Recurring concern

Inadequate safety incident investigations

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First reported 13 Dec 2008•Latest report 25 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes initiation, evidence gathering, witness testing, factual accuracy, analysis, timeliness, investigator competence and reporting within investigations of deaths, serious incidents and patient, resident or operational safety events.

Not included

  • Police, conduct, regulatory or other investigations not directed at organisational safety learning
  • Failure to implement an unrelated safety action not arising from an incident investigation
  • Generic governance failures not directly affecting a safety incident investigation or its learning process
  • Excludes downstream dissemination, learning and corrective-action controls once the investigation findings have been established.
Reports
244

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
316

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2008–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
447

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care31
Care Quality Commission21
NHS England20
Betsi Cadwaladr University LHB11
Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust10
Barts Health NHS Trust8
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust8
Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust7
Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust6
Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust5
Tameside and Glossop Integrated Care NHS Foundation Trust5
Tees, Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust5
Health and Safety Executive4
Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency4
NHS Greater Manchester Integrated Care Board4

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Phyllis TROMANS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Phyllis Tromans, a long-term resident with Parkinson’s disease who was in a frail condition, developed a grade 4 pressure ulcer while an inpatient at Queen Elizabeth Hospital and died at Cotteridge House on 24 May 2024. Concerns included an underestimated pressure sore risk assessment, prolonged periods without repositioning, an incomplete wound care plan, and an investigation that did not establish why gaps in care had occurred.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of post-death investigations to establish why care gaps occurred

    Wider context from the report

    “4. The Matron's investigation into these gaps in care did not seek to establish why they had occurred. This raises a concern about the quality and efficacy of the Trust's post-death investigations which in turn raises a concern for future deaths. ”

    Source location

    Phyllis TROMANS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Revise post-death investigations to obtain individual statements from involved care staff and embed findings in roundtable reports.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In response to this, the leadership team has reflected on the investigation process and acknowledged the need for individual fact-finding interviews with staff involved in care delivery. Moving forward:”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals Birmingham
    Page 3 · response
    Published 1 November 2024

    Open published response
  2. East London

    AI-generated summary

    Chloe Every · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Chloe Every died in hospital on 14 May 2019 after complications from a hypoxic cardiac arrest sustained during her admission. The report identified concerns including morphine use without recorded justification, an enema undertaken without informed consent while she was unconscious, inadequate clinical observations, missing records, and failures in incident reporting and governance.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of Serious Incident investigations to identify healthcare failings

    Wider context from the report

    “7. A Serious Incident report completed by the trust in the second half of 2019 failed to identify a series of healthcare failings in Chloe’s treatment. Management failings at the Trust meant that Chloe’s death was not reported to a Coroner until August 2023, by which time Chloe’s body had been cremated denying the court an opportunity to gather relevant evidence through autopsy. ”

    Source location

    Chloe Every · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of governance processes to identify patient safety incidents through mortality review

    Wider context from the report

    “6. Governance processes at the Trust failed to identify that Chloe’s death constituted a patient safety incident until months after her death. A mortality review authored by the Associated Medical Director on 17th May 2019 assessed Chloe’s care as good or excellent. ”

    Source location

    Chloe Every · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Operate the Learning Review Group to oversee learning responses, PSIRF adherence and development of improvement actions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In July 2024, the Learning Review Group was established. The Learning Review Group undertakes an oversight function to assess the quality of learning responses and adherence with PSIRF methodology. This multi-professional group ensures an appropriate systems-based approach has been used to extract learning from learning responses and develop robust improvement actions, as well as ensuring that compassionate engagement with patients, families and staff has been central to the learning response.”

