Recurring concern

Inadequate prison physical security controls preventing transfer of drugs and contraband

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First reported 25 Nov 2015•Latest report 4 Feb 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes dedicated prison physical-security, perimeter, structural and transfer-route controls intended to prevent or intercept drugs and other prohibited materials, including security fences, prison plumbing, windows, netting and comparable physical barriers or interception measures.

Not included

  • Excludes prison drug-risk intelligence, warnings, healthcare responses and general psychoactive-substance management where no deficient physical-security or contraband-transfer control is identified.
  • Excludes searches, screening and seizure processes unless the assertion specifically concerns a physical control preventing or intercepting contraband transfer.
  • Excludes generic prison staffing, training, communication, policy or governance deficiencies unless they directly impair a dedicated physical-security control for preventing contraband transfer.
  • Excludes general ward security, patient-room searches and custody access controls where drugs or prohibited-material transfer within the prison estate is not the shared unsafe condition.
Reports
4

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
5

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2015–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
8

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

HM Prison and Probation Service3
Ministry of Justice3
Birmingham Community Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust1
Birmingham Prison1
G4S1
Guys Marsh Prison1
Parc Prison and Young Offender Institute1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. South Wales Central

    AI-generated summary

    Ryan Harding · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Ryan Harding died overnight between 7 and 8 January 2023 in his prison cell after consuming drugs. Concerns included prison infrastructure and gatehouse security measures that required upgrading to reduce illicit materials entering the prison, and a delayed morning welfare check due to insufficient staffing.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to maintain the gate house at a security level that restricts entry of illicit materials

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) The gate house continues to require upgrading to enable enhanced security to be afforded to reduce the ability of illicit materials including drugs and mobile phones to enter the prison. ”

    Source location

    Ryan Harding · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to maintain prison-block windows at a security level that restricts entry of illicit materials

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) The inquest heard evidence that the windows of Alpha and Bravo blocks did in 2023 and continue to require upgrading in order to reduce the ability of illicit materials including drugs and mobile phones to enter the prison. ”

    Source location

    Ryan Harding · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Plan expansion works for a new Gate House and refurbishment of the existing Gate House to accommodate Enhanced Gate Security.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “HMP & YOI Parc is designated a Category C prison, and as such, was not originally funded or risk assessed to provide full Enhanced Gate Security. Increased and changing security challenges, including those enabled by technological advancements and changes to the make-up and nature of contraband items, have led to agreement by HMPPS that the prison should now be funded and risk assessed for Enhanced Gate Security, and the Director has, since June 2024, prioritised addressing identified requirements in Enhanced Gate Security provision.”

    Source location

    2026-0054 - Response from HM Prison Parc
    Page 2 · response
    Published 4 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use specialist screening equipment routinely to screen staff, professional visitors and social visitors entering the prison.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The conventional scanning equipment which is part of the traditional Enhanced Gate Security model will be installed within the new Gate House building once it is constructed. Pending construction of the new Gate House building, G4S identified a solution to the current logistical restriction by purchasing specialist technological equipment, similar to the latest equipment used in some airports. This equipment is now routinely used to screen staff, professional visitors and social visitors coming into the prison. HMP & YOI Parc was the first prison in the UK to deploy this technology, following a review of best practice across other sectors.”

    Source location

    2026-0054 - Response from HM Prison Parc
    Page 3 · response
    Published 4 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Expand the Special Searching Team to increase the frequency and quality of staff and visitor searches.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Enhanced Gate Security is provided by a range of additional tools and measures which are already being used at HMP & YOI Parc. Bag scanners and handheld metal detectors are routinely used by staff to support improved searching when visitors and staff enter the prison. The Director has expanded the size of the Special Searching Team, significantly increasing the frequency and quality of searches, and there are now an average of approximately 1,700 staff entry and exit searches per month, which represents a significant increase compared with 2022. This compares favourably with the majority of establishments within the prison’s comparative prison group. G4S has funded additional external dog patrols which have worked to significantly reduce the number of throwovers experienced at HMP & YOI Parc.”

