Recurring concern

Unreliable multi-agency communication procedures

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First reported 29 May 2013•Latest report 16 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of explicitly multi-agency communication procedures that impair the timely, accurate and complete exchange of safety-relevant information between involved agencies, including the anchor's prison-services communication failure.

Not included

  • Excludes generic communication, training, staffing or coordination deficiencies where no explicitly multi-agency communication procedure is identified.
  • Excludes failures confined to a single organisation's internal communication process.
  • Excludes failures of a separately named pathway, system or hazard when that concern provides the more specific supported boundary.
  • Excludes neutral descriptions of multi-agency working without an identified unsafe communication condition.
Reports
134

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
145

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
303

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care17
NHS England17
Ministry of Justice14
HM Prison and Probation Service10
Home Office8
Recipient name withheld6
Metropolitan Police Service5
Association of Ambulance Chief Executives4
East London NHS Foundation Trust4
National Police Chiefs’ Council4
Care Quality Commission3
College of Policing3
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust3
Greater Manchester Police3
NHS Greater Manchester Integrated Care Board3

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Central and South East Kent

    AI-generated summary

    Michael Longley · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Michael Longley had an adverse reaction to Rivaroxaban administered after hip surgery. He was admitted to hospital with an unrecordable platelet count and died the same day; the report also identified difficulties in communication between Integrated Care 24 and the District Nursing Service.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of effective oral and written communication between integrated care and district nursing services

    Wider context from the report

    “I heard evidence that Integrated Care 24 had difficulties in contacted the District Nursing Service on 25th December 2011 and I consider that improved methods of both oral and written communication between IC24 and the district nurses must be put in place. ”

    Source location

    Michael Longley · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  2. Milton Keynes

    AI-generated summary

    Doris Phoebe Miller · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    The circumstances of Doris Phoebe Miller’s death are not provided in the supplied text. Concerns included the GP surgery’s lack of access to her transferred medical records, ineffective communication about an urgent blood test, and the absence of a pulse oximeter at the surgery.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of an effective communication system between GP surgeries and district nurses

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) On the 23rd July 2013 the GP had requested the district nurses to attend Mrs Miller to carry out an urgent blood test. The GP was dismayed to discover a week later that the call out sample had not been taken and that the results, therefore, were not available to her. There appears to be no system for effective communication between the GP surgery and the district nurses. Again this gives rise to a concern that lives may be at risk. ”

    Source location

    Doris Phoebe Miller · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  3. Oxfordshire

    AI-generated summary

    DAVID LESLIE SELMAN · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    David Leslie Selman, who had schizophrenia and epilepsy, died after consuming a large amount of legal highs that adversely reacted with his prescription drugs. When he developed unusual behaviour, shaking and spasms at a public house, ambulance attendance was delayed by a miscommunication about whether the crew should stand down or stand back, and information about his condition was not passed on for reassessment of the resources needed. He later went into cardiac arrest before arriving at hospital and could not be revived; the inquest recorded multiple drug toxicity as the medical cause of death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in communication between police and the ambulance control room

    Wider context from the report

    “5.1 There was a miscommunication, or misunderstanding, between the control room and the ambulance staff as regards to whether they were required to stand down or stand back. 5.2 If they had stood back as instructed then I understand they would have been only a matter of two to three minutes away from the scene as opposed to ten to twelve minutes. In addition to the slight delays in communication between the police and the ambulance control room, this exacerbated a problem. ”

    Source location

    DAVID LESLIE SELMAN · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
  4. Worcestershire

    AI-generated summary

    Dana Louise Baker · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Dana Louise Baker was a looked after child whose foster placement broke down, after which she stayed with an adult friend and the following day hanged herself in a public place. The principal concerns were inadequate knowledge, understanding and communication between agencies, and the confidential handling of Individual Management Reviews, which prevented agencies from understanding areas of mutual concern.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequate communication between agencies

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) As outlined in the IMR's, the Serious Case Review and the draft Overview Report there was a lack of knowledge and understanding as between various agencies involved with Dana and inadequate communication between them. ”

    Source location

    Dana Louise Baker · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to share interagency serious incident reviews

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) The IMR's are kept confidential and not even shared as between Agencies concerned. Some IMR authors indicated that they could not comment on areas of "mutual concern" because they were unaware of the content of other Agency's IMR's. ”

    Source location

    Dana Louise Baker · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Share Individual Management Reviews between participating agencies as part of Serious Case Reviews.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The sharing of IMRs between agencies on the Panel has always been a key element of the SCR process and the more collaborative 'systems approach'”

    Source location

    2014-0242-Response-by-Safeguarding-Children-Board
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 May 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing guidance and established inter-agency sharing of Individual Management Reviews are considered sufficient to address the concern.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I would suggest that the current government guidance contained in Working Together to Safeguard Children 2013, together with the knowledge that Worcestershire Safeguarding Children Board has fully embraced this guidance, would help to address the issue of the sharing of IMRs which you have raised in the Regulation Report. Government guidance has been developed in the time since EW's death and WSCB has responded positively to this change.”

    Source location

    2014-0242-Response-by-Safeguarding-Children-Board
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 May 2014

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026