Recurring concern

Incomplete, inaccurate or unavailable clinical and care records

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First reported 13 Dec 2008•Latest report 26 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures affecting the completeness, accuracy, consistency, availability, legibility or contemporaneous maintenance of patient, resident and clinical care records.

Not included

  • Information-transfer failures where the underlying records are reliable
  • Documentation dedicated to a separately named safety system when that system supplies the more faithful parent boundary
  • Non-care administrative records
Reports
474

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
568

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2008–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
780

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care64
NHS England38
Care Quality Commission30
NHS Greater Manchester Integrated Care Board12
University Hospitals Sussex NHS Foundation Trust11
Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust10
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust10
Stockport NHS Foundation Trust10
Tameside and Glossop Integrated Care NHS Foundation Trust10
Office of the Chief Coroner9
Recipient name withheld9
Sussex Partnership NHS Foundation Trust9
Barts Health NHS Trust8
East London NHS Foundation Trust8
Manchester University NHS Foundation Trust8

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Cornwall and Isles of Scilly

    AI-generated summary

    Paul Byron Holmes · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Paul Byron Holmes sustained fractured ribs and a fractured sternum in a road traffic collision on 4 April 2022, followed by hospitalisation, delirium, dehydration and declining health. He died at home on 29 May 2022 after returning for palliative care. Concerns included inadequate doctor-to-doctor handover and recording of the treatment plan during a hospital transfer, and a prescription error that delayed intravenous fluids.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to properly record handovers in medical notes

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) Any handover which did take place was not properly recorded in Paul's medical notes ”

    Source location

    Paul Byron Holmes · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review the inter-hospital transfer form to document escalation plans, ensure consistent handover records, and prompt sharing of relevant medical-management details.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Both Trusts propose to review the inter-hospital transfer form used by both the discharging and receiving wards to ensure an escalation plan is documented and to ensure that the handover record in both Trusts is consistent. Any revisions to the handover documentation would need to include a prompt for the discharging and receiving nurse to share any relevant details from the medical management plan.”

    Source location

    Royal Cornwall Hospitals NHS Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 28 June 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Establish a task-and-finish group to review inter-hospital transfer-form design and take forward resulting developments.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Both Trusts commit to establishing a task and finish group to review the design of the inter-hospital transfer forms and take forward any developments. This group will be established by the start of October 2024.”

    Source location

    Royal Cornwall Hospitals NHS Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 28 June 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    A shared handover visible in both Trusts’ electronic systems is impracticable because their electronic patient records have limited interoperability.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Within CFT, the verbal nurse-to-nurse handover is documented on a paper record, which is then added to the patient’s paper notes on arrival at the ward. Due to limited communication between the electronic patient records of both Trusts, it is not practicable to produce a shared handover which is apparent on both systems.”

    Source location

    Royal Cornwall Hospitals NHS Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 28 June 2024

    Open published response
  2. Cumbria

    AI-generated summary

    James Reginald Capstick · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    James Reginald Capstick died in hospital on 1 October 2022 after sustaining multiple rib fractures during more than 20 minutes of chest compressions when he was not in cardiac arrest, followed by respiratory insufficiency and pneumonia. The report raised concerns about the quality of care at Westmorland Court, the reliability of care records, the absence of a defibrillator at the time, and the failure to recognise signs of life during the resuscitation attempt.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to maintain reliable clinical records

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) To Westmorland Court. The General Practitioner who came to give evidence said that care had improved since Reg's death but he still had concerns about care given and had to visit regularly every week to check residents -the only one of six homes he covers that requires this level of support. He said it was a struggle to provide good quality care and felt this report would be helpful -as I stated at inquest it is not intended in any way to be punitive but to put focus on areas that may be improved. A particular concern was clear evidence that examinations entered into Reg's notes were made at times when this was impossible because he was in hospital -this puts into question the reliability of notes generally. ”

    Source location

    James Reginald Capstick · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue the fitness-to-practise investigation into the registered nurse and decide whether to progress or close the case for public-protection reasons.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We can confirm that our investigations in relation to the concerns raised about the registered nurse in charge of the home on the night of Mr Capstick’s injury are ongoing. We have shared your concerns as set out in the PFD with the investigating team. We have also contacted Westmorland Court for further information and obtained details about the registered nurse’s current practice. We have contacted the registered nurse to give them the ability to comment on the concerns and are waiting for their response. We expect to make a decision in the next two to three weeks on whether to progress our investigations on the basis that we need to take action to protect the public or whether we can close the case on the basis that there are no public protection issues.”

