Recurring concern

Incomplete, inaccurate or unavailable clinical and care records

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First reported 13 Dec 2008•Latest report 26 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures affecting the completeness, accuracy, consistency, availability, legibility or contemporaneous maintenance of patient, resident and clinical care records.

Not included

  • Information-transfer failures where the underlying records are reliable
  • Documentation dedicated to a separately named safety system when that system supplies the more faithful parent boundary
  • Non-care administrative records
Reports
474

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
568

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2008–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
780

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care64
NHS England38
Care Quality Commission30
NHS Greater Manchester Integrated Care Board12
University Hospitals Sussex NHS Foundation Trust11
Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust10
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust10
Stockport NHS Foundation Trust10
Tameside and Glossop Integrated Care NHS Foundation Trust10
Office of the Chief Coroner9
Recipient name withheld9
Sussex Partnership NHS Foundation Trust9
Barts Health NHS Trust8
East London NHS Foundation Trust8
Manchester University NHS Foundation Trust8

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Black Country

    AI-generated summary

    Mr Ronald Compson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr Ronald Compson, who had Parkinson’s disease, was admitted to hospital after confusion and drowsiness and later sustained an unwitnessed fall with a head injury. He subsequently became unresponsive and died from a subdural haematoma; concerns included failure to notify a doctor, vomiting episodes with poor record keeping, and poor communication with his family about the fall.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Poor recording of vomiting episodes

    Wider context from the report

    “2. There were two separate incidents of vomiting and poor record keeping of when these occurred. ”

    Source location

    Mr Ronald Compson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Complete a root cause analysis investigation into the failures concerning doctor contact, vomiting records, and family communication.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The important issues you raise have been taken very seriously and I enclose a summary of the Root Cause Analysis (RCA) investigation undertaken by the Trust regarding these. The investigation has shown that there was no nerve system failure identified, the failure to contact a doctor was as a consequence of human error due to the input of incorrect patient details into the system.”

    Source location

    2018-0030-Response-by-Dudley-Group-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 8 June 2018

    Open published response
  2. South Wales Central

    AI-generated summary

    David Bassett COOPER · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    David Bassett Cooper was admitted to hospital after a serious head injury caused by a fall in the community and sustained nine further falls while being transferred between wards. He died from a subdural haematoma caused by the final fall on 5 March 2016. The concerns included inadequate handovers about falls risk, incomplete nursing records, a failure to see the overall pattern of falls, and shortcomings in arranging additional one-to-one nursing care.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inaccurate and incomplete nursing notes and falls records

    Wider context from the report

    “2. The accuracy and completeness of nursing notes and records left much to be desired. For example, on Ward 21 when he fell three times, there was no entry made in the Falls Diary – a document which was supposed to act as a tool for nursing staff to assess whether there was a pattern to the numerous falls being sustained – save for the last fall on 5th March. This deprived staff of the opportunity to see the ‘whole picture’ and to take into consideration the eight falls which he had sustained up to that point. ”

    Source location

    David Bassett COOPER · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Falls management is devolved to directly managed units, while the Falls Management Group retains scrutiny and performance-review functions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Health Board established a Falls Management Group in September 2015. This was a task and finish group that reviewed policies and training requirements in relation to falls management. The Health Board introduced the National Patient Safety Agency’s Risk Assessments and I enclose the Health Board’s Falls Policy and other supporting information for your review. The Falls Management Group last met in December 2016 and devolved falls management to the Directly Managed Units to ensure clinical orientation and responsibility.”

    Source location

    2016-0459-Response-by-University-Health-Board
    Page 1 · response
    Published 12 February 2017

    Open published response
  3. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Lita SERKES · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Lita Serkes underwent surgery at Whipps Cross Hospital on 22 July 2016, suffered a stroke the following morning, was transferred to the Royal London Hospital later that day, and died on 24 July. The concerns included discrepancies in observations and clinical records, delay in transfer for specialist stroke care, undelivered pain relief, and delayed recognition and assessment of a significant bleed.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to record clinically relevant discussions and diagnostic information in medical notes

    Wider context from the report

    “2. When Mrs Serkes’ treating consultant gynaecological surgeon attended her at 10.30am on Saturday, 23 July, he formed the impression that he was the first person to diagnose the stroke. In fact, her son and another doctor had already discussed the stroke, and her son was under the impression that they were simply waiting for an ambulance to transfer to the Royal London Hospital. (He was already making arrangements to drive his father there.) None of this is recorded in the medical notes. ”

    Source location

    Lita SERKES · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to record clinical attendance and examination in medical notes

    Wider context from the report

    “5. Mrs Serkes’ surgeon went to the Royal London Hospital to see her at 10.30pm on Saturday, 23 July. He described in court palpating her abdomen and there being no rigidity, guarding, or further distension. However, he made no record in the medical notes of his attendance and examination. ”

    Source location

    Lita SERKES · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Brief all medical staff on the requirement to record patient events completely and contemporaneously in medical records.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. All medical staff have been briefed on the requirement for complete and contemporaneous recording of all events in a patient’s medical records.”

