Recurring concern

Unreliable multi-agency communication procedures

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First reported 29 May 2013•Latest report 16 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of explicitly multi-agency communication procedures that impair the timely, accurate and complete exchange of safety-relevant information between involved agencies, including the anchor's prison-services communication failure.

Not included

  • Excludes generic communication, training, staffing or coordination deficiencies where no explicitly multi-agency communication procedure is identified.
  • Excludes failures confined to a single organisation's internal communication process.
  • Excludes failures of a separately named pathway, system or hazard when that concern provides the more specific supported boundary.
  • Excludes neutral descriptions of multi-agency working without an identified unsafe communication condition.
Reports
134

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
145

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
303

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care17
NHS England17
Ministry of Justice14
HM Prison and Probation Service10
Home Office8
Recipient name withheld6
Metropolitan Police Service5
Association of Ambulance Chief Executives4
East London NHS Foundation Trust4
National Police Chiefs’ Council4
Care Quality Commission3
College of Policing3
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust3
Greater Manchester Police3
NHS Greater Manchester Integrated Care Board3

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. West Sussex

    AI-generated summary

    John Michael WELLS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    John Michael Wells died at the scene after lacerating a varicose vein and suffering severe blood loss while prescribed anticoagulant medication. The report identified concerns about incomplete medical information, the accessibility and handling of responder contact details, the absence of automatic risk flagging, and the triage of third-party emergency calls.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to transfer important and accurate medical information to telecare and emergency services

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The information regarding Mr Wells’ medical conditions and medication held by RedAssure/Worthing Homes was not complete. RedAssure were the providers of the telecare service to Mr Wells and were part of Worthing Homes. RedAssure had contracted Apello to answer out of hours calls. During the inquest I heard evidence that when a resident moves into Worthing Homes sheltered housing they are asked to provide medical information; as are any persons who happen to accompany them. I heard that updates are requested from the residents by sending out a form. Neither Worthing Homes nor RedAssure seek permission from the residents to obtain medical information from their GP or other third parties. I heard evidence that the staff at Worthing Homes had been aware of Mr Wells’ special needs and vulnerability but this did not appear on the resident information sheet; which provides the information accessed by Appello. Whilst I heard evidence that Worthing Homes are no longer providing telecare support they still provide the medical information recorded on their residents to telecare providers. Subsequent to the inquest Worthing Homes provided further information to assist with the preparation of this report. This confirmed that RedAssure no longer existed and that Worthing Homes, as a social housing provider, were not involved in providing care or medical assistance. They state that medical information gathered at the application stage is solely for the purpose of ascertaining the prospective resident’s suitability for a property. Worthing Homes provided a full version of a review record from 2015 clearly stating that Mr Wells had learning difficulties. In addition a GP letter provided to Worthing Homes in 2008 states that Mr Wells had a low IQ. Neither of these pieces of information were transferred on the front sheet of the record, which appears to have been the source of the information entered onto Carenet. As a result of the incomplete records and summary Appello & SECAMB were not provided with important and accurate information regarding Mr Wells. ”

    Source location

    John Michael WELLS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  2. Lincolnshire

    AI-generated summary

    Helen BARKER · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Helen BARKER, aged 50, called emergency services on 11 November 2018 reporting suicidal feelings and threatening to take an overdose. Although reviews were recorded as having been undertaken, they did not occur, and paramedics attended 6 hours and 35 minutes after the initial call; she was pronounced dead at home on 12 November 2018. The report raised concerns about implementation of an investigation recommendation and whether an emergency category 3 call could be escalated when the ambulance response time was exceeded.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure CAT Team Leader contact with NHS 111 for increasing unassessed category 3 calls passed to the Trust

    Wider context from the report

    “1. A serious level investigation report (reference SI 2018/27277) made 5 recommendations, the fifth appearing on page 15 which reads as follows:- Consider the feasibility of the CAT Team Leader making contact with NHS 111 when it is noted that there is an increase in the number of C3 coded calls that have not been assessed by a NHS 111 Clinician before being passed to the Trust. Has this recommendation now been implemented particularly where attempted suicides have been reported. Why can't EMAS escalate a category 3 status to a category 2 status when their own call out time of 120 minutes for an ambulance on a category 3 status has been exceeded? ”

