Recurring concern

Unsafe emergency call handling

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First reported 6 Dec 2013•Latest report 16 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of the emergency call-handling process that impair location identification, information transfer, triage, escalation, reassessment, caller advice or appropriate resource deployment, including the anchor's failure to obtain riverfront coastguard location references and the delayed provision of a prison gate location.

Not included

  • Excludes deficiencies in coastguard staffing or service coverage that are not failures of emergency call handling.
  • Excludes clinical assessment, treatment or other downstream response failures after the call-handling process has ended.
  • Excludes generic staffing, training, policy or information-system deficiencies unless they are specifically tied to unsafe emergency call handling.
  • Excludes failures in non-emergency communication processes that do not concern handling an emergency call.
Reports
79

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
109

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
150

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

NHS England17
Department of Health and Social Care13
Association of Ambulance Chief Executives7
London Ambulance Service NHS Trust7
South East Coast Ambulance Service NHS Foundation Trust7
North West Ambulance Service NHS Trust6
Devon & Cornwall Police4
East Midlands Ambulance Service NHS Trust4
East of England Ambulance Service NHS Trust4
NHS Pathways4
South Central Ambulance Service NHS Foundation Trust4
Greater Manchester Police3
National Ambulance Service Medical Directors3
North East Ambulance Service NHS Foundation Trust3
Welsh Ambulance Services NHS Trust3

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Suffolk

    AI-generated summary

    Mark Harris · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mark Harris was found deceased with a rope around his neck at the home of his ex-partner on 11 January 2016, after expressing suicidal thoughts following his release from police custody. The report identified communication and information-sharing problems between the ambulance service, police control room and attending officers, including the deceased’s name being mis-spelt and uncertainty about the purpose of the police attendance.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide the police with the correct identity of the person involved in a welfare call

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The 999 call was directed to the ambulance service for a welfare check. The suicide protocol was initiated by the call handler to seek information. When the police were called the mis-spelt name of the deceased as HAIS was provided to them together with detail of the nature of the welfare call as “messaging all night threatening to kill himself”. The police attended the address. Had the correct spelling of the name been provided to the police they would have known Mark Harris and his history of suicide attempts. This was a significant problem for an intelligence led service. ”

    Source location

    Mark Harris · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to share the informant's contact details and ambulance service CAD information with the police

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) The police evidence was that in the event of a welfare call, which they could conduct in any event under section 17 powers in the absence of the ambulance service, there was additional information that should be shared including the name and contact telephone number of the informant, and the information recorded in the ambulance service CAD. ”

    Source location

    Mark Harris · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  2. Northamptonshire

    AI-generated summary

    Diana Faith Gudgeon · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Diana Faith Gudgeon collapsed at home after being diagnosed with a water infection and remained on the floor for a prolonged period. Her call was assessed as requiring a category three response, and substantial delays followed before ambulance attendance, hospital admission and treatment; she died on 25 May 2018 despite treatment for infection and sepsis. The principal concerns were the triage and escalation of her call, shortages of ambulance resources, and the effectiveness of EMAS capacity management arrangements.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to escalate calls when a urinary tract infection is suspected

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Triaging by ‘111’ and EMAS call handling systems, including in relation to sepsis. In the present case, Mrs Gudgeon had collapsed, passed out, been confused and had been vomiting. These are signs of central nervous system/neurological problems but were not regarded as urgent. Despite EMAS being told that Mrs Gudgeon may have a urinary tract infection, no escalation occurred. ”

    Source location

    Diana Faith Gudgeon · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The information provided did not warrant escalation, so the call was appropriately categorised without a higher-priority response.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Each individual call received by the Trust is either triaged via the Advanced Medical Priority Dispatch System (AMPDS), using the information provided to us either by the caller or is received via the electronic gateway from NHS Pathways - the 111 system. The AMPDS is an internationally recognised triage system that uses a data set to determine the response level required, based on the information provided during the call.”