    Source location

    Response from Barking, Havering and Redbridge NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 6 · response
    Published 31 October 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Monitor safety actions and improvement plans through the Improvement Oversight Panel, including scheduled three-month progression reviews.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust is monitoring implementation of the safety actions arising from learning responses via the Improvement Oversight Panel (IOP) which was implemented in July 2024. This panel oversees the effectiveness of safety actions and wider safety improvement plans to ensure they are delivering the required improvement. The panel will consider whether sufficient evidence is available of sustainable improvement, prior to closure of the relevant patient safety incidents, or where it is absent, consider what further improvement actions are needed.”

    Source location

    Response from Barking, Havering and Redbridge NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 7 · response
    Published 31 October 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    BHRUT is responsible for responding fully to the concerns, so the Department will not duplicate its response.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NHSE have informed us that BHRUT is preparing a response to address your concerns in full. This is entirely appropriate due to the nature of the concerns raised and as a direct recipient of this report. I look forward to their response with interest and do not wish to duplicate it. However, I will highlight some points from the information shared with us, of the actions taken to improve matters in relation to the care of patients with learning disabilities since Chloe’s death in 2019:”

    Source location

    Response from DHSC
    Page 1 · response
    Published 31 October 2024

    Open published response
  3. North Yorkshire and York

    AI-generated summary

    Janet Kathleen SEDDON · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Janet Kathleen Seddon underwent surgery after a CT scan was re-reviewed and found to show abdominal pathology that had not been identified in the initial report. She deteriorated with signs of sepsis and died in hospital on 9 February 2023. Concerns included the delay in identifying the pathology, the absence of a proper assessment of harm, and delays in disclosing the reporting error to her family and the Coroner.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Significant delays in investigating missed radiology reporting errors

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The Trust became aware on the 7th of February 2023 that abdominal pathology requiring urgent assessment had been missed when Mrs Seddon’s CT scan was initially reported on the 30th of January 2023. I found at inquest that there had been significant progression of Mrs Seddon’s bowel obstruction in the period between the initial report and the subsequent review, and that the delay in identifying her condition more than minimally contributed to her death. 2. The Trust referred Mrs Seddon’s death to the Coroner on the basis that her family was concerned about possible omissions in primary care. Despite the Trust becoming aware of the missed pathology on the 7th of February 2023, it does not appear to have set in motion any process of investigation of the case until approximately September 2023. I was advised that a radiology case could be concluded in October 2023 that there had been a reporting error and that a reasonable body of radiologists would have identified the concerning pathology on the CT scan. This finding was referred to the clinical care group responsible for Mrs Seddon’s care for them to assess whether the error had caused harm to Mrs Seddon, but no such definitive assessment took place and the Trust closed the investigation. As a result, no disclosure was made to Mrs Seddon’s family of the error in accordance with the Trust’s statutory Duty of Candour. The report of the closed investigation, indicating that an error had occurred in the reporting of the scan but no assessment of harm had been made, was not received by the court until February 2024, more than a year after Mrs Seddon’s death. 3. My concerns relate to – a) the very significant delay in addressing whether the missed abdominal pathology was the result of a reporting error; b) the absence of any proper assessment of harm caused to Mrs Seddon as a result of the error; c) the delay in clear disclosure of the error to Mrs Seddon’s family and to the Coroner; d) the absence of evidence that all relevant learning arising from the above has occurred and any actions arising from such learning have been completed; e) the potential risk of death to others in the event of a recurrence of any of the above. ”

    Source location

    Janet Kathleen SEDDON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement PSIRF-based systems to record, monitor, review and learn from incidents across the Trust.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is to be noted that at the time of the incident the Trust followed its previous policy on incident management. The Trust moved to the new Patient Safety Incident Response Framework (PSIRF) in December 2023. Since that time revised systems and processes have been put in place to record, monitor, review and learn from incidents across the Trust. It is acknowledged that this incident should have had, under the old policy, a 72-hour report, and this was not undertaken. This has been reviewed within the Surgery Care Group and the new policy requiring either hot debrief or other form of incident response is now in place and is being used to proper effect.”