    Source location

    2026-0054 - Response from HM Prison Parc
    Page 3 · response
    Published 4 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Fund and deploy additional external dog patrols to reduce contraband throwovers and support searching.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Enhanced Gate Security is provided by a range of additional tools and measures which are already being used at HMP & YOI Parc. Bag scanners and handheld metal detectors are routinely used by staff to support improved searching when visitors and staff enter the prison. The Director has expanded the size of the Special Searching Team, significantly increasing the frequency and quality of searches, and there are now an average of approximately 1,700 staff entry and exit searches per month, which represents a significant increase compared with 2022. This compares favourably with the majority of establishments within the prison’s comparative prison group. G4S has funded additional external dog patrols which have worked to significantly reduce the number of throwovers experienced at HMP & YOI Parc.”

    Source location

    2026-0054 - Response from HM Prison Parc
    Page 3 · response
    Published 4 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop a business case seeking funding for staffing and additional dogs to support searching seven days a week during core hours.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The prison is currently in communication with the Authority around submission of a business case seeking funding for additional staffing to support searching seven days a week during core hours (from the time the door opens until it is secured for night state), together with additional searching dogs to support this activity.”

    Source location

    2026-0054 - Response from HM Prison Parc
    Page 3 · response
    Published 4 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver the phased replacement of vulnerable prison windows to reduce contraband ingress.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In mid-2024, agreement was reached to move forward with a programme of window replacement works to replace the designated windows as quickly as possible, whilst maintaining the integrity of the establishment, allowing HMP & YOI Parc to remain fully operational. The significant cost of the replacement works (each replacement window unit costing in excess of £3,500) is being shared by HMPPS and G4S. A timetable for the replacement programme has been agreed with the Authority.”

    Source location

    2026-0054 - Response from HM Prison Parc
    Page 2 · response
    Published 4 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    A temporary gatehouse extension was not pursued because existing interim searching measures were considered a better use of finances, though less comprehensive.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “G4S previously submitted a proposal to HMPPS for a temporary extension (modular building) to accommodate Enhanced Gate Security. Understandably, this was not seen as the best use of finances since the local team had introduced interim measures to support and enhance the searching of staff and visitors, albeit not to the same level of searching achievable with Enhanced Gate Security provision. Any changes to the design of the building must be approved and funded by HMPPS.”

    Source location

    2026-0054 - Response from HM Prison Parc
    Page 3 · response
    Published 4 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    HMPPS must approve and fund building-design changes, while G4S is contracted only to manage and maintain the existing facility.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “His Majesty’s Prisons & Probation Service (HMPPS) (“the Authority”) oversaw the construction of HMP & YOI Parc leading to the establishment becoming operational in 1997. Following sign-off and approval of the construction works, operational responsibility for HMP & YOI Parc was handed over by HMPPS to G4S Care & Justice Services (UK) Limited (G4S).”

    Source location

    2026-0054 - Response from HM Prison Parc
    Page 1 · response
    Published 4 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Window replacement cannot be completed widescale or faster because approved suppliers, specialist contractors, prisoner relocation and security logistics constrain delivery.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Practical issues dictate the speed at which window replacement works can be achieved. The windows, by their very nature and purpose, require specialist manufacture and there are a very limited number of HMPPS approved suppliers manufacturing the windows to the requisite specification. Such suppliers are in demand, not only in relation to manufacturing replacement windows for existing prisons across the nationwide prison estate, but also manufacturing windows for new establishments currently under construction.”

    Source location

    2026-0054 - Response from HM Prison Parc
    Page 2 · response
    Published 4 February 2026

    Open published response
  2. Dorset

    AI-generated summary

    Kyle Nel · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Kyle Nel, a serving prisoner at HMP Guys Marsh, was found unconscious in his cell on 9 June 2018 and was subsequently declared dead after resuscitation attempts. The inquest recorded the medical cause of death as aspiration of gastric contents associated with synthetic cannabinoid (5F-ADB), also known as “Spice”, use, with a conclusion of misadventure. Concerns included the prison’s handling and recording of welfare concerns raised by families and the ability to pass drugs and other prohibited items between prison units through security fences.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of prison security fences to prevent the transfer of drugs and other prohibited materials between prisoners

