Recurring concern

Unreliable operational liaison between police and mental health services for safety-critical risk management

First to latest report 1 Nov 2013 — 5 Mar 2026

Reports that mention this concern
12
Times this concern has been raised
14
Stated actions linked to this concern
32

What this concern includes

Includes failures of the dedicated operational liaison interface between police and mental health services, including direct contact arrangements, prompt two-way communication, sharing of risk information and coordination of action for people presenting violence, missing-person, custody or other pressing mental-health-related risks.

What is not included
  • Excludes generic communication, staffing, training or information-sharing deficiencies without a specific police–mental-health operational liaison context.
  • Excludes failures confined to internal mental health assessment, treatment, referral or care coordination where police liaison is not the shared unsafe condition.
  • Excludes police or ambulance response failures that do not involve operational liaison with mental health services.
  • Excludes routine strategic meetings or general partnership governance that do not support frontline, safety-critical risk assessment or management.

Reports and published responses 12 reports

See individual reports that have raised this concern, and the actions taken in response

  1. Inner South London

    AI-generated summary

    Ms Kerry Aldridge · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Ms Kerry Aldridge was a student police officer who died by suicide after jumping into the path of a train at Sydenham Railway Station on 6 April 2019. The report raised concerns about the lack of established links between police Safeguarding Teams and NHS mental health teams, and about the need for further mental health training and access to non-urgent advice for officers.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of established links between police Safeguarding teams and NHS mental health teams

    Wider context from the report

    “During the course of the inquest, the local MPS investigation by Directorate of Professional Standards reported the view of the Central Mental Health Team that Sexual Offences Investigation Trained officers require further training in mental health. ████████ the investigating officer, gave evidence that it would be beneficial to have a mental health single point of contact within the local mental health team who could be contacted for non-urgent advice by Safeguarding Teams concerning victims that they are most concerned about. The investigation found no misconduct by officers, who provided a good level of care and support. It appears that the police Safeguarding team have no established links with NHS MH team and that referral to a Crisis Resolution and Home Treatment Team depends on an officer recognising the need was urgent, which may be a difficult judgment for officers, without professional mental health advice. ”

    Source location

    Ms Kerry Aldridge · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Employ two Metropolitan Police officers within main SLaM hospital sites to provide information, advice and support and liaise with borough safeguarding officers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Mental Health Support to Metropolitan Police Officers ████████ identified that the Metropolitan Police do not have a Safeguarding Adult Team, however, there are safeguarding strands attached to all 12 of the Borough Command Units. South London & Maudsley NHS Trust Foundation Trust employ two full time Metropolitan Police officers who work within our main hospital sites and liaise on a three monthly basis with the borough command safeguarding officers who all have mental health knowledge and experience. The officers employed within our mental health trust would usually act as a conduit for information, advice and support within our service but also their fellow officers in the borough command units”

    Source location

    2020-0055-Response-from-South-London-and-Maudsley-NHS-Foundation-Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 18 March 2020

    Open published response

  2. Derby and Derbyshire

    AI-generated summary

    Rachael Claire Slack and 2 others · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    On 2 June 2010, Andrew David Cairns entered Rachael Claire Slack’s home, stabbed their son Auden George Slack and Rachael Slack to death, and then stabbed himself to death. The principal concerns were failures in information-sharing between Police and Mental Health Services, and failures to communicate the assessed risk and safety measures to Rachael regarding the threat posed by Andrew.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to exchange relevant information between Police and Mental Health Services

    Wider context from the report

    “1. At the time of arrest of Mr Cairns, the Police were aware of his assessment under Section 136 of the Mental Health Act the previous day. The Custody Nurse had contacted the Crisis Team to obtain information regarding the 136 assessment which was duly given by the Mental Health Team. However, there was no reciprocal exchange of information and the Mental Health Team were not informed that Mr Cairns had been arrested with regards to Threats to Kill his partner. 2. At the conclusion of the Inquest and after all the evidence was heard, it came to light that there was in existence a policy for mutual sharing of information between the Police and Mental Health Services if each respective organisation requested information from the other. 3. This document was not disclosed prior to the Inquest or during the Inquest itself and it would have been critical to ask witnesses from the Police and Mental Health Services about their knowledge of this document. ”

    Source location

    Rachael Claire Slack and 2 others · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

Actions and positions describe what organisations say in published responses. Implementation is not independently verified.

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Data last updated 7 September 2026