Recurring concern

Inadequate safety incident investigations

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First reported 13 Dec 2008•Latest report 25 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes initiation, evidence gathering, witness testing, factual accuracy, analysis, timeliness, investigator competence and reporting within investigations of deaths, serious incidents and patient, resident or operational safety events.

Not included

  • Police, conduct, regulatory or other investigations not directed at organisational safety learning
  • Failure to implement an unrelated safety action not arising from an incident investigation
  • Generic governance failures not directly affecting a safety incident investigation or its learning process
  • Excludes downstream dissemination, learning and corrective-action controls once the investigation findings have been established.
Reports
244

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
316

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2008–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
447

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care31
Care Quality Commission21
NHS England20
Betsi Cadwaladr University LHB11
Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust10
Barts Health NHS Trust8
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust8
Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust7
Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust6
Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust5
Tameside and Glossop Integrated Care NHS Foundation Trust5
Tees, Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust5
Health and Safety Executive4
Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency4
NHS Greater Manchester Integrated Care Board4

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Gwent

    AI-generated summary

    Neil Francis Edwards · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Neil Francis Edwards was admitted to hospital in respiratory failure, was at high risk of falling, and required 1:1 observation. He suffered four falls, including an unobserved fall on 01/05/2023 that caused a hip fracture; after surgery, he suffered a gastrointestinal haemorrhage and died. The principal concerns were that the falls, including the fall contributing to his death, were not investigated and that this left insufficient reassurance about preventing similar deaths.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to investigate in-patient falls

    Wider context from the report

    “The inquest was advised that a Falls Panel had been convened to determine, in part, whether action could have been taken to prevent a fall which had occurred on 23/04/23. I received no evidence that there had been any investigation into the other falls including, importantly, the fall on 01/05/23 that contributed to Mr Edwards’ death. The court regularly hears that investigations into the circumstances of in-patient falls is central to minimising the risk going forward. It is of concern that no such investigation was undertaken at this time. Additionally, as there was no investigation, the court was not reassured as to how deaths in similar circumstances might be prevented in the future. ”

    Source location

    Neil Francis Edwards · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Operate a monthly Falls Review Panel to investigate injurious inpatient falls, identify learning, agree remedial actions and monitor fracture-related fall trends.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Health Board has a Falls Policy in place for Hospital Adult inpatients. The Falls Policy must be implemented at all levels within the organisation to ensure a safe and consistent approach is adopted. The aim is to reduce avoidable, injurious falls whilst ensuring appropriate management of patients who experience a fall, to include collaboration with intermediate care and the frailty programme.”

    Source location

    Response from Aneurin Bevan University Health Board
    Page 1 · response
    Published 21 March 2024

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Report inpatient falls through RLDatix and investigate falls causing fractures, with escalation through serious-incident and Duty of Candour processes where moderate or greater harm occurs.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Falls are reported via the Health Board’s incident reporting procedures, namely by completing an incident report via our electronic ‘RL Datix Incident’ reporting system. These reports are circulated to relevant staff and senior managers for review and action. Where any concerns are identified, consideration will then be given to the form and type of post fall investigation required. For cases identified where moderate harm or above, these will be managed in line with the Health Board’s”

    Source location

    Response from Aneurin Bevan University Health Board
    Page 1 · response
    Published 21 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Strengthen the Serious Incident process by appointing investigating officers before initial meetings, providing investigation training, and applying enhanced governance and approval of reports and action plans.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Health Board’s Serious Incident Process has been reviewed to improve the scrutiny of incidents. Serious Incident meetings are considered mandatory and investigating officers are now appointed in advance of the first meeting to ensure the investigating officer can be present and engaged from the outset. The Health Board has been delivering Investigating officer training since September 2020 which includes SIs and complaints. The workshops are half day workshops based and provide Investigating Officers with a range of methodologies to use in their investigations.”

    Source location

    Response from Aneurin Bevan University Health Board
    Page 3 · response
    Published 21 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use standardised Serious Incident agendas to define investigation scope, capture robust terms of reference, involve families from the outset and prompt reporting to external agencies.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Improved and standardised agendas have been introduced as part of the SI process to ensure that the scope of investigation and robust terms of reference are captured and referred back to at the end of the process and this will include the involvement of patient families and any concerns they may have, from the outset. The standardised agenda includes a prompt to ensure reporting to external Agencies such as NHS Executive and the HSE.”

    Source location

    Response from Aneurin Bevan University Health Board
    Page 3 · response
    Published 21 March 2024

    Open published response
  2. Nottinghamshire

    AI-generated summary

    Kenneth Stanley Baylis · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Kenneth Stanley Baylis took his own life on 23 January 2023 while on unescorted leave as an informal inpatient on Kingsley Ward. The report identified concerns including inadequate suicide risk assessment and mitigation, insufficient family involvement, failure to follow planned-leave procedures, and inadequate review and investigation after serious suicide attempts or a death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequate incident investigation following a serious suicide attempt or death

    Wider context from the report

    “4. Inadequate review and incident investigation following a serious suicide attempt or a death ”

    Source location

    Kenneth Stanley Baylis · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review IR1 incidents through assigned IR2 managers, monthly completion reports, and supervision-based learning.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “MHSOP have regular Time Out sessions with teams and in the session on the 22nd of March 2024 had a dedicated agenda item which covered learning and reflections from this quality improvement plan which included the learning about IR1s. Senior managers do regularly receive IR1s from all teams within MHSOP including ward and community teams. Following completion of an IR1 a manager is identified to complete an IR2 which reviews the incident and any learning that is identified from it. Senior managers receive monthly reports which indicate if the IR2s have been completed and ensure none have been missed and addition learning from incidents is included within management and clinical supervision which occurs monthly for each member of staff.”