    Source location

    2016-0458-Response-by-Barts-Health-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 February 2017

    Open published response
  4. Leicester City and South Leicestershire

    AI-generated summary

    Francis James Lea · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Francis James Lea, who was living in a care home, was transferred to a new GP without his family being informed. After a hospital admission for a seizure, his prescribed anti-epileptic medication was not continued because the new GP was unaware of the admission and prescription. The report raised concerns about involving next of kin, recording the rationale and consent or capacity assessment for changing GP, and ensuring a safe transfer of care between the care home and GP surgeries.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to record the rationale and patient consent for a change of GP

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) There appeared to be no notes on the patient's medical record regarding the rationale for this change, or any consent from the patient that he was in agreement that it should take place. There was also no record of whether any consideration of his capacity had been undertaken, and if so what the outcome of that decision was. ”

    Source location

    Francis James Lea · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require providers to document discussions and information received from residents, record potential changes in care plans and clinical systems, and update records promptly.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Residents/patients are assumed to have capacity unless proved otherwise. As part of this project residents were given the choice as to whether to move practice. In future projects of this type, ELR CCG makes the following recommendations:”

    Source location

    2016-0447-Response-by-East-Leicestershire-and-Rutland-Clinical-Commissioning-Group
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Contact care homes to recommend policies and documentation standards for staff signing on behalf of residents who can consent but cannot physically sign.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “During the course of the investigation it was established that the care home manager had signed the form on behalf of Mr Lea although this was not made clear to the Practice. Therefore we will be contacting all care homes to recommend:”

    Source location

    2016-0447-Response-by-East-Leicestershire-and-Rutland-Clinical-Commissioning-Group
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Issue standard practice application forms to membership practices, including a section for signing on behalf of another person.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Since the time of this incident, we have issued standard practice application forms to all of our membership practices. This includes a section for signing on behalf of somebody else.”

    Source location

    2016-0447-Response-by-East-Leicestershire-and-Rutland-Clinical-Commissioning-Group
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require care homes to confirm patients’ awareness, consent and appropriate next-of-kin notification when capable residents change GP practice.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In order to avoid such a situation arising again, we will as a practice be liaising with the care homes to request that:”

    Source location

    2016-0447-Response-by-Northfield-Medical-Centre
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    There is usually no need to record the rationale for changing a patient's registered GP in the medical record.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “There is usually no need for documenting on patients medical records regarding rationale for change of GP.”

    Source location

    2016-0447-Response-by-Hazelmere-Medical-Centre
    Page 1 · response
    Published 12 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Care homes are responsible for confirming patient awareness, consent and, where appropriate, next-of-kin notification when facilitating GP practice changes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Where a patient, with capacity, who is resident in a care home, changes GP practice and this change is facilitated by the care home, arrangements are put in place for the care home to provide written confirmation that the patient is aware of the change, the patient gives consent to the change and that where appropriate the patient’s next of kin have been informed.”

    Source location

    2016-0447-Response-by-Northfield-Medical-Centre
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 February 2017

    Open published response
  5. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Sandra Brotherton · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Sandra Brotherton was killed at her home on 31 December 2014, shortly after returning from hospital. The inquest heard that she had been the predominant and effectively sole carer for a person with a dual diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia and Asperger’s Syndrome, who had been alone at home during her hospital stay. Concerns included the lack of a clearly discussed contingency plan, inadequate documentation and sharing of care-plan information with the Personal Assistant, difficulty obtaining an urgent psychiatric appointment, and insufficient follow-up after Sandra requested that he be rehoused immediately.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to record objections to sharing confidential medical information

    Wider context from the report

    “2) Where a Personal Assistant is integral to the Mental Health Service Care plan there should have been a clear and documented record that the care plan should be provided to them. If there is an objection to confidential medical information being shared by the relevant person, where there is no suggestion of a lack of capacity, this should be recorded. ”

    Source location

    Sandra Brotherton · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require Care Coordinators to assess risk-based information sharing with Personal Assistants and document this in wellbeing care plans.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Care Coordinators within Stockport Community Services have been reminded that in line with the CPA policy, version 12, where a Personal Assistant is in place with individual service users, the Care Coordinator will assess the need to share information with the PA based on risk. This must form part of the wellbeing care plan.”