    Source location

    Response from NMC
    Page 3 · response
    Published 9 August 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Refer concerns about care at Westmorland Court and inaccurate healthcare records to the Employer Link Service and New Referrals team for enquiries.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have also considered whether the PFD raises any other concerns which we need to act on. We have noted that concerns were raised about the care provided to Mr Capstick generally at Westmorland Court and a specific issue relating to inaccurate entries made within healthcare records. We have noted that at the time of the inquest one safeguarding referral remained open.”

    Source location

    Response from NMC
    Page 3 · response
    Published 9 August 2024

    Open published response
  3. Carmarthenshire and Pembrokeshire

    AI-generated summary

    Susan Margaret Williams · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Susan Margaret Williams was admitted to hospital on 14 July 2019 with suspected sepsis and abdominal pain, later deteriorating and dying from cardiorespiratory failure due to lung fibrosis and cor pulmonale. The principal concerns were the lack of recorded medication prescription times, a potential delay in administering antibiotics, and the absence of equivalent medication timing records on the Accident & Emergency Record Card.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of provision on the Accident & Emergency Record Card to record medication prescription and administration

    Wider context from the report

    “2. In the course of the evidence, it also became apparent that the Accident & Emergency Record Card (known as the “Cas Card”) has no similar provision to record medication prescription and administration within its content. This would have been a separate point of reference for this purpose. Both of the documents referenced are understood to be used across the NHS in Wales and not confined to the Health Board in whose care Mrs Susan Margaret Williams was at the time. ”

    Source location

    Susan Margaret Williams · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use ARK medication administration charts with dedicated recording fields for immediate doses and antibiotic administration times.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “use since 2022, includes features to ensure time critical medicines are administered at the appropriate time. These features include:”

    Source location

    Response from Welsh Government
    Page 2 · response
    Published 20 August 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement electronic prescribing and medicines administration systems across Welsh hospitals, with timestamped prescribing and administration records and medication task lists.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “There are inherent risks with hard copy charts and one of the reasons why in September 2021, the Cabinet Secretary for Health and Social Care announced plans to introduce electronic prescribing and medicines administration (EPMA) systems in every hospital in Wales. All health boards are in the process of implementing EPMA solutions in their hospitals and Digital Health and Care Wales has confirmed both EPMA solutions being deployed in Wales record a timestamp for all activities which make alterations or add data to prescribing records. This includes prescribing and administration events. In future prescribing and administration events will therefore be fully auditable.”

    Source location

    Response from Welsh Government
    Page 2 · response
    Published 20 August 2024

    Open published response
  4. South Yorkshire (Western)

    AI-generated summary

    Maureen Alison Woollen · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Maureen Alison Woollen was discharged to Deerlands Residential Home after being identified as at high risk of falls. She was later found on the floor, developed facial bruising and reduced food and drink intake, and was admitted to hospital with an intracerebral haemorrhage, from which she died; concerns included missed opportunities to seek medical attention, inadequate care-note use, and failure to conduct a falls risk assessment on admission.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to fully utilise care notes for recording injuries and incidents

    Wider context from the report

    “The inquest found there were missed opportunities to conduct a falls risk assessment on Mrs Woollen's arrival to Deerlands Residential home, to seek medical attention when she was found on the floor on 3 October 2023, to seek medical attention when a bruise on her face was noted on 6 October 2023 and to monitor the progression of her bruise. I am concerned there is no process in place to ensure medical attention is promptly sought for residents who require it, that care notes are not fully utilised, especially for the recording of injury and incidents, and that falls risk assessments are not being conducted on admission. ”

