Recurring concern

Inadequate safety incident investigations

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First reported 13 Dec 2008•Latest report 25 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes initiation, evidence gathering, witness testing, factual accuracy, analysis, timeliness, investigator competence and reporting within investigations of deaths, serious incidents and patient, resident or operational safety events.

Not included

  • Police, conduct, regulatory or other investigations not directed at organisational safety learning
  • Failure to implement an unrelated safety action not arising from an incident investigation
  • Generic governance failures not directly affecting a safety incident investigation or its learning process
  • Excludes downstream dissemination, learning and corrective-action controls once the investigation findings have been established.
Reports
244

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
316

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2008–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
447

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care31
Care Quality Commission21
NHS England20
Betsi Cadwaladr University LHB11
Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust10
Barts Health NHS Trust8
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust8
Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust7
Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust6
Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust5
Tameside and Glossop Integrated Care NHS Foundation Trust5
Tees, Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust5
Health and Safety Executive4
Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency4
NHS Greater Manchester Integrated Care Board4

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Manchester North

    AI-generated summary

    Rowan Louis Thompson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Rowan Louis Thompson was a detained patient at the Gardner Unit who was found in his room on 3 October 2020, thought to be having a seizure, and died shortly after arriving at hospital. The investigation and inquest identified severe hypokalaemia, failures to communicate blood test results, missed and falsified observation records, inadequate emergency response arrangements, and concerns about staffing and auditing.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to conduct higher-level investigations into patterns of missed observations and falsified records

    Wider context from the report

    “2. At the time of the CCTV review and investigation following Rowan’s death there was a missed opportunity for management to understand the gravity and nature of the situation. There was no higher level investigation, so for example: a) Whether the staff who failed to complete observations/falsify records did so when working a particular shift ie night shift b) Whether the staff who failed to complete observations/falsify records did so when working weekends rather than during the week c) Whether there was any correlation between missed observations / falsifying of records and shifts when there was no deputy or ward manager on duty. ”

    Source location

    Rowan Louis Thompson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Carry out a thematic review of CAMHS observation-record audits to identify themes and resulting actions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “During the inquest the Associate Director of Quality gave evidence in relation to the daily audits of observation records in our Child and Adolescent Mental Health Services (CAMHS). Concerns were raised that these audits lacked vigour and were ineffective due to the themes and times, days not being considered in the longer term, rather they are completed daily.”

    Source location

    Response from Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 18 October 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct a nationally commissioned independent review of patient services, escalation, oversight and staff culture across Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition, NHS England’s (NHSE) have nationally commissioned an Independent Review which is being managed and led by the Northwest Region. An external Independent Chair has been appointed who is currently in the process of developing the Terms of Reference for the review. As part of the review process the Independent Chair will be making contact with Rowan’s family, to understand their experiences of the care Rowan received.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 18 October 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust is responsible for addressing the specific operational changes arising from the concerns.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We understand you have also addressed this Report to Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust. They will address specifics as to the changes being implemented on the ground.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 18 October 2023

    Open published response
  2. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Kamil Iddrisu and Youngson Nkhoma · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Kamil Iddrisu and Youngson Nkhoma collapsed during separate military selection runs at Whittington Barracks and later died after being taken to hospital. Both were found to have metabolic acidosis, acute kidney injury, rhabdomyolysis and sickle cell trait; the final causes of death remained under investigation, with the most likely cause of collapse described as sickle cell trait combined with military exercise. The principal concern was the risk of death or harm to non-UK selection candidates, including the need to consider screening for sickle cell trait.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a clearly identifiable person responsible for reviewing and investigating health and safety incidents

    Wider context from the report

    “Sickle cell trait (SCT) screening process and identifying SCT in candidates: 1. The Inquest heard evidence that since these tragedies there had be 12 (13 as one incident includes 2 people) near misses where the process that had been put in place following these tragedies had not be followed. This resulted in 3 candidates at High Risk for SCT according to their family origins questionnaire undertaking the 2km run. 1 of these had self-identified to a Group Leader prior to the exercise but was directed to complete the RFT(E) run element in any case. This raises a concern about the screening process may be safe and effective. 2. The inquest was told that the Air force and Navy are not screening any candidates for SCT. The Army are. Both services are recruiting from the Commonwealth. Medical evidence at the inquest confirmed screening was the only way to safely identify candidates at risk. This raises a concern that the recruitment process is not safe and effective. Training and Education 1. The near miss incidents lead to a concern that staff involved in the selection process and RFT assessments are still not aware of the risk associated with SCT given that in one case the person was directed to undertake the run despite knowing he was at high risk of developing exertional rhabdomyolysis associated with SCT. 2. The lack of screening in the Navy and Air Force leads to a further concern about the level of understanding regarding the risks associated with SCT – the evidence at the inquest said this risk was unpredictable . 3. The inquest heard evidence that there is no standardised way to identify SCT candidates who are going through the selection process as the different services were considering using different colours wrist bands in different services. The raises a concern about the ability to identify those candidates who have SCT. 4. There should be a review of the wording used and rationale for including questions for candidates regarding ‘cola coloured urine’ in the PMSA. Dr Gupta, an expert haematologist at the inquest, informed the court that this is not always a sign of SCT as an individual can get cola urine from hepatitis. This raises a concern about the level of understanding of the significant of "cola coloured urine" and what it might indicate. Reporting and investigation 1. The inquest heard how Capita have set up a clinical oversight board to review any incidents. First this board did not appear to have reviewed or audited any of the near misses referred to above and second it does not include a representative from the Army. This raises concerns about the lack of joined up thinking for an incident between Capita and the army and the safety of the new process. 2. Reporting of incidents: the majority of the 12 near misses were not investigated at the time they occurred which indicates the present process is not safe and effective. 3. There is no system to audit whether incidents are being correctly processed and investigated. 4. The reporting system continues to use two parallel reporting forms for Capita (Casper) and the Army (Durals). These are on separate IT systems. This raises a concern that there is no "one version of the truth". The inquest heard evidence that Capita were unclear if they had resolved the issue in their Casper system associated with the drop down menu options and the fact that non work related incidents close investigations automatically. 5. It was unclear from the evidence whether the Recruiting Group has a clear identifiable person to take responsibility for the review health and safety incidents and to ensure adequate investigation is undertaken. Specifically it was still not clear that any oversight of the medical incidents fell within the remit of the Capita Head of Health and Safety. 6. It was unclear from the evidence whether the Recruiting Group act as one entity regarding health and safety issues with a clear lines of responsibility for global risk assessment (and promoting information gathering & investigation) of incidents of any nature. The Inquest heard evidence that ‘H&S at work’ is considered differently to any medical risk, which is supported by the lack of investigation of the near misses. Medical response: 1. Inquest heard how Lichfield had specialist medical staff on site in the medical training unit but there was no system for getting urgent medical attention on the base if needed. There was no mechanism to put a tannoy out for a medical emergency but the Inquest heard evidence that this could be done for a cake sale. 2. All the services should consider whether there should be a generic policy for the treatment of exertional collapse (of any cause) as per US Army where during training there is a clear medical plan with availability of essential medical treatment (eg oxygen and fluids) before hospitalisation. ”

