Recurring concern

Incomplete, inaccurate or unavailable clinical and care records

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First reported 13 Dec 2008•Latest report 26 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures affecting the completeness, accuracy, consistency, availability, legibility or contemporaneous maintenance of patient, resident and clinical care records.

Not included

  • Information-transfer failures where the underlying records are reliable
  • Documentation dedicated to a separately named safety system when that system supplies the more faithful parent boundary
  • Non-care administrative records
Reports
474

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
568

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2008–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
780

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care64
NHS England38
Care Quality Commission30
NHS Greater Manchester Integrated Care Board12
University Hospitals Sussex NHS Foundation Trust11
Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust10
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust10
Stockport NHS Foundation Trust10
Tameside and Glossop Integrated Care NHS Foundation Trust10
Office of the Chief Coroner9
Recipient name withheld9
Sussex Partnership NHS Foundation Trust9
Barts Health NHS Trust8
East London NHS Foundation Trust8
Manchester University NHS Foundation Trust8

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Central Lincolnshire

    AI-generated summary

    Thor Harrison Dalhaug · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Thor Dalhaug was delivered by caesarean section on 23 September 2013 in poor condition after difficulties delivering his deeply engaged head, and died approximately one hour after birth. The report identified concerns including lack of supervision of the operating surgeon, use of an inappropriate forceps technique, inadequate contemporaneous records and shortcomings in the internal investigation and disclosure of the circumstances of his death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to identify and rectify missing full notes after a death

    Wider context from the report

    “(IV) The failure to identify in the immediate aftermath of Thor's death that the operating surgeons had neglected to make a full note of the circumstances in which he died and to obligate them to provide the same; in particular ████████ was advised to amend the Caesarean pro forma, to include the fact that forceps were used in the interests of candour. He was then dissuaded from doing so by senior management as a result of their concerns as to how this would be perceived if the matter was investigated. This raises very serious concerns as to the degree of candour in disclosing the circumstances of this death. What steps have been taken to obviate a repetition of this behaviour in the future? ”

    Source location

    Thor Harrison Dalhaug · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to maintain full contemporaneous records of term neonatal deaths

    Wider context from the report

    “(III) The failure to ensure a full contemporaneous record was kept by doctors involved in a term neonatal death. Such failure has seriously hampered my investigation into the circumstances surrounding Thor's death and has resulted in serious difficulties to Thor's family who clearly struggled and suffered as a result of not being able to understand why their son died shortly after his birth. ”

    Source location

    Thor Harrison Dalhaug · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver case-study learning and disseminate reminders to medical staff about complete contemporaneous clinical documentation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is accepted that contemporaneous recording of all events is important in healthcare practice. By way of reassurance, the doctors who join the Department are informed about the importance of ensuring a full contemporaneous record of any clinical interaction at their Trust and departmental induction. The Head of Service and the Consultant Labour Ward Lead undertake case study learning sessions. Lessons about, but not limited to, documentation problems from this case are included in the lessons learnt section.”

    Source location

    2015-0063-Response-by-United-Lincolnshire-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 6 March 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct annual operative-note spot audits for three years following the annual changeover of middle-grade doctors.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Whilst dissemination of learning is important, the Trust will also undertake spot audits of operative notes, once a year for the next 3 years. This will be done after annual change of middle grade doctors and facilitated by audit leads on both sites. Should there be any failures from the audit; appropriate action will be taken until the Trust is satisfied that there is a robust system of recording.”

    Source location

    2015-0063-Response-by-United-Lincolnshire-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 6 March 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Audit the accuracy of medical-record information and remind medical and midwifery staff of their candour duties.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust fully accepts, however, that any inference that a later timed addendum should not be added to provide greater clarity to the records was not appropriate. By way of reassurance, whilst reminding staff of the need to complete full contemporaneous notes we will also be auditing the accuracy of information within medical records, the Clinical Director and Head of Midwifery have written to all medical and midwifery staff to remind them of their duties regarding candour.”

