Recurring concern

Unreliable multi-agency communication procedures

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First reported 29 May 2013•Latest report 16 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of explicitly multi-agency communication procedures that impair the timely, accurate and complete exchange of safety-relevant information between involved agencies, including the anchor's prison-services communication failure.

Not included

  • Excludes generic communication, training, staffing or coordination deficiencies where no explicitly multi-agency communication procedure is identified.
  • Excludes failures confined to a single organisation's internal communication process.
  • Excludes failures of a separately named pathway, system or hazard when that concern provides the more specific supported boundary.
  • Excludes neutral descriptions of multi-agency working without an identified unsafe communication condition.
Reports
134

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
145

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
303

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care17
NHS England17
Ministry of Justice14
HM Prison and Probation Service10
Home Office8
Recipient name withheld6
Metropolitan Police Service5
Association of Ambulance Chief Executives4
East London NHS Foundation Trust4
National Police Chiefs’ Council4
Care Quality Commission3
College of Policing3
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust3
Greater Manchester Police3
NHS Greater Manchester Integrated Care Board3

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Suffolk

    AI-generated summary

    Anthony Robert CARD · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Anthony Robert CARD, known as Tony, died by suicide by suspension by ligature at 15 Duke Street, Ipswich, between about noon on 21 and 22 November 2023. The report identifies a concern that, outside Care Act safeguarding criteria, there was no mechanism for police to communicate medium-risk mental-health information to relevant medical or mental-health providers, potentially resulting in missed support or affecting later decision-making.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a mechanism for police to communicate consented mental-health risk information to medical or mental health care providers

    Wider context from the report

    “Outside of situations where section 42 of the Care Act 2014 applies, there appears to be no mechanism available to enable front-line police officers who wish, of their own volition and with the subject's consent, to communicate risk information, arising out of an interaction with an adult at Medium risk to self from mental ill-health, to medical or mental health care providers, whom may be the right person or agencies to provide support in the medium term. The information that an individual has, for example, been reported as presenting in such a way that police have had to consider detaining them under section 136 of the Mental Health Act 1983 could be important risk information that would assist medical or mental health care providers. Not having this risk information available in future assessments may adversely affect decision-making - e.g. not having this information available could contribute to a decision not to admit compulsorily the patient for mental health care if they were to present again in, say, one week from the police interaction. If such risk information is not received by treating medical or mental health care providers, there may be omission to offer vital further mental health support. ”

    Source location

    Anthony Robert CARD · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require the Contact and Control Room to confirm NHS 111 Option 2 was signposted or contacted before closing a CAD incident.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Suffolk Constabulary commit to:”

    Source location

    Response from Suffolk Constabulary
    Page 3 · response
    Published 12 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue consulting partner agencies to evaluate NHS 111 Option 2’s operability, reliability, staff knowledge, and training needs.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Suffolk Constabulary is committed to continuing to consult with partner agencies to encourage a multi-agency approach to evaluating the operability and reliability of NHS 111 Option 2 and whether improvements can be made to strengthen staff knowledge and training. It is respectfully submitted that the existing clinical pathways provide an adequate mechanism for raising mental health concerns in circumstances where statutory thresholds are not met. It is important to consider alongside this the limitations of police powers, the role of Adult Social Care and the statutory role of NSFT in dealing with adult mental health concerns across Suffolk as addressed above.”

    Source location

    Response from Suffolk Constabulary
    Page 4 · response
    Published 12 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue cooperating with partner agencies and sharing relevant information under applicable arrangements to support timely clinically led crisis assessment when suicide risk is identified.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “SCC will continue to co-operate with other partner agencies and share relevant information in accordance with applicable information-sharing arrangements, to support timely access to clinically led crisis assessment where suicide risk is identified”

    Source location

    Response from Suffolk County Council
    Page 3 · response
    Published 12 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing NHS 111 Option 2 clinical pathways provide an adequate mechanism for raising adult mental health concerns below statutory thresholds.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Suffolk Constabulary is committed to continuing to consult with partner agencies to encourage a multi-agency approach to evaluating the operability and reliability of NHS 111 Option 2 and whether improvements can be made to strengthen staff knowledge and training. It is respectfully submitted that the existing clinical pathways provide an adequate mechanism for raising mental health concerns in circumstances where statutory thresholds are not met. It is important to consider alongside this the limitations of police powers, the role of Adult Social Care and the statutory role of NSFT in dealing with adult mental health concerns across Suffolk as addressed above.”

    Source location

    Response from Suffolk Constabulary
    Page 4 · response
    Published 12 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    NSFT holds statutory and operational responsibility for adult mental health care across Suffolk, rather than MASH or the police.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Your Regulation 28 Report is addressed to both Suffolk Constabulary and Suffolk County Council (Adult Social Care), however is not addressed to Norfolk and Suffolk NHS Foundation Trust (“NSFT”). It is important to note that NSFT hold both the statutory and operational responsibility for adult mental health care across Suffolk.”