    Source location

    Kamil Iddrisu and Youngson Nkhoma · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to investigate near misses when they occur

    Wider context from the report

    “Sickle cell trait (SCT) screening process and identifying SCT in candidates: 1. The Inquest heard evidence that since these tragedies there had be 12 (13 as one incident includes 2 people) near misses where the process that had been put in place following these tragedies had not be followed. This resulted in 3 candidates at High Risk for SCT according to their family origins questionnaire undertaking the 2km run. 1 of these had self-identified to a Group Leader prior to the exercise but was directed to complete the RFT(E) run element in any case. This raises a concern about the screening process may be safe and effective. 2. The inquest was told that the Air force and Navy are not screening any candidates for SCT. The Army are. Both services are recruiting from the Commonwealth. Medical evidence at the inquest confirmed screening was the only way to safely identify candidates at risk. This raises a concern that the recruitment process is not safe and effective. Training and Education 1. The near miss incidents lead to a concern that staff involved in the selection process and RFT assessments are still not aware of the risk associated with SCT given that in one case the person was directed to undertake the run despite knowing he was at high risk of developing exertional rhabdomyolysis associated with SCT. 2. The lack of screening in the Navy and Air Force leads to a further concern about the level of understanding regarding the risks associated with SCT – the evidence at the inquest said this risk was unpredictable . 3. The inquest heard evidence that there is no standardised way to identify SCT candidates who are going through the selection process as the different services were considering using different colours wrist bands in different services. The raises a concern about the ability to identify those candidates who have SCT. 4. There should be a review of the wording used and rationale for including questions for candidates regarding ‘cola coloured urine’ in the PMSA. Dr Gupta, an expert haematologist at the inquest, informed the court that this is not always a sign of SCT as an individual can get cola urine from hepatitis. This raises a concern about the level of understanding of the significant of "cola coloured urine" and what it might indicate. Reporting and investigation 1. The inquest heard how Capita have set up a clinical oversight board to review any incidents. First this board did not appear to have reviewed or audited any of the near misses referred to above and second it does not include a representative from the Army. This raises concerns about the lack of joined up thinking for an incident between Capita and the army and the safety of the new process. 2. Reporting of incidents: the majority of the 12 near misses were not investigated at the time they occurred which indicates the present process is not safe and effective. 3. There is no system to audit whether incidents are being correctly processed and investigated. 4. The reporting system continues to use two parallel reporting forms for Capita (Casper) and the Army (Durals). These are on separate IT systems. This raises a concern that there is no "one version of the truth". The inquest heard evidence that Capita were unclear if they had resolved the issue in their Casper system associated with the drop down menu options and the fact that non work related incidents close investigations automatically. 5. It was unclear from the evidence whether the Recruiting Group has a clear identifiable person to take responsibility for the review health and safety incidents and to ensure adequate investigation is undertaken. Specifically it was still not clear that any oversight of the medical incidents fell within the remit of the Capita Head of Health and Safety. 6. It was unclear from the evidence whether the Recruiting Group act as one entity regarding health and safety issues with a clear lines of responsibility for global risk assessment (and promoting information gathering & investigation) of incidents of any nature. The Inquest heard evidence that ‘H&S at work’ is considered differently to any medical risk, which is supported by the lack of investigation of the near misses. Medical response: 1. Inquest heard how Lichfield had specialist medical staff on site in the medical training unit but there was no system for getting urgent medical attention on the base if needed. There was no mechanism to put a tannoy out for a medical emergency but the Inquest heard evidence that this could be done for a cake sale. 2. All the services should consider whether there should be a generic policy for the treatment of exertional collapse (of any cause) as per US Army where during training there is a clear medical plan with availability of essential medical treatment (eg oxygen and fluids) before hospitalisation. ”

    Source location

    Kamil Iddrisu and Youngson Nkhoma · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Direct incident reports to medical and health-and-safety leaders and provide them with joint investigation accountability.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Recruiting Group Clinical Oversight Board was established on 19 May 2022. Nine of the twelve identified Sickle Cell Trait related near misses occurred before this date. The Clinical Oversight Board did not examine three incidents following its establishment because, while Incident Reports were filed in all cases, they were not disseminated to key stakeholders at the time due to Incident Reports not going to functional leads such as the Chief Medical Officer and Health and Safety Manager. That has changed – the Chief Medical Officer, Deputy Chief Medical Officer and Health and Safety Executive Manager now directly receive all Incident Reports and initiate the Joint Lessons Learnt Panel process and subsequent review by the Clinical Oversight Board.”

    Source location

    2019-0416 - Response from Secretary of State for Defence and Capita
    Page 9 · response
    Published 30 December 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Blood-test candidates identified by the questionnaire as being at high risk of sickle cell trait before they undertake the 2000-metre run.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “(2) Stage 2 – Blood Test. The FOQ will identify those candidates who will need to undergo a blood test to determine if they are SCT positive or negative.⁷”

    Source location

    2019-0416-Response-by-MOD
    Page 3 · response
    Published 30 December 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Operate the Joint Lessons Learnt Panel and Learning Account process to investigate incidents, assign recommendations, disseminate learning and monitor completion.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Reporting processes have also been enhanced; any similar future incident will be investigated promptly and jointly by the medical and health and safety teams. These include automated notification of Recruiting Group’s Chief Medical Officer and Head of Health and Safety, to enable them to trigger an investigation by a newly established Joint Lessons Learnt Panel. This panel includes senior Recruiting Group and Army colleagues in operational, clinical, and health and safety leadership roles. The Panel has an enduring remit to review all reported accidents and near misses within 96 hours and make appropriate recommendations, although in practice incidents are reviewed within 48 hours. The panel also directs a suitably qualified individual or body (such as Recruiting Group’s Clinical Oversight Board) to conduct a more detailed Learning Account investigation.”