    Source location

    Response from Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 5 · response
    Published 6 March 2024

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct serious-incident discussions and thematic reviews through MHSOP safety, risk, quality-assurance and improvement forums.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Detailed discussion of serious incidents within the care unit is held in the MHSOP Health, Safety and Risk meeting and thematic review of serious incidents is completed via the MHSOP Quality Assurance and Improvement forum. These forums facilitate discussion and review across services and are Chaired by the Care Unit senior management team. The MHSOP care unit has a Learning the lessons bulletin which is shared across all services and teams to disseminate learning from serious incidents – this bulletin is featured on the agenda for the MHSOP Quality Operational Group and is disseminated across all service and team meetings to encourage active reporting and learning from incidents.”

    Source location

    Response from Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 5 · response
    Published 6 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Disseminate learning from serious incidents through the MHSOP Learning the Lessons bulletin and service and team meetings.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Detailed discussion of serious incidents within the care unit is held in the MHSOP Health, Safety and Risk meeting and thematic review of serious incidents is completed via the MHSOP Quality Assurance and Improvement forum. These forums facilitate discussion and review across services and are Chaired by the Care Unit senior management team. The MHSOP care unit has a Learning the lessons bulletin which is shared across all services and teams to disseminate learning from serious incidents – this bulletin is featured on the agenda for the MHSOP Quality Operational Group and is disseminated across all service and team meetings to encourage active reporting and learning from incidents.”

    Source location

    Response from Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 5 · response
    Published 6 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require investigators to address staff interviews through standard allocation emails and clinical-governance oversight.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To ensure that Serious Incident Investigators understand the requirement for staff interviews as part of the investigation each investigator is emailed when the investigation is allocated to ensure they are informed of this requirement, this is included in a standard email template to ensure consistent communication. The MHSOP Clinical Governance team maintain contact and act as a point of reference for the investigation panel and will oversee this as a consistent practice. Upon completion and approval of the Serious Incident investigation the final report is shared with the relevant service and team/ward manager so that they can discuss in detail with their team. The support in sharing lessons learnt is tailored dependent on the incident and could include reflective discussions to team time out sessions to ensure the correct level of learning is undertaken. The MHSOP Clinical”

    Source location

    Response from Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 5 · response
    Published 6 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Share approved investigation reports with relevant teams and witnesses and support incident-specific learning reflections.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To ensure that Serious Incident Investigators understand the requirement for staff interviews as part of the investigation each investigator is emailed when the investigation is allocated to ensure they are informed of this requirement, this is included in a standard email template to ensure consistent communication. The MHSOP Clinical Governance team maintain contact and act as a point of reference for the investigation panel and will oversee this as a consistent practice. Upon completion and approval of the Serious Incident investigation the final report is shared with the relevant service and team/ward manager so that they can discuss in detail with their team. The support in sharing lessons learnt is tailored dependent on the incident and could include reflective discussions to team time out sessions to ensure the correct level of learning is undertaken. The MHSOP Clinical”

    Source location

    Response from Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 5 · response
    Published 6 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement a standardised ward and community meeting governance template incorporating incident data and learning discussions across MHSOP wards.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Mental Health Care Group, of which MHSOP is part of, is introducing a new governance structure which includes a standardised template for ward and community meetings and within this data on incidents will be included and discussions take place within the team to reflect on the incidents to ascertain whether there is any learning and improvement required. This is currently being piloted within the Care Group and is due to go live across all MHSOP wards during June 2024.”

    Source location

    Response from Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 6 · response
    Published 6 March 2024

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Complete the PSIRF policy and local patient-safety incident response plan following stakeholder consultation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To date the trust has completed the PSIRF policy and PSIRP (patient safety incident response plan), which sets out the local priorities for the next year. As part of the development of the PSIRP the trust met and consulted with a number of stakeholders; commissioners, service users, clinical staff and services and continue to do so.”

    Source location

    Response from Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 6 · response
    Published 6 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement PSIRF across the Trust by August 2024.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust is in the process of moving towards the Patient Safety Incident Response Framework. (PSIRF) It represents a significant shift in the way the NHS responds to patient safety incidents and is a major step towards establishing a safety management system across the NHS and is also a key part of the NHS patient safety strategy. This new framework replaces the SI Framework and makes no distinction between ‘patient safety incidents’ and ‘Serious Incidents’ and so it removes the SI classification and the threshold for it.”

    Source location

    Response from Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 6 · response
    Published 6 March 2024

    Open published response
  3. North West Wales

    AI-generated summary

    Nesta Jones · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Nesta Jones died in hospital on 8 May 2017 after being admitted with suspected septic arthritis of a prosthetic left knee. The report describes concerns about delayed consideration and treatment of septic arthritis, junior doctors not being encouraged to challenge consultant opinions, inadequate handling of the family’s urgent complaint, and the lack of a full investigation into the death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to undertake full investigations into patient deaths

    Wider context from the report

    “c. There was no full investigation undertaken by the Health Board into Nesta’s death other than a desktop report, the quality of which was questionable, as the Police were investigating. This means that there were no formal considerations as to immediate actions or learning required to reduce harm and the risk of death. In oral evidence I was informed that there is a new governance process being considered and likely to be in force by April 2024. I have made previous Reports on this precise point and yet the new and improved process is still not in place. ”

    Source location

    Nesta Jones · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review incident and complaint processes and create an integrated framework covering incidents, complaints and mortality.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In relation to the complaint process, I can confirm that since Mrs Jones' death the process in the Complaints Team has now changed. A new Complaints Procedure was introduced in March 2022. This procedure includes an escalation process. However, I acknowledge that further improvement is still needed and we are currently undertaking a full review of the complaint process alongside the review of the incident process detailed below. We will create a new, integrated framework that covers incidents, complaints and mortality. This work is underway at present with a view to completion in the next two months.”

