Recurring concern

Inadequate safety incident investigations

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First reported 13 Dec 2008•Latest report 25 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes initiation, evidence gathering, witness testing, factual accuracy, analysis, timeliness, investigator competence and reporting within investigations of deaths, serious incidents and patient, resident or operational safety events.

Not included

  • Police, conduct, regulatory or other investigations not directed at organisational safety learning
  • Failure to implement an unrelated safety action not arising from an incident investigation
  • Generic governance failures not directly affecting a safety incident investigation or its learning process
  • Excludes downstream dissemination, learning and corrective-action controls once the investigation findings have been established.
Reports
244

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
316

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2008–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
447

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care31
Care Quality Commission21
NHS England20
Betsi Cadwaladr University LHB11
Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust10
Barts Health NHS Trust8
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust8
Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust7
Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust6
Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust5
Tameside and Glossop Integrated Care NHS Foundation Trust5
Tees, Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust5
Health and Safety Executive4
Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency4
NHS Greater Manchester Integrated Care Board4

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Norfolk

    AI-generated summary

    Ben Buster KING · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Ben Buster KING was detained under the Mental Health Act at Jeesal Cawston Park and died in hospital on 29 July 2020 after becoming unwell following respiratory problems and receiving sedative medication. The inquest identified concerns including failure to diagnose obesity hypoventilation syndrome, inadequate consideration of promethazine, failure to recognise the seriousness of a life-threatening situation, and wider care, observation, record-keeping and hospital communication issues.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of internal investigations to capture identified care concerns

    Wider context from the report

    “9. The internal investigation carried out following Mr Ben King’s death did not capture the concerns raised at inquest 10. Evidence was heard that no substantive changes have been made at the residential homes owned by JHL and JRCSL following the death of Ben King and the closure of JCP to deal with these concerns ”

    Source location

    Ben Buster KING · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The internal investigation was suspended because continuing it could compromise the police investigation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “11. The coroner is correct the investigation did not capture the concerns raised in the inquest. However, the investigation was halted due to the matter becoming a Police Investigation and as such common practice is any internal investigation is suspended to ensure it does not compromise the Police enquiry. I am satisfied that if we had been allowed to proceed all of the issues would have been identified by the investigating officers.”

    Source location

    2021-0250-Response-from-Jeesal-Residential-Care-Services_Published
    Page 4 · response
    Published 23 July 2021

    Open published response
  2. North Wales (East and Central)

    AI-generated summary

    Rhian Margaret Roberts · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Rhian Margaret Roberts was admitted to hospital after being found unresponsive at home following a presumed overdose, with extremely high paracetamol levels identified on admission. ICU clinicians did not become aware of the results until the early hours of the following morning, and she died on 25 November 2020. Concerns included uncertainty about whether a requested toxicology screen was undertaken, delays in approving an updated procedure for communicating life-threatening blood results, and delays in investigating incidents, sharing learning and implementing actions.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in investigating adverse incidents

    Wider context from the report

    “3. I am concerned that the continual delays in investigating adverse incidents, sharing learning and implementing actions following the same, create risks to patient safety. ”

    Source location

    Rhian Margaret Roberts · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Operate a new serious-incident process with daily review, executive oversight, rapid learning escalation, appointed investigators and senior reviewers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A new process to support the services to deliver timely investigations was commenced in April 2021. This process will improve performance and ensure investigations are robust, proportionate and timely.”

    Source location

    2021-0242-Betsi-Cadwaladr-University-Health-Board_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 July 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require timely completion and weekly governance tracking of investigations, with advance approval for extensions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Depending on the complexity of the incident, investigations are required to be completed within 25 to 45 working days. Any extensions must be requested in advance from the Associate Director of Quality Assurance. The progress of the investigation is tracked via a weekly governance report that is scrutinised in directorate weekly governance meetings.”

    Source location

    2021-0242-Betsi-Cadwaladr-University-Health-Board_Published
    Page 3 · response
    Published 15 July 2021

    Open published response
  3. West Yorkshire (Western)

    AI-generated summary

    Susan Margaret ROBERTS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Susan Roberts died at Bradford Royal Infirmary on 15 July 2019 after being admitted two days earlier with necrotising fasciitis, without an appreciation of the diagnosis or need for surgical intervention. The concerns included ineffective handover between surgical specialties, the absence of a formal protocol, and lack of engagement by plastic surgeons during the incident and subsequent investigation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of Plastic Surgeons to attend round-table analysis during SI investigations

    Wider context from the report

    “2. That when asked for help at the time and during the investigation, there seems to have been a lack of engagement from the Plastic Surgeons. They failed to join the Orthopaedic Registrar in theatre at the time of the incident and then failed to attend the round table analysis as part of the SI investigation. ”