    Source location

    2019-0416 - Response from Secretary of State for Defence and Capita
    Page 3 · response
    Published 30 December 2019

    Open published response
  3. Inner South London

    AI-generated summary

    Daniel John O’Sullivan · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Daniel John O’Sullivan was found deceased on 27 March 2019 while a voluntary psychiatric patient at St Charles Hospital, after leaving the hospital unescorted and failing to return. The principal concerns were failures to update his self-harm risk assessment, formulate a care and treatment plan, document unescorted leave, and promptly notify police when he did not return. The report also raised concerns that the hospital’s serious incident investigation did not identify or investigate these issues adequately.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of Serious Incident Investigations to investigate missing records and interview relevant witnesses

    Wider context from the report

    “2) My second concern is the poor contemporaneous documentation of the grant of unescorted leave from the hospital and the time taken to alert the police when Daniel failed to return on 26/3/19 by 21:00 pm. A ward nurse eventually contacted the police after midnight. i) I am concerned that an earlier call to the police may have prevented the death, because Daniel was recorded on General Security Zone (GSZ) cameras at 22:21 leaving Vauxhall bridge, and returning, on foot at 23:48. An earlier call might have enabled police to intervene before he was able to commence the actions which ended his life. ii) The ward manager claimed in evidence that he had instructed others to call the police when Daniel failed to return at 21:00. However, this was not documented anywhere in the medical records and a leave book with handwritten entries went missing after the death. The missing leave book was not investigated by the SII. iii) A nurse who called the police, sometime before 00:30 according to the medical records, at 01:10 according to police records, was not interviewed by the SII. I found these investigative deficits troubling because the learning of lessons in patient care depends, in part, on an early SII by the hospital concerned so that risks to patient safety can be identified to enable recommendations and improvements long before an inquest conclusion. The delay in reporting the failure to return to the Ward was a factor that contributed to the dangerous situation already created by rescinding s.2. I am nonetheless concerned that, in general, psychiatric patients being tested on voluntary leave are a vulnerable group and as such failures to return should be reported with expedition not only because they may be a danger to themselves, but also due to a risk of being preyed upon by others. ”

    Source location

    Daniel John O’Sullivan · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of Serious Incident Investigations to investigate care and treatment plan deficiencies and make recommendations

    Wider context from the report

    “1) On completion of the inquest, I found the decision to rescind detention under s.2 on 25/3/19 was undermined in two essential respects: a) A failure to update a suicide self-harm risk assessment. b) A failure to formulate a Care and Treatment plan identifying core treatment needs. A Serious Incident Investigation (SII), commissioned by CNWL, completed on 9/9/2019, investigated the Risk Assessment and made recommendations which I heard from a CNWL witness had subsequently been implemented and I am satisfied that his risk to life has been satisfactorily reduced. However, I remain concerned that the Care and Treatment plan aspect was not identified by the SII and as such no recommendations were identified and followed up. The psychiatrist who rescinded s.2, on 25/3/2019, was unable to participate in the inquest through illness. As a result, I instructed an independent expert psychiatrist who gave evidence that there had been no treatment plan addressing Daniel’s core treatment needs. The core treatment needs were that Daniel required antipsychotic medication to control his delusional beliefs and psychological intervention to address his substance misuse which exacerbated his delusional beliefs. The expert also identified from statements and medical records that Daniel lacked insight into his mental health conditions and thereby lacked capacity. The treatment Daniel required was twofold. Assertive treatment of the delusional disorder with antipsychotics, whilst detained under s.2, to achieve stability, coupled with psychological therapy to address the illicit drug use. I heard evidence that antipsychotics could not commence until the results of liver function tests were available, but this did not persuade the expert, that recession of s.2 was correct. The psychiatrist who rescinded s.2 on 25/3/19 was interviewed by the SII but the care and treatment plan aspect was not explored by that investigation. My concern is that failures in the formulation of a Care and Treatment Plan made a significant contribution to the death and this failing was not exposed until the inquest when it could have been identified much earlier by the SII in September 2019. The fact that a Care and Treatment plan was not formulated gives me concern that the mistake could be repeated in future and my concern is compounded by the SII failing to investigate and make recommendations arising from this issue. ”

    Source location

    Daniel John O’Sullivan · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Accredit the serious incident review process through SIRAN, revising policies, templates and review arrangements to meet best practice.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “At the beginning of 2020, the Trust sought to incorporate best practice in its management of serious incidents, which would result in improvement and effectiveness of the process and evidenced through Accreditation. Following several months of readiness activity including auditing and self-evaluation, workshops with Divisional representatives, implementation of agreed actions, revision of templates and redrafting of our policy, we succeeded through SIRAN. At the time of the changes, the Trust also introduced a forum to support reviewers/investigators of serious incidents to enhance understanding of the Root Cause Analysis (RCA) process.”

    Source location

    Response from Central and North West London NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 6 · response
    Published 25 October 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide RCA methodology training to staff and establish a forum supporting serious-incident reviewers and investigators.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “At the beginning of 2020, the Trust sought to incorporate best practice in its management of serious incidents, which would result in improvement and effectiveness of the process and evidenced through Accreditation. Following several months of readiness activity including auditing and self-evaluation, workshops with Divisional representatives, implementation of agreed actions, revision of templates and redrafting of our policy, we succeeded through SIRAN. At the time of the changes, the Trust also introduced a forum to support reviewers/investigators of serious incidents to enhance understanding of the Root Cause Analysis (RCA) process.”

    Source location

    Response from Central and North West London NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 6 · response
    Published 25 October 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Create a dedicated serious incident review post in the incident division.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “On the specific issue of skills and competency to undertake reviews/investigations, 88 members of staff have been trained in RCA methodology in the last 2 years (since 2020). This methodology equips reviewers with the skill to probe and draw out care and service delivery problems and guides them to elicit lessons. In addition, the Division in which the incident occurred now has a dedicated serious incident review post, offering additional skills and support in this process.”