    Source location

    2015-0063-Response-by-United-Lincolnshire-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 6 March 2015

    Open published response
  2. Manchester West

    AI-generated summary

    Emmeline Hampson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Emmeline Hampson died in hospital on 6 November 2014 after a fall at her nursing home caused a subdural haematoma and intracerebral bleeding. The concerns included repeated falls without review of her falls risk assessment or referral back to the Falls Service, inadequate procedures and record keeping, shortcomings in alarm audibility and differentiation, and insufficient training of agency staff.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Omissions in documentation and record keeping of falls and changes in residents’ condition

    Wider context from the report

    “iv. There were omissions in the documentation and record keeping at the Nursing Home particularly in relation to falls, and changes in Mrs Hampson’s condition, which were witnessed by members of her family on a daily basis. ”

    Source location

    Emmeline Hampson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
  3. Inner South London

    AI-generated summary

    Archie Haxell · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Archie Haxell was born by forceps delivery on 24 March 2013 and suffered a respiratory arrest about two hours after birth. He was transferred to St Thomas’ Hospital, where he died on 29 March 2013. The principal concerns were breakdowns in communication between healthcare professionals, failure to retain observation records, and failure to inform Archie’s parents about concerns regarding his breathing, contributing to delay in recognising his deteriorating condition.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to retain recorded observations in the medical records

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) About 25 minutes after his birth Archie was noted to be grunting and he then developed nasal flaring, both of which are potential signs of respiratory distress. He was ████████ performed a set of observations, including oxygen saturations and she also noticed vomiting, grunting and nasal flaring. The evidence at the inquest was that the observations on a piece of paper because the medical records were not immediately available (her observations were performed shortly after the birth of Archie’s brother who required resuscitation). Midwife ████████ later transcribed these results into the medical records. However, the evidence was that midwife ████████ was not aware of the vomiting, grunting and nasal flaring noticed by midwife ████████ although midwife ████████ believes she did pass this information on verbally. During this period may understandably have been focussed on Archie’s brother. However, I am concerned that the important information about further possible signs of respiratory distress was somehow lost in the communication between the two midwives. Also, the piece of paper on which the observations were recorded was not retained. I am concerned that this should have been retained in the medical records. ”

    Source location

    Archie Haxell · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require staff to secure all loose clinical documentation in the main clinical notes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1 – Documentation This issue was raised by the PFD report in relation to loose paper being used to document observations contemporaneously and later transcribed into the clinical notes. In this case the observations taken from Archie were transcribed into the clinical notes by a different person to the member of staff who had performed the observations. All members of staff have been reminded that any loose documentation must be secured into the main clinical notes even if written on a small piece of paper.”

    Source location

    2015-0081-Response-by-Lewisham-Greenwich-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 5 March 2015

    Open published response
  4. Powys, Bridgend & Glamorgan Valleys

    AI-generated summary

    Mr. Brian Francis · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr. Brian Francis was admitted to Princess of Wales Hospital on 5 September 2014 after several days of illness and was treated for presumed chest sepsis. He died of a pulmonary embolism the following day. Concerns included a failed process for recording Consultant attendance and the unavailability of Community medical records, which may have affected assessment and the commencement of anti-coagulation therapy.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of paper records to accurately document Consultant patient review

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The process of a Consultant’s attendance on patient being noted by a ‘tick in the box’ on a paper record failed. The box had been ticked when in fact the patient had not been reviewed by the Consultant. ”

    Source location

    Mr. Brian Francis · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Replace tick-box tracking with standardized ED and AMU registers requiring consultant signatures to provide auditable confirmation of patient review.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “At the two entrances there are two registers one in the ED department and one in the AMU department and these are now formatted the same way and require the consultant to sign the register when he/she has seen the patient (Appendix 1). This enables the nursing and medical teams to see quickly who has been reviewed by whom and who has yet to be reviewed. This has replaced the tick box that previously existed; recognising that the ticks could have been entered by anyone and the system could not be reviewed and checked. The enclosed map (Appendix 2) shows the Clinical Decision Unit (now called the Acute Medical Unit) and Emergency Department are next to each other and the medical team works in both areas throughout the 24/7 service.”

    Source location

    2015-0085-Response-by-University-Health-Board
    Page 2 · response
    Published 4 March 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement ward documentation requiring the senior reviewing clinician to record completion and timing of review for ward staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The current arrangements have been reviewed and it is clear that when a patient is admitted the clinical assessment documentation is completed by the admitting doctor. A copy of the document is attached (Appendix 3) and comes as a booklet rather than 8 separate sheets. Page 8 of that document has to be completed by the senior reviewing clinician. This record is sent to the ward with the patient and so ward staff can quickly identify whether senior review has taken place and the time that it took place.”