    Source location

    Susan Margaret ROBERTS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Revise the Serious Incident Reporting and Investigating policy to require crucial staff to attend multidisciplinary round-table discussions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is not acceptable for a team to fail to attend when requested to participate in a formal investigation of a patient safety incident. The Trust has an Incident Reporting and Investigation Policy which makes clear its commitment to patient safety and improving the quality of care that it provides, developing a just culture and encouraging staff to be willing to admit mistakes without fear of punitive measures. Staff are therefore actively encouraged and are supported to be open and honest about events and issues that have or could pose a risk to patient safety. It is the Trust’s expectation that all staff participate in and support the investigation into a patient safety incident that they were either directly involved in or could provide insight into why such an event has occurred.”

    Source location

    2021-0195-Response-from-Bradford-Teaching-Hospitals_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 June 2021

    Open published response
  4. Norfolk

    AI-generated summary

    Peggy COPEMAN · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mrs Peggy Copeman became unresponsive and was declared dead at the scene while being transported by ambulance on the M11. Concerns included delayed recognition of her deterioration, delay in calling emergency services, ineffective CPR because of her position, and inadequate CPR training among the transporting staff.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of internal investigation to identify concerns about emergency response and CPR safety

    Wider context from the report

    “1. PRAS Response Policy provides that staff escorting patients “are to be fully trained in Basic Life Support (BLS) and are deemed to be competent to apply the techniques when needed. Staff can notice any changes or deteriorating patients and act appropriately in line with BLS training. Starting with Primary assessments followed by secondary assessment then commencing CardioPulmonary Resuscitation (CPR) while waiting for ambulance to arrive ... “ 2. The evidence so far is that during transit, Peggy did not respond when being called or when moving her head and on being noted as being unresponsive, emergency services were not called immediately but calls were initially made to Cygnet and then PRAS. CPR was started on being told to do so by emergency services 3. On attendance by Paramedics it was noted that due to the position of the patient in the back of the van, CPR was ineffective 4. A report has been obtained from a Consultant Cardiologist and General Physician as an expert witness who is of the firm view that the staff transporting Mrs Copeman did not recognise she was in respiratory distress and/or cardiac arrest and that she had effectively died whilst sat between them 5. Only one member of staff out of three had training in CPR 6. An internal investigation (undated) carried out shortly after the incident did not raise concern about these matters 7. A statement provided by the Compliance Manager, PRAS, dated 7 May 2021 concludes that “the ambulance was adequately staffed to enable the journey to be safely carried out”, despite only one member of staff being trained in CPR contrary to PRAS’s own Conveyance Policy ”

    Source location

    Peggy COPEMAN · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Revise and immediately implement the internal investigation procedure, assigning interim investigations to a fully trained State Registered Nurse.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “4. Premier Rescue Ambulance Service Ltd., merely observe that the request to transfer Peggy Copeman was received late in the afternoon of the 15th December with a request to transfer her on the morning of the 16th December. Accepting instructions such as this in such a short timeframe has been identified by the Company as a weakness in procedures which led to two untrained staff accompanying one trained member of staff.”

    Source location

    2021-0182-Response-from-Premier-Rescue-Ambulance-Service-Ltd_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 2 June 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Investigate the possibility of appointing a qualified independent assessor for future internal investigations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “5. The Company regret their initial investigation did not highlight ████████ ████████ or ████████ as not having CPR training. They have now revised their internal investigation procedure and they are now investigating the possibility of a qualified independent assessor carrying out such a role in the future should the need arise. In the meantime, any internal investigation pending such an appointment will be carried out by”

    Source location

    2021-0182-Response-from-Premier-Rescue-Ambulance-Service-Ltd_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 2 June 2021

    Open published response
  5. Manchester West

    AI-generated summary

    KENNETH SMITH · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Kenneth Smith, who had cognitive impairment and was at high risk of falls, died on 9 November 2020 after falling at a care home and developing acute-on-chronic subdural haematomas. The report raised concerns about reducing his supervision, failing to set a review date, inadequate escalation of care after further falls, and insufficient consideration of medication and mental-health factors in assessing his falls risk.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to trigger serious or untoward incident review following repeated falls