    Source location

    Response from York & Scarborough Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 15 October 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement the incident-response policy requiring a hot debrief or another incident response after relevant incidents.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is to be noted that at the time of the incident the Trust followed its previous policy on incident management. The Trust moved to the new Patient Safety Incident Response Framework (PSIRF) in December 2023. Since that time revised systems and processes have been put in place to record, monitor, review and learn from incidents across the Trust. It is acknowledged that this incident should have had, under the old policy, a 72-hour report, and this was not undertaken. This has been reviewed within the Surgery Care Group and the new policy requiring either hot debrief or other form of incident response is now in place and is being used to proper effect.”

    Source location

    Response from York & Scarborough Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 15 October 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Revise the Radiology Duty of Candour SOP with assessment procedures and response timeframes for discrepancy and harm-feedback cases.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust Radiology Duty of Candour Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) (available should you wish to have sight of this) describes how discrepancies are assessed to establish if radiological errors have occurred and how these are then disclosed to clinicians to evaluate degree of harm and inform duty of candour conversations if required. This SOP is in line with, and applies, national Royal College guidance to our processes. It was last revised in July 2024, before this inquest, and that update included specifying the one-week turnaround timeframe for reporters responding to a candour panel, improving efficiency from the Radiology side of the process, and a two-week response timeframe for treating clinicians to respond to Radiology letters disclosing confirmed radiological errors and requesting feedback on the degree of harm.”

    Source location

    Response from York & Scarborough Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 October 2024

    Open published response
  4. North Yorkshire and York

    AI-generated summary

    Stephen Frederick DULLING · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Stephen Frederick Dulling, who had Parkinson’s disease, symptoms of dementia and swallowing problems, was admitted to York District Hospital and choked while eating toast, subsequently dying from aspiration pneumonia. Concerns included the response to reported risks before admission and multiple nursing-care lapses during his hospital admission, including the appropriateness of his diet, nutritional monitoring, response to choking and incident investigation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in undertaking and completing patient safety investigation reviews

    Wider context from the report

    “4. I heard evidence of a number of omissions and lapses in the care afforded Mr Dulling by registered nurses during his admission to York District Hospital. My concerns relate to the following findings – a) No evidence of any direct inquiry being made of Mr Dulling’s primary carer in respect of his nutritional needs, despite Mr Dulling being deemed to lack capacity; b) It being recorded and acted upon that a regular diet was appropriate for Mr Dulling, despite a) above; c) No food chart being implemented and maintained despite the outcome of Mr Dulling’s malnutrition risk assessment; d) No assessment or escalation of Mr Dulling’s refusal of intravenous fluids; e) Evidence of a delayed response by a staff nurse to the information that Mr Dulling was choking; f) The absence of a de-brief of staff involved in the choking incident by a nurse of the requisite level within the period of 72 hours after the event. This, together with the subsequent delay in undertaking and completing the patient safety investigation review, resulted in important gaps in the evidence supplied both to the review and the inquest. 5. My concern is that the above reflects a series of lapses in basic nursing care identified in respect of a single patient, a repetition of any of which could present a risk of future deaths to others. ”

    Source location

    Stephen Frederick DULLING · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Complete and present a cluster review of speech-and-language-therapy and swallow-related incidents with an associated action plan.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “not optimal and are in the process of bringing these assessments together into one section of Nucleus (electronic digital nursing record) and this is due to go live in January 2025. We are confident that this will significantly reduce the risk of essential information being overlooked. The Trust recognises the previous poor compliance in this area, as identified in Mr Dulling’s case, and this is a focus of current quality improvement project work. The Trust has completed a Patient Safety Incident Investigation (PSII) cluster review of Speech and Language Therapy (SLT) and swallow related incidents. This was presented to the Trust’s Serious Incident Group in December 2024 with an associated action plan.”