    Source location

    2015-0085-Response-by-University-Health-Board
    Page 3 · response
    Published 4 March 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Reinforce with consultants and nursing staff their responsibilities for authenticating and checking documentation of senior patient review.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We will continue to monitor the system in place and the Clinical Director will review the working practices of the Consultant Physician body in this regard. The Clinical Director has reinforced to all Consultants that it is vital that they only sign the book after a review has taken place and is monitoring the system. All the teams are aware of this incident and have learned from that. They continue to monitor and review and support the ongoing pilot to develop an electronic system.”

    Source location

    2015-0085-Response-by-University-Health-Board
    Page 2 · response
    Published 4 March 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue monitoring the review-tracking system and have the Clinical Director review consultant working practices while supporting development of an electronic system.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We will continue to monitor the system in place and the Clinical Director will review the working practices of the Consultant Physician body in this regard. The Clinical Director has reinforced to all Consultants that it is vital that they only sign the book after a review has taken place and is monitoring the system. All the teams are aware of this incident and have learned from that. They continue to monitor and review and support the ongoing pilot to develop an electronic system.”

    Source location

    2015-0085-Response-by-University-Health-Board
    Page 2 · response
    Published 4 March 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Pilot a live electronic work list to notify teams about patients requiring review and treatment decisions, with auditable, time-stamped entries.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We will continue to monitor the system in place and the Clinical Director will review the working practices of the Consultant Physician body in this regard. The Clinical Director has reinforced to all Consultants that it is vital that they only sign the book after a review has taken place and is monitoring the system. All the teams are aware of this incident and have learned from that. They continue to monitor and review and support the ongoing pilot to develop an electronic system.”

    Source location

    2015-0085-Response-by-University-Health-Board
    Page 2 · response
    Published 4 March 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement the national Symphony emergency department system across Health Board emergency and assessment units, beginning at specified hospitals in September 2015 and continuing in November 2015.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “From September 2015 a new National Emergency Department system (called Symphony) will be implemented within the Emergency Departments and Assessment Units throughout the Health Board. Initially the system will be introduced in Princess of Wales Hospital and Neath Port Talbot Hospitals in September 2015, the first sites in NHS Wales to go live with the new national system. This will be followed by implementation in Morriston and Singleton Hospitals in November 2015.”

    Source location

    2015-0085-Response-by-University-Health-Board
    Page 3 · response
    Published 4 March 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing clinical assessment documentation and nursing escalation arrangements sufficiently notify ward staff whether senior review has occurred.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The current arrangements have been reviewed and it is clear that when a patient is admitted the clinical assessment documentation is completed by the admitting doctor. A copy of the document is attached (Appendix 3) and comes as a booklet rather than 8 separate sheets. Page 8 of that document has to be completed by the senior reviewing clinician. This record is sent to the ward with the patient and so ward staff can quickly identify whether senior review has taken place and the time that it took place.”

    Source location

    2015-0085-Response-by-University-Health-Board
    Page 3 · response
    Published 4 March 2015

    Open published response
  5. Sunderland

    AI-generated summary

    Paige Louise Bell · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Paige Louise Bell, aged 20, died at Sunderland Royal Hospital on 14 August 2014 after applying a ligature to her neck following an episode of self-harm. The inquest identified contradictions in the observation policy as a contributing factor. Concerns included case notes not being held together or fully transferred with the patient, and the need for consistent observation policies and updated guidance on managing patients with Borderline Personality Disorder.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure medical personnel have immediate electronic access to complete patient notes

    Wider context from the report

    “The case notes were not held in one place and not all transferred with the patient. I wondered if there were any ongoing plans to allow medical personnel to have immediate access to all notes electronically rather than notes following the patient as they will contain essential information for a patient’s healthcare and treatment. ”

    Source location

    Paige Louise Bell · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Choice and implementation of electronic patient-record systems are matters for individual NHS Trusts.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition, there are a number of versions of electronic patient record and health record systems being used in many hospitals across the UK. These systems are being used to provide accurate, up-to-date, and complete information about patients at the point of care. However, the choice and implementation of these systems is a matter for individual NHS Trusts.”