    Source location

    Helen BARKER · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  3. Cheshire

    AI-generated summary

    Mr Sam Spooner · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr Sam Spooner died at Leighton Hospital on 31 August 2018 after being found unresponsive following an act intended to end his life. The report identified concerns about inadequate multi-agency information sharing, coordination and intervention despite known suicide risk, and excessive reliance on his family to keep him safe.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of multi-agency information sharing and communication between health care providers

    Wider context from the report

    “1) There was a lack of multi-agency information sharing, co-operation, co-ordination and effective communication both within and between health care providers which meant that: a) The private counsellor who provided treatment to Mr Spooner did not have adequate information from other health care providers as to his medical/mental health history, diagnosis and treatment by other healthcare professionals. b) There was a failure to adopt an effective multi-agency approach to the care for Mr Spooner from 20th August 2018 when it was known that he was actively considering ending his life. c) There was a failure to adequately intervene from 30th August 2018 when it was known that: (1) Mr Spooner had recently attempted to take his life; and (2) Mr Spooner had subsequently undertaken additional research and made further preparations to enable him to do so. 2) There was an excessive and unreasonable reliance placed upon Mr Spooner's family by health care providers to keep him safe when those providers knew that Mr Spooner's family were not in a position to do so. Health care providers lacked awareness of and/or failed to adequately involve other agencies who may have been able to keep Mr Spooner safe, for example the police who may have been able to exercise their powers under section 136 of the Mental Health Act 1983 to take Mr Spooner to a place of safety. ”

    Source location

    Mr Sam Spooner · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Support NHS England and devolved health authorities in developing improved mental-health care, including information sharing, case coordination and family-carer support.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Additionally, RCGP regularly inputs into national organisations looking to improve the responsiveness and understanding of mental health services. For example, I have personally attended and input into the All Party Parliamentary Group on Suicide and Self Harm. We also regularly support NHS England and devolved nations health authorities in the development of improved care, frequently alongside our sister Royal College, the Royal College of Psychiatrists. Work has included strategies to improve information sharing and case co-ordination as well as support for family members/carers.”

    Source location

    2019-0378-Royal-College-of-General-Practitioners
    Page 2 · response
    Published 27 December 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Amend assessment and consent forms to ask about psychiatric history and obtain consent to contact relevant mental health practitioners.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “She has spoken to other private psychotherapists and her Clinical Supervisor about their respective practices. Mrs ████████ always asks clients whether they have ever been under Mental Health Services, but she has now amended her assessment and consent forms (which are attached) so that she asks more particular questions about previous psychiatric history. It is also the case that NICE issued guidelines on 10 September 2019 (i.e. after Mr Spooner's death) in relation to multi-agency suicide prevention partnerships and Mrs ████████ has both considered those guidelines and thought about how she might implement some changes in her practice, both as a result of those guidelines and as a result of this case.”

    Source location

    2019-0378-Response-from-Counsellor_Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 27 December 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing RCGP mental-health education, guidance and service-improvement work is considered an adequate response to suicide-prevention concerns.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “From the above, RCGP already undertakes considerable work in this important area as we see it as a key priority. I will ensure that the sad case of Mr Spooner is brought to the attention of our mental health leads and our educational convenors so that we can continue to do what we can to improve services for patients such as Mr Spooner.”

    Source location

    2019-0378-Royal-College-of-General-Practitioners
    Page 3 · response
    Published 27 December 2019

    Open published response
  4. East Sussex

    AI-generated summary

    Martin Leslie Haines · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Martin Leslie Haines was detained at Lewes Prison and was found dead in his cell on 18 March 2018. He had Type II Diabetes and warning signs of cerebrovascular disease, but the appropriate diagnostic tests were not carried out; alcohol, Venlafaxine and Amitriptyline were later found in his system and considered by the pathologist to have contributed to his death. The principal concerns included inadequate diabetes and cardiovascular monitoring, healthcare falling below community standards, the ability to brew or distil alcohol in prison, a lack of protocols for responding to an unresponsive body, and insufficient communication between healthcare providers and the prison service.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Insufficient communication and information sharing between prison healthcare organisations

    Wider context from the report

    “(5) In my opinion, the underlying problems were due to the fact that responsibility for healthcare in the prison was split between the prison service, Sussex Partnership Foundation Trust (which is a mental health provider but was also contracted to run all healthcare, both physical and mental within the prison), Medco Ltd who provided the GPs and Forward Trust who were contracted to treat alcohol and substance misuse in the prison. There was insufficient communication between these bodies and they had separate IT databases. ”