    Source location

    Response from Central and North West London NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 6 · response
    Published 25 October 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce Advanced Clinical Practitioners to support care planning, risk management and identification of Care and Treatment Plan deficiencies.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition, St Charles Mental Health Unit has recruited and trained Advanced Clinical Practitioners (ACPs). One of the roles of the ACP is to support the MDT and in particular the nursing team with specific interventions, care planning and risk management. This includes reviewing the Care and Treatment Plan and highlighting any deficiencies.”

    Source location

    Response from Central and North West London NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 25 October 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement the Patient Safety Incident Response Framework through a fortnightly working group and human-factors education incorporating learning from this case.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In August 2022, NHS England launched the Patient Safety Incident Response Framework (PSIRF), which NHS organisations are expected to implement over the next year. This new framework phases out the RCA methodology, introducing human factors and system-based approaches instead. As rolling out of human factors training had already commenced in the Trust prior to publication of the new framework, the Trust is ahead in its preparations in this regard. A working group is in place and meeting fortnightly to drive implementation of the new process. Education is a significant part of this work and training procured will take learning from this case into account.”

    Source location

    Response from Central and North West London NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 7 · response
    Published 25 October 2022

    Open published response
  4. Swansea and Neath Port Talbot

    AI-generated summary

    Robert Lee Evans · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Robert Lee Evans, a prisoner at HMP Swansea, was found deceased in his cell in the early hours of 14 January 2018 after tying a ligature around his neck, shortly after arriving at the prison and while undergoing alcohol detoxification. The concerns included inadequate assessment and monitoring of his suicide and self-harm risk, failures relating to prescribed antidepressant and detoxification medication, and failures to promptly capture evidence from prison staff witnesses after his death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to promptly capture and consider evidence relevant to deaths in custody

    Wider context from the report

    “I heard evidence from the two prison officers who appear in the HMP Swansea CCTV as mentioned above. On the evidence I have seen these witnesses were the last members of prison staff Lee spoke to before his death. At all stages into the investigation into Lee’s death (prisons and probations ombudsman and coronial) these witnesses have stated that they are unable to assist with what Lee was saying to them before his death. I am concerned that immediately following Lee’s death and the following day that these highly material witnesses (who were on duty) were not spoken to, did not attend a hot or cold debrief and were not asked to make a first account of events when matters were fresh in their minds. These witnesses did become known to the PPO. As a result, my investigation into Lee’s death has been significantly hampered. I am therefore concerned that lessons may not have been fully learnt from the circumstances of Lee’s death. I am concerned that if evidence relevant to a death in custody is not immediately captured and considered a situation may be created where evidence is lost which prevents general lessons from being learnt from a death in custody and that this creates a risk that other deaths will occur. ”

    Source location

    Robert Lee Evans · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Draft and update the death-in-custody policy framework to identify relevant staff and prompt early recording of their information.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I recognise the importance of ensuring that any evidence relating to deaths in custody is preserved, including the recollections of staff who have had recent interactions with the deceased individual. Prisons are required to have contingency plans in place that include debriefs with staff who were on the scene at the time of the incident, but these will not be the only staff to have had potentially relevant contact with the prisoner. We are currently drafting a new HMPPS Policy Framework, updating the policy for prisons to follow in the event of a death in custody, and within this will include guidance for prisons to ensure that staff who have relevant information are identified and prompted to make a record of this at an early stage.”

    Source location

    Response from HM Prision and Probabtion Services
    Page 2 · response
    Published 20 October 2022

    Open published response
  5. Avon

    AI-generated summary

    Mr George Michael ELLIOTT · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr George Michael Elliott was an 81-year-old inpatient receiving investigation and treatment for an underlying cardiac condition when he fell in hospital on 4 September 2021 and suffered a fatal brain injury, dying on 9 September 2021. The principal concern was that the Patient Safety Investigation overlooked obvious failings in his falls risk assessment and management, including failures to reassess and communicate his risk, thereby missing important patient-safety learning opportunities.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the patient safety investigation to identify omitted falls risk reassessments

    Wider context from the report

    “My concerns are about the quality (or otherwise) of the Patient Safety Investigation (“PSI”) which took place after Mr ELLIOTT’s death. In Mr ELLIOTT’s case the investigation (and accompanying report) overlooked obvious failings in his care. As a result important learning opportunities (and therefore important opportunities to improve patient safety in the future) were also missed. I am concerned that if this investigation (and report) is in any way representative of the quality and rigour of such investigations within the Trust, then the Trust may be missing vital opportunities to learn from its mistakes, and to make its patients (now and in the future) safer as a result of that learning. To give a little more detail: • The stated remit of the Patient Safety Investigation was to “review the care episode… [and] to understand the events and identify opportunities to learn and to improve patient safety” (see page 4 of the resulting report) • Given that this was a case where a patient suffered a fatal injury as the result of an inpatient fall, one of the first and most obvious points to investigate would have been the adequacy (or otherwise) of his falls risk assessment/s, and the extent of the nursing staff’s compliance with any relevant Trust protocols / procedures • Notwithstanding that background, the PSI report failed to identify the (very obvious) fact that although a falls risk assessment had been performed, it had not been performed properly • There were also numerous other failings in the approach that had been taken to the assessment of Mr ELLIOTT’s falls risk, and/or the way that risk had been managed while he was an inpatient, but none of these were identified by the PSI / present in the report. • For example: - Para.6.13 of the Trust’s then-current Falls Prevention Policy stipulates that Mr ELLIOTT’s family should have been made aware of the outcome of his falls risk assessment. That did not happen, but the fact that it did not happen is not mentioned in the PSI report. - There is no indication that Mr ELLIOTT’s falls risk was ever re-assessed (after 30 August 2021). According to the Trust’s policy it should have been reassessed after he moved to the Cardiology ward, and again after his fall on 4 September, but no such reassessment took place, and the PSI report makes no mention of these oversights/omissions. - After Mr ELLIOTT’s fall on 4 September, he continues to be described as at “low risk” of falls in the Daily Intentional Rounding documentation within his medical records. This is an alarming error, but one which has been overlooked entirely by the PSI report. • I asked Nurse ████████ (one of the PSI-report authors, who gave evidence at the inquest) about the fact that none of these errors had been identified in the report and she had no explanation for why that was the case. As stated above, if PSI reports overlook clear / obvious failings, then learning opportunities are missed, patient safety is compromised, and there is a risk of future deaths. ”

    Source location

    Mr George Michael ELLIOTT · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct a gap analysis against the final national PSIRF guidance to ensure full alignment.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In August this year, the final PSIRF documentation was published by NHS England, with all NHS Trusts now transitioning to PSIRF. We in NBT are using the newly published documentation to conduct a gap analysis about the end-state framework documentation. The core reason for the gap analysis is to ensure that, as an early adopter, we are now working in full alignment with the final guidelines that other (non-early adopter) organisations are starting to transition to. This is a process being adopted by all other early adopters.”