    Source location

    2019-0015-Response-by-East-Midlands-Ambulance-Service
    Page 1 · response
    Published 11 April 2019

    Open published response
  3. South Yorkshire (Western)

    AI-generated summary

    Allan Herbert Shepard · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Allan Herbert Shepard, aged 89, fell at home on 8 February 2018 while being assisted out of his wheelchair and remained trapped in a hoist awaiting help. His breathing deteriorated, and he lost consciousness from positional asphyxiation before the ambulance attended; he died later that day in hospital. The concerns related to responder staffing and policies for single-person units, and to outdated information about Mr Shepard and his family situation held by the call-handling service.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to pass updated information to third-party call-handling contractors

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) The information that had been provided to the call handling centre by City Wide Care Alarms about Mr Shepard and his family situation had not been updated since 2015. On this occasion Mr Shepard was being assisted by his son who himself had a visual impairment. Mr Shepard junior was struggling to see the difficulty his father was in. This is important information that may allow operators to prioritise calls and/or provide more complete information to the emergency services to allow them to accurately prioritise the call. Updated information about Mr Shepard was available to City Wide Care Alarms but had not been passed on to their third party call centre contractors. It would be helpful if the information could be updated when there is a significant change and City Wide Care Alarms is invited to consider how this can be done. ”

    Source location

    Allan Herbert Shepard · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  4. West Yorkshire Eastern

    AI-generated summary

    Joshua Lee Edwards · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Joshua Lee Edwards, aged 19, became unwell in Leeds after taking ecstasy and cocaine and died in hospital on 15 May 2017 despite treatment. The ambulance was delayed by road closures for the Leeds 10K run, and concerns were raised that repeated calls from police did not lead to escalation and that ambulance crews were unclear about crossing road-closure signs in an emergency.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to escalate repeated requests for an ambulance in the control room

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The ambulance despatched to the scene encountered roads closed for the Leeds 10K run that day. It then navigated a route around the course, thus encountering a delay in reaching the casualty. The Police Officers at the scene telephoned three times to ask where the ambulance was but this did not result in the situation being escalated in the control room at Yorkshire Ambulance Service. ”

    Source location

    Joshua Lee Edwards · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  5. South Wales Central

    AI-generated summary

    Mr Richard Thomas Peter Barrett · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    On 20 April 2018, Mr Richard Thomas Peter Barrett took a large overdose of medication with alcohol, called 999 for help, and died before an ambulance reached his flat. Concerns included underestimated ambulance demand, delays in welfare checks and ambulance dispatch, unrealistic hospital turnaround targets, and the failure to ask police to conduct a welfare check.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to re-categorise incidents when welfare-call information indicates increased risk

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) There does not seem to be a reliable system for the making and chasing-up of ‘welfare calls’. Evidence showed that it was not until 2 hours 45 minutes after the initial call that an attempt was made to ring the patient back. It was known that the patient had taken a massive overdose of sleeping tablets at 01:50. It was not enquired by the call handler as to whether he had also taken alcohol, or whether he was alone. When there was no response from his telephone at 05:13 there was a missed opportunity to re-categorise the incident. ”

    Source location

    Mr Richard Thomas Peter Barrett · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Remind clinical contact centre leads to handle Protocol 23 overdose cases promptly.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Following this specific incident, an email was sent to the Clinicians on the Clinical Support Desk on the 15th May 2018 by the CCC Clinical Lead. The email identified the importance of attempting to review protocol 23 (overdose) calls when there were delays in responding as these may be time critical. If there was no reply the clinicians should use their critical thinking skills to determine how likely unconsciousness or death would be based on what the patient is recorded as having taken and act accordingly.”

    Source location

    2018-0249-Response-by-University-Health-Board
    Page 3 · response
    Published 24 September 2018

    Open published response
  6. Portsmouth and South East Hampshire

    AI-generated summary

    Rafe Robbie Angelo · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Rafe Robbie Angelo was born at 17:30 on 23 September 2014 after his mother was transferred from the Blake Birthing Centre to hospital during labour. He was born pale and floppy, without breathing or a heart rate, and died after 37 minutes of resuscitation. The principal concerns included delays in recognising the need for urgent delivery and communication failures between the birthing centre, ambulance service and hospital, including failure to request a time-critical transfer and a non-urgent ambulance stop.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Uncontrolled discretion by call handlers when time-critical factors are disclosed without an explicit time-critical transfer request

    Wider context from the report

    “Discretion of SCAS call handlers if time critical factors are mentioned but birthing centre staff do not actually request a time critical transfer is requested. ”

    Source location

    Rafe Robbie Angelo · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Vagueness of the Use of Standby Points policy for probing emergency requests