    Source location

    Martin Leslie Haines · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Procure and award an integrated single-provider healthcare contract for HMP Lewes, using one provider and database to support integrated delivery.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NHS E have undertaken a procurement process for provision of these services after those dates. The services procured is an integrated model of delivery which means that the contract has been awarded to one provider for the delivery of all services to HMP Lewes residents. This is a tried and tested form of service delivery and puts the responsibility for delivery of all elements of the contract with one provider only. This will negate any communication issues and the provider will use one database system only.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 3 · response
    Published 16 August 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review providers’ use of SystmOne tasks in response to concerns about communication and messages going astray.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “the Prime Provider model, giving them greater control over use of more innovative IT and software solutions. All users of SystmOne can create tasks for other team members and which are linked to patient records where applicable, thus reduces the risk of messages going astray. NHS E Commissioners will review the use of tasks by providers by end of October 2019, as a result of concerns raised in this Regulation 28 notice.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 4 · response
    Published 16 August 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Improve health and care data collection and information-sharing before, during and after incarceration to support continuity of care.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Agreement sets out a joined-up, strategic approach to meet the complex nature of offender health care needs and provides the partnership members with an overarching framework for collaborative working at all levels. The Agreement has three shared core objectives to be delivered through ten high level priorities. These priorities are underpinned by the Agreement’s 2018 Workplan, which includes a commitment to deliver on three key issues that relate to the responsibilities of all organisations involved in prison care. These commitments are:”

    Source location

    2019-0486-Response-by-Department-of-Health-and-Social-Care
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 August 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Prison staff cannot access clinical records on SystmOne because such access is not appropriate.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Your final concern is that responsibility for healthcare is split between different contractors, and that there was insufficient communication between these bodies and their separate IT databases. As you know, the commissioning of healthcare in English prisons is the responsibility of NHS England and NHS Improvement (NHSE/I). HMPPS is responsible for ensuring access to healthcare services within establishments and, where required, at external healthcare facilities. With regard to the sharing of information between the various organisations, you will appreciate that it is not appropriate for prison staff to have access to clinical records on SystmOne. At HMP Lewes, there is a daily meeting between prison and healthcare staff at which important information is shared. Each staff team then ensures that their respective databases are updated.”

    Source location

    Response from HM Prison and Probation Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 August 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Healthcare providers are responsible for the quality and safety of care, including investigating care and considering improvements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Providers of healthcare services are responsible for the quality and safety of the care they provide. I expect the healthcare providers at HMP Lewes to look into the care provided to Mr Haines and to consider where improvements can be made. This includes how they work with the prison authorities and other relevant organisations, including NHS England which is responsible for commissioning healthcare services for prisoners. Given its role in monitoring, inspecting and regulating the providers of health and social care in prisons, my officials have brought your reports to the attention of the Care Quality Commission (CQC).”

    Source location

    2019-0486-Response-by-Department-of-Health-and-Social-Care
    Page 1 · response
    Published 16 August 2019

    Open published response
  5. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Hannah Dolly Kaur Bharaj · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Hannah Dolly Kaur Bharaj had anorexia, depression and fluctuating suicidal ideation, and died at Salford Royal Hospital on 13 July 2018 from injuries sustained after jumping from a first-floor café. Concerns included inadequate communication and discharge planning, unsuitable placement and care coordination, incomplete sharing of clinical information, and the safety of the café balustrade and adjacent table.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of mental health trusts to communicate placement information with private providers and families

    Wider context from the report

    “4. Communication with private providers by NHS trusts once mental health trusts have placed individuals in private settings. During the time that Hannah was placed at the Priory the mental health trust who placed her did not have any discussion with Hannah, her family or the Priory regarding the placement. A care coordinator had been allocated by the Trust once requested by the Priory but no care coordination had taken place; ”

    Source location

    Hannah Dolly Kaur Bharaj · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
  6. Lancashire and Blackburn with Darwen