    Source location

    Response from Suffolk Constabulary
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    A new MASH pathway is not viable because projected referrals would impose substantial operational impact and require structural redesign.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A new MASH referral pathway for adult mental health concerns is not, in our respectful submission, viable. Creating a pathway for Medium-risk adult mental health referrals falling short of section 42 of the Mental Health Act would generate an estimated 500 additional referrals per month, creating substantial operational impact across the police and Adult Social Care. This would require a structural redesign of MASH which, in our view, would not lead to improved outcomes due to adult mental health sitting wholly within the remit of NSFT as opposed to within MASH. As addressed below, NHS 111 Option 2 already exists as the appropriate clinical route for sharing concerns falling outside of the statutory framework.”

    Source location

    Response from Suffolk Constabulary
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Adult mental health provision and clinical pathways are the responsibility of NHS commissioners and mental health providers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The responsibility for adult mental health provision and clinical pathways as identified by the report rests predominantly with NHS commissioners and NHS mental health providers (this is without prejudice to SCC’s distinct statutory responsibilities in respect of mental health social care, including Care Act functions and, where applicable, joint aftercare duties under the Mental Health Act).”

    Source location

    Response from Suffolk County Council
    Page 1 · response
    Published 12 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    SCC will not create a new MASH pathway for adult mental health-only referrals outside safeguarding or adult social care functions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Where information relates solely to adult mental health concerns and does not meet statutory adult safeguarding criteria and/or does not otherwise engage adult social care functions, SCC is not the appropriate recipient for clinical triage or onward clinical referral into adult mental health pathways. Where a contact nonetheless indicates an appearance of care and support needs, SCC will consider whether Care Act assessment duties are engaged.”

    Source location

    Response from Suffolk County Council
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 February 2026

    Open published response
  2. Wiltshire and Swindon

    AI-generated summary

    Christopher John Bird (“Chris”) · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Christopher John Bird died by suicide on 19 September 2024 after placing his head on a railway line near South Marston and being struck by a freight train. The report found that a mental-health response sent to primary care was not received, and that this communication failure meant he was not updated about his referral and more likely than not exacerbated his mixed anxiety and depression. It also raised concern about the reliability of nhs.net email for transmitting important information between mental-health and primary-care services.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of nhs.net email to reliably deliver important information to GP practices

    Wider context from the report

    “During the course of the Inquest, I heard evidence from ████████ the joint Senior Partner at The White Horse Medical Practice. Having asked colleagues to carry out a forensic search for evidence of the e-mail having been received and finding none he did allude to a view that was not shared by him alone, but by colleagues both within the Surgery and it appears colleagues in other surgeries that there were concerns that when using the nhs.net e-mail e-mails had gone missing and were not received through the system suggesting its 100% reliability. I personally have not come across another case where this issue has been raised but there is no evidence that I saw that pointed to the e-mail having been incorrectly sent by mental health to the GP practice and I have to accept ████████ evidence that there is no evidence to support it was in fact received. The systemic failure in my view more than minimally contributed to the deterioration in Chris’ mental health that led to his death late afternoon on the 19 September 2024. When Chris spoke with another GP on the 16 September 2024, she was unaware of the response from mental health because the e-mail indicating in detail the nature of that response was never received by the GP practice. She in turn contacted the embedded mental health social worker the next day via e-mail although however he was not available that day hence the assumption that that was the reason if not a combined reason for Chris’ case being discussed at the hub meeting on the 19 September 2024. If there is a reliability issue with the use of nhs.net for whatever reason such as old infrastructure, in that clearly is a concern and one which I am of the view could impact on future deaths if important information having been sent through the system is not guaranteed to be received and is lost; During the course of the Inquest it became clear that there had been a systemic failure in relation to the communication from mental health to primary care on the 28 August 2024 and I asked and indicated that I would like both organisations to work together to reflect on the finding in relation to ways of working relative to the interaction between secondary and primary care levels to see if there are any measures that could be undertaken to minimise and ideally exclude the repetition of such an incident occurring again. It is not the job of a Coroner to make recommendations. You are aware of my concern here and I am sure that Chris' brother, ████████ would equally welcome your joint input in respect of the matter. ”

    Source location

    Christopher John Bird (“Chris”) · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use DocMan instead of email for DWF Hub referral-outcome communication with GPs, except when the referrer explicitly requests email.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. Primary Care Mental Health Hubs The manager of the Didcot, Wantage and Faringdon Hub (”DWF Hub”) attended the inquest and provided you with some evidence on the day. They have introduced an immediate change to the practice at the DWF Hub. The change is that the DWF Hub has changed its practice, and now also uses the DocMan system as the means of communication with GPs with regard to the outcome of a referral. The team no longer uses email, save where there is an explicit request for email to be used by the referrer.”