    Source location

    Maureen Alison Woollen · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Roll out refresher training on pre-admission assessments, detailed care notes, falls documentation and escalation, using anonymised scenarios and monthly monitoring.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The importance of maintaining care notes was discussed at the Deputy Managers’ meeting on 2 July 2024 [see document 9]. Sheffcare already have sophisticated Person–Centred Software, but this does not appear to have been used effectively at the time of Mrs Woollen’s care. Sheffcare has now improved the training sessions which already focus on the importance of keeping timely and accurate care notes by incorporating within the existing training real and anonymised scenarios to reinforce to staff understanding. The software includes training around ensuring a falls risk assessment is completed on admission. Falls (witnessed or otherwise) must be documented in the Person–Centred Care system and there is a monitoring and tracking section in the notes. This is audited.”

    Source location

    Reponse from Sheffcare
    Page 3 · response
    Published 27 June 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Discuss falls, documentation and escalation requirements with staff through huddles, supervision and management briefings.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Directly after the incident with Mrs Woollen, the service met with staff at Deerland and what is known as “huddles” were carried out [see document 7]. A huddle is an informal meeting at which matters to celebrate as well as concerns are raised directly with staff. The incident with Mrs Woollen was discussed and staff were reminded of the policies in relation to falls risk, documentation, and escalation it has also been part of their mandatory training and discussed in supervisions. [see document 8].”

    Source location

    Reponse from Sheffcare
    Page 3 · response
    Published 27 June 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Issue updated guidance and brief managers on completing body maps and photographing injuries or marks.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “████████ held a Deputy Managers’ meeting on 2 July 2024 and issued notes for all the homes to ensure a generic approach and focus on, the process for completing body maps and taking photographs of any injuries or marks. Updated guidance on ensuring correct and robust use of body maps. This was completed on 12 July 2024 [see document 9].”

    Source location

    Reponse from Sheffcare
    Page 4 · response
    Published 27 June 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Complete a quality-assurance systems review for linked care plans, risk assessments, falls escalation and care-note updating.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Subsequent to Mrs Woollen’s fall, there has also been a complete review spearheaded by Louise of the Quality Assurance Systems for the Person-Centred Care systems which links care plans and risk assessments automatically; this is audited [see document 3]. There is a three-tier approach to quality auditing headed by the Team Leader, Deputy Manager and Registered Manager who undertake quality audits which then inform the monthly quality dashboard report. [see document 4]. There has been further focus on the process at Team Leader level to capture whether falls and requirement for medical attention is being escalated appropriately. The auditing also includes analysis of whether care notes are properly updated. This review was completed on 8 July 2024.”

    Source location

    Reponse from Sheffcare
    Page 4 · response
    Published 27 June 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce management checks and sampling of the Person-Centred Care system and daily care notes to strengthen record-keeping oversight.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition, the Registered Manager and Deputy Manager QA now incorporate management checks on the Person-Centred Care system and daily care notes are sampled to promote good record-keeping principles. This gives further quality assurance and the end of the roll out of this new part of the services oversight will be completed by 31 August 2024.”

    Source location

    Reponse from Sheffcare
    Page 4 · response
    Published 27 June 2024

    Open published response
  5. Lancashire and Blackburn with Darwen

    AI-generated summary

    Margaret Clement · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Margaret Clement, aged 92, died at Royal Blackburn Hospital on 15 June 2022 after developing significant rectal bleeding, vomiting blood and an upper gastrointestinal bleed following hospital admission after a fall. Concerns included inadequate nursing records and handovers, ineffective prioritisation of urgent tasks, failure to seek urgent clinical assistance for significant rectal bleeding, and inadequate assessment of compliance with procedural changes.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequate nursing records

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Evidence was heard that nursing records on Reedyford ward were inadequate in a number of respects including recording the wrong medication, requesting a medical review for the wrong patient and not recording when an urgent review was needed in the doctor's task book ”