    Source location

    Response from North Bristol NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 10 October 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review investigation progress, timelines and rigour through the central Patient Safety Team, escalating concerns where necessary.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “At NBT we have developed and are implementing a process in which the central Patient Safety Team routinely review the progress of investigations. This process focuses on the timelines, but also the rigour being applied to the actual investigation process. Any concerns and feedback will be communicated with the respective Division and, where necessary, escalated to the Chief”

    Source location

    Response from North Bristol NHS Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 10 October 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Reassess investigation support structures and capacity, including considering new posts dedicated to patient safety investigations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Over the past 4 years, the governance teams within our divisions have undergone significant investment, part of which has been to ensure governance teams are better resourced to support and undertake investigations in relation to patient safety incidents. To continue to strengthen our approach, we are also reassessing our approach to how we support detailed, high-quality investigations, and considering establishing new posts that focus entirely on investigations. This is in line with the recently published national PSIRF guidelines.”

    Source location

    Response from North Bristol NHS Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 10 October 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Report gap-analysis findings and associated system or process improvements to the Patient Safety and Quality Committees.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As noted above, we accept that the George Elliott investigation missed some key elements, but do not consider this is reflective of the standard of our Patient Safety Incident Investigations at the Trust. We are presently conducting a gap analysis using the recently published PSIRF national guidance. As part of this, we are re-focusing on how we support expert investigations being conducted by scoping the structure and capacity within our central and divisional teams.”

    Source location

    Response from North Bristol NHS Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 10 October 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The shortcomings in this investigation are not representative of the Trust’s usual patient safety investigation standards or processes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Regulation 28 raised concerns about the quality of the investigation report and supporting process following Mr Elliot’s fall in hospital. Furthermore, it raised concerns that if this report were representative of the wider quality of such reports it may indicate that North Bristol NHS Trust may miss opportunities to learn, which may contribute to further deaths.”

    Source location

    Response from North Bristol NHS Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 10 October 2022

    Open published response
  6. Worcestershire

    AI-generated summary

    Mr Peter Antony Joseph Pearson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr Peter Antony Joseph Pearson died at Worcester Royal Hospital on 6 December 2021 from aspiration pneumonia, which was in all probability acquired while he was resident at Corbett House Nursing Home. Concerns included a delay in calling an ambulance despite his critical condition, incomplete nursing and medication records, failures in oral-cavity checks, shortcomings in management oversight, and an ineffective investigation into his death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Ineffective investigation of resident deaths

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) It is accepted on behalf of the Home that there was an “ineffective investigation” into Mr Pearson’s death by the Home. Responsibility for that cannot not solely be attributed to the former Registered Manager. ”

    Source location

    Mr Peter Antony Joseph Pearson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  7. West Yorkshire Eastern

    AI-generated summary

    John Francis Heffron · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    John Francis Heffron, a 50-year-old wheelchair user, was found confused in his flat and later suffered a cardiac arrest while alone in an A&E cubicle. There was a delay in initiating CPR, including delays in making a crash call and ascertaining his DNAR status; he was resuscitated but sustained a hypoxic brain injury and died in hospital. The concerns included bank and agency nursing staff’s familiarity with emergency procedures, training and induction, and the adequacy and independence of the Trust’s investigation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to obtain timely and adequate evidence during serious incident investigations

    Wider context from the report

    “(7) The Trust saw the need to initiate a “Serious Incident Investigation” but allocated this work to a person (i) present in the ED at the time of the incident, and thus not independent of the events being examined (ii) who had not been trained in such investigations save for a one-day course some five years previously and had never undertaken one of this nature before (iii) who spoke to the staff involved during the shift on the night of the incident, only when time permitted, alongside their other work. No written statements were obtained. In consequence, the precise chronology of events is unclear (iv) no context was provided which may have enabled an assessment of the workload or staffing levels in the ED at the material time For these reasons the inquest felt unable to rely upon the conclusions reached in the Serious Incident Investigation Report ”

    Source location

    John Francis Heffron · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to assess workload and staffing levels in serious incident investigations

    Wider context from the report

    “(7) The Trust saw the need to initiate a “Serious Incident Investigation” but allocated this work to a person (i) present in the ED at the time of the incident, and thus not independent of the events being examined (ii) who had not been trained in such investigations save for a one-day course some five years previously and had never undertaken one of this nature before (iii) who spoke to the staff involved during the shift on the night of the incident, only when time permitted, alongside their other work. No written statements were obtained. In consequence, the precise chronology of events is unclear (iv) no context was provided which may have enabled an assessment of the workload or staffing levels in the ED at the material time For these reasons the inquest felt unable to rely upon the conclusions reached in the Serious Incident Investigation Report ”

    Source location

    John Francis Heffron · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure serious incident investigations are conducted by suitably trained and experienced investigators

    Wider context from the report

    “(7) The Trust saw the need to initiate a “Serious Incident Investigation” but allocated this work to a person (i) present in the ED at the time of the incident, and thus not independent of the events being examined (ii) who had not been trained in such investigations save for a one-day course some five years previously and had never undertaken one of this nature before (iii) who spoke to the staff involved during the shift on the night of the incident, only when time permitted, alongside their other work. No written statements were obtained. In consequence, the precise chronology of events is unclear (iv) no context was provided which may have enabled an assessment of the workload or staffing levels in the ED at the material time For these reasons the inquest felt unable to rely upon the conclusions reached in the Serious Incident Investigation Report ”

    Source location

    John Francis Heffron · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure serious incident investigations are conducted independently

    Wider context from the report

    “(7) The Trust saw the need to initiate a “Serious Incident Investigation” but allocated this work to a person (i) present in the ED at the time of the incident, and thus not independent of the events being examined (ii) who had not been trained in such investigations save for a one-day course some five years previously and had never undertaken one of this nature before (iii) who spoke to the staff involved during the shift on the night of the incident, only when time permitted, alongside their other work. No written statements were obtained. In consequence, the precise chronology of events is unclear (iv) no context was provided which may have enabled an assessment of the workload or staffing levels in the ED at the material time For these reasons the inquest felt unable to rely upon the conclusions reached in the Serious Incident Investigation Report ”