    AI-generated summary

    Cherylee Yvette Shennan · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Cherylee Yvette Shennan, a 40-year-old woman, was murdered on 17 March 2014 by a former offender who had subjected her to domestic abuse, including serious violence. The report raised concerns about inadequate inter-agency communication and management of the perpetrator, including the absence of a mandatory process for sharing information when an offender with a known history of domestic abuse was managed at MAPPA Level 1.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of mandated joined-up inter-agency communication at offender release or when new personal relationships develop

    Wider context from the report

    “1) During the course of the inquest statistics regarding the nature of domestic abuse were repeatedly reviewed and accepted by senior member of both probation and police services. In particular domestic abuse features in about half of all cases managed by probation staff and that in the year to the end of 2018 of the 659 homicides 1 in 10 were committed by a partner. Evidence was heard of the MAPPA process, for the managing of risk of offenders to be released on licence, and for the interagency sharing of information regarding those offenders. During the course of the evidence it was made clear that the perpetrator in this instance was a very dangerous individual, who was described as controlling and manipulative, and who, it was accepted by the witnesses involved in his management, was likely to have controlled his meetings by his nature, and by partial disclosures of information. The underlying issue that arose from both the various reviews that took place after the death of Cherylee Shennan, and from the inquest was that there was no substantial interagency communication following the perpetrator's release on licence, which would, the jury found, have allowed the sharing of his licence conditions and action plans to be put in place by local police forces. The jury concluded that such a failing possibly contributed to the death on the 17th March 2014. At the inquest no evidence was heard regarding any changes to MAPPA or the guidance given. Whilst the evidence heard was that the MAPPA level allocated to an individual is fluid, and would be based upon their risks and presentation at that time, my concern centres on the issue that an offender who has served a significant sentence and accordingly has never been fully tested before release on licence, and who has a significant history of domestic abuse and violence, will still be released on MAPPA level 1. On the evidence that was heard there remains no mandated process for joined up inter-agency working or communication at the point of their release, or when they develop new personal relationships. ”

    Source location

    Cherylee Yvette Shennan · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Refresh MASH staff messaging periodically on identifying life-licensed perpetrators as high risk and sharing referral information to prompt safeguarding action.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Lancashire Constabulary are a key stakeholder in the MASH (Multi-Agency Sharing Hub), which has dedicated and co-located National Probation Service staff able to access national databases to ensure quality research can be conducted on criminal matters subject of safeguarding referrals – in particular those with previous convictions and actionable orders – such as licence conditions.”

    Source location

    2019-0244-Response-by-Lancashire-Constabulary_Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 9 September 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Pan-Lancashire MARAC operating protocol already addresses urgent referrals and high-risk prioritisation for relevant offenders.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Specifically, with regards to perpetrators with homicide convictions and urgent MARAC referral, a Pan-Lancashire MARAC Operating Protocol Document was agreed in April 2016 which referenced specifically the procedure relating to Emergency MARAC, and reflects a response to the DHR in question.”

    Source location

    2019-0244-Response-by-Lancashire-Constabulary_Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 9 September 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Responsibility for referring relevant life-licensed offenders to MARAC lies with the offender manager.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Specifically, with regards to perpetrators with homicide convictions and urgent MARAC referral, a Pan-Lancashire MARAC Operating Protocol Document was agreed in April 2016 which referenced specifically the procedure relating to Emergency MARAC, and reflects a response to the DHR in question.”

    Source location

    2019-0244-Response-by-Lancashire-Constabulary_Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 9 September 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing MASH arrangements provide research, information sharing and referral of life-licensed perpetrators to relevant agencies, including Probation and Social Care.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Lancashire Constabulary are a key stakeholder in the MASH (Multi-Agency Sharing Hub), which has dedicated and co-located National Probation Service staff able to access national databases to ensure quality research can be conducted on criminal matters subject of safeguarding referrals – in particular those with previous convictions and actionable orders – such as licence conditions.”