    Source location

    Margaret Clement · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Administer and update medications through Cerner scanners, with senior-nurse observations and governance monitoring of wristband and medication-administration compliance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I can also confirm that all medications are now administered and updated via Cerner. All Reedyford Ward computers have scanners attached to them to administer medications and these are now being used by the Registered Nurses during the medicine rounds. To provide assurance that this action is being taken, the use of wrist bands and the administration of correct medication will be routinely monitored through senior nurse observations and reported back to the Division if any concerns are identified. I am pleased to advise that following an audit undertaken on 24 June 2024 no concerning medication incidents were identified and we will continue to monitor this through the appropriate governance forums, including the Trust’s Quality and Safety Committee.”

    Source location

    Response from East Lancashire Hospitals
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 May 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Standardise clinical-risk handovers by using Cerner tasks and embedding Patient e-Obs trend review during nursing handover.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Since the conclusion of the inquest work has been undertaken to ensure that there is a standardised approach for the measurement and management, and communication, of clinical risks between shifts.”

    Source location

    Response from East Lancashire Hospitals
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 May 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Enable nursing staff to accompany doctors on ward rounds and use the daily multidisciplinary meeting to escalate concerns and immediate actions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “With regards to the above concern, I am aware that nursing staff on the ward relied heavily on the doctor’s task book to escalate to actions. In addition to the removal of the task books, nursing staff now accompany the doctors on their ward rounds and make use of the daily MDT to escalate concerns and immediate actions where necessary.”

    Source location

    Response from East Lancashire Hospitals
    Page 3 · response
    Published 15 May 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Arrange simulation-based deterioration training for community-ward staff, including assessment, escalation, handover, documentation and gastrointestinal-bleeding scenarios.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Firstly, the Trust has arranged simulation training for all staff on the community wards. The staff are presented with a history of the patient and are asked to detail how they would assess that individual; this is repeated a number of times looking at the appropriate and most effective ways to identify any concerns or deteriorations in a patient. The staff are expected to complete full assessments of clinical observations, a physical examination of the patient, discuss handover and who they would escalate to. Detailed documentation is also discussed, including Incident reporting and the importance of accurate timely documentation.”

    Source location

    Response from East Lancashire Hospitals
    Page 4 · response
    Published 15 May 2024

    Open published response
  6. Cornwall and Isles of Scilly

    AI-generated summary

    Sally Poynton · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Sally Poynton, aged 44, was fatally stabbed by her son on 22 June 2021. The report raised concerns about failures in mental-health assessment and follow-up, including inadequate discharge information, difficulties obtaining reassessment, referral handling, communication with family, and discharge without clinical consideration despite signs of deteriorating mental health.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in recording family-provided clinical timelines