    Source location

    John Francis Heffron · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide the Emergency Department senior nursing team with a memory-capture tool to promote prompt, consistent incident recording and formalise evidence gathering.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In relation to your observations regarding the chronology of events it is noted that the incident summary in the investigation report does contain an outline chronology of events. It is acknowledged that it would have been helpful if this had contained more detail in regard to the time of the doctor’s attendance and if the report had been supported by notes of discussion with relevant staff. The Trust’s Investigation Procedure includes a range of tools and templates to assist staff when conducting investigations and whilst use of these is actively encouraged, it is not mandated. In response to the specific concerns raised about the investigation of this incident, the Trust has provided the ED senior nursing team with a memory capture tool to promote prompt and consistent recording of staff involvement in incidents and to formalise the evidence gathering stage of the investigation.”

    Source location

    Response from The Leeds Teaching Hospital
    Page 5 · response
    Published 3 October 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Train staff conducting Patient Safety Incident Response Framework reviews, with ongoing support and updating sessions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “You will be aware from previous discussions that the Trust has been a pilot site for the new Patient Safety Incident Response Framework (PSIRF) which will replace the current Serious Incident Framework. It represents a significant shift in the way the NHS responds to patient safety incidents. The PSIRF promotes a range of system-based approaches for learning from patient safety incidents and national tools and guides have been produced to support this.”

    Source location

    Response from The Leeds Teaching Hospital
    Page 5 · response
    Published 3 October 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver bespoke Patient Safety Incident Response Framework documentation sessions for Urgent Care senior staff with the Risk Management team.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As a pilot site the Trust has had the opportunity to trial the new approaches and better understand the training requirements that will need to be delivered. All Trust staff charged with undertaking reviews under the new framework will receive training in how to conduct and record them. Support and advice, and regular updating sessions, will also be provided. The Urgent Care CSU has planned some bespoke sessions for their senior staff with the Trust’s Risk Management team to complete training in relation to the new investigation documentation. This will help ensure that learning from incidents is maximised and documentation is completed to a high standard.”

    Source location

    Response from The Leeds Teaching Hospital
    Page 5 · response
    Published 3 October 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Trust disputes that CPR was delayed for 15 minutes, stating that it began within 30 to 60 seconds of the patient being found.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “(1) The Trust acknowledges that there was a delay in CPR being commenced after the patient had been found in an unresponsive condition and there were discrepancies in the evidence for the inquest about timings. However, the senior sister stands by the account that she gave in court i.e., that she had been contacted at 01.15am, after the doctor had been approached, and that she attended immediately after the call to her, by which time CPR was being undertaken. In her statement for the inquest, she explained that her discussions with the relevant team members afterwards indicated that CPR had been started within 30 to 60 seconds of the patient being found. The Trust understands that it was Dr Binbay’s recollection that she had been contacted at 01.30am however this was not supported by other staff members.”

    Source location

    Response from The Leeds Teaching Hospital
    Page 2 · response
    Published 3 October 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    A fully independent investigation was not required because the incident was locally investigated under procedures reserving complete independence for serious incidents.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “(7) The investigation into the care provided to this patient was not a Serious Incident (level 3) within the terms of NHSE’s Serious Incident Framework. Within the Trust there is a grading process to decide which incidents will be fully investigated. There are three main considerations when making this decision:”

    Source location

    Response from The Leeds Teaching Hospital
    Page 4 · response
    Published 3 October 2022

    Open published response
  8. Avon

    AI-generated summary

    Mr Gerwyn John REES · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr Gerwyn John REES, who was elderly and frail, was admitted to hospital after experiencing falls and was assessed as requiring low-risk enhanced care observations. He fell twice on 29 November 2020, fracturing his hip, and later died in January 2021 following surgery, as a result of general frailty and the hip injury. The principal concerns were the initial low-risk falls assessment, inadequate steps to prevent the fall, and an apparent lack of learning and investigative rigour following his death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of rigour in RCA investigations of ECO-related incidents

    Wider context from the report

    “• I find it very difficult to see how Mr REES could properly have been allocated to level 2 ECO observations (“low risk”) at the time of his initial falls risk assessment on 29 November 2020 • However, notwithstanding that initial concern on my part, I am more concerned by the apparent absence of learning following Mr REES’s death • The Trust’s Root Cause Analysis (‘RCA’) investigation/report (co-authored by ████████ a Matron / Senior Nurse) does not identify any issue or concern in respect of that initial allocation to ECO level 2 • Further – during the inquest – when I questioned the nurse who had approved the initial “Level 2” allocation on Ward A413 ████████ she initially maintained that ECO Level 2 was appropriate for Mr REES at that time, before later conceding to me that he should have been allocated to Level 3 observations from the outset and that ECO Level 2 was not an appropriate categorisation for him at the time of his initial falls risk assessment • When I then questioned ████████ (RCA co-author) about this same point, she too initially gave evidence that ECO Level 2 was a reasonable categorisation for Mr REES during the initial falls risk assessment, applying “clinical judgement” (albeit that she later accepted – I think – that it had not been an appropriate categorisation at that time) • I struggle to see how, as a senior nurse with responsibility for investigating an incident such as this and disseminating learning as a result of it, Nurse ████████ can have suggested to me that ECO 2 was ever appropriate for Mr REES • The lack of criticism of Mr REES’s initial risk allocation to ECO level 2 in the RCA report, coupled with these aspects of the live evidence of Nurse ████████ and Matron ████████ (see above) suggest to me that there was a lack of investigative rigour in the RCA reporting process, and/or that the ECO Policy was (and is) not properly understood by the staff involved in authoring the RCA, or in implementing the policy • Whilst it is relatively commonplace to see circumstances in which policies or standard operating procedures have not been properly understood or implemented on a ward, in real time, it is more concerning still to see circumstances such as these; in which even after the Trust’s investigation and learning process have been completed there does not appear to be an appreciation of where mistakes have been made: this of course means that there has been a missed opportunity to learn from the death in question • For completeness, I do not think that I am wrong in my interpretation of the ECO Policy, but if I am, and if – following that policy properly – a patient with a background such as Mr REES could properly be described as at “low risk” and requiring only the protection that is afforded by ECO level 2, then I would be very concerned that the policy itself was not fit for purpose, or safe. ”