    Source location

    Response from Betsi Cadwaladr University Health Board
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 March 2024

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Engage the NHS Wales National Executive quality team to support improvement work on incident and complaint processes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Chief Executive is now personally driving this work which will include a new, integrated framework that covers incidents, complaints and mortality as I have detailed above. The Chief Executive is also personally overseeing performance in relation to overdue incidents and complaints with that area being escalated for close executive scrutiny. As a result, we expect to see significant improvement in the process, and the quality and timeliness of investigations, over the coming months as changes are implemented. We are also engaging the support of the NHS Wales National Executive quality team to support us in this improvement work.”

    Source location

    Response from Betsi Cadwaladr University Health Board
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 March 2024

    Open published response
  4. North Wales (East and Central)

    AI-generated summary

    Benjamin David Leonard · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Benjamin David Leonard, aged 16, died after slipping and falling from a cliff while descending the Great Orme during an Explorer Scout trip in North Wales. The report identifies concerns about inadequate planning, risk assessment, briefing, supervision, training, safeguarding, first-aid provision, oversight and the Scouts Association’s response to the death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to complete a timely Fatal Accident Inquiry Panel investigation

    Wider context from the report

    “4. As of 22.2.24, over 5 years since Ben’s death there is still no Fatal Accident Inquiry Panel Report in existence. Further still, even the prospective panel members for this investigation have not been identified. A document I have received entitled ‘BL Great Orme Learning and Actions Update’ dated 30.9.19 is inadequate when considering the root and branch type of review needed following a child fatality to identify and address issues of safety and safeguarding – particularly these having been identified as significant issues on the day of Ben’s death and despite this fact – no investigation followed -with The Scouts Association maintaining this was due to a live police investigation initially, and latterly due to this inquest. ”

    Source location

    Benjamin David Leonard · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 5 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Investigate Ben’s death under the Work-related Death Protocol to determine its cause, identify lessons and prevention actions, and take appropriate enforcement action.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Our Investigation Division have now begun an investigation into Ben’s death in accordance with the Work-related Death Protocol to determine the cause, identify lessons and actions needed to prevent any recurrence and take appropriate enforcement action. I have asked the team to ensure the investigation is given priority, given the unacceptable delays that have already occurred.”

    Source location

    Response from Health and Safety Executive
    Page 3 · response
    Published 26 February 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review how the investigation error occurred and identify measures to prevent it recurring.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The error in not identifying, repeatedly, that this was a matter for HSE to investigate was clearly unacceptable and I would like to apologise to Ben’s parents and family that an investigation has not been undertaken sooner. HSE will undertake an appropriate review to identify how this error occurred, and to ensure that it is not repeated. We also will be writing directly to Ben’s family to offer them an apology.”

    Source location

    Response from Health and Safety Executive
    Page 3 · response
    Published 26 February 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Commission and complete an independent Fatal Incident Investigation into Ben’s death, then share its findings and learning.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1. The Scout Association has now commissioned the Fatal Accident Investigation (FAI) into Ben’s death with Terms of Reference, completed within 48 hours of the inquest concluding. Please see TORs attached for reference at Appendix B. As we highlight, we apologise for not doing this sooner. The initial FAI report is due to be completed by June 2024 and its findings and actions will be shared with the Leonard family and HM Coroner in accordance with our commitment at the inquest. We have also asked the FAI panel to undertake a detailed review into actions by The Scout Association after Ben’s death and our response. This is to ensure learning and to better understand the changes we need to make. This will also be shared with the Leonard family and as part of our annual Safety Report.”

    Source location

    Response from Scouts
    Page 10 · response
    Published 26 February 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Create and implement a Critical Incident and Investigation Policy, including prompt independent fatality investigations and transparent information sharing.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. The Scout Association is creating a new Critical Incident & Investigation Policy (using a root cause analysis approach) which will be formally approved by the Board in July 2024 (with the principles of the policy being implemented immediately). While the Board approval process is in train, the Board has agreed that the key requirements within this new policy are implemented immediately.”

    Source location

    Response from Scouts
    Page 11 · response
    Published 26 February 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Designate a senior accountable staff member to lead future fatality investigations and liaise with statutory agencies.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• In the event of a fatality, a senior level staff member (Executive Director level) will be designated as the senior accountable person for leading the process and for collating information and liaising with relevant statutory agencies. That staff member will report directly to the Board.”

    Source location

    Response from Scouts
    Page 11 · response
    Published 26 February 2024

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Department cannot comment on the Scout Association’s internal structure, workings, or implementation of internal policies and procedures.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “6. Finally, we would note that various matters identified in your report concern the internal structure and workings of the Scout Association (for example their internal FAIP process). Where feasible, we have sought to address all matters of concern, but unfortunately we cannot comment on the internal set-up and structure of individual organisations, or charities in the case of the Scout Association. We understand that the Scout Association will provide a response to your report which we expect will address these issues. Similarly, we understand that the Charity Commission will provide a response which we expect will address matters relating to charity trustees’ legal duties and responsibilities in managing their charity.”

