside railway tracks near footbridge 57 between Walkden and Atherton after sustaining injuries consistent with being struck by a train. The principal concern was that the approximately five-foot walls of the steps leading to the footbridge could allow a person of reasonable athletic ability to access the railway track, creating a risk of future fatalities.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequate restriction of public access to the railway track from the steps accessing footbridge 57

    Wider context from the report

    “i. Due to the height of the walls of the steps which are used to access footbridge 57 on the railway line between Walkden and Atherton train stations, a person of reasonable athletic ability could gain access to the railway track, which could lead to future fatalities at this location on the railway ”

    Source location

    Adam Lee Connelly · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Install shorter palisade pales on the lower flight to connect with the boundary fence and raise the parapet to at least two metres.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The bridge is not known to Network Rail as being used by members of the public to gain access to the infrastructure. However, as a consequence of this event, I can confirm that we intend to undertake the following works:”

    Source location

    2015-0284-Response-by-Network-Rail
    Page 2 · response
    Published 17 July 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Raise the upper-flight stepped parapet with engineering brick and bullnose units to prevent scaling and access behind the lower-flight palisade.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The bridge is not known to Network Rail as being used by members of the public to gain access to the infrastructure. However, as a consequence of this event, I can confirm that we intend to undertake the following works:”

    Source location

    2015-0284-Response-by-Network-Rail
    Page 2 · response
    Published 17 July 2015

    Open published response
  9. South London

    AI-generated summary

    Colette Hughes · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Colette Hughes died on 7 July 2014 after jumping from the top storey of a multi-storey car park at Centrale Shopping Centre in Croydon. Concerns were raised that the accessible perimeter wall had been involved in at least two previous deaths, posed a danger to people using it as seating, and that notices about Samaritans services might not be sufficient without physical modifications.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to physically modify an easily accessible wall to prevent dangerous use as a seating area

    Wider context from the report

    “The wall is easy to access and at least two previous deaths have occurred in similar circumstances since 2006. Whilst recognising that barriers cannot be provided at every location above ground, and the fact that the building complies with regulations , there is a concern that others may die in the same manner. There is also a concern that the wall presents a danger to those who may decide to use it as a seating area, particularly after taking drink or drugs. In the absence of some physical modifications, the notices advising visitors of the services of the Samaritans recently installed may not be sufficient. ”

    Source location

    Colette Hughes · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Install hostile planting to make access to the Level 3 corner parapet walls more difficult.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3.1. We are making access to the parapet walls to the corner of the car park from which Colette Hughes fell (Level 3) more difficult with ‘hostile planting’ being introduced which in particular will assist in preventing access. For an example of how hostile planting is introduced see Appendix A.”

    Source location

    2015-0246-Response-by-Hammerson-PLC
    Page 1 · response
    Published 30 June 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Install hostile planting around lower parapet walls on Levels 3 and 3A where potential falls exceed five metres.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3.2. Generally to prevent the lower (less than 1.8m) level walls on levels 3 and 3A (rooftop level) which are under 1.8m in height potentially being used by members of the public to lever themselves up onto the perimeter ledge, we are installing similar hostile planting which will prevent access in those areas where the potential fall distance is over 5 metres i.e. beyond the next car park level.”

    Source location

    2015-0246-Response-by-Hammerson-PLC
    Page 1 · response
    Published 30 June 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Install vehicle stopping barriers beside relevant lower parapet walls to prevent vehicles being used as steps.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3.3. In order to prevent cars from parking close to any lower level parapet walls we are installing vehicle stopping barriers along the floor adjacent to the walls in the relevant locations. This will prevent cars being used as a step up to a perimeter wall by members of the public (Appendix A).”

    Source location

    2015-0246-Response-by-Hammerson-PLC
    Page 1 · response
    Published 30 June 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue exploring the feasibility of raising parapet walls on Levels 3 and 3A, including required planning and building-regulations approvals.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “5. Following receipt of the Report we commissioned structural engineers to advise on the feasibility of raising the height of the parapet walls on levels 3 and 3A. Their report (received on 14th August 2015) in summary advised how this could be achieved but would involve regulatory planning and building regulations approval. This is currently being explored.”

    Source location

    2015-0246-Response-by-Hammerson-PLC
    Page 2 · response
    Published 30 June 2015

    Open published response
  10. Inner South London

    AI-generated summary

    Mathew Lee Hoare · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mathew Lee Hoare was found on a live rail near Wandsworth Road Train Station after entering Clapham High Street Station and accessing its platforms and tracks after hours. He sustained fatal injuries after being electrocuted and struck by an oncoming train; concerns related to ineffective security equipment and the ease of access through widely spaced yellow tape.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of after-hours station and track access barriers to prevent access

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The lack of effective security equipment preventing access to the station and tracks after the hours of operation. (2) The ease at which Mr Hoare was able to access the station and tracks by climbing through widely spaced yellow tape. ”

    Source location

    Mathew Lee Hoare · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Install barriers to separate rail infrastructure where access is unnecessary, including fencing SouthEastern infrastructure from LOROL infrastructure at the station.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “For our part, safety is a core value for Network Rail and we are continually striving to reduce fatalities on the railway through a number of initiatives an example of which is the installation of barriers to separate rail ‘streams’ where access is not needed to Network Rail infrastructure; an example of this can be seen at the Station where the SouthEastern railway infrastructure (which does not offer services from the Station) is fully fenced from the LOROL infrastructure.”

    Source location

    2015-0203-Response-by-Network-Rail
    Page 2 · response
    Published 27 May 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Station access and management are outside the infrastructure owner's management because the station is operated by the train operator.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Network Rail Infrastructure Limited (“Network Rail”) owns, operates and maintains the rail infrastructure including the track and signalling equipment across the UK. Clapham High Street Station (“the Station”) is not operated by Network Rail but is managed by the operator of the majority of trains stopping at the station, LOROL. Although the station is not an asset under our management, but noting that the recommendations in your report concern access to the station and the tracks we have sought clarity from LOROL. LOROL has been able to assist with some information particularly in respect of changed practices at the Station, which we hope will assist in responding to your concerns.”

    Source location

    2015-0203-Response-by-Network-Rail
    Page 1 · response
    Published 27 May 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Responsibility for station access information and practices rests with the station operator, which provided the relevant clarification.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Network Rail Infrastructure Limited (“Network Rail”) owns, operates and maintains the rail infrastructure including the track and signalling equipment across the UK. Clapham High Street Station (“the Station”) is not operated by Network Rail but is managed by the operator of the majority of trains stopping at the station, LOROL. Although the station is not an asset under our management, but noting that the recommendations in your report concern access to the station and the tracks we have sought clarity from LOROL. LOROL has been able to assist with some information particularly in respect of changed practices at the Station, which we hope will assist in responding to your concerns.”

    Source location

    2015-0203-Response-by-Network-Rail
    Page 1 · response
    Published 27 May 2015

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026