    Source location

    Response from Oxford Health NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 September 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Evaluate the DWF Hub’s DocMan process and use Trust governance processes to decide whether to adopt it across the other Hub teams.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “There are seven other Hub teams in Oxfordshire (eight in total with the DWF Hub being one). The plan is for the Trust to evaluate the use of DocMan by the DWF Hub and we will then utilise Trust governance processes to make a decision on whether the new process is adopted in each of the hubs.”

    Source location

    Response from Oxford Health NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 September 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review AMHT communication practice, identify available changes and assess which options could strengthen controls against GPs missing important communications.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Service Managers agreed to talk to their teams about how communication with GPs is happening and whether anything can/should be done to make an”

    Source location

    Response from Oxford Health NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 September 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Undertake Clinical Safety Cases, Hazard Logs and Data Protection Impact Assessments before national NHSmail deployment.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Prior to the roll out of NHSmail across England, Clinical Safety Cases, Hazard Logs, and Data Protection Impact Assessments were undertaken to support the delivery of the service at a national level. Clinical Safety Cases are used to ensure any clinical risks, hazards and potential harms are identified prior to deployment and these are managed within either product development or within system adoption methodologies. The model uses joint data controllers and clearly sets out in the requirements of organisations using the service, that they have similar local-level policies in place.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 September 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Trust will not change AMHT communication practices until it understands available options, utility and potential consequences.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “improvement. Email communication with GPs is commonplace across AMHTs and the Trust must apply diligence to any decision to direct staff to change their practice. That is particularly so because managers are not aware of any similar incidents between AMHTs and GPs and the Trust is reticent to make what could be a significant change without being confident that it will have utility for service users of AMHT services.”

    Source location

    Response from Oxford Health NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 29 September 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The forensic search found that the mental health email was received by the GP practice and copied into the patient's clinical record.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Forensic discovery has confirmed that a referral letter was sent from the White Horse Medical Practice via the electronic referral service (e-RS) to the community mental health team at 8:40am on 28 August 2024 by the GP administration team.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 3 · response
    Published 29 September 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    NHSmail is considered reliable and resilient, with monitoring, recovery mechanisms, support arrangements and established clinical safety controls.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NHSmail is considered a reliable and resilient email platform, specifically designed and maintained for NHS business communications, with systems put in place to protect and recover from common IT failures like outages. While occasional incidents do occur, such as delayed arrival of emails in the destination mailbox, the overall reliability is strong, and service status is closely monitored and reported on the NHS support webpage, with disruptions usually resolved quickly and service continuity prioritized. All users of NHSmail are encouraged to contact their local administrator or service desk if they are experiencing any issues. If these cannot be resolved by the user’s local IT team, then there is a national NHSmail helpdesk which operates 24 hours a day.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 September 2025

    Open published response
  3. West Yorkshire Eastern

    AI-generated summary

    Christian Barry · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Christian Barry, who had recent alcohol withdrawal and worsening mental health symptoms, was found hanging in a bathroom at a respite facility on 6 January 2025 and was pronounced dead at the scene. The principal concern was the lack of a formal system for communication, information sharing and handover between the respite facility and the clinical service responsible for his care, including after a planned 48-hour review was missed.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a formal system for communication, information sharing and handover between the respite facility and the Intensive Support Service

    Wider context from the report

    “There remains no system for formal communication, sharing and handover of information about patients who are admitted to the respite facility operated by Leeds Survivor-Led Crisis Service, but remain under the clinical care of the Intensive Support Service at Leeds and Yorkshire Partnership Foundation Trust. It was candidly accepted in evidence that there needs to be an improvement in communication channels and information sharing for the partnership to run efficiently and effectively and to mitigate risk. ”

    Source location

    Christian Barry · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use a standardised daily handover template to capture clinical information, reviews, tasks, incidents, MDT comments and required follow-up.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1. Standardised Daily Handover and implementation of daily ‘huddle’ meeting”

    Source location

    Response from Leeds and Yorkshire Partnership Foundation Trust and Leeds Survivor-Led Crisis Service
    Page 1 · response
    Published 19 September 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Hold a daily Oasis–CRISS huddle to discuss handover information and address immediate actions and queries.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Once completed, the handover sheet is emailed to the appropriate LYPFT Crisis Resolution Intensive Support Service (CRISS) team. There are three locality teams East, South, and West, and the handover is sent to the corresponding area in which the individual is currently receiving care. The shift coordinator within the CRISS team is responsible for accessing this information and ensuring this is taken for discussion in the daily ‘huddle’ meeting as described below.”

