Recurring concern

Unreliable criminal-conviction vetting for safety-sensitive roles

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First reported 12 May 2015•Latest report 13 Feb 2023

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures in obtaining, checking, accurately recording, interpreting or considering domestic or foreign criminal-conviction information through DBS or equivalent vetting arrangements before appointment or continued authorisation for roles involving firearms, vulnerable people or comparable safety-sensitive responsibilities.

Not included

  • Excludes general recruitment, character assessment or professional-competence concerns where criminal-conviction vetting is not the deficient control.
  • Excludes failures to apply employment restrictions after accurate and complete conviction information has been obtained and considered.
  • Excludes ordinary police crime-recording and offender-management processes unless they directly impair conviction information used for safety-sensitive vetting.
  • Excludes routine background checks for roles without a material firearms, vulnerable-person or comparable public-safety responsibility.
Reports
4

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
4

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2015–2023

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
1

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Disclosure and Barring Service2
Ministry of Justice2
Care Quality Commission1
Department of Health and Social Care1
Greater Manchester Police1
HM Prison and Probation Service1
Home Office1
Metropolitan Police Service1
Ministry of Defence1
National Police Chiefs’ Council1
Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust1
Security Industry Authority1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Michael ROBERTS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Michael Roberts died by suicide on the evening of 20 August 2022 after shooting himself with a gun taken from his workplace, where he had access to firearms. A DBS certificate recorded no convictions despite his past conviction for a violent offence, which had led to his dismissal as a police officer; the report states that he would not have been employed at Proof House if the conviction had been correctly recorded. It was unclear whether the inaccurate DBS certificate resulted from an error by the DBS or the MPS.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of DBS certificates to accurately record relevant convictions

    Wider context from the report

    “Before he was employed as a proof assistant testing new guns, Mr Roberts’ prospective employer asked for a DBS (Disclosure and Barring Service) certificate. This was provided and recorded no convictions, cautions, reprimands or warnings. However, Mr Roberts had in the past been convicted of a violent offence for which he had received a custodial sentence. This was the reason for his dismissal from his former occupation as a police officer in the MPS (Metropolitan Police Service). If Mr Roberts’ DBS certificate had correctly recorded his conviction, he would not have been employed at Proof House where he had access to firearms. It is unclear to me whether the inaccuracy of the DBS certificate was caused by an error made by the DBS or by the MPS. ”

    Source location

    Michael ROBERTS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  2. East London

    AI-generated summary

    Mrs Jane Jowers · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mrs Jane Jowers, who had advanced Alzheimer’s dementia and was dependent on carers for medication, did not receive her anti-epileptic medication on 21 October 2018. She suffered a seizure the following day, was admitted to hospital, and her health deteriorated before she died in a hospice on 23 November 2018. The report raised concern that there was no statutory procedure for checking criminal convictions outside the UK, which may allow unsuitable people to work with vulnerable adults and children.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a statutory procedure for checking criminal convictions outside the UK

    Wider context from the report

    “The evidence at the Inquest revealed that there is no statutory procedure for checks to be undertaken for criminal convictions outside of the UK. The absence of statutory international checks may result in unsuitable persons with prior convictions working with vulnerable adults and children. ”

    Source location

    Mrs Jane Jowers · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Publish advice on obtaining overseas criminal-record checks and link to relevant Home Office guidance on the DBS website.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Advice in this regard and reference to the appropriate Home Office guidance is published on the DBS website and is attached as Appendix A. The Home Office published guidance provides information as to how to apply to a number of countries, including the Republic of Ireland, for an overseas criminal records check. Home Office guidance is attached as Appendix B.”

    Source location

    2020-0180-Response-from-DBS-Redacted.pdf
    Page 5 · response
    Published 19 November 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing statutory arrangements allow overseas criminality information to be disclosed, while employers can obtain further overseas checks as part of recruitment risk assessment.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The decision to carry out an overseas check is made by the employer and forms part of their risk assessment to be used in conjunction with their other pre-employment checks. DBS guidance states that the DBS check is only one component of an employer’s recruitment practices and the employer should decide on whether to obtain an overseas check on applicants who have lived or worked abroad, where there is not a statutory requirement to do so.”

    Source location

    2020-0180-Response-from-DBS-Redacted.pdf
    Page 5 · response
    Published 19 November 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Further statutory obligations concerning overseas criminal-record checks are matters for the Home Office and Parliament.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In conclusion, under the existing statutory arrangements, there is provision to disclose criminality information from overseas on DBS certificates, but DBS has not considered the appropriateness or not of further statutory requirements and no further action is proposed. Consideration of further statutory obligations is a matter for the Home Office and Parliament. However, as I have explained above, there are considerable practicable limitations in gaining access to and sharing such information.”

    Source location

    2020-0180-Response-from-DBS-Redacted.pdf
    Page 5 · response
    Published 19 November 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Reliable international data flows cannot be established because necessary agreements and cooperation with overseas law-enforcement agencies are unavailable.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “There is no other international system available to DBS to identify overseas convictions. The DBS is not, therefore, aware of overseas criminality information unless it is passed from international law enforcement agencies to UK forces and recorded on their systems. DBS guidance for employers, therefore, sets out that DBS does not access overseas criminal records.”