    Source location

    Response from York and Scarborough Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 October 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement revised incident-management systems and processes for recording, monitoring, reviewing and learning from patient-safety incidents.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is to be noted that at the time of the incident the Trust followed its previous policy on incident management. The Trust moved to the new Patient Safety Incident Response Framework (PSIRF) in December 2023. Since that time revised systems and processes have been put in place to record, monitor, review and learn from incidents across the Trust. It is acknowledged the investigation undertaken following this incident was not timely nor optimal. This has been reviewed with the Medicine Care Group and the new policy requiring either hot”

    Source location

    Response from York and Scarborough Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 October 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Maintain a dedicated Medicine Care Group Clinical Governance Team to review reported patient-safety events daily, request learning responses and escalate severe or moderate harm events.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “debrief or other form of incident response is now in place and is being used to proper effect. The Medicine Care Group has a dedicated Clinical Governance Team who review all reported patient safety events on a daily basis, appropriate learning responses identified and requested, and any severe or moderate harm patient safety events escalated to the Care Group quadrature.”

    Source location

    Response from York and Scarborough Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 15 October 2024

    Open published response
  5. East London

    AI-generated summary

    Gordon Long · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Gordon Long was admitted to hospital on 1 July 2023 with suspected dry gangrene of the left foot, was assessed by a vascular specialist on 6 July, underwent amputation on 7 July, and died on 8 July 2023. The concerns were the unexplained delay in referral to the vascular team, shortcomings in the patient safety investigation, and the lack of clear evidence that an action plan had resulted in changed practice.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequate patient safety incident investigations

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Despite undertaking a patient safety incident investigation (“PSII”) the Trust was unable to explain why Mr Long was not referred to the vascular team after he was admitted from ED into the medical receiving unit (“MRU”) on the morning of 2nd July 2023. The Trust struggled to identify the consultant in charge of Mr Long’s treatment when on the MRU and could not demonstrate that the consultant was spoken to as part of the PSII investigation. The inadequate standard of the investigation makes the court doubt the effectiveness of the Trust to identify and reflect upon future risks to patients. ”

    Source location

    Gordon Long · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  6. East London

    AI-generated summary

    Terence Harry Clark · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Terence Harry Clark, who had an impaired swallow and aspiration pneumonia, was admitted to hospital on 26 October 2023 and died there on 1 November 2023 after sustaining a cardiac arrest while waiting unescorted in an X-ray waiting area. Concerns included the discovery of liquid food in his airway, the unexplained removal and loss of his naso-gastric tube, and the failure to identify the tube’s removal as a significant factor during the patient safety investigation, which impeded investigation of the death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Patient safety investigations failing to review evidence relevant to governance and coronial investigations

    Wider context from the report

    “B. The Trust conducted a patient safety investigation into the circumstances leading to Mr Clark’s death, the investigation did not identify the removal of the NG tube as a significant factor worthy of scrutiny. Both of these issues raise a concern that the Trust can not adequately secure and review evidence relevant to governance and coronial investigations, necessary to mitigate risks of future fatalities. ”

    Source location

    Terence Harry Clark · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review and update the Bereavement policy to clarify when tubes, lines and devices remain in situ after sudden or unexpected death, including medical examiner involvement.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Following this case, we are reviewing the Bereavement policy to clarify the guidance around removal of tubes, lines and devices. Where a sudden or unexpected death has occurred, the policy will mandate that tubes, lines and devices are left in situ until after:”

    Source location

    Response from Barts Health
    Page 2 · response
    Published 2 September 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The NG tube’s removal was not considered materially relevant to the care issues identified in the internal investigation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I will respond to these items together as they are interlinked. Mr Clark had an NG tube inserted on the 1st November 2023. It was not used prior to the X-Ray being conducted at which point Mr Clark had a cardiac arrest and died. The investigation into his death focused on the lack of nursing escort and therefore knowledge of Mr Clark’s DNACPR status when he arrested in the department which resulted in CPR being commenced. The NG tube was removed by ward staff on the day of Mr Clark’s death following a discussion with a doctor and the site manager. At this point a coroners referral had not been considered or made. The coroner’s referral was made on the 3rd November 2023. The terms of reference for the concise internal investigation into Mr Clark’s death did not include review of the NGT removal as it was not considered to be materially relevant to any care issues identified.”