    Source location

    Response from Department for Education
    Page 4 · response
    Published 26 February 2024

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Scout Association and the Charity Commission are expected to address matters concerning internal operations and charity trustees’ legal duties, respectively.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “6. Finally, we would note that various matters identified in your report concern the internal structure and workings of the Scout Association (for example their internal FAIP process). Where feasible, we have sought to address all matters of concern, but unfortunately we cannot comment on the internal set-up and structure of individual organisations, or charities in the case of the Scout Association. We understand that the Scout Association will provide a response to your report which we expect will address these issues. Similarly, we understand that the Charity Commission will provide a response which we expect will address matters relating to charity trustees’ legal duties and responsibilities in managing their charity.”

    Source location

    Response from Department for Education
    Page 4 · response
    Published 26 February 2024

    Open published response
  5. Nottinghamshire

    AI-generated summary

    Kane Christopher Boyce · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Kane Christopher Boyce, a serving prisoner at HMP Lowdham Grange, was found with a ligature around his neck on 3 October 2021 and could not be resuscitated. The jury found that alcohol intoxication and the failure of staff to share information, open an under-the-influence log, adequately monitor him, and consider risk when isolating cell power and ignoring cell bells contributed to his death. The report raised concerns about these practices, staff understanding of relevant policies, learning from deaths in custody, and organisational candour.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unclear and potentially inaccurate Early Learning Review investigation methodology

    Wider context from the report

    “6. Poor Quality Early Learning Review process, November 2021 While it is recognised that the ELR process is designed to capture information at a very early stage of the investigation, it is nevertheless an important tool in seeking to identify safety issues that should be addressed swiftly in order to prevent future deaths. The central issue in this case was obvious from the outset, as recorded in various intelligence reports submitted by staff on the night of the death, namely, a number of members of staff suspected Kane to be under the influence of alcohol yet failed to take the necessary steps to seek to safeguard against harm. On page 4 of the ELR it is concluded that “all procedures were followed” and there were no local or national recommendations for learning lessons. It is difficult to rationalise this conclusion against the evidence available even at the earliest stages of the investigation. The author was clearly aware that staff had considered Kane to be under the influence of alcohol (see page 1) and should have been aware that no Under the Influence Log existed. The author simply notes that “the policy has been reviewed”. There is no explanation as to why the policy wasn’t followed. Was the policy unclear in its requirements? Was there an absence of staff training on the policy? Of great concern to me is the fact that staff giving evidence at the inquest still seemed to fail to grasp the significance of intoxication as a risk factor for self harm. My concerns extend beyond the quality of the report, but also to the accuracy of the same. The report is written in such a way as to create the impression that the author interviewed key members of staff. Comments are attributed to staff in particular points in time, yet all prison staff witnesses denied ever having been interviewed as part of the ELR process. It is unclear exactly what methodology the author has used during the investigation. I am concerned that the quality of the investigation has led to missed opportunities to have identified these issues at the outset. ”

    Source location

    Kane Christopher Boyce · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Poor quality Early Learning Review failing to identify safety issues and learning

    Wider context from the report

    “6. Poor Quality Early Learning Review process, November 2021 While it is recognised that the ELR process is designed to capture information at a very early stage of the investigation, it is nevertheless an important tool in seeking to identify safety issues that should be addressed swiftly in order to prevent future deaths. The central issue in this case was obvious from the outset, as recorded in various intelligence reports submitted by staff on the night of the death, namely, a number of members of staff suspected Kane to be under the influence of alcohol yet failed to take the necessary steps to seek to safeguard against harm. On page 4 of the ELR it is concluded that “all procedures were followed” and there were no local or national recommendations for learning lessons. It is difficult to rationalise this conclusion against the evidence available even at the earliest stages of the investigation. The author was clearly aware that staff had considered Kane to be under the influence of alcohol (see page 1) and should have been aware that no Under the Influence Log existed. The author simply notes that “the policy has been reviewed”. There is no explanation as to why the policy wasn’t followed. Was the policy unclear in its requirements? Was there an absence of staff training on the policy? Of great concern to me is the fact that staff giving evidence at the inquest still seemed to fail to grasp the significance of intoxication as a risk factor for self harm. My concerns extend beyond the quality of the report, but also to the accuracy of the same. The report is written in such a way as to create the impression that the author interviewed key members of staff. Comments are attributed to staff in particular points in time, yet all prison staff witnesses denied ever having been interviewed as part of the ELR process. It is unclear exactly what methodology the author has used during the investigation. I am concerned that the quality of the investigation has led to missed opportunities to have identified these issues at the outset. ”

    Source location

    Kane Christopher Boyce · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require Early Learning Reviews after deaths in custody and ensure resulting recommendations and learning are investigated and implemented.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Following a death in custody at a Sodexo prison (whilst under Sodexo operational management) an Early Learning Review is required – this should be completed within 7 days. The Early Learning Review notes areas of good practice and recommendations, the Director is expected to ensure that any recommendations are complied with – alongside any recommendations made by the PPO.”

    Source location

    Response from Sodexo
    Page 3 · response
    Published 25 January 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Issue and use national guidance and a standard template to improve the consistency and quality of Early Learning Reviews.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In 2021 the National Safety Team issued guidance and a standard template to assist those conducting the reviews and to bring greater consistency to the reports, which improved the overall quality. Being implemented during the COVID-19 pandemic meant our ability to deliver face-to-face training was limited and as such we have continued to work to improve the quality of ELRs, including holding a workshop with GSLs in July 2022 at which the National Safety Team shared the results of a review of a sample of reports and provided feedback designed to improve practice in the conduct of the reviews and the writing of the reports.”