    Source location

    2019-0244-Response-by-Lancashire-Constabulary_Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 9 September 2019

    Open published response
  7. East London

    AI-generated summary

    Edir Frederico Araujo DA COSTA · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Edir Frederico Araujo DA COSTA died after his airway became obstructed by a plastic bag containing drugs while he was being restrained by police. The report identified concerns about emergency life-support training, supervision and safety-officer roles during restraint, risks associated with plastic bags and CS spray, recognition of agonal breathing, and communication with the ambulance service.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to follow the procedure for updating CADs about life-threatening deterioration

    Wider context from the report

    “(7) The controller who was communicating with the LAS received information that Mr Da Costa had stopped breathing. She did not use the correct procedure to update the LAS in relation to this life threatening deterioration. The MPS are requested to review the operation of the procedure for updating CADs and to take any necessary action to ensure that staff are fully aware of the correct procedure to be adopted. ”

    Source location

    Edir Frederico Araujo DA COSTA · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Circulate a bulletin reminding staff to create a new CAD for significant patient deterioration and update the LAS.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To this effect, on 2nd August 2019 a reminder was circulated to all staff via a weekly MetCC Operational update bulletin. This policy is emphasised in MetCC initial call handler training and included in the next Personal Development Days (training days) in October 2019. It must be stated however that although on this occasion the policy was not correctly complied with, it is the experience of Team Duty Officers and Met Grip Chief Inspectors that no previous issues have been identified and that the policy has been adhered to.”

    Source location

    2019-0211-Response-by-Metropolitan-Police
    Page 5 · response
    Published 23 August 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Include significant-deterioration CAD procedures in initial call-handler training and October personal-development training days.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To this effect, on 2nd August 2019 a reminder was circulated to all staff via a weekly MetCC Operational update bulletin. This policy is emphasised in MetCC initial call handler training and included in the next Personal Development Days (training days) in October 2019. It must be stated however that although on this occasion the policy was not correctly complied with, it is the experience of Team Duty Officers and Met Grip Chief Inspectors that no previous issues have been identified and that the policy has been adhered to.”

    Source location

    2019-0211-Response-by-Metropolitan-Police
    Page 5 · response
    Published 23 August 2019

    Open published response
  8. Manchester North

    AI-generated summary

    Beverley Shaw · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Beverley Shaw was found deceased in her bed at home in Oldham in the early hours of 11 December 2018. The inquest heard that she had multiple prescribed medicines, was receiving methadone, and was using cocaine and butane gas. Concerns included inadequate communication between the substance misuse service and GP practice about her butane gas use, lack of a full medication review, and incomplete transfer of medical records.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to communicate clinically significant butane gas use and consumption amount to the GP practice

    Wider context from the report

    “○ There was a lack of communication between Turning Point and the GP practice specifically in respect of Ms Shaw’s use of butane gas. There was no information contained in the evidence before the Court to indicate her GP was aware of the use of butane gas, which was significant (ie 5 cans a day). This was described in evidence by Turning Point as her most significant addiction which was not amenable to treatment with medication. There was one 4 page letter dated the 15th May 2018 from Turning Point to the GP practice, in the summary section this simply recorded, “Uses butane gas daily.” In the section headed “Current Reported Substance Use” there is no mention of butane gas. The remainder of this letter deals with other matters. No information was shared with the GP with regards to the amount of gas being used by Ms Shaw. ”

    Source location

    Beverley Shaw · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement a DNA policy requiring discussion of missed appointments and selection of an appropriate patient-contact method.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Since the inquest we have as a practice reflected on Beverley’s death and have discussed what we could have done differently to prevent her death. We noticed that in her records she had many failed appointments (DNAs) and possibly not fully engaged with clinicians about her health. In April 2019 we put together a DNA policy. The policy outlines that patients who DNA shall be discussed in the practice meeting and a suitable method of contacting the patient should be sought. On reflection with this patient if we had done this, Miss Shaw could have been referred to the Focus Care worker linked to our practice and she would have had a home visit assessment. From this we may have been made aware of the extent of her Butane abuse and this could have been communicated to the clinicians and Turning Point.”

    Source location

    2019-0191-Response-by-Hopwood-House-Medical-Practice
    Page 1 · response
    Published 23 August 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use the electronic Butane-misuse code on patients’ problem lists in future.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We also found the electronic code “Misuse of Butane EMISNQM197”. That we will use in future to code this on the Problem List.”

    Source location

    2019-0191-Response-by-Hopwood-House-Medical-Practice
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 August 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Identify the EMIS electronic code for flagging butane misuse.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In respect of the butane gas use, the appropriate electronic code has been identified to flag misuse of butane on the EMIS system. This will be communicated to all practices as part of the lessons learned from this review to ensure that all Oldham GP practices are aware of this code.”