    Wider context from the report

    “ii) The security fences within the prison estate need to be reviewed and consideration urgently given to prevent drugs and other prohibited materials being passed between prisoners through the fences. ”

    Source location

    Kyle Nel · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct diagnostic checks of internal and external perimeters, including fences and gates, to identify drug-supply vulnerabilities and report findings to establishments.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The national Drug Strategy and Delivery team conduct diagnostic visits, checking internal and external perimeters (including fences and gates), to identify any vulnerabilities relating to drug dealing which are reported back to establishments to take action. HMP Guys Marsh has also been included in the accelerator project, where selected prisons have received additional resources in certain areas. At HMP Guys Marsh this includes a dedicated drug strategy manager who has been in place since Autumn 2021 and is making a positive impact on the local drug strategy processes. The project has now received additional funding and will be extended for three years to further support efforts to tackle the problem of drugs in prisons.”

    Source location

    2021-0426-Response-from-HMPPS_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 December 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing security fences at HMP Guys Marsh meet agreed national requirements, so further review is not identified as necessary.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The second concern you raise recommends that consideration should be given to reviewing the security fences used within the prison estate to prevent drugs and other prohibited items from being passed between prisoners. As a category C prison, the security fences in place at HMP Guys Marsh meet the current agreed national requirements necessary to keep prisoners safe and secure. I wish to assure you that the work being carried out nationally by the Drug Strategy Team and filtered down into each establishment is focused on restricting the supply of drugs in prisons, supporting prisoners to reduce and avoid substance misuse, and providing the help and treatment they need to maintain their recovery.”

    Source location

    2021-0426-Response-from-HMPPS_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 December 2021

    Open published response
  3. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Andrew Stephen Carr · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Andrew Stephen Carr, a prisoner, was found unresponsive in his cell on 29 March 2018 and was pronounced dead at 22:53 after attempts to revive him were unsuccessful. The medical cause of death was recorded as the effects of a synthetic cannabinoid. Concerns included failures to identify and record information about his prior substance use, the known use of the prison plumbing system to pass drugs, and the role of contraband mobile phones in substance misuse.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to prevent drugs and other items being passed through the prison plumbing system

    Wider context from the report

    “2. It had been known for approximately 5 years that drugs and other items could be passed through the plumbing system of the prison. No action was taken before Andrew’s death and the inquest heard that no solution had been found to the problem. This raises an ongoing concern for the wellbeing of prisoners and the risk of future deaths. ”

    Source location

    Andrew Stephen Carr · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  4. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Dean Ronald Edmund BOLAND · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Dean Ronald Edmund Boland was found unresponsive in his cell at HMP Birmingham on 17 April 2015 and was pronounced dead shortly afterwards. Post-mortem examination confirmed multiple drugs in his system, and the inquest concluded that he died from mixed drug toxicity. The principal concerns included inadequate awareness, communication, monitoring, searching and security measures relating to drug use within the prison.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Insufficient exercise-area netting and package interception

    Wider context from the report

    “9. There are several exercise areas at the prison. Only two have netting. Further consideration needs to be given to netting other areas given the number of packages being thrown over the wall and then secreted by prisoners on their person. The inquest heard that only a small proportion of packages are seized as they come over the wall. ”

    Source location

    Dean Ronald Edmund BOLAND · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Undertake collaborative work with West Midlands Police to close the prison’s most significant illicit-substance ingress point.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Only two exercise yards have netting. Further consideration needs to be given to netting other areas given the number of packages being thrown over the wall and then secreted by prisoners on their person. Only a small proportion of packages are seized as they come over the wall. Preventing illicit articles from entering the prison is a key part of the prison’s supply reduction strategy, and a vast amount of work has been undertaken, in conjunction with West Midlands Police, on closing down the most significant ingress point, where the establishment considers it necessary it can submit bids for capital expenditure, and it would do so if it believed that additional security measures would make an impact on supply.”

    Source location

    2015-0468-Response-by-NOMS
    Page 4 · response
    Published 25 November 2015

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026