    Source location

    Response from Barts Health
    Page 2 · response
    Published 2 September 2024

    Open published response
  7. Manchester North

    AI-generated summary

    Mr David Thompson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr David Thompson had a longstanding affective disorder and a history of alcohol and illicit drug use. After receiving inpatient and outpatient mental health care, he consumed alcohol and inflicted deep cuts to his wrists; he died on 3 March 2024 from hypovolaemic shock caused by the wrist injuries. Concerns included gaps in discharge planning and follow-up at Priory Dorking, incomplete awareness of his care and relapse history at Priory Altrincham, and a lack of communication between NHS and private consultants.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to investigate nursing staff and determine whether care failures reflect individual or system failure

    Wider context from the report

    “7. When conducting the internal review no members of the nursing staff were spoken to to consider why the matters highlighted above had not been carried out. There was therefore a lack of understanding as to whether this was an individual failing or error or a cultural / system failure. Nor was consideration given to whether any individuals should be reported to their regulatory body. ”

    Source location

    Mr David Thompson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct separate service-level Team Incident Reviews involving staff involved in care and consolidate findings at a senior-manager joint meeting for cross-service learning.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It was recognised that Mr Thompson had been a recent patient at both Priory Hospital Altrincham and Priory Hospital Dorking and hence why it was considered at the time that inviting representatives from both services to attend a joint TIR was good practice. On reflection, we conclude that we should have hosted a separate TIR at each service, inviting those involved in the care and treatment of the patient (to include nursing colleagues), and thereafter brought together the key findings at a joint meeting attended by the senior managers, to identify any areas for cross service learning. This learning point has since been reiterated to Priory’s Director of Quality and our regional Associate Directors of Nursing and Quality who are responsible for the commissioning and quality review of TIR’s.”

    Source location

    Response from Priory Group
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 August 2024

    Open published response
  8. County Durham and Darlington

    AI-generated summary

    Janet Rice · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Janet Rice, aged 65, died in hospital from pulmonary and cerebral embolism after surgery for a hip fracture sustained in an accidental fall. Anti-coagulant medication was inconsistently administered, including during a period when she was experiencing acute delirium; concerns included the absence of a capacity assessment, best-interests decision, escalation, or consideration of alternative treatment. The report also raised concerns about delays and limitations in the Trust’s patient safety investigation and the limited scope of related training.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in completing and providing patient safety investigation reports

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The final version of the patient safety investigation report carried out by the Trust was only received on the first day of the Inquest, some 16 months after the death. The concerns raised in this Inquest have been well known to the Trust for a considerable period of time and the concern is that lessons cannot be learned in a timely fashion if patient safety investigations are so significantly delayed. ”

    Source location

    Janet Rice · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of patient safety investigations to comprehensively review anticoagulant omissions across hospital settings

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) The patient safety investigation report is not a comprehensive and robust review of the omissions in provision of anti coagulant and does not consider or address the omission to administer anti coagulant because the deceased was transferred between hospitals, nor does it detail all of the incidents of missed anti coagulant, some of which only became apparent upon receipt of the independent expert report. It’s remit and action plan are limited to the community hospital only, and do not consider or address the further instances of omission to administer anti coagulant in the acute hospital setting, where there was a continued failure to carry out a capacity assessment and any subsequent best interests decision making process, failure to escalate these issues, and/or to consider any alternative treatment to reduce the high risk of DVT/PE. ”

    Source location

    Janet Rice · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to consider alternative treatment to reduce DVT/PE risk