    Wider context from the report

    “a) In-patient care at Longreach Hospital Approximately one year before Sally’s homicide, ████████ had been detained under s2 of the MHA and spent 10 days at Longreach. At the time, there had been noted changes in his behaviour to include a belief that he could live without food for 10 years (Breatharianism), disinhibited behaviour to include sunbathing naked on a driveway (believing he received energy from the sun) and a stated belief that others could hear his thoughts – thought broadcasting – a potential symptom of schizophrenia. ████████ was selectively mute, fasting and drinking only distilled water. He was assessed on at least three occasions by a consultant psychiatrist, was reviewed by multiple junior medical doctors, seen by mental health nurses and reviewed by the Early Intervention in Psychosis Team. No one saw any evidence of psychosis and it was felt there were no longer grounds in law to detain him. He was discharged without a diagnosis or a plan for future care. At inquest, ████████████ accepted the medical team never completely got to the bottom of the reason for his presentation. His Responsible Clinician, ████████████, referred to a ‘quandary’ in identifying how much of ████████ presentation was due to culture or lifestyle and how much was due to his morbid condition. This uncertainty was not reflected in the discharge summary which described ████████ as a ‘model patient.’ One of the most striking features of the evidence was the difficulty Sally then encountered in having ████████ re-assessed. Indeed, in the year that followed, despite multiple attempts, ████████ was not seen again by a doctor from the mental health team. It is noteworthy that ████████ did not believe himself to be unwell, there appears to have been an assumption he had capacity and as he did not consent to treatment, that appears to have become an insurmountable barrier to further care. I felt there were a number of points of learning: i) An inaccurate or incomplete discharge summary that did not reflect the element of uncertainty in diagnosis both doctors outlined at inquest; ii) A failure to discuss with Sally or the maternal side of ████████ family how he presented, notwithstanding a clear direction following a first ward round to ‘collaborate’ with the family. This seems particularly relevant given Jacob’s mutism which made obtaining a history difficult. It may be of note that there was a difficult family dynamic with an acrimonious separation of ████████ parents. ████████ father was spoken to and there was a reference in the evidence that a member of the in-patient team felt it was Sally’s mental health that needed consideration. It was not explored at inquest whether one side of the family’s views had been accepted at the expense of the other’s. iii) The absence of a plan detailing the route back for ████████ to be seen again if the reason for his bizarre presentation was due to an emerging illness (that worsened) rather than alternative lifestyle choices; iv) A failure to advise Sally, as Nearest Relative, of her statutory right to request ████████ assessment under the MHA. This omission has been noted previously in other PSIF/SIRs. You may wish to reflect whether information in this regard can be included on a website or similar if it is not already and whether there is a need for training of staff in this regard. v) A delay of five months in putting into the RiO records a detailed timeline provided by Sally while ████████ was an in-patient. ████████ accepted that had he seen it at the time, he would have had further questions for Jacob. vi) A lack of understanding or professional curiosity about ████████ drug-taking and the extent to which, if at all, this contributed to ████████ presentation. It was accepted by ████████ that he had been misled by ████████ who had minimised his history in this regard where there was substantial evidence of illicit drug use, including psychotropics. ”

    Source location

    Sally Poynton · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inaccurate or incomplete discharge summaries failing to record diagnostic uncertainty

    Wider context from the report

    “a) In-patient care at Longreach Hospital Approximately one year before Sally’s homicide, ████████ had been detained under s2 of the MHA and spent 10 days at Longreach. At the time, there had been noted changes in his behaviour to include a belief that he could live without food for 10 years (Breatharianism), disinhibited behaviour to include sunbathing naked on a driveway (believing he received energy from the sun) and a stated belief that others could hear his thoughts – thought broadcasting – a potential symptom of schizophrenia. ████████ was selectively mute, fasting and drinking only distilled water. He was assessed on at least three occasions by a consultant psychiatrist, was reviewed by multiple junior medical doctors, seen by mental health nurses and reviewed by the Early Intervention in Psychosis Team. No one saw any evidence of psychosis and it was felt there were no longer grounds in law to detain him. He was discharged without a diagnosis or a plan for future care. At inquest, ████████████ accepted the medical team never completely got to the bottom of the reason for his presentation. His Responsible Clinician, ████████████, referred to a ‘quandary’ in identifying how much of ████████ presentation was due to culture or lifestyle and how much was due to his morbid condition. This uncertainty was not reflected in the discharge summary which described ████████ as a ‘model patient.’ One of the most striking features of the evidence was the difficulty Sally then encountered in having ████████ re-assessed. Indeed, in the year that followed, despite multiple attempts, ████████ was not seen again by a doctor from the mental health team. It is noteworthy that ████████ did not believe himself to be unwell, there appears to have been an assumption he had capacity and as he did not consent to treatment, that appears to have become an insurmountable barrier to further care. I felt there were a number of points of learning: i) An inaccurate or incomplete discharge summary that did not reflect the element of uncertainty in diagnosis both doctors outlined at inquest; ii) A failure to discuss with Sally or the maternal side of ████████ family how he presented, notwithstanding a clear direction following a first ward round to ‘collaborate’ with the family. This seems particularly relevant given Jacob’s mutism which made obtaining a history difficult. It may be of note that there was a difficult family dynamic with an acrimonious separation of ████████ parents. ████████ father was spoken to and there was a reference in the evidence that a member of the in-patient team felt it was Sally’s mental health that needed consideration. It was not explored at inquest whether one side of the family’s views had been accepted at the expense of the other’s. iii) The absence of a plan detailing the route back for ████████ to be seen again if the reason for his bizarre presentation was due to an emerging illness (that worsened) rather than alternative lifestyle choices; iv) A failure to advise Sally, as Nearest Relative, of her statutory right to request ████████ assessment under the MHA. This omission has been noted previously in other PSIF/SIRs. You may wish to reflect whether information in this regard can be included on a website or similar if it is not already and whether there is a need for training of staff in this regard. v) A delay of five months in putting into the RiO records a detailed timeline provided by Sally while ████████ was an in-patient. ████████ accepted that had he seen it at the time, he would have had further questions for Jacob. vi) A lack of understanding or professional curiosity about ████████ drug-taking and the extent to which, if at all, this contributed to ████████ presentation. It was accepted by ████████ that he had been misled by ████████ who had minimised his history in this regard where there was substantial evidence of illicit drug use, including psychotropics. ”