    Source location

    2016-0400-Response-by-Pennine-Care-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Disseminate and deliver a briefing on Personal Assistant involvement in care planning and information-sharing records.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To share the learning highlighted in this regulation a 7 minute briefing regarding the involvement of a PA in care planning processes has been developed and has been shared with all community based mental health teams in the Trust. The briefing recommends that where a Personal Assistant is integral to the Mental Health Service”

    Source location

    2016-0400-Response-by-Pennine-Care-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Discuss adding Personal Assistant care-planning and information-sharing guidance as an addendum to each community team’s operational policy at the Tier 4 meeting.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To be discussed at the Tier 4 meeting to discuss adding guidance as an addendum to current operational policy for each community based team.”

    Source location

    2016-0400-Response-by-Pennine-Care-NHS-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 26 February 2017

    Open published response
  6. Surrey

    AI-generated summary

    Matthew RUSSELL · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Matthew Russell was a serving prisoner who was found hanging by a ligature from his cell door and died in hospital the following day. The jury concluded that multiple failures in the management and application of the ACCT plan procedure materially contributed to his death, including concerns about medication monitoring, care planning, multidisciplinary reviews, staff training, risk assessment and communication.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to effectively use Read Codes to flag significant patient-care risk factors

    Wider context from the report

    “d. The effective use of Read Codes on the System One record, to flag up and highlight significant risk factors in a patient’s care. ”

    Source location

    Matthew RUSSELL · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver refresher training so CNWL staff can use SystmOne risk indicators and set the high-risk icon on patient records.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “CNWL recognises the need for improved interagency co-operation and communication in the local use of SystmOne. All CNWL staff using SystmOne upon login are taken to the patienthomepage which includes an “exclamation mark icon”. This icon identifies that a patient is of high risk of self-harm, open ACCTs, suicide risk and any other significant risk areas that staff need to be aware of. All CNWL staff will receive refresher training by the end of February 2017 to ensure they know how to set this icon up on the client record should the need arise.”

    Source location

    2016-0430-Response-by-Central-and-North-West-London-NHS-Trust
    Page 6 · response
    Published 26 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review SystmOne use across Surrey sites and make it a standing item in local Clinical Quality Meetings.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “CNWL has a dedicated Performance Lead for the Surrey cluster and we will ensure a full review of the use of SystmOne is undertaken in each site, and that this is a standing agenda item in all local Clinical Quality Meetings. We have recently appointed a performance and data analyst who is currently working with managers and senior clinicians across all our prison sites to improve local recording and support with local induction and ongoing support for teams.”

    Source location

    2016-0430-Response-by-Central-and-North-West-London-NHS-Trust
    Page 6 · response
    Published 26 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop a SystmOne training package covering system functionality and READ codes, and incorporate homepage login requirements into the Standard Operating Procedure.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “CNWL is currently developing a training package for staff on the effective use of SystmOne on the functionality of the system, and the use of READ codes. We recognise that the homepage is a vital screen for agencies communicating risk and essential information in relation to a patient’s care. All staff have been advised through local meetings of the requirement to log in via the homepage and this will be included in the CNWL Standard Operating Procedure going forward.”

    Source location

    2016-0430-Response-by-Central-and-North-West-London-NHS-Trust
    Page 6 · response
    Published 26 February 2017

    Open published response
  7. Blackburn, Hyndburn and Ribble Valley

    AI-generated summary

    Alfred Grimshaw · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Alfred Grimshaw had an unwitnessed fall at a residential care home on 26 May 2016, was admitted to hospital, and was discharged before being readmitted when a fractured hip was identified. He underwent surgery and died from bronchopneumonia on 6 June 2016. Concerns included the failure to obtain a hip X-ray after the fall and inability to mobilise, failure to report a hip fracture visible on an abdominal X-ray, and lack of evidence that requested physiotherapy or occupational therapy reviews occurred before discharge.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to sign and date handwritten clinical notes