    Source location

    Response from Leeds and Yorkshire Partnership Foundation Trust and Leeds Survivor-Led Crisis Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 September 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Ensure CRISS shift coordinators bring Oasis handover information to each locality’s daily multidisciplinary team meeting.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. Multidisciplinary Review Meetings”

    Source location

    Response from Leeds and Yorkshire Partnership Foundation Trust and Leeds Survivor-Led Crisis Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 September 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Record handover details and required actions in Oasis’s own system.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3. Documentation improvements”

    Source location

    Response from Leeds and Yorkshire Partnership Foundation Trust and Leeds Survivor-Led Crisis Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 September 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Add Oasis handover notes, MDT discussions and required actions to LYPFT care records.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• LYPFT adds Oasis handover notes to the patient’s LYPFT care record as well as a full record of the MDT discussion and any required action.”

    Source location

    Response from Leeds and Yorkshire Partnership Foundation Trust and Leeds Survivor-Led Crisis Service
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 September 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide training on the handover sheet, including each organisation’s roles and responsibilities.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “5. Training and Governance”

    Source location

    Response from Leeds and Yorkshire Partnership Foundation Trust and Leeds Survivor-Led Crisis Service
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 September 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Monitor handover-process compliance and effectiveness through audits and feedback mechanisms.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “5. Training and Governance”

    Source location

    Response from Leeds and Yorkshire Partnership Foundation Trust and Leeds Survivor-Led Crisis Service
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 September 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Explore Oasis staff access to LYPFT’s electronic patient record and discuss the proposal through the operations meeting.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition to the above, the CRISS team at LYPFT and Oasis staff are exploring the possibility of Oasis staff having access to LYPFT’s electronic patient record. This will be taken for further discussion through the operations meeting (described below).”

    Source location

    Response from Leeds and Yorkshire Partnership Foundation Trust and Leeds Survivor-Led Crisis Service
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 September 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing referral, admission, joint review, interface, operations and governance processes provide formal communication and risk-management arrangements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We would also like to take this opportunity to describe the escalation processes and monitoring we currently have in place to ensure formal communication, risk management, and information sharing for patients admitted to the respite facility:”

    Source location

    Response from Leeds and Yorkshire Partnership Foundation Trust and Leeds Survivor-Led Crisis Service
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 September 2025

    Open published response
  4. Milton Keynes

    AI-generated summary

    Brian Thomas RINGROSE · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Brian Thomas Ringrose died on 2 February 2021 after being taken to hospital following an overdose and then subjected to prolonged prone restraint by police. The report identifies concerns about police restraint practices and welfare monitoring, communication and handover, prioritisation of transport over welfare, and the hospital and mental health teams’ assessment, communication and discharge processes.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to communicate concerns that a patient is not medically fit for discharge