    Source location

    Mr Gerwyn John REES · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement the agreed and funded patient-safety investigation model, including a central team of expert investigators and a human-factors specialist.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Unfortunately, pace was impeded by the Covid-19 pandemic and the need to prioritise clinical service provision however in the past 12 months practical preparations have taken off to enable transfer to the new framework by June 2023. A number of changes have already been made which are relevant to this response with more currently underway and planned which are summarised below.”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospital Bristol and Weston
    Page 3 · response
    Published 30 September 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Complete level 3 patient-safety investigation training for seven relevant staff members.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Seven members of staff working in patient safety roles in UHBW have undertaken the new level 3 investigation training made available by the Healthcare Safety Investigation Branch (HSIB) in early 2022 (or possess a recognised Masters level”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospital Bristol and Weston
    Page 3 · response
    Published 30 September 2022

    Open published response
  9. Nottinghamshire

    AI-generated summary

    Jade Michelle Hart · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jade Michelle Hart died on 9 July 2018 after giving birth, following a uterine inversion caused by inappropriate management of the third stage of labour. She suffered massive uterine haemorrhage and multiple cardiac arrests, with delayed recognition and management of the bleeding, and the inquest concluded that her death was contributed to by neglect. The report raised concerns about the Trust’s serious incident investigation and insufficient support for newly appointed obstetric consultants.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to obtain timely written accounts and interviews from key staff in serious incident investigations

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The conduct of the Trust Serious Incident Investigation – there are outstanding concerns regarding the methodology, findings and conclusions in this case. The Investigation in my view was flawed in a number of serious ways as follows: • It was undertaken without including, nor giving due weight to, the family evidence, in the analysis and conclusions of the report • It was undertaken without any immediate written accounts taken of what had happened, and very limited and delayed interviews of key staff involved • The Trust commissioned an expert to assist with the Investigation. This was provided by a well respected Royal College of Obstetrics and Gynaecology recommended expert, and was then ignored, simply because there were aspects of the expert report that the Trust did not accept. All of these omissions in the Investigation process, led to serious omissions in the analysis, conclusions, recommendations and actions that followed in the report, in my view. Also, the Trust, on the evidence of Dr ████████, Executive Medical Director, likely did not share with either the CCG or the CQC, the fact that they had received a detailed, but critical, expert report, that they had not included, nor referred to in the final Investigation report. At the Hearing, there was no reflection on this latter issue by senior Trust staff, no acceptance that the inadequacies of the report had caused huge distress to the family, and more importantly insufficient learning. If there is insufficient learning from a tragic and avoidable death such as this, what reassurance is there that there will be sufficient learning by the Trust in the future. In my view this poses a continuing risk of similar deaths occurring in the future if the Investigation process does not change. ”

    Source location

    Jade Michelle Hart · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to include and properly weight family evidence in serious incident investigations

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The conduct of the Trust Serious Incident Investigation – there are outstanding concerns regarding the methodology, findings and conclusions in this case. The Investigation in my view was flawed in a number of serious ways as follows: • It was undertaken without including, nor giving due weight to, the family evidence, in the analysis and conclusions of the report • It was undertaken without any immediate written accounts taken of what had happened, and very limited and delayed interviews of key staff involved • The Trust commissioned an expert to assist with the Investigation. This was provided by a well respected Royal College of Obstetrics and Gynaecology recommended expert, and was then ignored, simply because there were aspects of the expert report that the Trust did not accept. All of these omissions in the Investigation process, led to serious omissions in the analysis, conclusions, recommendations and actions that followed in the report, in my view. Also, the Trust, on the evidence of Dr ████████, Executive Medical Director, likely did not share with either the CCG or the CQC, the fact that they had received a detailed, but critical, expert report, that they had not included, nor referred to in the final Investigation report. At the Hearing, there was no reflection on this latter issue by senior Trust staff, no acceptance that the inadequacies of the report had caused huge distress to the family, and more importantly insufficient learning. If there is insufficient learning from a tragic and avoidable death such as this, what reassurance is there that there will be sufficient learning by the Trust in the future. In my view this poses a continuing risk of similar deaths occurring in the future if the Investigation process does not change. ”

    Source location

    Jade Michelle Hart · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Insufficient organisational learning from serious incident investigations

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The conduct of the Trust Serious Incident Investigation – there are outstanding concerns regarding the methodology, findings and conclusions in this case. The Investigation in my view was flawed in a number of serious ways as follows: • It was undertaken without including, nor giving due weight to, the family evidence, in the analysis and conclusions of the report • It was undertaken without any immediate written accounts taken of what had happened, and very limited and delayed interviews of key staff involved • The Trust commissioned an expert to assist with the Investigation. This was provided by a well respected Royal College of Obstetrics and Gynaecology recommended expert, and was then ignored, simply because there were aspects of the expert report that the Trust did not accept. All of these omissions in the Investigation process, led to serious omissions in the analysis, conclusions, recommendations and actions that followed in the report, in my view. Also, the Trust, on the evidence of Dr ████████, Executive Medical Director, likely did not share with either the CCG or the CQC, the fact that they had received a detailed, but critical, expert report, that they had not included, nor referred to in the final Investigation report. At the Hearing, there was no reflection on this latter issue by senior Trust staff, no acceptance that the inadequacies of the report had caused huge distress to the family, and more importantly insufficient learning. If there is insufficient learning from a tragic and avoidable death such as this, what reassurance is there that there will be sufficient learning by the Trust in the future. In my view this poses a continuing risk of similar deaths occurring in the future if the Investigation process does not change. ”

    Source location

    Jade Michelle Hart · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to properly consider commissioned expert evidence in serious incident investigations

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The conduct of the Trust Serious Incident Investigation – there are outstanding concerns regarding the methodology, findings and conclusions in this case. The Investigation in my view was flawed in a number of serious ways as follows: • It was undertaken without including, nor giving due weight to, the family evidence, in the analysis and conclusions of the report • It was undertaken without any immediate written accounts taken of what had happened, and very limited and delayed interviews of key staff involved • The Trust commissioned an expert to assist with the Investigation. This was provided by a well respected Royal College of Obstetrics and Gynaecology recommended expert, and was then ignored, simply because there were aspects of the expert report that the Trust did not accept. All of these omissions in the Investigation process, led to serious omissions in the analysis, conclusions, recommendations and actions that followed in the report, in my view. Also, the Trust, on the evidence of Dr ████████, Executive Medical Director, likely did not share with either the CCG or the CQC, the fact that they had received a detailed, but critical, expert report, that they had not included, nor referred to in the final Investigation report. At the Hearing, there was no reflection on this latter issue by senior Trust staff, no acceptance that the inadequacies of the report had caused huge distress to the family, and more importantly insufficient learning. If there is insufficient learning from a tragic and avoidable death such as this, what reassurance is there that there will be sufficient learning by the Trust in the future. In my view this poses a continuing risk of similar deaths occurring in the future if the Investigation process does not change. ”