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) The patient safety investigation report is not a comprehensive and robust review of the omissions in provision of anti coagulant and does not consider or address the omission to administer anti coagulant because the deceased was transferred between hospitals, nor does it detail all of the incidents of missed anti coagulant, some of which only became apparent upon receipt of the independent expert report. It’s remit and action plan are limited to the community hospital only, and do not consider or address the further instances of omission to administer anti coagulant in the acute hospital setting, where there was a continued failure to carry out a capacity assessment and any subsequent best interests decision making process, failure to escalate these issues, and/or to consider any alternative treatment to reduce the high risk of DVT/PE. ”

    Source location

    Janet Rice · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Track patient safety investigations at the weekly Senior Clinical Leaders patient safety forum.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust has robust processes in place in relation to the investigation of any patient safety incidents identified. When the Trust were made aware that there were patient safety concerns relating to Janet’s care, in April 2024, a review commenced of her care led by one of the Community matrons. The time taken to conclude and ensure the report had progressed through the appropriate Trust governance resulted in the report not being available to yourself until the morning of the inquest. However we recognise that this was not an acceptable timeframe to enable you to properly review the report. Whilst the progress of patient safety investigations have always been tracked by the corporate patient safety team, additional processes have now been established whereby these cases are tracked at the weekly Friday Senior Clinical Leaders patient safety forum.”

    Source location

    Response from Durham and Darlington NHS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 1 August 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review and update the patient safety investigation report and action plan to cover the patient’s acute and community care.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The patient safety investigation report is not a comprehensive and robust review of the omissions in provision of anti-coagulant and does not consider or address the omission to administer anti-coagulant because the deceased was transferred between hospitals, nor does it detail all of the incidents of missed anti-coagulant, some of which only became apparent upon receipt of the independent expert report. It’s remit and action plan are limited to the community hospital only, and do not consider or address the further instances of omission to administer anti-coagulant in the acute hospital setting, where there was a continued failure to carry out a capacity assessment and any subsequent best interests decision making process, failure to escalate these issues, and/or to consider any alternative treatment to reduce the high risk of DVT/PE.”

    Source location

    Response from Durham and Darlington NHS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 1 August 2024

    Open published response
  9. East London

    AI-generated summary

    David John Morris · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    David John Morris, aged 78, developed oesophageal cancer after delays in diagnosis and treatment, later undergoing gastrostomy surgery. He developed a gastrostomy leak, peritonitis and septic shock, and died in hospital on 16 May 2022 after further surgery. The concerns included delayed recognition and treatment of the leak and sepsis, poor clinical records, deficiencies in the investigation, and ineffective controlled-drug management systems.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of serious incident investigations to identify relevant reviewing clinicians

    Wider context from the report

    “4. The initial serious investigation report into Mr Morris’s death was unfit for purpose. The report to investigate or even identify the Registrar who reviewed Mr Morris on the evening of 3rd May 2022. Since then, no effective review has been undertaken by the Trust upon how this deficient report gained executive approval. ”

    Source location

    David John Morris · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unfit serious incident investigation reports

    Wider context from the report

    “4. The initial serious investigation report into Mr Morris’s death was unfit for purpose. The report to investigate or even identify the Registrar who reviewed Mr Morris on the evening of 3rd May 2022. Since then, no effective review has been undertaken by the Trust upon how this deficient report gained executive approval. ”

    Source location

    David John Morris · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use the Patient Safety Investigation Response Framework with multidisciplinary investigations and centrally allocated investigating officers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Since October 2023 there has been a change in the process of investigating significant patient safety incidents at BHRUT. This has now been changed to the Patient Safety Investigation Response Framework (PSIRF) which uses multidisciplinary investigations and reviews with multiple responsible authors. In line with NHS England guidance, the Investigating Officer is centrally allocated by the Quality and Safety team and, whenever possible, these are allocated outside of the Clinical Group where the incident occurred.”