    Wider context from the report

    “Thames Valley Police Inadequate application of police restraint training The evidence demonstrated that the officers who initially restrained Mr. Ringrose failed to follow their training in multiple critical respects: a) Officers maintained Mr. Ringrose in a prone position for a prolonged period (over 20 minutes with only a brief interruption) despite training that warns of the dangers of positional asphyxia in a restrained prone position. b) Officers positioned Mr. Ringrose's arms in extreme and abnormal positions (between 90-180 degrees) while handcuffed behind his back, causing severe shoulder injuries including torn ligaments, muscles, and deep internal bruising. c) Officers failed to place Mr. Ringrose on his side as soon as practicable after handcuffing and applying leg restraints, contrary to their training. There were opportunities when this could have been done. d) One officer inappropriately dragged Mr. Ringrose by his arms across the floor without informing the other officer or Mr. Ringrose he was about to do so despite being within a few feet only of both, causing significant pain to Brian. Failure to apply the National Decision Model Officers failed to apply the National Decision Model to reassess their actions during the restraint, particularly: a) When Mr. Ringrose was briefly on his side or back at around 15:31 and had become calmer, officers returned him to the prone position without reasonable justification. b) When hospital security staff arrived at approximately 15:35, providing an opportunity to reassess the situation, appoint a safety officer, and move Mr. Ringrose to his side, the officers failed to do so. Ineffective welfare monitoring The officers failed to adequately monitor Mr. Ringrose's welfare during restraint: a) Officers did not appropriately listen to, interpret, or react to Mr. Ringrose's breathing despite their close proximity, instead attributing his deteriorating condition to purposeful actions. b) Officers failed to check that Mr. Ringrose's airways were clear or monitor his breathing rate, despite their training to monitor the welfare of anyone in police custody without relying on medical professionals. c) Officers failed to voice concerns about Mr. Ringrose's changing pallor, which progressed from extremely pale to blue, red, and even purple. Failure of officers to "speak up and speak out" The officers failed to challenge inappropriate restraint techniques: a) None of the officers present, including those who arrived later, questioned the circumstances, duration, or manner of the restraint, despite police training requiring officers to "speak up and speak out." b) No officer raised concerns about the extreme position of Mr. Ringrose's arms or the prolonged prone restraint, despite this clearly contravening their training on positional asphyxia risks. c) No officer sought advice on Mr Ringrose’s clinical condition from the many clinical staff who were stood around watching the event. Inadequate communication and handover There were significant failures in communication between officers: a) When additional officers arrived to transport Mr. Ringrose, the initial restraining officers did not inform them of how long Mr. Ringrose had been restrained in the prone position or that his arms had been elevated and the arriving officers were passive in not making any enquiry as to that. b) Officers relied on the passive inaction of hospital staff who were stood about watching, rather than actively requesting them to assess Mr. Ringrose's condition. Inappropriate prioritisation of transport over welfare After the arrival of additional officers at approximately 15:45: a) All officers became primarily focused on applying the Flexible Lift and Carry System (FLACS) and transporting Mr. Ringrose to police custody rather than monitoring his welfare. b) During the ongoing restraint and application of the FLACS, none of the officers monitored Mr. Ringrose's welfare instead focussing on how to apply a device none had adequate experience of. Central and Northwest London NHS Foundation Trust a) Delay in Assessment: There was a significant delay in the mental health team attending to Brian in the Emergency Department (ED), despite the urgency of his condition. b) Inadequate Assessment: When the mental health team did attend, they felt unable to assess Brian due to his unresponsiveness but did not escalate their concerns or communicate effectively with medical staff or police. They did not plan to return to follow up on Brian Ringrose. c) Failure to Escalate Concerns: A member of the mental health team believed Brian was not medically fit for discharge but failed to voice this to medical staff or police. d) Unsafe Communication Practices: Reliance on verbal communication and delayed written notes (within a maximum 24 hours) is inherently risky in emergency settings, as contemporaneous notes are essential for critical information to be promptly shared with other clinical and nursing staff dealing with patients. e) Inappropriate Discharge Recommendation: The mental health team suggested reassessment in police custody, despite Brian’s ongoing medical instability. In my view this represented a very high risk to Brian’s safety. Milton Keynes University Hospital NHS Foundation Trust a) Non-existent Documentation Referenced in Policy: The hospital policy makes reference to a "discharge for police custody form" that does not actually exist. This suggests the policy was hastily created, possibly for the purposes of satisfying the inquest requirements, without appropriate consideration of its content or implementation. b) Misleading Discharge Documentation: The discharge form generated by hospital staff was interpreted by police officers as a formal discharge notice, as the jury found. The current system allows for the generation of forms that may be misinterpreted by third parties as official discharge documents when they may not be. c) Unsafe Form Design: The process of generating discharge forms and additional notes requires staff to advance through a structure that may include boxes not meant to be ticked but none the less resulting in production of a document purporting to be a “Discharge Notice” which the police then understandably but erroneously rely on. This poses a risk to patient safety through potential misunderstanding of care requirements. d) Inadequate Discharge Review Process: The decision on whether patients should have a final review by doctors before formal medical discharge is reportedly scheduled to be made by a committee by June 2025. Given that four years had already passed since Brian's death at the time of Inquest, this timeline for implementing such a critical safety measure is unreasonably prolonged, and, in my view, cannot be supported. An immediate decision by the clinical director should have been made to institute final medical reviews before discharge. e) Ambiguous discharge process: The ED doctor’s plan for discharge was vague (“more awake”), not aligned with ToxBase guidance, and not clearly documented and not clearly communicated. The ED doctor told the jury that he did not assess or intend that Brian was fit for discharge at the time he was removed from the ED. I note however that when Brian was being removed he did not intervene or seek to prevent it. f) Unsafe supervision: There were a number of senior clinicians and nursing staff present and seen to be watching the restraint of Brian. None of those senior individuals asserted their authority and made enquiry or intervened. g) Premature Discharge: Brian was not medically fit for discharge (still symptomatic, GCS still not recovered, ECG not done as required, Toxbase recommendations not followed) ”

    Source location

    Brian Thomas RINGROSE · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require escalation to emergency-department clinicians, continued emergency-department medical care and liaison-team availability for reassessment when patients cannot engage or remain medically unfit.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “b. Inadequate Assessment Our revised protocol mandates that when a patient cannot engage due to intoxication (alcohol or drugs) or other factors rendering them unfit, the HLT must escalate concerns to the ED team, advise that the patient remains under ED care for ongoing medical management, and the HLT remain available for reassessment. This ensures continuity of care and avoids missed opportunities for intervention. This applies equally in cases where the patient is under police arrest within the ED.”