    Wider context from the report

    “The call to SCAS from the Blake lasted 4 minutes, 57 seconds and the fact the baby was in distress was not mentioned until 3 minutes, 53 seconds. The responding ambulance was dispatched at 15:46 and shortly afterwards the paramedic contacted control centre and indicated that it was appreciated the call was an emergency but could they use the facilities first. No questions were asked and permission was given ████████ accepted that if this had been designated as a time critical call, it may have made a difference as to whether permission to use facilities would have been given and asking questions or not would depend on the person taking the call from the paramedic. There was a policy to cover this sort of request – “Use of Standby Points” but it was accepted the policy is very broad and somewhat vague so it was accepted that it would very much depend on the person taking the call to probe further ”

    Source location

    Rafe Robbie Angelo · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update the Standard Operating Procedure and Clinical Directive to require clinicians to identify time-critical transfers and prioritise qualifying inter-facility calls as Category 1.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Following your report, we have reviewed the SOP and updated it so that any Health Care Professional (HCP) requesting an Inter-facility transfer (i.e. Hospital or Birthing Unit) who asks for an emergency / immediate response will now be asked “Do you require a Time Critical Transfer?” Due to the known risks associated with obstetric emergencies. Midwives will be asked whether the case is time critical when they call from a patient’s home as well as a standalone birthing centre. If the HCP answers positively then the Emergency Call Taker (ECT) will prioritise the call using the TCT pathway and will process the call as a Category 1 response.”

    Source location

    2017-0421-Response-by-South-Central-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 27 February 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Disseminate the updated Standard Operating Procedure and Clinical Directive to all Emergency Operations Centre staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The new Standard Operating Procedure and Clinical Directive has been sent to all staff in the Emergency Operations Centre. A mail drop will also be issued to all Emergency Departments and Birthing units across the South Central Area to remind all HCP’s of the correct process to request a Time critical transfer.”

    Source location

    2017-0421-Response-by-South-Central-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 27 February 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide Emergency Operations Centre staff with guidance on diagnoses and circumstances indicating a time-critical transfer, including escalation to the Clinical Support Desk when needed.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust has provided the below list of diagnoses and circumstances as a guide to EOC staff. ECT’s are also instructed that if they do not understand what the medical condition is, assistance must be gained from the Clinical Support Desk.”

    Source location

    2017-0421-Response-by-South-Central-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 27 February 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Audit inter-hospital time-critical transfer requests and provide feedback to acute trusts and commissioners when request information conflicts with the patient’s clinical condition.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To ensure that TCT requests are made by clinicians and are made in appropriate circumstances, as well as the mail drop described above, requests for inter-hospital TCT’s will now be audited by SCAS and feedback will be provided to acute Trusts and commissioners when there is a discrepancy between the information provided when the request was made and the clinical condition of the patient when SCAS arrive. This is because it is important to ensure that SCAS resources are used appropriately and are not diverted from medical emergencies in the community unnecessarily. This process will also identify at an early stage occasions where re-education or further engagement with acute Trusts is required.”

    Source location

    2017-0421-Response-by-South-Central-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 27 February 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Amend and finalise the Use of Standby Points policy to clarify that crews dispatched to Time Critical or Category 1 calls cannot reasonably request facilities use.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In response to this point, the Trust has reviewed the said policy and amended section 7.13 which previously read:”

    Source location

    2017-0421-Response-by-South-Central-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 27 February 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    An exhaustive list of time-critical transfer diagnoses and circumstances cannot be provided because medical care is complex.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is not possible to provide an exhaustive list of diagnoses and circumstances that would or would not be classified as a time critical transfer due to the complex nature of medical care. However, as above, the ECT who is taking the call will now be speaking to a clinician and will ask the”

    Source location

    2017-0421-Response-by-South-Central-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 27 February 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Changes to the standby-points policy require review by staff union representatives and senior operational staff before finalisation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “to confirm that it will not be considered reasonable to request the use of facilities where a crew has been dispatched to a Time Critical or Category 1 call. I understand that Miss Saunders has already informed you that making changes to this policy requires a review by staff union representatives in addition to senior members of the operational team. The final review will take place on 13th February 2018 and we will of course forward a copy of the amended policy to you once it has been finalised.”

    Source location

    2017-0421-Response-by-South-Central-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 27 February 2018

    Open published response
  7. Black Country

    AI-generated summary

    Reginald Dixon · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Reginald Dixon, a 70-year-old man, suffered an unwitnessed fall downstairs on 26 June 2017, sustaining multiple injuries including a severe head injury. He was taken to hospital after a 57-minute delay from the original emergency call and died the same day. Concerns included the incorrect triage of a later call and insufficient ambulance resources contributing to delays in response times.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to accurately triage emergency calls

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Firstly, evidence emerged during the inquest that the second call received by the WMAS operator at 1921 hours had been incorrectly triaged as Level 3. The evidence of vomiting and drowsiness should have resulted in a Level 2 categorisation and therefore faster response time. ”

    Source location

    Reginald Dixon · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver further education and refresher training on head injuries through the NHS Pathways update.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Following this serious incident WMAS have included further education and refresher training around head injuries during the NHS Pathways update due to take place in October/November.”