    Source location

    Response from HMPPS
    Page 1 · response
    Published 25 January 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver workshops and feedback to Group Safety Leads to improve their Early Learning Review skills, practice and report writing.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In 2021 the National Safety Team issued guidance and a standard template to assist those conducting the reviews and to bring greater consistency to the reports, which improved the overall quality. Being implemented during the COVID-19 pandemic meant our ability to deliver face-to-face training was limited and as such we have continued to work to improve the quality of ELRs, including holding a workshop with GSLs in July 2022 at which the National Safety Team shared the results of a review of a sample of reports and provided feedback designed to improve practice in the conduct of the reviews and the writing of the reports.”

    Source location

    Response from HMPPS
    Page 1 · response
    Published 25 January 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Monitor Early Learning Review quality and share feedback with Group Safety Leads.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We continue to monitor the quality of ELRs and to share feedback on them with GSLs. We are currently working on a new policy framework on the follow-up to deaths in custody (replacing PSI 64/2011) and intend to use that to mandate the early learning review process, and to make clear that it is the responsibility of the Prison Group Director to satisfy themselves of the quality of the ELR before signing the report off. Alongside the new policy framework, we will issue a revised standard template and a refreshed guidance document.”

    Source location

    Response from HMPPS
    Page 1 · response
    Published 25 January 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop a new policy framework that mandates Early Learning Reviews and assigns Prison Group Directors responsibility for checking report quality before sign-off.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We continue to monitor the quality of ELRs and to share feedback on them with GSLs. We are currently working on a new policy framework on the follow-up to deaths in custody (replacing PSI 64/2011) and intend to use that to mandate the early learning review process, and to make clear that it is the responsibility of the Prison Group Director to satisfy themselves of the quality of the ELR before signing the report off. Alongside the new policy framework, we will issue a revised standard template and a refreshed guidance document.”

    Source location

    Response from HMPPS
    Page 1 · response
    Published 25 January 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Issue a revised Early Learning Review standard template and refreshed guidance alongside the new policy framework.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We continue to monitor the quality of ELRs and to share feedback on them with GSLs. We are currently working on a new policy framework on the follow-up to deaths in custody (replacing PSI 64/2011) and intend to use that to mandate the early learning review process, and to make clear that it is the responsibility of the Prison Group Director to satisfy themselves of the quality of the ELR before signing the report off. Alongside the new policy framework, we will issue a revised standard template and a refreshed guidance document.”

    Source location

    Response from HMPPS
    Page 1 · response
    Published 25 January 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Sodexo’s death-in-custody learning processes apply only while the prison is under Sodexo’s operational management.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The above processes only apply when the prison is under Sodexo’s operational management.”

    Source location

    Response from Sodexo
    Page 3 · response
    Published 25 January 2024

    Open published response
  6. County Durham and Darlington

    AI-generated summary

    Linda Louise Banks · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Linda Louise Banks died at the University Hospital of North Durham on 10 April 2022 after taking a paracetamol overdose, against a background of alcohol misuse and deteriorating mental health. The report identified concerns about the quality of mental health assessments, triage, safety planning and record keeping, the underestimation of risk, failure to identify possible learning difficulties and provide reasonable adjustments, and delays in investigating the care provided. It also identified concerns that similar issues found in an earlier thematic review had not been effectively addressed.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in completing serious incident investigations

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) The Serious Incident Investigation into the care received by Linda was not completed until the end of January 2023, some 9 months after the death. This is neither timely nor responsive. Despite reassurances given that the Trust are working to eradicate such delays, in response to a series of previous PFD reports issued by the Coroners of Durham and Darlington, there are still cases coming to the attention of the Coronial service where Serious Incident Investigations are significantly delayed in excess of the 60 day NHS framework. ”

    Source location

    Linda Louise Banks · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to preserve evidence while memories are fresh during serious incident investigations

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) As previously reported the concern in relation to the delays in such investigations and any subsequent necessary action required, is twofold. Firstly, the quality of the investigation is severely compromised as the evidence is not captured when memories are fresh. Secondly, because any lessons to be learnt and improvements to be made to improve patient safety cannot be implemented promptly. ”

    Source location

    Linda Louise Banks · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The PFD appears to arise from unrelated advice about a future investigation, not outstanding concerns from evidence heard at this inquest.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It was therefore disappointing to receive a further PFD on this matter. I was further confused that the PFD in this case appears to have been issued in relation to you being advised on another unrelated matter that an SII would not be completed until January 2024, when the death occurred in October, and not due to any outstanding concerns in relation to the evidence heard at this inquest.”

    Source location

    Response from Tees, Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 December 2023

    Open published response
  7. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    MORGAN-ROSE HART · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Morgan-Rose Hart, who was detained on a female mental health ward, died on 12 July 2022 after being found unresponsive with a ligature around her neck. The report identified concerns about missed and falsified observations, failures to complete physical welfare checks after bathroom alerts, inadequate escalation of risk, shortcomings in investigation and record keeping, and insufficient suitable placements for people with autism and mental health and self-harm risks in Essex.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays and premature sign-off in Trust investigations