    Wider context from the report

    “After a proposed re-assessment of the falls risk posed by the deceased on the 22nd of October 2020 the 14-day period expired on the 22nd and 29th of October established that the deceased was to suffer 6 falls between the 22nd and 29th of October 2020. Two of these falls took place on the 22nd of October 2020 – the same date of the reduction in the level of care being offered. The evidence from the care home indicated that there was no date that had been given for a future review. It was also accepted that there was no action taken to consider whether any fall or falls resulted in the Accident Record including no action taken on the 29th of October 2020 when the deceased suffered two falls, resulting in tears and a head injury. Additionally, the evidence established that on release from hospital to the care home on the 6th of October 2020, the discharge clinicians had stopped the prescription of Trazodone due to its known sedative qualities. There was no evidence of this (as part of the falls risk assessment) being taken into account by carers adequately, or at all. Care staff had only escalated concerns over the deceased's progressive agitation to a general practitioner on 30th of October 2020. This had resulted in a referral to the Older Persons' Mental Health Team. There was no evidence as to why further advice from a mental health practitioner was not sought earlier, or as part of the risk assessment on the 22nd of October 2020. The nature and quality of the care received by the deceased between the 22nd and 31st of October 2020 reveal the following concerns: 1. The decision to reduce the level of supervision was suboptimal, incorrect and unlawful. 2. The failure to consider and specify a review date; 3. The lack of appropriate scaling up of care to meet identified problems or issues with the reduced level of care, with no prompt to act on urgent review. 4. Care plan guidance, whilst not triggered, was serious or untoward incidents review by the care home, the CCG, or local authority; ”

    Source location

    KENNETH SMITH · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  6. East London

    AI-generated summary

    Juliet Saunders · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Juliet Saunders, a 25-year-old woman with Cornelia De Lange Syndrome and a profound learning disability, attended hospital on 7 March 2020 with abdominal pain and vomiting and died at home the following day. The report identified concerns including misinterpretation of abdominal x-rays, failure to diagnose intestinal obstruction, inadequate escalation and supervision, departures from transfer and discharge procedures, lack of safety-netting advice, and insufficient support for patients with learning disabilities at weekends.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Serious Incident Investigation process failing to identify significant care failings and produce a good-quality report

    Wider context from the report

    “8. Ineffective identification of significant failings in care delivered through the Trust’s own Serious Incident Investigation process, leading to a finalised report of poor quality. ”

    Source location

    Juliet Saunders · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Commission and complete an external review of serious-incident reports, policies and procedures.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• The Trust commissioned an external maternity review in March 2021, into Serious Incidents (SIs) from the period of January 2019 to December 2020. The review involved a structured review of SI reports as well as a review of SI related policies and procedures at the Trust. This was in conjunction with a series of semi structured interviews with staff at all levels of the Trust as well as site visits during which more informal conversations with staff and patients took place. The final report has now been received by the Trust. This will enable the Trust to undertake a review of existing systems and processes, and the opportunity to plan positive actions as well as planning for the transition to the new national policy framework, particularly the new Patient Safety Incident Response Framework (PSIRF), set to be rolled out nationally from spring next year.”

    Source location

    2021-0157-Response-from-Queens-Hospital_Published
    Page 5 · response
    Published 18 May 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Serious Incident governance arrangements remain paused because COVID-19 released clinical staff and the Trust awaits national guidance, although reports are being progressed.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “During the Covid pandemic governance arrangements, including SI reports were placed on hold, to allow for clinical staff to be released to support ward areas. The pause is still in place (the declaration of SIs or Never Event continues) however the Trust is taking proactive steps to ensure reports are still being progressed in line with reporting requirements, which the Trust is awaiting guidance from NHSEI and the CCG.”

    Source location

    2021-0157-Response-from-Queens-Hospital_Published
    Page 5 · response
    Published 18 May 2021

    Open published response
  7. Sefton, St. Helens and Knowsley

    AI-generated summary

    Pauline BRUMFITT · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Pauline BRUMFITT died on 15 April 2020 after a fall at a care home led to hospital admission and diagnosis of an intracranial bleed. The concerns were that falls risk assessments, prevention measures and referrals were not implemented after her previous falls, and that the incident was not promptly reported or investigated.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to commence a timely investigation of falls-related matters

    Wider context from the report

    “[BRIEF SUMMARY OF MATTERS OF CONCERN] (1) The policies and procedures in existence at the care home pertaining to falls risk assessment and prevention were not applied to Pauline Brumfitt (as stated above) as they should have been. (2) Pauline fell on 3 occasions and the opportunities to assess Pauline’s risks and take appropriate action to prevent further falls were not taken as they should have been. (3) The matter was (given in evidence) not reported to the regulatory bodies and again as given in evidence an investigation had not been commenced at the time of the inquest and staff supervision/discussion re falls prevention had only been commenced in Feb/March 2021, appropriate timely action could have helped (and could still help) to prevent future deaths in similar circumstances where dependent elderly residents are at risk of falling and suffering serious injury/death as a consequence. ”