    Source location

    Response from Central and North West London NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 4 August 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require immediate escalation of concerns to the treating medic or nurse in charge through the Operational Policy.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “c. Failure to Escalate Concerns We have strengthened our escalation pathways. A standing agenda item has been added to monthly cross-team meetings to review HLT practices. Our Operational Policy now explicitly requires immediate escalation of concerns to the treating medic or nurse in charge.”

    Source location

    Response from Central and North West London NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 4 August 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement the Emergency Department adult-discharge SOP defining discharge responsibilities, documentation requirements, safety-netting, and safeguards for higher-risk patients.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In the course of investigating Brian’s death and preparing for the inquest, the decision-making, documentation and processes surrounding his discharge were an area of focus for the Trust in the context of the individual decision making and the actions and inactions of the healthcare professionals involved in his care. To be plain, the omissions were felt to be particular to this case and not a systemic issue requiring a change in wider policy and practice. The forensic level of examination of this issue at inquest enabled the Trust to reflect further on this and to consider whether wider change was in fact necessary to improve safety and make professional expectations explicit in a local context. To that end, the Emergency Department has developed and implemented a Standard Operating Procedure for the discharge of adult patients. This is appended at Appendix 2.”

    Source location

    Response from Milton Keynes University Hospitals
    Page 8 · response
    Published 4 August 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue anonymised learning events using Brian’s case in the Emergency Department to improve documentation and communication of risk.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “This is addressed in the Emergency Department SOP for the discharge of adult patients described above and appended at Appendix 2. The individuals involved in this case have reflected at great length about their actions and inactions. Brian’s death was a seminal event for the Trust and learning from it has been widely shared within the Emergency Department. Further learning events using Brian’s case (anonymised) will continue in the Emergency Department, both to raise awareness of risk of unclear documentation and communication, and to ensure that there is an enduring legacy of improvement following Brian’s death.”

    Source location

    Response from Milton Keynes University Hospitals
    Page 10 · response
    Published 4 August 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Share learning from Brian’s case across the Emergency Department to raise awareness of unclear documentation and communication risks.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “This is addressed in the Emergency Department SOP for the discharge of adult patients described above and appended at Appendix 2. The individuals involved in this case have reflected at great length about their actions and inactions. Brian’s death was a seminal event for the Trust and learning from it has been widely shared within the Emergency Department. Further learning events using Brian’s case (anonymised) will continue in the Emergency Department, both to raise awareness of risk of unclear documentation and communication, and to ensure that there is an enduring legacy of improvement following Brian’s death.”

    Source location

    Response from Milton Keynes University Hospitals
    Page 10 · response
    Published 4 August 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The discharge omissions were considered case-specific, not a systemic issue requiring wider policy or practice change.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In the course of investigating Brian’s death and preparing for the inquest, the decision-making, documentation and processes surrounding his discharge were an area of focus for the Trust in the context of the individual decision making and the actions and inactions of the healthcare professionals involved in his care. To be plain, the omissions were felt to be particular to this case and not a systemic issue requiring a change in wider policy and practice. The forensic level of examination of this issue at inquest enabled the Trust to reflect further on this and to consider whether wider change was in fact necessary to improve safety and make professional expectations explicit in a local context. To that end, the Emergency Department has developed and implemented a Standard Operating Procedure for the discharge of adult patients. This is appended at Appendix 2.”

    Source location

    Response from Milton Keynes University Hospitals
    Page 8 · response
    Published 4 August 2025

    Open published response
  5. Kent and Medway

    AI-generated summary

    Azroy Dawes-Clarke · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Azroy Dawes-Clarke died in hospital after self-ligaturing in HMP Elmley, followed by restraint, cardiac and respiratory arrest, and further arrests during conveyance and hospital treatment. The principal concerns included confused communication and unclear command structures among prison staff, healthcare professionals and paramedics, disproportionate and prolonged restraint, delays in obtaining medical assistance and starting CPR, and inadequate consideration of his breathing and positioning.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to establish a communication strategy during critical medical emergencies in custodial settings

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) As the jury noted, communication between attending prison staff, healthcare professionals and paramedics was confused. There was confusion as to who had command and control of the medical emergency, which public body took primacy and the difference in roles and responsibilities. Those attending the scene did not establish any sort of communication strategy or command structure. During prevention of future deaths evidence, there remained a lack of clarity and consistency as to how such a situation would be avoided if a critical medical emergency eventuated in a custodial setting again. (2) (3) ”

    Source location

    Azroy Dawes-Clarke · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report
  6. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Paul Christopher REEVES · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Paul Christopher Reeves died in hospital on 9 April 2024 after ingesting and aspirating mud following the use of unknown drugs or psychoactive substances, and suffering a cardiac arrest during re-intubation. The principal concerns related to inadequate communication between his supported accommodation and mental health team, uncertainty about staff responsibilities, escalation of concerns about his deteriorating condition, and staff knowledge, skills or training in responding to his behaviour in the community.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of communication with the treating mental health team