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The Trust investigation was materially incomplete and there was a lost an opportunity to: a. Understand concerns of the Family b. Acknowledge errors and learn lessons from the circumstances of the death. The Director of Operations and Matron informed the Trust Senior Management that the PSII Report had omissions. The Trust evidence was that it was an early adopter of the new NHS investigation process. The lead investigator did not report on material issues as to how Morgan-Rose was observed on the ward and the report was significantly delayed. Evidence was there was a pressure to sign the report off although it remained incomplete and did not contain a note about the limitations. c. d. Escalate concerns about staff observations - About 2 weeks after the death the Matron received a report that staff observations had not been appropriately conducted. This prompted a review of CCTV from the afternoon of Morgan-Rose’s death. There was insufficient scrutiny of the CCTV that showed that multiple observations entries made on 6 July 2022 after 14:06 hours could not be correct. e. Understand security issues on a locked mental health ward - It has not been possible to establish the identity of the person that reset the bathroom alert triggered for Morgan-Rose on 6 July 2022 at 15:31. The Trust does not have an accurate records of Trust staff pass allocation. The Trust investigation did not establish that staff borrowed each other's security passes. On the day of Morgan-Rose’s death a visitor pass issued had had access to the nursing office. The Trust was unable to provide the identity of this person. ”

    Source location

    MORGAN-ROSE HART · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of investigations to identify and document material issues and limitations

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The Trust investigation was materially incomplete and there was a lost an opportunity to: a. Understand concerns of the Family b. Acknowledge errors and learn lessons from the circumstances of the death. The Director of Operations and Matron informed the Trust Senior Management that the PSII Report had omissions. The Trust evidence was that it was an early adopter of the new NHS investigation process. The lead investigator did not report on material issues as to how Morgan-Rose was observed on the ward and the report was significantly delayed. Evidence was there was a pressure to sign the report off although it remained incomplete and did not contain a note about the limitations. c. d. Escalate concerns about staff observations - About 2 weeks after the death the Matron received a report that staff observations had not been appropriately conducted. This prompted a review of CCTV from the afternoon of Morgan-Rose’s death. There was insufficient scrutiny of the CCTV that showed that multiple observations entries made on 6 July 2022 after 14:06 hours could not be correct. e. Understand security issues on a locked mental health ward - It has not been possible to establish the identity of the person that reset the bathroom alert triggered for Morgan-Rose on 6 July 2022 at 15:31. The Trust does not have an accurate records of Trust staff pass allocation. The Trust investigation did not establish that staff borrowed each other's security passes. On the day of Morgan-Rose’s death a visitor pass issued had had access to the nursing office. The Trust was unable to provide the identity of this person. ”

    Source location

    MORGAN-ROSE HART · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Refine patient-safety incident processes and reporting templates.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Improvement activities include:”

    Source location

    Response from Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 December 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update the PSIRF policy to set learning-response timescales, sign-off requirements, safety-action-plan management and organisation-wide learning dissemination.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “▪ The PSIRF Policy is being updated to reflect best practice. The policy includes time scale for completion of a learning response review and timely sign off. The policy also includes process for the management of safety action plan and cascading of learning across the trust.”

    Source location

    Response from Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 28 December 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce post-incident protocols for collating staff statements and triangulating written evidence with CCTV, Oxevision and body-worn-camera data.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “▪ Further, following a patient safety incident the following new ‘post incident immediate actions protocol’ will ensure that security measures in relation to the signing in and out of patient related records are immediately collated:”

    Source location

    Response from Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 28 December 2023

    Open published response
  8. Teesside and Hartlepool

    AI-generated summary

    John Robert Taylor · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    John Robert Taylor took a deliberate insulin overdose and contacted emergency services for help. The ambulance arrived more than 13 hours later, and he died in hospital on 27 July 2022; the inquest concluded that the delay contributed to his death. Concerns included inadequate checking of the property’s unlocked door, the failure to include this issue in the internal investigation, and the lack of consideration of using a taxi to transport him to hospital sooner.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of internal investigations to elicit the circumstances of relevant operational failures

    Wider context from the report

    “2. The circumstances surrounding the failure to adequately check the door handle was not offered or elicited within the internal investigation. Subsequently it was not reported to the SI author. This issue was not considered within the SI. ”

    Source location

    John Robert Taylor · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the SI to consider relevant operational failure issues

    Wider context from the report

    “2. The circumstances surrounding the failure to adequately check the door handle was not offered or elicited within the internal investigation. Subsequently it was not reported to the SI author. This issue was not considered within the SI. ”

    Source location

    John Robert Taylor · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  9. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    WILLIAM BRIAN KIN GRAY · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    William had poorly controlled asthma and experienced a life-threatening asthma attack on 29 May 2021, followed by respiratory and cardiac arrest and a brain injury not compatible with life. The report identified multiple concerns, including failures to assess, review, escalate and treat his asthma, ambulance treatment and airway-management issues, gaps in investigation and training, and limitations in asthma and emergency-care services.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of ambulance investigations to compare attendances and identify learning