    Source location

    Sally Poynton · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Integrated Care Board is expected to respond to concerns about the specific care provided.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I would expect the Cornwall and Isles of Scilly Integrated Care Board to respond in detail to the concerns you have raised about the specifics of the care that Sally’s son received.”

    Source location

    2024-0267 Response from Department of Health and Social Care
    Page 1 · response
    Published 20 May 2024

    Open published response
  7. East London

    AI-generated summary

    Elvon Paul Randolph Morton · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Elvon Paul Randolph Morton, a 38-year-old man with extensive co-morbidity, was admitted to hospital on 6 December 2022 with abdominal pain, vomiting, diarrhoea, dizziness and shortness of breath. He deteriorated and went into cardiac arrest while awaiting a CT scan under sedation; the inquest concluded that his death was caused by the combined effects of septic shock, oxycodone and lorazepam. Concerns included poor documentation of critical decisions, a flawed decision to sedate him, failures to manage workload pressures safely, and inadequate Trust processes for identifying and reviewing serious incidents.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to document key clinical decisions and treatment stages contemporaneously

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Documentation of key stages in Mr Morton’s care was poor or non-existent. Critical decisions on; mental capacity, best interests, the choice of sedation, the amount of drug administered, the method of administration and the timing of administration were not clearly recorded. In multi-clinician treatment contemporary documentation is essential to preserve patient safety. In this case the lack of clear documentation meant that some clinicians were unaware that Elvon was sedated, whilst others were ignorant of the fact that he had declined treatment. ”

    Source location

    Elvon Paul Randolph Morton · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver an A&E induction programme covering mental capacity, contemporaneous documentation, emergency medicines, sedation and escalation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A specific induction programme has been formulated for the A&E which specifically covers themes such as the mental capacity act, contemporaneous documentation including emergency administered drugs with rationale, sedation and also escalation. The induction programme will be delivered and evidenced retained. A specific presentation relating to the Mental Capacity Act (MCA) its implementation in practice and the wider considerations will be delivered within the teaching programmes for all grades within A&E.”

    Source location

    Response from Barts Health
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 May 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update ITU induction materials to require contemporaneous documentation or justified retrospective entries.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “All doctors starting with ITU receive written pre-induction material to orientate them to the service. This is supplemented with face-to-face departmental induction. The induction material has been updated to state very clearly the need for contemporaneous documentation of clinical decision making wherever possible. Where not possible the documentation should reflect a retrospective entry with reasons why the entry had to be deferred.”

    Source location

    Response from Barts Health
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 May 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide staff training on mental-capacity assessment and deprivation-of-liberty safeguards.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The speciality medicine team have a teaching programme and induction of all levels of staff on Internal Professional standards and appropriate contemporaneous documentation. Training will also be provided to all staff grades to ensure that they understand how to assess mental capacity and the application of deprivation of liberty safeguards (DoLS).”

    Source location

    Response from Barts Health
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 May 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require on-call consultants to confirm remote access to the electronic healthcare record.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Teams will ensure consultants on call confirm that they have remote access to the electronic healthcare record, this will eliminate the risk that documentation is not completed in relation to critical decisions.”