    Source location

    2020-0180-Response-from-DBS-Redacted.pdf
    Page 5 · response
    Published 19 November 2020

    Open published response
  3. Nottinghamshire

    AI-generated summary

    Ivy Atkin · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Ivy Atkin was a resident at Autumn Grange Residential Care Home and died as a result of gross neglect. The Provider and its Nominated Individual were convicted of offences arising directly from her death, and an inquest recorded a conclusion of unlawful killing. Concerns included the Nominated Individual’s failure to provide a DBS certificate and a regulatory loophole affecting the independent assessment of suitability for that role.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to obtain and consider DBS certificates for proposed Nominated Individuals

    Wider context from the report

    “1. ████████ had criminal convictions including for an offence involving violence against another person. He had not provided a Disclosure and Barring Service (“DBS”) certificate to the CQC nor been asked to do so, before becoming Nominated Individual. 2. The CQC were therefore unable to assess whether or not ████████ was of good character and was suitable for the position of Nominated Individual, that person being responsible for the supervising the management of a Residential Care Home, a role which ████████ undertook. 3. This is because the CQC expected and still expects a Provider to consider DBS certificates and make decisions as to the suitability of a proposed Nominated Individual, where the Provider is (as was here) a limited company. 4. In the case of a small family owned limited company, where the controlling director and Nominated Individual are one and the same person, as in this case, there is therefore no reliable nor independent nor objective means of assessing the good character, safety and suitability of a Nominated Individual. 5. This is because the wording of the present Regulation 6 of the Health and Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) Regulations 2014 allows for such a “loophole”, and/or in the alternative the manner in which the CQC interprets its powers and duties in the light of this Regulation allows for such a loophole. ”

    Source location

    Ivy Atkin · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    CQC will not directly check nominated individuals’ DBS records because it lacks power to approve or refuse their appointment as nominated individuals.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Having given very careful consideration to the concerns you have raised we have concluded that CQC should not directly check the DBS for Nominated Individuals. This decision was authorised by ████████, Chief Inspector, Adult Social Care.”

    Source location

    2016-0379-Response-by-Care-Quality-Commission
    Page 2 · response
    Published 25 October 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Providers are responsible for assessing nominated individuals’ suitability and conducting appropriate enquiries, including DBS checks where necessary.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3. This is because the CQC expected and still expects a Provider to consider DBS certificates and make decisions as to the suitability of a proposed Nominated Individual, where the Provider is (as was here) a limited company.”

    Source location

    2016-0379-Response-by-Care-Quality-Commission
    Page 1 · response
    Published 25 October 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Providers remain responsible for managing and delivering care; CQC should not oversee providers’ management decisions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The underpinning principle of the regulatory regime in health and social care is that providers remain responsible for the management and delivery of the care that they offer. The role of the CQC is to assess providers to give assurance that they are taking the necessary steps to fulfil their legal duties and, where appropriate, to take regulatory enforcement action if providers are failing in their duty. In the view of the Department of Health, it would be neither desirable nor practical for the CQC to take on a role in which it was overseeing the management decisions of providers. For this reason, the legislation is established in a way that requires providers to demonstrate to the CQC that they have appropriate systems and processes in place to manage and oversee the care that they provide.”

    Source location

    2016-0379-Response-by-Department-of-Health
    Page 2 · response
    Published 25 October 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The existing nominated-individual arrangements and CQC’s general powers provide proportionate assurance, so the system should be maintained.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “You raise concerns around the role of the nominated individual, particularly the fact that CQC does not check DBS records for individuals fulfilling this role. The role of the nominated individual is essentially that of a point of contact between the care provider and the CQC for the purposes of correspondence and other regulatory business. For this reason, the nominated individual is not registered directly with the CQC. This is different in the case of Registered Managers, who are legally responsible for the care being delivered within care organisations; these individuals are registered directly with the CQC, and therefore vetted more closely by CQC upon registration.”

    Source location

    2016-0379-Response-by-Department-of-Health
    Page 2 · response
    Published 25 October 2016

    Open published response
  4. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Paul Mc Guigan · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Paul Mc Guigan was shot and unlawfully killed by a close protection work colleague on 9 August 2009 while both were working as armed private security contractors in Baghdad. The report identified missed opportunities and failings in managing the offender’s escalating offending behaviour and risk, and stated that G4S had not adequately vetted him before deployment. Concerns also included failures in information sharing, recording bail conditions, police disclosure processes, and the supervision and risk assessment of offenders.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unavailability of enhanced criminal-record disclosures for overseas armed private security employment

    Wider context from the report

    “I also have a concern that an employer on a private security contract at home has regulated by the SIA and a private security employed overseas [unregulated save for voluntary schemes such as International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers 2010 [ICoC] and accredited certification to the standard ANSI/ SSlS PSC. 1-2012] is not entitled or able to obtain an enhanced CRB and would only ever receive a Standard disclosure on a pre employment check. It concerns me in particular that in respect of employing on individual on an armed contract then consideration should be given to enabling Private Security Companies a route to obtaining an enhanced disclosure. ”

    Source location

    Paul Mc Guigan · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Employment of security and close protection personnel outside the United Kingdom falls outside the Home Office’s and SIA’s jurisdiction.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “You may be aware that the employment of security or close protection personnel for posts outside the United Kingdom is governed by an International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers (which the UK joined as a founding member) setting out obligations for the providers, particularly with regard to international humanitarian law and human rights law. However, neither the SIA nor the Home Office has jurisdiction over the employment of security or close protection personnel for posts outside the United Kingdom.”

    Source location

    2015-0185-Response-by-Home-Office
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 May 2015

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026