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) Learning and sharing lessons learned is a function of investigation. The Trust investigation report did not: (a) scrutinise the ambulance attendance to William on 27 October 2020 in comparison to the attendance on 29 May 2021 and missed an opportunity to understand: i. the timeliness of the administration of adrenalin during a life-threatening asthma attack in accordance with the JRCALC guidelines and that there may be additional training needs. Two paramedics attended both on 27 October 2020 and 29 May 2021 but did not consider the administration of intramuscular adrenalin on the second occasion. ii. Whilst life-threatening asthma in children is an extremely rare call, the same two paramedics attended on 27 October and 29 May and initial treatment given differed during a life-threatening asthma attack iii. that ambulance crew focused on the airway to exclusion of other treatment options and did not recognise the significant amount of inflation pressures that are required to manage the airway of an asthmatic child in respiratory arrest. Crew were misled in thinking that the airway adjunct equipment was not the correct size as a consequence, and were swapping the adjuncts iv. that the same paramedic was left managing an airway throughout the arrest despite the arrival of more experienced colleagues that arrived as backup, including an LMO until HEMS took over. The Trust did not address the issues at 3 (a) i-iv above in their annual training following William’s death and no alerts or learning notes have been circulated. (b) East of England Ambulance NHS Trust investigation did not identify a number of risks and omissions its investigation of this child death: i. inflation pressure being a potential cause of failure to secure a paediatric airway adjunct in life threatening asthma the consequence of this being increased ventilations pressure would be required ii. Intramuscular adrenalin was not administered for life threatening asthma for a child in respiratory arrest in accordance with JRCALC iii. Intravenous adrenalin was not given or attempted when the patient went into cardiac arrest in accordance with the resuscitation guidelines and Intraosseous access was not attempted for a child in cardiac arrest for at least 10 minutes and only when the patient was in the ambulance. ”

    Source location

    WILLIAM BRIAN KIN GRAY · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement the Patient Safety Improvement Response Framework for developing patient-safety systems and learning from incidents.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Your report also referred to the Serious Incident investigation and missed opportunities for learning. Since this investigation, the Trust has implemented the Patient Safety Improvement Response Framework, which was produced by NHS England and sets out the approach to developing effective patient safety systems and learning from these incidents. The approval process for identifying actions from patient safety incidents is now more robust in that an Action Setting Group meets fortnightly to review incident reports and set appropriate actions.”

    Source location

    Response from East of England Ambulance Service
    Page 3 · response
    Published 12 December 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Establish fortnightly Action Setting Group reviews of incident reports to set appropriate actions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Your report also referred to the Serious Incident investigation and missed opportunities for learning. Since this investigation, the Trust has implemented the Patient Safety Improvement Response Framework, which was produced by NHS England and sets out the approach to developing effective patient safety systems and learning from these incidents. The approval process for identifying actions from patient safety incidents is now more robust in that an Action Setting Group meets fortnightly to review incident reports and set appropriate actions.”

    Source location

    Response from East of England Ambulance Service
    Page 3 · response
    Published 12 December 2023

    Open published response
  10. Leicester City and South Leicestershire

    AI-generated summary

    Lindy Lyanne ASTON · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Lindy Lyanne Aston underwent a total gastrectomy for stomach cancer and later suffered a ruptured spleen, requiring emergency surgery. She was transferred from Kettering General Hospital to Leicester Royal Infirmary, where she underwent a splenectomy, remained very unwell and died on 18 October 2021. The principal concerns were the decision not to provide immediate surgery at Kettering and inadequacies in the Trust’s investigation and incident-reporting processes, which delayed learning about potential care failures.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in Trust investigation of serious care concerns

    Wider context from the report

    “2) Trust investigations into Mrs Aston’s care – I am gravely concerned about the seeming inadequacies in the investigation and/or incident reporting processes at Kettering General Hospitals NHS Trust. The inquest was advised that a DATIX incident report was not raised in relation to Mrs Aston’s care or death. I am concerned about the fact that Kettering General Hospitals NHS Trust did not look into the care provided to Mrs Aston until such time as the University Hospitals of Leicester NHS Trust contacted them about the inquest. I am further concerned about the fact that when Kettering General Hospitals NHS Trust did look into the care provided to Mrs Aston they did so on the assumption that the clinical decision making had been appropriate, this makes the exploration of the care provided somewhat otiose. The Trust’s exploration of the care provided to Mrs Aston failed to identify the fact that surgery should have been undertaken within an hour and the fact that, despite some of the assurances to the contrary, it would have been appropriate and possible to undertake that life-saving surgery at Kettering General Hospital. The failure to properly investigate led to the wholly untenable situation where the Kettering General Hospital NHS Trust were alerted for the first time to the questionable clinical decision making and the potential errors in care at the inquest, which took place some 24 months after death (due to witness availability). I am concerned that the lack of robust critical analysis and investigation of the clinical decision making and care provided to Mrs Aston at Kettering General Hospitals NHS Trust before her death has caused a delay to, and led to missed opportunities to learn lessons that are vital to patient safety. My concerns relating to the inadequacy of the Trust’s exploration of the care provided to Mrs Aston and the risks related to that go far beyond just the care provided by the Surgical Team at Kettering General Hospital NHS Trust. The risks have the ability to prevent learning, therefore negatively impact upon patient safety, across the entire Trust. ”

    Source location

    Lindy Lyanne ASTON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of Trust investigations to identify critical care and treatment findings

    Wider context from the report

    “2) Trust investigations into Mrs Aston’s care – I am gravely concerned about the seeming inadequacies in the investigation and/or incident reporting processes at Kettering General Hospitals NHS Trust. The inquest was advised that a DATIX incident report was not raised in relation to Mrs Aston’s care or death. I am concerned about the fact that Kettering General Hospitals NHS Trust did not look into the care provided to Mrs Aston until such time as the University Hospitals of Leicester NHS Trust contacted them about the inquest. I am further concerned about the fact that when Kettering General Hospitals NHS Trust did look into the care provided to Mrs Aston they did so on the assumption that the clinical decision making had been appropriate, this makes the exploration of the care provided somewhat otiose. The Trust’s exploration of the care provided to Mrs Aston failed to identify the fact that surgery should have been undertaken within an hour and the fact that, despite some of the assurances to the contrary, it would have been appropriate and possible to undertake that life-saving surgery at Kettering General Hospital. The failure to properly investigate led to the wholly untenable situation where the Kettering General Hospital NHS Trust were alerted for the first time to the questionable clinical decision making and the potential errors in care at the inquest, which took place some 24 months after death (due to witness availability). I am concerned that the lack of robust critical analysis and investigation of the clinical decision making and care provided to Mrs Aston at Kettering General Hospitals NHS Trust before her death has caused a delay to, and led to missed opportunities to learn lessons that are vital to patient safety. My concerns relating to the inadequacy of the Trust’s exploration of the care provided to Mrs Aston and the risks related to that go far beyond just the care provided by the Surgical Team at Kettering General Hospital NHS Trust. The risks have the ability to prevent learning, therefore negatively impact upon patient safety, across the entire Trust. ”