    Source location

    2017-0214-Response-by-West-Midlands-Ambulance-Service
    Page 1 · response
    Published 25 September 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    It is unclear whether the call was incorrectly categorised because the caller’s answers may not have supported a Category 2 response.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Response - The second 999 call had failed the audit completed against the Pathway system. The audit identified that the call assessor did not fully establish during the call the level of consciousness of the patient, further probing was required, due to the lack of probing on the call it is unclear whether the category 3 response which was generated was appropriate.”

    Source location

    2017-0214-Response-by-West-Midlands-Ambulance-Service
    Page 1 · response
    Published 25 September 2017

    Open published response
  8. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    Terence Joseph Pimm · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Terence Joseph Pimm died after leaping from the seventh floor of a car park on 26 August 2016, following recent threats to jump and contact with police, hospital and probation services. The substantive concerns included call handling and record-keeping, guidance and training, assessment of immediate risk, involvement of family members in mental health assessments, information sharing and coordination, and clinicians’ understanding of warrants.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of police call handlers to assess whether an individual is objectively at immediate risk

    Wider context from the report

    “4). To police call handlers as to whether an individual is, objectively, at an “immediate” risk. ”

    Source location

    Terence Joseph Pimm · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Supplement Force Control Room call-handler training with guidance on assessing immediacy, welfare risks, and when to seek advice.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The sufficiency of guidance and training to police call handlers as to whether an individual is, objectively, at an ‘immediate’ risk”

    Source location

    2017-0217-Response-by-Essex-Police
    Page 2 · response
    Published 25 September 2017

    Open published response
  9. Exeter and Great Devon District

    AI-generated summary

    Mark Craig BANKS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mark Craig Banks, a homeless man with long-term alcohol and mental health problems, died from exposure in an unmade tent near the Tarka Trail in bad weather in the early hours of 23 February 2015; alcohol was a factor. Concerns included failures to contact or correctly grade an ambulance call and insufficient efforts to search for and check on Mr Banks’ wellbeing.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to grade calls correctly where there is a clear danger to life

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) Failure to grade the call correctly when there was a clear danger to Mr Bank’s life. ”

    Source location

    Mark Craig BANKS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review and update policy D051 to align grading and deployment decisions with national incident-recording and call-handling standards, incorporating the THRIVE risk-assessment tool.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition, since the death of Mr Banks, the police’s grading and deployment policy (policy D051) and operational practices regarding call grading and incident creation have been reviewed to ensure that they are compliant with the NSIR and National Call Handling Standards (NCHS). D051 was subsequently updated to reflect that good decision-making in terms of grading and deployment required consideration of and compliance with national guidance on log classification; namely, the NSIR and NCHS.”

    Source location

    2017-0271-Response-by-Devon-Cornwall-Police
    Page 2 · response
    Published 25 November 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing grading and deployment policies, audits and working practices are considered sufficient to ensure compliance with national incident-recording and call-handling standards.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I am now satisfied that every reasonable effort has been made to ensure that the police’s policies and practices in this respect will be compliant with the required national standards. Furthermore, in order to keep abreast of developments in this area and as a part of a general effort to refine and improve our working practices in this regard, D051 has been reviewed and updated on five occasions following the death of Mr Banks.”

    Source location

    2017-0271-Response-by-Devon-Cornwall-Police
    Page 3 · response
    Published 25 November 2017

    Open published response
  10. South Yorkshire (Eastern)

    AI-generated summary

    Jack Owen Sheldon · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jack Owen Sheldon died in a shed fire after petrol vapours from paint stripping reached a candle flame on 27 October 2016. Concerns included the handling and prioritisation of multiple emergency calls, staff communication and training, appliance mobilisation protocols, and systems for checking appliance availability and location.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of an effective system for managing multiple calls regarding the same incident

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Lack of an effective system for management of multiple calls being received regarding the same incident and prioritisation of appliances. ”

    Source location

    Jack Owen Sheldon · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
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Data last updated 7 September 2026