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Maygrove Road, the supported accommodation, is not a care home and there is no expectation that staff at the accommodation will administer or supervise medication. Despite this, staff at the accommodation documented that they had collected Mr Reeves’ medication ‘for daily supervision’. Staff were aware that it was an expectation, from the mental health unit, that the accommodation staff should supervise Mr Reeves’ compliance with his medication. There is no suggestion that the accommodation provider contacted the mental health unit to advise that this was something that they were unable to facilitate. The concerns here are twofold. First, there appeared to be a lack of awareness from staff at Maygrove Road about the nature and extent of what they could/should do to support residents. Second, there was a lack of communication with the treating mental health team. ”

    Source location

    Paul Christopher REEVES · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop guidance for specialist mental health services covering hospital discharge communication, support needs, risks and unplanned returns to supported accommodation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Our Quality and Improvement Team is currently developing a guidance document, due for completion by the end of September 2025, for staff working with specialist mental health services. This document will reinforce keeping in touch arrangements, ensuring that support teams are informed in advance when a customer is due for discharge from hospital or other clinical settings. It will also establish procedures to ensure that we receive up-to-date information about a customer’s support needs, including medication, legal status and any other known risks, prior to their return to supported accommodation and allow for concerns to be raised where we are unable to facilitate the level of support required, particularly around medication.”

    Source location

    Response from The Riverside Group Limited
    Page 2 · response
    Published 21 May 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Train and remind staff to communicate behavioural changes, environmental damage, deterioration and other welfare concerns promptly through appropriate clinical escalation channels.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Staff have been reminded of the importance of sharing behavioural changes, environmental damage or unusual incidents with the relevant mental health team — not only for safeguarding, but to ensure a collaborative, well-informed approach to care. The Senior Team Manager, ████████, held a Maygrove Service Improvement Meeting with the staff team on 4 February 2025 and a follow up via email was shared on 27 May 2025. This was addressed and completed within our three-month improvement plan completed in May 2025.”

    Source location

    Response from The Riverside Group Limited
    Page 3 · response
    Published 21 May 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Support Officers are not authorised or trained to restrain residents because their remit is supportive and non-clinical.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Support Officers are not authorised or trained to restrain residents. Their remit is supportive and non-clinical. Although this was an isolated incident and the coroner confirmed that it did not alter the outcome for Mr Reeves, we have used it as a learning opportunity. On 4 February 2025, Support Officers were reminded of their responsibilities in responding to residents in visible distress or potential danger. Further to the above, this included a reminder that any concerns regarding a customer’s mental or physical health should be reported to the appropriate teams, including management, without delay within 24 hours and that any issues or concerns related to assigned customers should be escalated to management and the clinical team for appropriate action.”

    Source location

    Response from The Riverside Group Limited
    Page 5 · response
    Published 21 May 2025

    Open published response
  7. Inner West London

    AI-generated summary

    Raihana Oluwamidalo Awolaja · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Raihana Oluwamidalo Awolaja, who was tracheostomy-dependent and required one-to-one nursing care, was left unsupervised at her residential care home for approximately fifteen minutes. Secretions blocked her tracheostomy, causing respiratory compromise and cardiac arrest; she was later resuscitated but died of hypoxic ischaemic brain injury. The principal concerns included inadequate supervision and staffing, possible shortcomings in training and communication, and concerns about the care provider’s investigation and handling of concerns raised by next of kin.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Insufficient communication with commissioning authorities and next of kin about care and supervision risks

    Wider context from the report

    “3. That TCT do not sufficiently communicate with the commissioning LA nor next of kin in relation to issues with care and supervision, for example not informing the named social worker nor the mother of the disciplinary proceedings against a staff member who left Raihana alone. This in turn leaves vulnerable residents at risk, as the named social workers and possibly the commissioning authority nor the next of kin will be aware of potential increased risks to the vulnerable child. This matter also goes to matter 2 above. ”

    Source location

    Raihana Oluwamidalo Awolaja · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement communication protocols for promptly and transparently sharing serious care or safeguarding concerns with families and local authorities.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• New Communication Protocols: We have implemented new communication protocols to ensure that all serious care or safeguarding concerns are promptly and transparently shared with the child’s family and the relevant local authority. This is done in accordance with the Patient Safety Incident Response Framework (PSIRF) and our updated incident management policy and procedures.”