    Source location

    Response from Barts Health
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 May 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update rapid-tranquilisation guidance to require senior, clearly documented decision-making when its criteria cannot be followed.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “For assurance and complete clarity, the new rapid tranquilisation guidance which in the process of being recently updated is applicable to the whole of Barts Health has a very clear wording at the top “This guidance is not to be used in the hypoxic, hypovolemic or septic patient or in one in which intubation as opposed to rapid tranquilisation is required”. This will ensure decision making is senior and clearly documented if and when the guidance cannot be followed in cases where there is sound clinical justification to do so.”

    Source location

    Response from Barts Health
    Page 3 · response
    Published 14 May 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The primarily local concerns are for Barts Health NHS Foundation Trust to address.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In preparing this response, Departmental officials have made enquiries with NHS England. The department is advised that the matters of concern raised are primarily local and for Barts Health NHS Foundation Trust to address, who confirm they are in receipt of this report. The report provides a further opportunity for the Trust to reflect and assure itself that it has acted on all the learnings to be taken from Mr Morton’s death. It is vital that lessons are learnt collectively, and changes are made to reflect where things have gone wrong, which is essential to ensure the NHS provides safe, high-quality care.”

    Source location

    Response from DHSC
    Page 1 · response
    Published 14 May 2024

    Open published response
  8. Blackpool and the Fylde

    AI-generated summary

    Mr Terence John Manning · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr Terence John Manning, a resident of Haddon Court Rest Home, experienced a choking incident while eating a meal on 22 October 2023 and died in hospital on 24 October 2023. The concerns included inaccurate care records caused by carers carrying forward records from other residents, meaning the records did not reflect the food being given to him, and the absence of a Speech and Language Therapy referral despite a known propensity to eat quickly.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to maintain accurate resident-specific care and dietary records

    Wider context from the report

    “Mr Terence John Manning was a resident at Haddon Court from 29 June 2023. It was known to Haddon Court Rest Home, that Mr Manning had a propensity to eat quickly and to take food from other plates. Mr Manning was not being fed a pureed or soft texture diet, and entries to this effect in the care records are errors in the record keeping. These errors had been caused by carers carrying forward the details of records relating to other residents from entries made on the records of those other residents. It was noted in the evidence, that erroneous record keeping had taken place over a period of time and involved multiple carers. It was caused by carers transposing the records of one resident into the care records of another, leading to inaccuracies. I found that these matters gave rise to a risk of future death as the record keeping was inaccurate and did not reflect the foods being given to Mr Manning, and engaged my duty under paragraph 7, Schedule 5, of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and regulations 28 and 29 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013. ”

    Source location

    Mr Terence John Manning · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Reinforce accurate record-keeping and require staff to check records after using the software’s repeat functionality.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In terms of our staff, we would like to reassure you that all staff have been reminded about the importance of accuracy in record keeping. We have particularly reminded the staff about the risks of using what is termed the “repeat functionality” of the software in question, and to ensure that records are checked for accuracy after use of this feature.”

    Source location

    Response from Haddon Court Rest Home
    Page 1 · response
    Published 17 September 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing staff reminders, record-checking practices and other measures are considered robust enough to ensure accurate care records.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In terms of our staff, we would like to reassure you that all staff have been reminded about the importance of accuracy in record keeping. We have particularly reminded the staff about the risks of using what is termed the “repeat functionality” of the software in question, and to ensure that records are checked for accuracy after use of this feature.”

    Source location

    Response from Haddon Court Rest Home
    Page 1 · response
    Published 17 September 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Further software changes cannot be undertaken directly; the matter has been raised with and can only be influenced through the provider.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is important that carers are encouraged to record the most accurate and person-centred records as possible. Based on your input, we will review the repeat functionality in detail and consider certain categories of care to be removed from the repeat functionality. That would force users to individually report the details for each resident in those selected categories.”