    Wider context from the report

    “1. On being assessed in the emergency department on the 26th May, despite the history of an unwitnessed fall and the fact that he was 93 years of age and had been subsequently unable to mobilise so x-ray was carried out in order to rule out the possibility of a fracture to his hip. 2. On the 27th May 2016 an x-ray of the abdomen was requested to rule out a sub-acute intestinal obstruction. Although that was an x-ray of the abdomen it covered part of the right hip, which disclosed a significant displaced fracture through the right lesser trochanter that was visible on the lower limit of the film. Despite the fracture being disclosed on the x-ray, the report made no reference to it. 3. On the 27th May a request was made for physio and O T review which was clearly documented, there was however no evidence that physio or O T was carried out prior to discharge. 4. On the discharge summary that was printed on the 28th May 2016 at 16:21 is a handwritten note “Patient off his legs. Pain ++ right hip and during movement. Physio advises x-ray to exclude hip fracture prior to any physiotherapy.” That handwritten note is not signed or dated. ”

    Source location

    Alfred Grimshaw · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  8. Blackpool and the Fylde

    AI-generated summary

    Barry THOMPSON · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Barry Thompson, an insulin-dependent diabetic, died on 27 February 2016 while a patient on the Acute Medical Unit, after being admitted with sepsis from diabetic foot ulcers and hyperglycaemia. The report identified concerns about failure to provide insulin, fluids, adequate monitoring, antibiotics and medical review, as well as inaccurate and incomplete records and ineffective information sharing during transfer between departments.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inaccurate, infrequent, disjointed and incomplete clinical record keeping

    Wider context from the report

    “(4) Record keeping. /Information sharing. I found on hearing the evidence that records from both departments from 16.52 onwards are inaccurate, infrequently made, disjointed and are incomplete causing them to be unreliable and affected continuity of care. Also this caused staff at the inquest not to be able to fully recall their actions. There was a 3 stage system in place to ensure transfer of important information about Mr Thompson when he moved from the ED to the AMU. a) A SBAR document is completed by the transferring nurse who accompanies the patient. In this case the document does not state (despite there being provision on the form) who that person was or who the receiving nurse was. It does not identify Mr Thompson as a diabetic nor state he has not had his insulin. It erroneously states he is not on a sepsis pathway. b) There is a computerised tracking system providing for doctors in the ED to transfer key information about a patient to the doctors on the AMU. This then serves as a live reference point for staff on the ward. In this case the information refers to Mr Thompson having cellulitis only and makes no reference to his diabetes. This affected the prioritisation of Mr Thompson on the AMU particularly when it came to observations and testing needed and review by a doctor. c) The evidence from the ED matron was that either the named nurse or department co-ordinator should share key information by telephone with the ward prior to transfer. I concluded this did not occur as neither said they could remember doing so nor was there a record. The remainder of case notes which had come into existence whilst Mr Thompson was in the ED did go to the ward with him and referred to his diabetes and earlier assessments but I am concerned that the 3 tier system put in place to share key information quickly is not working. ”

    Source location

    Barry THOMPSON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  9. Stoke-on-Trent and North Staffordshire

    AI-generated summary

    Norman Arthur BEARD · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Norman Arthur BEARD suffered a fall, was admitted to hospital, and later transferred to Daisy Bank Nursing Home, where he developed serious pressure sores, dehydration and significant weight loss. He died at Abbey Court Nursing Home on 14 February 2015. Concerns included delayed referral and inadequate treatment of pressure sores, shortages of staff and essential supplies, incomplete care records, inadequate response to weight loss and minimal GP involvement.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to complete turning charts

    Wider context from the report

    “(5) Mr Beard's deteriorating pressure ulcers were not referred to the Tissue Viability Nurses in a timely fashion and advice, once given, was not followed. Turning charts were not filled in and an upgraded mattress was not provided. ”

    Source location

    Norman Arthur BEARD · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  10. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    Martha Ann Davies · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Martha Ann Davies, a 98-year-old woman, fell at home, underwent surgery for a fractured hip, was transferred for rehabilitation, suffered a further fall, and died in hospital on 29 November 2015. The report identified concerns including communication failings, reliance on agency and junior staff, delayed response to deterioration, lack of engagement by ward staff and management, and documentation failings; the inquest concluded that she did not receive adequate care and appropriate treatment at Clacton District Hospital, which may have contributed to her death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failings in documentation

    Wider context from the report

    “(5) Failings in the documentation ”

    Source location

    Martha Ann Davies · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
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Data last updated 7 September 2026