    Source location

    Jade Michelle Hart · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use a memory-capture document in DATIX alongside immediate interviews and written statements, and reinforce its use across teams.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Furthermore, the Trust recognises how vital it is to document factual accounts of events at the earliest opportunity and that this should be done without delay. When an incident occurs within the organisation, this is immediately scoped which includes requesting a recollection of the event from all staff involved in the incident. To support this process, a memory capture document (please see attached) was developed and is accessible on the Trust’s Incident Reporting System (DATIX) for ease of access and is utilised in addition to undertaking initial interviews and obtaining factual accounts in the form of written statements.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS Doncaster and Bassetlaw Teaching Hospitals
    Page 3 · response
    Published 28 September 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Involve families directly in investigations and include their recollections and concerns, with supporting evidence, in reports.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• we now involve families more directly and incorporate comments from families within investigation reports. A family’s recollection of events along with the clinicians’ recollection of events are both included to enable the author to draw reasonable conclusions based on the available evidence. Recollections may differ and reports will display these differences, balance any supportive evidence, and draw conclusions over the most likely description of events. There is expected to be evidence included to support the rationale for the conclusion.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS Doncaster and Bassetlaw Teaching Hospitals
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 September 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Reference commissioned expert opinions in investigation reports and record reasons when an opinion is not reconciled with the evidence.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As noted above, where an expert opinion is sought for the purposes of a Serious Investigation, it will now always be referenced within the report. Where the authors of the investigation report determine that the expert opinion provided cannot be reconciled with the evidence obtained through interviews and within statements, then the rationale for that determination will be included within the report.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS Doncaster and Bassetlaw Teaching Hospitals
    Page 5 · response
    Published 28 September 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    HSIB could not support the requested investigation because its northern branch had not yet been established and operations were limited to southern England.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I can assure you that incidents of this kind are no longer investigated by the Trust and are now escalated to the Healthcare Safety Investigation Branch (HSIB) to carry out the investigation. As stated in the evidence provided in the inquest by ████████, Executive Medical Director, the Trust did approach HSIB shortly after the incident to request their involvement. However, they were unable to support us at that time, as their northern branch had not been established and they were only operating in the South of England.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS Doncaster and Bassetlaw Teaching Hospitals
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 September 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The external expert opinion was not relied upon because it conflicted with subsequently gathered evidence and was considered less informed than staff accounts.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust took the decision to seek an early external opinion for this case to ensure the investigation was both robust and comprehensive. We initially approached the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists to ask them to conduct a review. They declined to do so, but were able to suggest the names of people who could assist and review the case, including ████████. We therefore approached ████████ who was provided with copies of the clinical records. We are mindful that clinical opinions can vary significantly, however the conclusion of ████████ report was at odds with the emerging evidence that we were subsequently gathering through the interviews and statements of”

    Source location

    Response from NHS Doncaster and Bassetlaw Teaching Hospitals
    Page 3 · response
    Published 28 September 2022

    Open published response
  10. East London

    AI-generated summary

    Mr Graham Edgar White · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr Graham Edgar White was treated for a ureteric stone in November 2019 with an antegrade ureteric stent intended for temporary use. The stent remained in place for 20 months despite deterioration observed on multiple occasions, and was removed after he developed a urinary tract infection and right perinephric abscess. He developed sepsis and died in hospital on 18 August 2021. Concerns included the absence of a stent registry for monitoring and recall, uncertainty about other patients at risk, and delayed identification of the death as a serious incident.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to identify and escalate deaths through governance procedures as serious incidents for investigation

    Wider context from the report

    “3. The Trust did not successfully identify and escalate this death through its governance procedures as a serious incident for investigation until the issue was raised by the Coroner. ”

    Source location

    Mr Graham Edgar White · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review governance procedures for detecting potential incidents and emphasise internal incident reporting within clinical divisions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In respect of the Coroner’s concern around the Trust’s delay in identifying this as a serious incident for investigation, whilst a serious incident report was completed, which has resulted in key actions and recommendations described above, that process should have commenced at an earlier stage and in accordance with the BHRUT’s own governance procedures. BHRUT has reviewed its governance procedures for the detection of potential incidents and via the Quality and Safety Team, the need to internally report incidents has been emphasised within the Divisions. In addition, BHRUT has introduced incident reporting of all new inquests to formalise divisional review, with the aim of capturing any incidents that may not have been incident reported prior to the opening of an inquest.”

    Source location

    Response from Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals
    Page 2 · response
    Published 27 September 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce incident reporting for all new inquests to formalise divisional review and identify previously unreported incidents.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In respect of the Coroner’s concern around the Trust’s delay in identifying this as a serious incident for investigation, whilst a serious incident report was completed, which has resulted in key actions and recommendations described above, that process should have commenced at an earlier stage and in accordance with the BHRUT’s own governance procedures. BHRUT has reviewed its governance procedures for the detection of potential incidents and via the Quality and Safety Team, the need to internally report incidents has been emphasised within the Divisions. In addition, BHRUT has introduced incident reporting of all new inquests to formalise divisional review, with the aim of capturing any incidents that may not have been incident reported prior to the opening of an inquest.”

    Source location

    Response from Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals
    Page 2 · response
    Published 27 September 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delayed stent removal should largely be addressed through individual NHS trust clinical governance systems, led by trust medical directors.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Importantly, we feel that clarity is needed with regard to “ownership” of the delayed stent removal issue, in particular as to which parts of the NHS should be taking a lead going forward. As an example of this, we feel that a large part of the issue is fundamentally one that should sit within individual trust clinical governance systems and yet there are no recommendations for action by trust medical directors in the HSIB report.”

    Source location

    Response from BAUS HSIB
    Page 6 · response
    Published 27 September 2022

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026