    Source location

    2015-0075-Response-by-Department-of-Health
    Page 2 · response
    Published 3 March 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Electronic RiO records and information-sharing through team meetings and handovers provide a more appropriate account than printed records alone.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In respect to the stated over the presentation of written copies of RiO records, ████████ explained that this is something which was identified in the Serious Incident Review. He explained that the RiO records are used by staff electronically, and a printed version does not properly reflect how they would be seen or used by staff. In particular the date and time of a meeting or incident is recorded in addition to when the record was made. This allows the entries to be recorded chronologically in relation to the date and time of the meeting or incident. As you heard in evidence, in a very busy and demanding mental health ward”

    Source location

    2015-0075-Response-by-Northumberland-Tyne-Wear-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 3 March 2015

    Open published response
  6. Powys, Bridgend and Glamorgan Valleys

    AI-generated summary

    Barrie Lewis · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Barrie Lewis was found by his family hanging from a rope attached to a garage rafter on 31 August 2014. The inquest concluded that his death was suicide. Concerns included the absence of a specific risk assessment for suicidal ideation, poor communication between mental health services, no reliable system assigning responsibility for assistance, and a lack of clinical records of crisis-team contact.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to make clinical records of crisis team contact

    Wider context from the report

    “[BRIEF SUMMARY OF MATTERS OF CONCERN] (1) A clinical review was undertaken of the contact the deceased had with the mental health services in the days prior to his death and it was apparent from that review, and from the evidence heard that: a) That no risk assessment was undertaken to detail risks specifically associated with the deceased’s suicidal ideation which, on the evidence, would have assisted the crisis team in assessing his risk of suicide or self harm. b) There was little formal mechanism for communication between the mental health out patients department and the acute services which he accessed in the days prior to his death. c) There was no reliable system to ensure that a member of the crisis team took responsibility for providing assistance to the deceased – simply leaving the deceased to make his own telephone call to the appropriate department. d) No clinical recordings were made of the contact the deceased had with the crisis team (Crisis Resolution Home Treatment team) following his contact with them. ”

    Source location

    Barrie Lewis · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Improve monitoring of recording systems and processes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. Actions implemented”

    Source location

    2015-0065-Response-by-University-Health-Board
    Page 1 · response
    Published 19 February 2015

    Open published response
  7. London Inner (North)

    AI-generated summary

    John DACK · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    John Dack sustained fractures to both ankles, underwent procedures and was discharged home unable to weight bear without the planned follow-up. He later developed an infected left ankle with osteomyelitis and died on 24 September 2014 after hospital treatment. The report’s principal concern was that an incorrect address in his medical notes prevented follow-up despite notifications from his daughter; it also raised concern about early discharge home after the MDT meeting.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to maintain accurate patient addresses in medical notes

    Wider context from the report

    “Mr Dack was not called for follow up because his medical notes recorded the wrong address for him, despite the fact that one of his daughters had notified staff of this on two separate occasions. What seems at first blush to be a relatively unimportant administrative matter can therefore have serious consequences. I heard from the surgeon treating Mr Dack that this has happened before with other patients. It seems that this part of the system of administration would benefit from review. ”

    Source location

    John DACK · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Emphasize to relevant staff the importance of accurately recording and changing patient details.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Our investigation has concluded that the ward clerk was told to change Mr Dack’s address by the patient’s nurse. A mistake was made however as she recorded him as being of ‘no fixed abode’. We have asked the ward matron to speak to her staff to remind them of the importance of accurately changing patient details and the consequences of not doing so.”

    Source location

    2015-0151-Response-by-Barts-Health-NHS
    Page 1 · response
    Published 19 February 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The clerical address error did not cause Mr Dack to be lost to follow-up because he knew about and rearranged his appointment.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Your concern was that Mr Dack was not called for follow up because his medical notes recorded the wrong address for him, despite the fact that one of his daughters had notified staff.”

    Source location

    2015-0151-Response-by-Barts-Health-NHS
    Page 1 · response
    Published 19 February 2015

    Open published response
  8. Mid Kent and Medway

    AI-generated summary

    George Marks · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    George Marks was admitted with confusion, immobility and a chest infection, and was later diagnosed with a deep vein thrombosis and a thrombus in the pulmonary artery. After his anticoagulant medication was changed to Rivaroxaban, he was not given it from the evening of 28 February until 4 March, and he died on 6 March 2014. The principal concerns were agency staff’s failures in medication administration, record-keeping and handover procedures.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of agency staff to make adequate records in patients' nursing notes

    Wider context from the report

    “3) Agency Staff failed to have an understanding of the need to make a record and or any adequate record in the patients nursing notes, ”

    Source location

    George Marks · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of agency staff to understand the need to record information in patients' nursing notes

    Wider context from the report

    “3) Agency Staff failed to have an understanding of the need to make a record and or any adequate record in the patients nursing notes, ”

    Source location

    George Marks · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Send monthly SMS reminders to all staff about documentation, escalation, medication administration and compassion.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• A generic SMS has been sent to all staff detailing the importance of documentation, escalation, administration of medication and compassion. This is done once a month to remind all staff of their basic duties.”