    Source location

    2024-0360 - Response from Barking Havering and Redbridge NHS Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 4 July 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Operate a weekly Incident Oversight Learning Group to review concerning incidents and commission further learning responses where needed.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “There is a weekly Incident Oversight Learning Group (IOLG) whereby all incidents that are considered of concern are discussed with specific terms of reference. This includes background information and a review of the entire pathway which a patient has encountered when systems issues are identified; thereby including any omissions that may have occurred with the previous Serious Incident Framework. The Incident Oversight Learning Group meetings are chaired by either the Medical Director for Patient Safety and Patient Experience or the Director of Nursing for Quality and Safety, and this group decides when to commission a further PSIRF learning response.”

    Source location

    2024-0360 - Response from Barking Havering and Redbridge NHS Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 4 July 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require Learning Review Group sign-off with Board Executive attendance for quoracy when approving patient safety investigations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “On completion of Patient Safety Incident Investigations (PSIIs) there is a Learning Review Group (LRG) which reviews the contents of the reports to ensure adequate exploration of key issues has occurred and that the family has had an opportunity to input into the investigation; and ensures the improvement action plan both aligns with learning identified and is sufficiently robust to counteract the existing safety issues identified. The Terms of Reference for this meeting have been updated and now include a Board Executive (or nominated deputy) who must be in attendance for quoracy when signing off investigations.”

    Source location

    2024-0360 - Response from Barking Havering and Redbridge NHS Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 4 July 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Trust will respond separately to the concerns about care and processes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I understand that the Barking, Havering & Redbridge University Trust will also be responding separately to your concerns and that the London region of NHS England is”

    Source location

    2024-0360 - Response from DHSC
    Page 1 · response
    Published 4 July 2024

    Open published response
  10. Nottinghamshire

    AI-generated summary

    Arlo River Phoenix Lambert · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Arlo River Phoenix Lambert died aged 5 days after sustaining a hypoxic-ischaemic brain injury during the intrapartum period. The report describes multiple missed opportunities to deliver him earlier, alongside systemic failings in clinical guidance, escalation, communication and handover. Concerns included a lack of urgency in the Trust’s antepartum haemorrhage guideline and the absence of a clear system for obtaining early reflective accounts from key staff.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to capture early reflective accounts from key staff

    Wider context from the report

    “2. Failure to ensure early reflective accounts were captured from key staff in response to this significant event and others. I consider this to be a Trust wide issue. The Trust cannot begin to rectify patient safety issues, if they do not understand exactly what happened and why. This analysis can only properly occur with the input of those involved in care, and in circumstances where those individuals have had the opportunity and support of the Trust to capture early written accounts. The Trust currently has no clear system in place to facilitate this early capture of relevant accounts. ”

    Source location

    Arlo River Phoenix Lambert · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement a Trust-wide system, templates, guidance, staff engagement, governance, and review prompts for capturing early factual recollections after incidents.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust have put in place a system of capturing early Factual Recollection of Events, which are a description of involvement in an incident at the time it occurred but are not a replacement for the medical record.”

    Source location

    Response from Sherwood Forest Hospitals NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 4 July 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce Edinburgh Emergency Medicine STOP 5 hot debriefs to provide immediate team discussion, document learning, and highlight factual-recollection requirements after incidents.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust’s Maternity department, supported by the Professional Midwifery Advocates, are reviewing the immediate responses taken following an incident as defined within the Trusts Incident Reporting Policy and are planning to introduce the Edinburgh Emergency Medicine ‘STOP 5’ moments for ‘Hot Debriefs’. This will enable clinicians involved in an incident to have a 5-minute team debrief immediately following an incident. During this team debrief, the need to complete a Factual Recollection of Events will be highlighted to relevant staff and will provide the clinicians with a space to discuss what went well and the opportunities to improve. The debrief will be documented and saved on the Incident reporting system.”

    Source location

    Response from Sherwood Forest Hospitals NHS Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 4 July 2024

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026