    Source location

    Response from The Children’s Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 May 2025

    Open published response
  8. Lancashire and Blackburn with Darwen

    AI-generated summary

    Mary Frances Cunningham and 3 others · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mary Frances Cunningham, Grace Foulds, Anne Elizabeth Ferguson and Peter Anthony Westwell died in separate road traffic collisions involving drivers whose eyesight was below the legal standard for driving. The report raises concerns about the UK licensing system, including reliance on self-reporting, the lack of periodic visual checks, and the limitations of the number-plate test. It states that the DVLA continued to license the drivers involved despite their impaired vision.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to communicate unsafe visual assessments promptly to the DVLA

    Wider context from the report

    “Doctor/optometrist-patient medical confidentiality is an entrenched aspect of UK medical practice and is only rarely breached and this only occurs after protracted patient negotiations during which time a driver continues to drive their car. Unless there were to be some form of requirement for a driver's visual assessment that is believed the legal limit to be communicated to the DVLA, this safeguard by which the DVLA may be notified of a driver continue to drive against advice produces only a minimal number of cases each year. This is already known to the DVLA. ”

    Source location

    Mary Frances Cunningham and 3 others · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Work with eye healthcare professionals and regulatory bodies to identify and address barriers to notifying the DVLA when disclosure is in the public interest.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “However, I recognise that this may be challenging where there are concerns about confidentiality and the ethical implications of disclosing sensitive health information without a patient’s consent and where drivers dishonestly declare themselves to be non-drivers. I also acknowledge that this often involves protracted negotiations between healthcare professionals and their patients before a notification is made to the DVLA. My Department will work with eye healthcare professionals and their regulatory bodies to identify and aim to address any concerns and issues that may be preventing them from notifying the DVLA when it is in the public interest to do so.”

    Source location

    Response from Department for Transport
    Page 3 · response
    Published 25 April 2025

    Open published response
  9. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Bernard Lyon · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Bernard Lyon, who had dysphagia and was living at Hyde Nursing Home, developed sepsis and aspiration pneumonia and died at Tameside General Hospital on 30 January 2024. The report describes concerns about the nursing home's management capacity, staffing and adherence to his modified diet plan, as well as multi-agency oversight, communication with families, ambulance handover delays and delays in administering antibiotics in a very busy emergency department.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of CQC participation in multi-agency care home oversight meetings

    Wider context from the report

    “3. The inquest was told that the Local Authority regularly held MAC meetings to look at care home issues from a multi-agency perspective. The CQC was invited but rarely attended the meetings. As a consequence, the flow of information to the CQC was reduced. ”

    Source location

    Bernard Lyon · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Attend multi-agency meetings when concerns about care homes arise.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “CQC are surprised that this is the view of the Local Authority, as we have regular meetings with both the commissioners and the quality team and will always attend MAC meetings where there are concerns.”

    Source location

    Response from CQC
    Page 5 · response
    Published 16 April 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    CQC disputes that it rarely attended multi-agency meetings, stating it regularly meets commissioners and attends meetings where concerns exist.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “CQC are surprised that this is the view of the Local Authority, as we have regular meetings with both the commissioners and the quality team and will always attend MAC meetings where there are concerns.”

    Source location

    Response from CQC
    Page 5 · response
    Published 16 April 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The CQC will address concerns about its attendance at multi-agency care home meetings separately.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3) CQC not attending MAC meetings – this will be addressed by the CQC separately.”

    Source location

    Response from Department of Health and Social Care
    Page 4 · response
    Published 16 April 2025

    Open published response
  10. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Sheridan Tate Pickett · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    On 9 August 2024, Sheridan Tate Pickett sustained fatal injuries after falling from a height out of a window; the inquest concluded that the death was suicide. The concern was that information about an overdose and advice not to recommence ADHD medication was not shared with the private ADHD provider, and that there were no current guidelines governing information sharing between private psychiatry providers and NHS services involved in parallel care.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of guidelines for communication and information sharing between private psychiatry providers and NHS services providing parallel neurodiversity care

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The inquest heard evidence that Mr Pickett had a history of mental health issues and received an online diagnosis of ADHD from a private service provider (which prescribed Mr Pickett with medication too). Following his diagnosis Mr Pickett was admitted into an NHS hospital having taken an overdose. In their discharge letter the hospital suggested that the ADHD medication should not be recommenced. This information was not provided to the private ADHD provider which continued to prescribe Mr Pickett with ADHD medication. I am concerned that there are no current guidelines governing communication and information sharing as between private psychiatry providers offering assessment, care and treatment in relation to neurodiversity and NHS services involved with providing care and treatment in parallel. ”

    Source location

    Sheridan Tate Pickett · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing hospital discharge guidance already governs information sharing between private and NHS providers, including medication and care information.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In your report, you raise concerns that there are no current guidelines governing communication and information sharing between private providers and NHS providers. The following guidance, Hospital discharge and community support guidance - GOV.UK states that:”

    Source location

    Response from DHSC
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 March 2025

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026