    Source location

    Pauline BRUMFITT · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review the internal coroner process and introduce formal safeguarding-team triage to monitor trends and support risk assessment.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition, we have also recently introduced the following:”

    Source location

    2021-0098-Response-from-Anchor-Hanover-Group-1
    Page 4 · response
    Published 13 April 2021

    Open published response
  8. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Raymond Alfred POWELL · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Raymond Alfred POWELL became increasingly frail, moved into Cole Valley Nursing Home, and suffered falls on 3 November 2020 that caused an acute subdural haematoma. He later developed an infection and seizure and died on 5 December 2020. Concerns included failures to record a preceding fall, update his falls risk assessment, accurately document observations, formally review the circumstances, and comply with court orders for evidence, creating an ongoing risk to other residents.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to formally review falls risk assessments and care policies after a resident death

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The nursing home manager confirmed that Cole Valley Nursing Home had not conducted an internal investigation into the circumstances of Raymond's death. The rationale was "no foul play or inappropriate behaviour was suspected. Staff acted appropriately and phoned 999". I am concerned that it was not thought necessary to formally review the appropriateness of Raymond's falls risk assessment and the nursing home's policies and procedures to see what lessons could be learned to improve the safety of other residents. ”

    Source location

    Raymond Alfred POWELL · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct internal investigations of all falls, attach action plans, and report falls and incidents weekly to the Nominated Individual.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1. Manager to conduct internal investigations to all falls and attach action plans. All falls and incidents to be reported on the weekly manager’s report and submitted to Nominated Individual.”

    Source location

    2021-0089-Response-from-Cole-Valley-Nursing-Home-Redacted
    Page 1 · response
    Published 30 March 2021

    Open published response
  9. Manchester North

    AI-generated summary

    Lee David Marsden · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Lee David Marsden was struck by a vehicle on the M66 motorway on 20 December 2019 after accessing the carriageway on foot, sustaining fatal injuries. Concerns included delays in activating a 30 mph warning, ineffective communication between Highways England and North West Motorway Police Group, and the absence of an internal review by Highways England.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of internal review of fatal accident circumstances

    Wider context from the report

    “3. No internal review of the circumstances of this fatal accident has been undertaken by Highways England with the consequent loss of an opportunity for learning ”

    Source location

    Lee David Marsden · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Complete an internal review of Regional Operations Centre handling of the December 2019 incident and identify learning from it.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “An internal review has been carried out into the Regional Operations Centre handling of the incident in December 2019, as requested by the Coroner. Our review concluded that on the information available to the Operations staff at the time, our staff complied with the company policy and work instructions in place, and the incident was managed appropriately. Highways England Regional Operations Centre staff were not aware that one of the entries on the log originated from a call from an off-duty police officer, or the significance and meaning of prefix numbers electronically transferred to the Highways England incident log from the NWMPG. The Coroner’s Officer brought this point to our attention shortly before the inquest. With that information, we have taken action as explained at paragraph b. above.”

    Source location

    2021-0084-Response-from-Highways-England-Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 30 March 2021

    Open published response
  10. Gwent

    AI-generated summary

    Elizabeth Robinson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Elizabeth Robinson, an 87-year-old woman at Ysbyty Ystrad Fawr for rehabilitation after hip surgery, fell and sustained a fatal head injury on 21 October 2019. Concerns included inadequate falls-risk assessment and documentation, staffing levels that nurses considered insufficient to deliver safe care, and nursing staff not having seen the internal investigation findings more than a year after her death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to consider staffing levels in internal investigations

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Staffing Levels Aneurin Bevan University Health Board undertook an internal investigation which was presented at the inquest by ████████ and ████████ confirmed that Mrs Robinson had not been correctly assessed and warranted a higher level of supervision to minimise the risk of her falling. Whilst the documentation was not completed, two nurses gave evidence and I was reassured that they both understood that Mrs Robinson was at high risk of falls and were monitoring her as closely as possible with the staffing complement available. I was informed that on the ward at YYF there were usually 3 members of nursing staff to care for 15 patients. Mrs Robinson was in a cohorted group which meant that 1 member of staff was assigned to observe a group of 4 patients at all times. This left 2 nurses for the remaining 11 patients. The nurses who gave evidence both told me that they rarely managed to get their full breaks (40 minutes in a 12 hour shift) and were constantly in a position where they did not feel they could deliver a safe standard of care to the patients. Mrs Rowlands confirmed that staffing levels were not considered during the investigation and it was further confirmed that these apparently low staffing levels still exist. ”

    Source location

    Elizabeth Robinson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
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Data last updated 7 September 2026