    Source location

    Response from Haddon Court Rest Home
    Page 2 · response
    Published 17 September 2024

    Open published response
  9. County Durham and Darlington

    AI-generated summary

    Gillian PEACOCK · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Gillian Peacock died at Darlington Memorial Hospital on 8 March 2023 after suffering a cardiac arrest during an admission for a chest infection. She had been prescribed digoxin and clarithromycin, and although a pharmacist recorded a warning about possible digoxin toxicity, no alternative drug was prescribed and monitoring did not occur until 7 March. The principal concern was that important information in medical records was not sufficiently visible or accessible to clinicians involved in the patient’s care.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of medical records to make important information immediately visible and accessible to relevant clinicians

    Wider context from the report

    “The evidence I have heard is that the treating clinicians had not seen the entry in her medical records. This was in part due to the way the entries are displayed in the records and the 'huge' number of entries that are recorded. I heard that now that any pharmacist entries of significance must be verbally passed to a junior doctor involved in the patient's care and in turn passed on at ward meetings to the broader group of staff caring for that patient. I have a concern that the current system does not address the issue of important medical information being recorded in a patient's notes not being accessible in such a way that clinicians can see and if necessary act on it. The use of verbal handovers does not in my view fully address my concern that crucial medical information should be recorded in a patient's medical records in such a way that relevant information is visible to those involved in care. In addition, that it can be accessed immediately without reliance on the verbal passing of information from one member of the treating team to another. ”

    Source location

    Gillian PEACOCK · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Convene a multidisciplinary cross-specialty group led by the Chief Pharmacist to review Major (level 2) drug interactions for potential prescriber alerts.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Having taken into consideration your concerns the Trust is convening a multi-disciplinary, cross speciality group led by the Chief Pharmacist to review all Major (level 2) drug to drug interactions to review whether any are appropriate to activate a prescriber alert.”

    Source location

    Response from CDDFT
    Page 5 · response
    Published 14 June 2024

    Open published response
  10. Northumberland

    AI-generated summary

    Harry David HALL · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Harry David Hall, who had a history of depression and recent suicidal ideation, was found dead in the rear garden of his home on 29 May 2023 after sustaining a self-inflicted traumatic head injury from a captive bolt gun. The principal concern was inadequate record keeping about the missed mental-health appointment and the lack of clarity about whether any assessment took place before his death; the report also noted delays in appointments.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to record the reason for a missed appointment and whether an assessment was undertaken

    Wider context from the report

    “The deceased was seen by his General Practitioner on 27 March 2023 when he described ongoing suicidal ideation. His General Practitioner referred him to the 24-hour crisis team at 17.56 hours on 27 March 2023. The Initial Response Team ("IRT") provides 24 hour access to urgent mental health care and treatment. The IRT called the deceased at 22.37hrs on 27 March 2023 and I am told during which no immediate risks of self-harm were identified and although frequent thoughts of suicide were being experienced they were felt to be chronic in nature. The clinical decision was to not to refer on the Crisis Team and instead refer to the West Northumberland Community Treatment Team. There were two letters the first dated 31 March 2023 offering an appointment on 17 May 2023 and the second dated 4 April offering an appointment on 26 June 2023. I heard there was a ten week delay in appointments although that delay has since been rectified. The appointment on 17 May 2023 did not go ahead. No evidence was given as to why the appointment on the 17 May 2023 did not go ahead. There is nothing in the records, it is unclear if any assessment was undertaken at that time and this is crucial information. It is speculation if the outcome would have been any different if the deceased had been seen prior to his death. I am concerned with regard to the record keeping at this time. ”

    Source location

    Harry David HALL · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Trust disputes that a cancelled appointment lacked rationale and says assessment remained within the applicable 18-week timeframe.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “There was therefore no cancelled appointment and therefore no omission of rationale for the perceived cancellation. Furthermore, as was explained in the hearing, Mr Hall would have been seen within the 18 week timeframe that was the appropriate benchmark at the time.”

    Source location

    Response from Cumbria, Northumberland, Tyne and Wear
    Page 2 · response
    Published 9 May 2024

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026