    Source location

    2015-0057-Response-by-Mayday-Healthcare
    Page 1 · response
    Published 17 February 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Send quarterly formal letters to staff reinforcing documentation, escalation, medication administration and compassion.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Formal letters sent to all staff, detailing the importance of documentation, escalation, administration of medication and compassion. This is currently being done every quarter.”

    Source location

    2015-0057-Response-by-Mayday-Healthcare
    Page 1 · response
    Published 17 February 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update the yearly training programme on documentation, escalation, medication administration and compassion beyond mandatory training requirements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Updated our yearly training program in regards to documentation, escalation, administration of medication and compassion, which is outside of the framework requirements for the Mandatory Training subjects”

    Source location

    2015-0057-Response-by-Mayday-Healthcare
    Page 2 · response
    Published 17 February 2015

    Open published response
  9. Northamptonshire

    AI-generated summary

    Jane Marie Clark and Isobel Griffin · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jane Marie Clark died by suicide after leaving Berrywood Hospital on 22 August 2013 with an inadequate risk assessment, following recent suicide-related concerns and possession of a ligature. Isobel Griffin died after hanging herself on the ward on 17 August 2013, with death pronounced on 21 August 2013. The principal concerns included inadequate handover and risk assessments, failures to review relevant clinical information and treatment, and insufficient measures to minimise ligature risk.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Poor and perfunctory risk assessment documentation

    Wider context from the report

    “Re Jane Marie Clark 1. The very challenging events of the previous evening and that morning do not appear to have been handed over and the nurse in charge did not read the notes before granting leave. Her risk assessment then was ill informed. It was not discussed with anyone nor properly documented. 2. She did not place any boundaries on the leave for example providing a time by which Jane was to return. 3. Risk assessment documentation generally was poor and appeared perfunctory. Re Isobel Griffin 1. Mrs Griffin was admitted on 1 August and was not allocated a key worker until 8th August. The key worker did not read the notes so was not aware of the events of the 7th. 2. The risk assessment was not updated with the events of the 7th. 3. Mrs Griffin’s responsible clinician saw her on only one occasion on 14 August 2013 at which time he did not read the notes so he was unaware of events on the 7th when she handed in a belt and scissors and said she had 3-4 times tried to hang herself using a ligature. 4. A planned review of medication, diagnosis and treatment never took place despite a number of references in the notes to it from 6 August 2013. Mrs Griffin had been substantially unmedicated for most of the admission despite concerns expressed by her family. 5. On 11 August Mrs Griffin started to express thoughts to harm others. These thoughts distressed her. She did not intend to act on them but they were something new and a measure of her distress. These thoughts and their significance were not included in any risk assessment. 6. A risk assessment concluded on the 18th, the day after she had hanged herself on the ward, purports to be made with her agreement. It was evidence that risk assessment documentation is cut and pasted rather than reflecting the true circumstances. 7. The doors do not appear to be ligature proof and little was made available by way of evidence as to what measures would now be taken to minimise this risk. ”

    Source location

    Jane Marie Clark and Isobel Griffin · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
  10. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Paul Moroney · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Paul Moroney attended Tameside Hospital by ambulance on 27 August 2014 with worsening breathing and concern about a blood clot, was discharged with arrangements to return the following day, and later required a second emergency ambulance. Concerns included the lack of monitoring or recording of his oxygen saturations, discontinuation of oxygen before discharge without monitoring, and the absence of previous oxygen-level records when he was readmitted.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to record oxygen saturations during hospital care

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Whilst at the hospital on the first occasion, no oxygen saturations were monitored or recorded ”

    Source location

    Paul Moroney · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Oxygen saturations were monitored and recorded during the hospital attendance, contrary to the concern that they were not.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1. Whilst at the hospital on the first occasion, no oxygen saturations were monitored or recorded.”

    Source location

    2015-0043-Response-by-Tameside-Hospital-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 4 February 2015

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026