    Source location

    Lindy Lyanne ASTON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of robust critical analysis to deliver timely patient-safety learning

    Wider context from the report

    “2) Trust investigations into Mrs Aston’s care – I am gravely concerned about the seeming inadequacies in the investigation and/or incident reporting processes at Kettering General Hospitals NHS Trust. The inquest was advised that a DATIX incident report was not raised in relation to Mrs Aston’s care or death. I am concerned about the fact that Kettering General Hospitals NHS Trust did not look into the care provided to Mrs Aston until such time as the University Hospitals of Leicester NHS Trust contacted them about the inquest. I am further concerned about the fact that when Kettering General Hospitals NHS Trust did look into the care provided to Mrs Aston they did so on the assumption that the clinical decision making had been appropriate, this makes the exploration of the care provided somewhat otiose. The Trust’s exploration of the care provided to Mrs Aston failed to identify the fact that surgery should have been undertaken within an hour and the fact that, despite some of the assurances to the contrary, it would have been appropriate and possible to undertake that life-saving surgery at Kettering General Hospital. The failure to properly investigate led to the wholly untenable situation where the Kettering General Hospital NHS Trust were alerted for the first time to the questionable clinical decision making and the potential errors in care at the inquest, which took place some 24 months after death (due to witness availability). I am concerned that the lack of robust critical analysis and investigation of the clinical decision making and care provided to Mrs Aston at Kettering General Hospitals NHS Trust before her death has caused a delay to, and led to missed opportunities to learn lessons that are vital to patient safety. My concerns relating to the inadequacy of the Trust’s exploration of the care provided to Mrs Aston and the risks related to that go far beyond just the care provided by the Surgical Team at Kettering General Hospital NHS Trust. The risks have the ability to prevent learning, therefore negatively impact upon patient safety, across the entire Trust. ”

    Source location

    Lindy Lyanne ASTON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to conduct impartial investigation of clinical decision-making

    Wider context from the report

    “2) Trust investigations into Mrs Aston’s care – I am gravely concerned about the seeming inadequacies in the investigation and/or incident reporting processes at Kettering General Hospitals NHS Trust. The inquest was advised that a DATIX incident report was not raised in relation to Mrs Aston’s care or death. I am concerned about the fact that Kettering General Hospitals NHS Trust did not look into the care provided to Mrs Aston until such time as the University Hospitals of Leicester NHS Trust contacted them about the inquest. I am further concerned about the fact that when Kettering General Hospitals NHS Trust did look into the care provided to Mrs Aston they did so on the assumption that the clinical decision making had been appropriate, this makes the exploration of the care provided somewhat otiose. The Trust’s exploration of the care provided to Mrs Aston failed to identify the fact that surgery should have been undertaken within an hour and the fact that, despite some of the assurances to the contrary, it would have been appropriate and possible to undertake that life-saving surgery at Kettering General Hospital. The failure to properly investigate led to the wholly untenable situation where the Kettering General Hospital NHS Trust were alerted for the first time to the questionable clinical decision making and the potential errors in care at the inquest, which took place some 24 months after death (due to witness availability). I am concerned that the lack of robust critical analysis and investigation of the clinical decision making and care provided to Mrs Aston at Kettering General Hospitals NHS Trust before her death has caused a delay to, and led to missed opportunities to learn lessons that are vital to patient safety. My concerns relating to the inadequacy of the Trust’s exploration of the care provided to Mrs Aston and the risks related to that go far beyond just the care provided by the Surgical Team at Kettering General Hospital NHS Trust. The risks have the ability to prevent learning, therefore negatively impact upon patient safety, across the entire Trust. ”

    Source location

    Lindy Lyanne ASTON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Rewrite and implement the mortality-review policy for externally identified concerns, including formal notification, committee oversight, Structured Judgement Review, escalation and multidisciplinary review.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have reviewed the Trusts Medical Examiner and Mortality Review and Learning from Adult Inpatient Deaths Policy (Ref GOV01). The policy is very clear in relation to the Structured Judgement Review (SJR) outcomes. Section 8 of this policy refers to the processes to be followed when the outcome of an SJR is deemed very poor or avoidable with a score of 1-3. More specifically, section 8.5 refers to the process to be followed when an SJR is referred from an external organisation, for example when a patient was treated at KGH, then transferred to another hospital, and dies. This section states that these referred concerns will go through an SJR process and governance process for mortality reviews.”

    Source location

    Response from Kettering General Hospital NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 December 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The round table panel concluded that no further action was necessary regarding the concerns about the patient's care.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A round table panel was convened 23/2/2022, following notification from the Coroner of Mrs Aston’s death. The panel made the decision that no further action need be taken.”

    Source location

    Response from Kettering General Hospital NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 December 2023

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026