    Source location

    2019-0191-Response-by-Oldham-NHS-CCG
    Page 1 · response
    Published 23 August 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Communicate the butane-misuse EMIS code to all Oldham GP practices as a review lesson.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In respect of the butane gas use, the appropriate electronic code has been identified to flag misuse of butane on the EMIS system. This will be communicated to all practices as part of the lessons learned from this review to ensure that all Oldham GP practices are aware of this code.”

    Source location

    2019-0191-Response-by-Oldham-NHS-CCG
    Page 1 · response
    Published 23 August 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Complete a wide-ranging review of GP communication across all community substance misuse services.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Whilst we recognise that the clinician had written to the GP, we accept that there is more that we could do to improve this communication, not only in this tragic case but also more broadly across our substance misuse services. Therefore, we have undertaken a wide ranging review of GP communication across all our community substance misuse services, not just in Rochdale and Oldham. That review has been led by our Senior Management Team, including our senior clinical team, and our Risk and Assurance department.”

    Source location

    2019-0191-Response-by-Turning-Point
    Page 1 · response
    Published 23 August 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Change the frequency of communication with GPs across community substance misuse services.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “This review has highlighted the key processes that we needed to change in order to improve effective communication and reduce the risk of future recurrence. Those processes are the template used by prescribers to review clients, the frequency of communication with GPs, the way that communication is recorded on our electronic client records system and the processes for audit of the frequency of that communication.”

    Source location

    2019-0191-Response-by-Turning-Point
    Page 1 · response
    Published 23 August 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Improve recording of GP communications in the electronic client records system.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “This review has highlighted the key processes that we needed to change in order to improve effective communication and reduce the risk of future recurrence. Those processes are the template used by prescribers to review clients, the frequency of communication with GPs, the way that communication is recorded on our electronic client records system and the processes for audit of the frequency of that communication.”

    Source location

    2019-0191-Response-by-Turning-Point
    Page 1 · response
    Published 23 August 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    A joint learning meeting with Turning Point would occur only if Oldham CCG supported it.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The practice would also, if supported through Oldham CCG have a meeting with Turning Point separately as a learning event to see what further changes we can both make to make sure miscommunications are avoided in the future”

    Source location

    2019-0191-Response-by-Hopwood-House-Medical-Practice
    Page 4 · response
    Published 23 August 2019

    Open published response
  9. Norfolk

    AI-generated summary

    Christopher Williams · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Christopher Williams underwent a procedure to remove an infected foot-surgery screw and later developed severe leg pain, bilateral paraesthesia, worsening back pain, and suspected cauda equina. There were delays in ambulance attendance and Emergency Department admission, and concerns about incorrect call triage, failure to escalate his worsening condition, and communication about an arranged admission bed. His condition deteriorated with sepsis, multi-organ failure and worsening heart failure, and he died on 26 January 2019.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to communicate arranged admission-bed information to ambulance crews

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The amount of time taken for the ambulance to arrive which was markedly outside the Trust’s guidelines. (2) The failure by the call handler to both escalate Mr Williams worsening condition and her incorrect use of the haemorrhage algorithm. (3) When the ambulance transported Mr Williams to the NNUH he was kept on board the vehicle awaiting a space in the Emergency Department, despite a bed already arranged several hours before by the GP. This information was unknown to the crew and resulted in several hours delay in Mr Williams being investigated and treated which may have contributed to his death by sepsis. The Trust’s Business Continuity Manager was unaware until the inquest that the call handler had erred in failing to escalate and in using the wrong algorithm. He gave evidence that the Trust does not have an algorithm dealing with neurological deficit only a question asking if the patient is conscious. Given that Mr Williams had paraesthesia to both legs and the GP’s concerns about cauda equina this would seem to be a potentially dangerous gap in the Trust’s triaging system, placing patients at risk. In evidence the reasons given for the call handlers failure was that they did not know why she failed to escalate Mr Williams’ worsening condition and why she used the wrong algorithm and that the supplier of their IT software (the triage system), were reluctant to add a neurological algorithm, the reason for this is unclear. When asked the manager accepted that as the customer surely (the trust) could state that a neurological algorithm was necessary but merely that the supplier was reluctant. It is unknown why the paramedic crew were unaware of the arranged admission bed and the manager accepted in evidence that he had not made any enquiries about this, prior to inquest. Again, this failure in communication is one which I feel places other patients at risk of death and is unacceptable. This is not an isolated incident (death) and it appears that there are system failures within your organisation which should be addressed. ”

    Source location

    Christopher Williams · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Work with the CAD supplier to alter call duplication so pertinent destination information transfers into the active call.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In the initial call the HCP called and asked for the patient to be conveyed to the Norfolk and Norwich University Hospital, the clinician requested for the patient to be taken to the Emergency Assessment Unit. When we received a 999 call from the property identifying that the patient’s condition had deteriorated the dispatcher allocated on the new call as it was of a higher priority, in line with 20180525 Ambulance System Indicators. Due to the dispatcher assigning to the new call it is apparent that information pertaining to the destination of the patient was omitted as the information is sent to the crew using data. We are in communications with the CAD supplier to make an alteration to the duplication process which would allow pertinent information to be transferred from the original call into the call which EEAST are “running on”.”

    Source location

    2019-0183-Response-by-East-of-England-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 August 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require dispatch staff to transfer pertinent information manually into new calls until the technological solution is available.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Having a technical solution will minimise risk of human error. As an interim arrangement we will ask all dispatch staff to ensure that any pertinent information of this kind is transferred into the new call, until there is a technological resolution in place.”

    Source location

    2019-0183-Response-by-East-of-England-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 August 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Share CAD information-recording and transmission best practice and solutions with other ambulance services.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We are also working with our colleagues in other Ambulance Services who use the same CAD to share best practice and solutions with regards to how information is recorded and subsequently transmitted to attending resources.”

    Source location

    2019-0183-Response-by-East-of-England-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 August 2019

    Open published response
  10. North Northumberland

    AI-generated summary

    Lesley Ann Armstrong · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Lesley Ann Armstrong died at home on 20 July 2016 after taking her own life by hanging. She had believed she remained under suspicion of assault because Northumbria Police did not inform her that its investigation had been discontinued, and the report identified concerns about communication between the police, safeguarding authorities and her employer regarding the investigation’s status.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to communicate completion of Police investigations to the Local Safeguarding Adults Board and care home owners

    Wider context from the report

    “It is recognised that employers have a duty of care to their employees to investigate allegations against them promptly and keep them reasonably informed about the progress of investigation of misconduct. On this occasion the employers Akari Care Limited could not properly inform Mrs Armstrong about the status of their investigation because they were not formally told when the Section 47 investigation by Northumbria Police had been discontinued. Northumbria Police acknowledged at the Inquest that there were procedural errors by two of their Officers, that the procedures themselves required improvement and that they had taken steps to address these. It was not clear that any practical steps had been taken to improve communication with the Local Safeguarding Adults Board or the owners of the Care Home both of whom needed to know when the Police investigations were completed so that the Safeguarding Board could if necessary progress an investigation under the Care Act 2014, and the Care Home could keep Mrs Armstrong informed about progress and her employment position. That lack of information or progress caused Mrs Armstrong to believe she was still under suspicion for an offence of assault. ”

    Source location

    Lesley Ann Armstrong · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Routine employer updates about criminal investigations are inappropriate and unlawful without the employee’s consent, subject to case-by-case disclosure decisions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Sharing of criminal conviction data, or of information relating to allegations of criminal conduct, is subject to the provisions of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the Data Protection Act 2018 (the Act). Such information is defined as “special category data” (analogous to sensitive personal data under the earlier Data Protection Act 1998). The legislation restricts the sharing of such information save in clearly defined circumstances.”

    Source location

    2019-0136-Response-by-Northumbria-Police
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 June 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Investigation outcomes should normally be communicated directly to the suspect or legal representative by the investigating officer, not through an employer.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The purpose of information sharing between agencies, particularly in the care context, is to safeguard care users. It is this purpose which potentially enables disclosure of information relating to allegations of criminal conduct to be disclosed to an employer. The purpose of such information sharing is not to enable the employer to keep its employee updated as to the progress of the criminal investigation against that employee. Disclosure for that reason would be unlawful, unless the employee provided his or her consent and if the employee provided such consent, there would of course be no need to notify the employer. If the employee requires an update as to progress then it is clearly most appropriate that contact should be sought directly with the police, or via the employee’s legal representative.”

    Source location

    2019-0136-Response-by-Northumbria-Police
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 June 2019

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026